The Khasavyurt agreements were associated with. “Useless treaty”: why did they sign the Khasavyurt agreements?
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (represented by the Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (represented by Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in Khasavyurt (Dagestan) (known as the Khasavyurt Agreements, which put an end to the first Chechen war). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
This is how the First Chechen War ended.
After the collapse of the USSR, against the backdrop of worsening nationalist sentiments in the republic, former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev (pictured with a microphone), who headed the National Congress of the Chechen People (OCCHN) created in 1990, announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic, as a result of which Dzhokhar Dudayev became president of Chechnya. On November 2, 1991, the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR declared these elections illegal
On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic,” which caused a sharp escalation of the situation in the republic: separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. Three days after the introduction of the state of emergency, the state of emergency was thwarted, and the decree had to be canceled on November 11 - after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. At the same time, the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992
In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (pictured in the center) ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in Chechnya to the Dudayevites. According to the minister, this was a forced step, because a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and it was not possible to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains. In turn, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government Oleg Lobov at a State Duma meeting explained the appearance of a large number of weapons among the residents of the Chechen Republic as follows: “You know that in 1991 a huge amount of weapons was partially transferred, and partially - and mostly - seized by force during the withdrawal of troops from the Chechen Republic. It was a period of reorganization. The quantity of these weapons amounts to tens of thousands of units, and they are dispersed throughout the Chechen Republic, buried in residential buildings, forests and caves.”
Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dzhokhar Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council, unofficially supported by Russia. Troops under the command of Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. These hostilities were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used
Even before the announcement of the decision of the Russian authorities to send troops to Chechnya, on December 1, 1994, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and thus disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic” (which was later recognized by the Constitutional Court as consistent with the Constitution - like most of the actions of the federal government in Chechnya)
On December 11, 1994, units of the joint group of forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia) and from the east (from the territory of Dagestan)
The command of “measures to maintain constitutional order” in Chechnya was entrusted to the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused to lead the operation “due to its complete unpreparedness” and submitted his resignation from the Russian armed forces
The eastern group of the OGV was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group made the most successful progress: already on December 12 it approached the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny
A new offensive by units of the joint group of forces began on December 19, 1994. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. Thus, in the first days of hostilities, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
In mid-December 1994, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center. Artillery shelling and bombing killed and injured many civilians (including ethnic Russians)
On December 31, 1994, a joint group of troops began the assault on Grozny. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, which were extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops turned out to be poorly prepared: interaction and coordination were not established between various units, many soldiers lacked combat experience, in addition, the Russian armed forces did not have closed communication channels, which allowed the enemy to intercept negotiations
In January 1995, Russian troops changed tactics: instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they mainly used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny. By the end of January, despite the successful offensive, the combined group of troops controlled only a third of the capital of the republic. By the beginning of February, the number of the OGV was increased to 70 thousand people
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, on concluding a temporary truce. The parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and under the terms of the truce, both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of Grozny. In fact, the truce was violated by both sides
In February 1995, the “South” group was formed in the OGV, and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By the end of the month, street fighting was still ongoing in the city, but the Chechen troops were gradually retreating. Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants led by field commander Shamil Basayev (pictured) retreated from Chernorechye, the last separatist-controlled area of Grozny, and the city came under the control of Russian troops
At the same time, in March 1995, after the capture of the city by Russian troops in Grozny, a pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov. As a result of the assault, the capital of Chechnya was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the combined group of troops was to establish control over the lowland regions of Chechnya. The Russian side began intensive negotiations with the local population of the republic, convincing residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian combat units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thus, at the end of March 1995, Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight. A characteristic feature of these victories was that the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas
Major battles in the first Chechen war were the battle for the village of Bamut and the operation of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the village of Samashki. On April 7-8, 1995, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It is believed that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called Abkhaz battalion of Shamil Basayev). Street fighting began in the village. According to a number of international organizations (including the UN Commission on Human Rights), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya
On March 10, 1995, protracted and fierce battles began for the village of Bamut. The core of the Chechen defense of the village consisted of 100 fighters under the command of Khizir Khachukaev. The approaches to Bamut and its main streets were densely mined with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. On April 15-16, Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on its outskirts. But soon the OGV fighters were forced to leave Bamut, since the militants managed to occupy commanding heights; they also used old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. The fighting for Bamut continued until June 1995 and was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part. The offensive resumed only on May 12. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were stuck in enemy defense. Just as in the lowland areas, the militants were not defeated: they were able to leave abandoned settlements and transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions
On June 14-19, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, attacked Budyonnovsk, followed by the seizure of a hospital and hostages - 1,600 city residents. The terrorists' demands were the end of military operations in Chechnya and the beginning of negotiations between the Russian authorities and the regime of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Thanks to the storming of the hospital by special forces, 61 hostages were freed on June 17. After negotiations on June 19, the militants released the remaining hostages, the Russian authorities agreed to end the military operation in Chechnya, and the terrorists were allowed to return to Chechnya. As a result of the terrorist attack, 129 people were killed and 415 people were injured.
After the terrorist attack in Budennovsk, from June 19 to 22, 1995, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place in the capital of Chechnya, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all”, the disarmament of the detachments of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections. At the same time, the truce regime was violated by both sides, and local battles took place throughout the republic.
On December 14-17, 1995, elections were held in Chechnya - with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. A protégé of the Russian authorities, the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Doku Zavgaev, won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes. All military personnel of the joint group of forces participated in the elections
Since the beginning of the first Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) Dzhokhar Dudayev (pictured), but three attempts ended in failure. However, we managed to find out that Dudayev often uses a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system. On April 21, 1996, the special services located the signal from the satellite phone of the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When Russian warplanes reached their target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, killing Dzhokhar Dudayev
In 1996, despite some successes of the Russian armed forces (such as the liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the first Chechen war began to take on a protracted character. In the context of imminent presidential elections, the Russian authorities decided to once again negotiate with the separatists. On June 10, in Nazran (Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen militants numbering, according to various estimates, from 850 to 2 thousand people attacked Grozny. The Russian garrison under the command of General Konstantin Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city. According to a number of historians, it was the defeat of the Russian armed forces in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements
The end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century is inclined to believe that the decision on this truce was wrong for the Russian side - the Khasavyurt agreements gave the Chechen separatists the opportunity to take a break and accumulate forces and means for further military operations.
An ongoing source of conflict
In the first Chechen campaign, federal troops were placed in obviously unfavorable conditions for themselves - the militants were supported by a significant part of the population of the rebellious republic, they were well oriented in the mountainous terrain familiar to them and waged a largely successful guerrilla war. The liquidation of the first president of self-proclaimed Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, did not change the situation - the fighting continued, and the federal authorities realized that this bloody conflict could be protracted. The Kremlin made attempts to negotiate with the leadership of the militants, but these truces each time turned out to be short-lived. The situation was complicated by the fact that “illegal armed gangs” regularly received assistance from abroad - weapons, money, mercenaries. At the end of the summer of 1996, the separatists recaptured Grozny from the federals, and such strategically important settlements of Chechnya as Argun and Gudermes also came under the control of the militants.
Chechnya was in fact recognized as independent
It was these strategic losses of federal troops, according to some experts, that served as the reason for the conclusion of the Khasavyurt peace agreement, signed at the end of August of the same year. The agreement was signed by the then Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov, the future unrecognized president of the rebellious Chechnya. The agreement contained clauses on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the republic, on the resumption of economic relations with Russia (essentially, financing of Chechnya from the center). The main thing in this agreement was what was written between the lines: Russia’s actual recognition of the independence of Chechnya. Although consideration of this issue from a legal point of view was formally postponed until the complete restoration of Chechnya after the war.
Useless contract
In essence, the legal aspects of this agreement were never respected by the Chechen side during the life of the agreement - it was drawn up in such a way that the main responsibilities were imposed on Russia. The main one is the complete provision of the destroyed republic. In addition, a dangerous precedent was created, on the basis of which the rest of the North Caucasus republics could also present their rights to autonomy. Some State Duma deputies tried to check the agreement for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but the Constitutional Court of Russia did not consider this appeal. With the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, the situation in Chechnya only worsened: Islamic extremists rapidly expanded the territory of their influence, human trafficking flourished in the republic and cases of hostage-taking and cases of brutal oppression of the Russian-speaking population became more frequent. No one was going to restore the infrastructure of Chechnya, and because of ethnic cleansing, everyone who did not belong to the Chechen nation was in a hurry to leave the republic. This “sluggish schizophrenia” continued until the attack of gangs on Dagestan in 1999. The second Chechen campaign began; this time the North Caucasus region remained in the counter-terrorist operation mode for 8 years, until 2009. The Russian authorities realized that the only way to fight the militants was by force, without agreeing to their terms.
More than 16 years have passed since the signing of the so-called Khasavyurt Agreement. Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed put their signatures on the document on behalf of the presidents of the Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation. It is officially believed that it was Khasavyurt '96 that put an end to the bloody war in Chechnya and confirmed the complete and final victory of the Chechen army, supported by international separatists of various stripes, over federal troops; the victory of the then Chechen leadership over Yeltsin and his political entourage. Naturally, this version has long served as a life-giving balm for supporters of the separation of the North Caucasus from Russia with the subsequent creation of the so-called Caucasian Caliphate, capable of stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.
However, both the agreements themselves between Moscow and Grozny, and their background, even years later, continue to remain extremely contradictory and give reason to doubt that Chechnya’s victory over the federal center occurred solely as a result of the military superiority of the former over the latter. And there is a whole range of evidence for this, many of which have proven documentary form.
So, once again dryly and officially: the Khasavyurt agreements of the type on August 31, 1996 were signed by the Chief of Staff of the Republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov and the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation General Lebed. Here are the points defining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow according to the Khasavyurt Paper:
1. An agreement on the fundamentals of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, determined in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law, must be reached before December 31, 2001.
2. No later than October 1, 1996, a Joint Commission is formed from representatives of government bodies of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, the tasks of which are:
monitoring the implementation of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 25, 1996 985 and preparing proposals for completing the withdrawal of troops;
preparation of coordinated measures to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of national and religious hatred and monitoring their implementation;
preparation of proposals for the restoration of monetary, financial and budgetary relations;
preparation and submission to the government of the Russian Federation of programs for the restoration of the socio-economic complex of the Chechen Republic;
control over the coordinated interaction of government authorities and other interested organizations in providing the population with food and medicine.
3. The legislation of the Chechen Republic is based on respect for human and civil rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equal rights of peoples, ensuring civil peace, interethnic harmony and the safety of citizens living on the territory of the Chechen Republic, regardless of nationality, religion and other differences.
4. The Joint Commission completes its work by mutual agreement.
Moscow undertakes to withdraw military units from Chechnya, direct funds to restore the destroyed republic, and provide Ichkeria with food, money and medicine. A kind of indemnity that Moscow must pay...
However, this is not the main thing. After all, Moscow even today financially helps Chechnya... The main thing here should be considered the phrase contained in the first paragraph of the principles for defining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow. We are talking about such a concept as “in accordance with... the norms of international law.” In other words, the Chechen Republic was de jure to be recognized as a subject of international law, separating from Russia over the next five years. Journalist Andrei Karaulov talks about three years of “waiting” for complete independence for Ichkeria. Three years or five years – in the grand scheme of things it doesn’t matter. What matters is that on behalf of the President of Russia a document was signed in which Russia not only admits its defeat in the North Caucasus, but also creates a precedent for the North Caucasian republics to secede from the federation. After all, today hardly anyone has any doubts that the separation of Chechnya from Russia would not have led to the so-called domino effect, when the entire country, already consumed by economic and political problems, would begin to crumble.
Let's not forget that in August 1996, not even five years had passed since the signing of the infamous Belovezhskaya Accords, which put an end to the big country. It turns out that in 1996, Yeltsin, who had recently celebrated an extremely dubious victory in the elections, essentially received the status of the leader of the state, who managed, within less than five years, to take part in events to collapse two states (first the USSR, and then the Russian Federation).
But was the hand of only Boris Yeltsin visible in the Khasavyurt agreements, or was he not the most important figure in someone’s big game?
Answering this question, it is worth considering the background of the Khasavyurt agreements themselves, according to which Ichkeria could turn into an independent state in a few years and become the “first sign” of the total destruction of the Russian Federation. The background is that the Khasavyurt agreements were signed on August 31 after units of Chechen militants occupied Grozny, driving out federal troops from there, but according to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Chechen Republic Ruslan Tsakaev, the agreements themselves were prepared by General Lebed at least a month before the attack by the Chechen separatists. According to him, the attack on the Chechen administrative center itself was an event that should have justified the signing of the paper in Khasavyurt, Dagestan.
It turns out that the Russian authorities at that time needed a reason to end the war on the territory of Chechnya, but the withdrawal of troops without an obvious reason would have looked completely ridiculous. The fact that many people knew about the militant attack on Grozny on August 6, 1996 is today confirmed by both politicians and journalists who were working in Chechnya at that time. In particular, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic Yuri Plugin says that an unexpected order was received to remove Ministry of Internal Affairs officers from several checkpoints at the entrance to Grozny and, for unknown reasons, send them to the villages of the region to carry out passport control and monitor the situation on rural roads. Moreover, immediately before the militants’ attack on Grozny, the commander of the combined group of Russian troops in Chechnya, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, went on vacation, and General Vladimir Shamanov (at that time the commander of the group of forces of the Ministry of Defense in the Chechen Republic) was unexpectedly summoned to study at the Academy of the Russian General Staff in Moscow . In essence, the army group was decapitated, and it was clear that someone was very stubbornly and methodically clearing the way for international terrorists so that they could calmly take possession of the Chechen capital. In total, 887 people entered Grozny, according to information once published by the head of the separatist information bureau, Mairbek Vachagaev, almost unhindered. After several days of confrontation with representatives of the Chechen police loyal to Moscow, as well as units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops remaining in the city, they took control of Grozny.
It was after this that Moscow, or, more precisely, those who stood behind it then, had a motive to withdraw troops from Ichkeria, essentially announcing the defeat of the federal troops. The motive, as mentioned above, was written in the script version before the so-called storming of Grozny by militants.
After signing the paper in Khasavyurt under the controlling gaze of diplomats from the OSCE, General Lebed in Russia was accused of almost state treason. But if, let’s say, we rewind time, it becomes clear that he was not the person who played a serious role in this big game. The fact is that Alexander Lebed, as you know, in 1996 ran for president from the Congress of Russian Communities. At the same time, in the first round of the presidential campaign, Lebed managed to take third place, gaining more than 14% of the votes. Obviously, Boris Yeltsin needed the votes cast for the general, and he made Lebed an offer that he could not refuse. Yeltsin appointed General Lebed, who was popular among the troops, to the post of Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation for National Security and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
Apparently, immediately after the appointment, Lebed was told about how it was necessary to complete the Chechen campaign. At first glance, it is surprising why the general, who managed to distinguish himself in Afghanistan and Transnistria, made the shameful proposal to conclude agreements with the separatists, in fact condoning the fact that Russian military personnel were left in Grozny to obvious death. Betrayal?.. Ignorance of the situation?.. Vanity?..
The answer to this question can be the words spoken by Lebed in an interview with the German publication Der Spiegel. In particular, in 1996, General Lebed stated that he was ready to take the post of president and did not see any potential in the sick and aging Boris Yeltsin.
In other words, Lebed could have signed the Khasavyurt agreements, among other things, in order to show the world who really stopped the war in Chechnya. Probably, the thought was spinning in his head that this would give him some political trump cards, and especially trump cards would appear when the West supported him in the event that Yeltsin retired due to his health. It turns out that it was precisely vanity that could push the military general to such a very dubious move as shaking hands with Maskhadov and other representatives of the separatists. Obviously, Lebed knew well who really stood behind the militants in Chechnya, and therefore wished that they would certainly like him as a kind of peacekeeper general.
But the aspirations of General Lebed were not destined to come true: the West, led by the United States, supported Boris Yeltsin, who already in mid-October 1996 (from the moment of the Khasavyurt agreements) dismissed Alexander Lebed. The situation is reminiscent of one in which General Lebed, who had hoped for someone’s help in pushing through his candidacy for the highest government post, was skillfully taken advantage of, and then simply lost... Yeltsin took advantage of the moment, received votes from Lebed, let him carry out an extremely unpopular task in Russia, and then gently pulled the drain rope...
Thus, for many, Lebed is still associated with a person who was ready to have a hand in the collapse of Russia, but in fact he only took part in a rather short-lived stage of a large geopolitical party. At the same time, President Yeltsin himself played the role of an extra, who obviously did not intend to become a two-time destroyer of the country, because this could completely bury his chances of continuing his political career, which by that time was already in considerable doubt. Yeltsin, who, according to his associates, received active funding from abroad for his election campaign, had to pursue a policy that was of interest to the West. At the same time, the Khasavyurt agreements are one of the stages of such a policy.
To put it in simple terms, President Yeltsin himself found himself hostage to the forces that he once asked to support him in the elections. These forces supported him, but on conditions that could put an end to such a state as Russia. For obvious reasons, Yeltsin was burdened by this dependence, and he wanted to show his character by once and for all cutting the western Gordian knot that tied his hands. At the same time, Yeltsin dealt his main blow to those who decided to finally tear Russia into pieces in 1999, when, without agreement with Western “partners,” he decided to make first the second and then the first person in the state of Vladimir Putin. It is clear that Putin did not fit into the Western concept of the Russian leader, if only because it was thanks to Putin that those same Khasavyurt agreements, apparently dictated in 1996 by a certain group of foreign “specialists” and which became Yeltsin’s ticket to a second presidential term, were buried , and the Caucasian people are consolidated against the separatist movement in the Caucasus. The events of 1999 in Dagestan, when Chechen militants decided to strengthen their positions, and the people of Dagestan gave them a serious rebuff, clearly illustrate this.
The big political game, in which Russia was assigned the role of a patchwork quilt, each part of which was supposed to snap at neighboring parts, turned out to be completed in a completely different way than those interested in the collapse of the country expected.
This can be judged by Western and Russian overly liberal newspapers of that time, which, from calmly telling about the victory of law and democracy in Chechnya, about the joyful day of the possible independence of this North Caucasian republic from Russia, first suddenly turned into somewhat taken aback, and then began throwing mud at the new Russian leadership, accusing them of “oppression” of the Caucasian peoples and new “imperial ambitions.” And this mournful record has been spinning for the 13th year in a row, confirming the thesis that in 1999 Yeltsin, by signing the document on the appointment of Putin, seriously confused the cards for someone...
Materials used:
Program “Moment of Truth” Channel 5 from 10/01/2012
Documentary film “On the other side of the war – Khasavyurt”, NTV
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/12737/print
http://www.peoples.ru/military/general/lebed/index.html
http://mn.ru/blog_caucasus/20110901/304590216.html
http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=91245&p=39
In essence, the legal aspects of this agreement were never respected by the Chechen side during the life of the agreement - it was drawn up in such a way that the main responsibilities were imposed on Russia. The main one is the complete provision of the destroyed republic. In addition, a dangerous precedent was created, on the basis of which the rest of the North Caucasus republics could also present their rights to autonomy. Some State Duma deputies tried to check the agreement for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but the Constitutional Court of Russia did not consider this appeal. With the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, the situation in Chechnya only worsened: Islamic extremists rapidly expanded the territory of their influence, human trafficking flourished in the republic and cases of hostage-taking and cases of brutal oppression of the Russian-speaking population became more frequent. No one was going to restore the infrastructure of Chechnya, and because of ethnic cleansing, everyone who did not belong to the Chechen nation was in a hurry to leave the republic. This “sluggish schizophrenia” continued until the attack of gangs on Dagestan in 1999. The second Chechen campaign began; this time the North Caucasus region remained in the counter-terrorist operation mode for 8 years, until 2009. The Russian authorities realized that the only way to fight the militants was by force, without agreeing to their terms.
More aboutDid the first Chechen war end on time?
Kommersant asked Alexander Rutsky, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Franz Klintsevich and its other readers / Russia after the 90s
August 31 marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Khasavyurt Truce and the end of the First Chechen War. On topic: |
Kommersant asked its readers whether the fighting in Chechnya was stopped in time in August 1996.
2. Photo: Alexander Miridonov
It's difficult to answer. By the standards of that time, the signing of the military bloc agreement on August 31, 1996, was, albeit a small victory... But almost immediately it became clear from the intercepted negotiations of the militant leaders what was on their minds. They accumulated strength and did not give up hope of striking. It had to be admitted that every time our good will shown towards the militants backfired on us.
3. Photo: Gennady Gulyaev
It was better not to start it. And there was such a possibility, but Pavel Grachev (in 1994, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation - Kommersant) convinced Boris Yeltsin that it should be started... But the agreements signed in Khasavyurt, although they stopped the war, were a betrayal towards those who laid down there are their heads. And if these agreements had included clauses on the complete surrender of weapons by the Chechens and the complete withdrawal of troops from the territory, then there would not have been a second war.
4. Photo: Dmitry Dukhanin
The pause, which was sustained as a result of protracted negotiations with Maskhadov, gave our security forces the opportunity to come to their senses and prepare for further actions. In the Chechen Republic the situation among the population has also changed. People are tired of war. The population of the republic began to understand that the war needed to be stopped, because they were not gaining anything from it.
5. Photo: Vyacheslav Reutov
During. I am against any bloodshed. The army that was on the territory of Chechnya consisted of conscript soldiers. They were not at all ready for full-fledged combat operations. Therefore, saving their lives by the Khasavyurt agreement seems to me to be the right decision. Moreover, from a political point of view, it also looked quite successful.
6. Photo: Stanislav Tikhomirov
The war did not end then. The first Chechen war was betrayed. Two weeks before the assault on Grozny, the militants warned about this and asked to leave there in order to avoid casualties. Exactly on the appointed day they actually took the city. And our valiant commanders have already withdrawn the special services and riot police from there and practically surrendered the city. The resentment of the military personnel who participated in this campaign was great because they were simply betrayed. Nobody wanted to figure out how it happened later.
7. Photo: Dmitry Lebedev
It was impossible to end the war, and the Khasavyurt agreement was an ordinary betrayal. The bandits in Chechnya took a break, regrouped, and active hostilities then continued for another seven years. This led to the loss of the country's image and the death of a large number of our soldiers. The war could have been ended even then.
8. Photo: Dmitry Lekai
It was necessary to stop the war and bloodshed, but signing the Khasavyurt agreement was impossible. I was almost the only one who criticized it, saying that it was shameful and would not lead to peace. Even my allies criticized me then, but subsequent events and the second war became the logical consequence of this particular agreement.
9. Photo: Gleb Shchelkunov
I don’t have a clear answer to this question. It’s good that it was completed, because its completion allowed us to avoid more losses. But there are no internal wars that, after their end, would have a clear, clear ending. This war ended when the opportunity to end it arose.
10. Photo: Maxim Kimerling
That war could have been avoided and the conflict stopped in the bud. Yeltsin lacked more respect for Dzhokhar Dudayev (leader of the separatists - Kommersant). Yeltsin responded haughtily to Dudayev’s proposals... Yes, Yeltsin started that war, it was a mistake on the verge of a crime. But he repented of it.
Don't look down on your finest hour
Gleb Cherkasov - about Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov
By the time the Khasavyurt agreements were signed, Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, already had experience in stopping hostilities. Moreover, his political career really began in 1992 in Transnistria. His appointment as commander of the 14th Army led, as was commonly believed then, to the cessation of hostilities. And the incredible bass and penchant for chopped aphorisms only added to the beauty of the image.
11. Gleb Cherkasov / Photo: Sergey Mikheev
The Khasavyurt agreements were supposed to be the same step on General Lebed’s road to the very top, like a scandalous dismissal from the army or third place in the 1996 presidential elections. That summer, it would be difficult to find anyone who doubted that Alexander Lebed would become one of the main characters in the next presidential elections. And when they pass, Boris Yeltsin’s appearance suggested that everything could happen a little earlier than expected.
Aslan Maskhadov, who signed the Khasavyurt agreements on behalf of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria, also negotiated a truce not for the first time. But in August 1996, everything said that it was he who would become the leader of post-war Ichkeria and it was with him that the Russian leaders, who, according to the Kremlin staffing table, stood above the secretary of the Security Council (SC), would have to negotiate. And so it happened: in January 1997, Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the republic, and in the fall of 1996 and spring of 1997 he signed agreements with Viktor Chernomyrdin and Boris Yeltsin - simple human memory has not preserved their names, contents, or circumstances.
Only Alexander Lebed, Aslan Maskhadov and Khasavyurt remain in my memory. The agreements that were signed there were then a symbol of peace, the end of one of the most difficult conflicts in the post-Soviet space, then they began to be called a symbol of weakness and surrender. The assessment of the cessation of hostilities often varies: after the shooting stops and some time later.
In any case, the Khasavyurt agreements were not implemented. By 2001, when the parties were going to return to the issue of the status of Chechnya, the second Chechen war was going on, and there was no one and nothing to discuss.
Aslan Maskhadov remained the president of Ichkeria and could only remember how it was not possible to ensure long-term peace. The second campaign of Russian troops turned out to be more successful than the first, and by 2001 the star of the Kadyrov clan was already rising, having defected to Moscow. Ahead were wanderings around the not-so-native republic and death, it is believed, in battle.
Alexander Lebed experienced a scandalous resignation from the post of Secretary of the Security Council, a retreat to the post of governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, which was initially perceived as an attack on the Kremlin from the flank, and by 2001 he was an ordinary leader of the region with the absence of any career prospects. Ahead was an unsuccessful helicopter ride - this type of transport has killed more than one governor.
The Khasavyurt agreements became the finest hour for Lebed and Maskhadov, but at that moment they probably did not understand this. Maybe because for two former Soviet officers with experience in the conflicts of the late 80s, any ceasefire agreement was perceived as nothing more than a respite. Or maybe because of the hope that the future career will only be more beautiful.
There is no politician who does not dream of his “finest hour,” and not everyone is able to realize when it actually happens. And not everyone has time to live to write truly detailed memoirs.
"The generals did not want to admit that they could not win"
Vladimir Lukin, a participant in the Khasavyurt negotiations, told Kommersant how the first Chechen war ended
On August 30, 1996, at about seven o’clock in the evening, a combat Mi-24 landed on the outskirts of the village of Zondak, Nozhai-Yurtovsky district of Chechnya. A short, middle-aged man dressed in camouflage uniform climbed on board. This was the chief of the main headquarters of the armed forces of Ichkeria, former colonel of the Soviet army Aslan Maskhadov. The helicopter flew towards Dagestan. Half an hour later, negotiations began between the Russian and Chechen delegations in the Khasavyurt city administration building. In the dead of night, Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed, then secretary of the Russian Security Council, signed peace agreements.
12. Former chief of the main staff of the armed forces of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov and General Alexander Lebed / Photo: Alexi Fyodorov
Khasavyurt was preceded by fierce battles in Grozny. In the early morning of August 6, several thousand militants, many of whom made their way into the city in advance, attacked military and administrative facilities. For several days they paralyzed the actions of the federal forces, but the superiority in numbers and weapons ultimately allowed the army and internal troops to block the separatist forces.
Thus, a small detachment of Shamil Basayev took up a fighting position in the basement of an old multi-story building in the center of Grozny, a few blocks from a complex of government buildings. The Basayevites fired at the federals, and they hit back with direct fire. In addition to the militants, civilians were also hiding in the house. Women asked the militants: “What will happen to us?” The militants answered: “Get ready to die in Gazavat, we won’t leave here alive.”
Then, when the republic finally fell into the hands of the separatists, the field commanders themselves admitted: after the ultimatum of the commander of the Russian military group, General Konstantin Pulikovsky, who threatened to bomb Grozny, there were only a few hundred militants left in the city who decided to fight to the end. “It was not we who won, but Allah came to our aid and removed the Russians from here,” said Aslan Maskhadov.
Member of the Russian delegation at negotiations with the separatists in 1996 Vladimir Lukin explained to a Kommersant correspondent Musa Muradov, which forced Moscow to negotiate and conclude a peace, which both then and now many call “treasonous.”
13. Photo: Dmitry Korotaev
“Lebed hoped to replace the sick Yeltsin”
- Who came up with the idea of negotiations?
Many began to say that this war was terrible and tragically prolonged. However, if we talk about personalities, then, of course, the decisive role in the fact that truly intensive peace negotiations began belongs to Alexander Ivanovich Lebed. It was he who initiated this process. As you know, then the presidential elections took place in Russia. The swan took third place and became such a regulating factor. And Alexander Ivanovich very clearly imagined that he could play a historical role. And, of course, he hoped that he would become the main figure, that he would replace the seriously ill Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin as president in one way or another. Alexander Lebed believed that his fame as a peacemaker would make his path to the presidency easier. And then, without being distracted by the war, he will successfully solve the country’s political and economic problems. That is why he set out to remove this thorn from the body of our country, to stop hostilities, in fact, a civil war.
- Do you think that Alexander Lebed forced Boris Yeltsin to negotiate with the Chechens?
I don't think he forced it. Boris Nikolaevich himself was, of course, in a difficult position and by this time he had already begun to understand that this war in which he found himself drawn was politically counterproductive for him. Because of her, he lost a significant part of his political capital. But he was in a deadlock: those around him could not agree on how to end this war, and in the army everything was not easy. The generals did not want to admit that they could not win, although they really could not win at that time. And as a result of all this, a situation arose that someone had to decisively correct. This man turned out to be Alexander Lebed
- Were there any signals from the Chechen side?
I think there were signals from the Chechen side as well. They probably were.
- How did you get into the delegation?
I was then the chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, a representative of the Yabloko party, which took an anti-war position. Many people in the government of that time trusted me and treated with understanding what I said. I raised the question that we must immediately end the war, we must make peace. I spoke about this with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. I spoke about this with General Anatoly Kulikov, who was then the Minister of Internal Affairs.
- What did you mean by the words “we must end the war”?
This means, first of all, to stop hostilities. There is a children's game called “Freeze.” When everyone freezes and so on. There should have been no haggling about who stood where, what the boundaries were. It was necessary to simply stop hostilities and continue to negotiate about a further political system, and so on and so forth.
Then in August I was on vacation with my family in the Pskov region. And there, on vacation, I received a call from General Kulikov, who, on behalf of Chernomyrdin, said that this kind of negotiations was beginning, that Alexander Ivanovich Lebed was going to the Caucasus. And they ask me to join him as an experienced negotiator, as a person who knows what diplomacy is. Well, I immediately interrupted my vacation and came to Moscow. Came to Swan. We practically didn’t know him before. He told me that he also readily agreed with my candidacy. So we began to actively work on who would go and how they would go. And all this was compressed into a very short time. On August 30 we flew to Makhachkala. At midnight we boarded a helicopter and flew from Makhachkala to Khasavyurt. This flight became the most difficult test for me. The fact is that soon after takeoff, Alexander Ivanovich, removing the pilot, began to fly the helicopter himself.
“The Chechens felt that the wind was blowing into their sails”
- How did you meet the Chechens?
When we arrived, I asked: “Where is Maskhadov?” Nobody knows anything, no one has contacted anyone. In general, it's a mess. Then I told my assistant, he now works as an ambassador to one of the Asian countries: “Listen, you need to call the Swiss Embassy in Moscow.” The fact is that Tim Guldimann, a Swiss citizen and OSCE representative in the conflict zone, knew about our mission. I decided to let them find Guldimann at the embassy and connect him with us. And the ambassador: “We don’t know anything, we’re not participating.” I had to call several times and insist. Then the second or third time the ambassador says: “Okay, I’ll try.” After some time, that same Guldimann appears. We ask him: “Where is the Chechen company? Where are our negotiators? He says he doesn't know exactly what he'll try to find out. We told him: let them know about us, let them know that Alexander Lebed is here, our delegation is here and we came with the intention of seriously concluding peace agreements. After some time, Mr. Guldimann reports that he managed to contact the Chechens, that soon Aslan Maskhadov and his people will arrive. And so they started to arrive. One by one: first the ordinary members of the delegation, and the last - Aslan Maskhadov.
- Why did they choose Khasavyurt in Dagestan and not Grozny as the meeting place?
I do not know this. Apparently because Khasavyurt is such a border town. Near Chechnya. It seems that the Chechens insisted on this. It was convenient for them to get there from the places where they were hiding. Again, many Chechens lived here, among whom, by the way, there were many supporters of independence. In general, the location was agreed upon during preliminary negotiations. That's how we sat down at the table. Alexander Ivanovich in general, especially at first, sat on the sidelines and watched. For him, diplomacy was new and something incomprehensible. And we were negotiating - me and some of my colleagues. But mainly I was engaged in this matter.
- How did the Chechens behave?
At first the Chechens behaved very emotionally. They felt like people who felt that they had an advantage, that the wind was blowing in their sails. Because before that, they had actually captured Grozny, so to speak. At least Moscow didn't win. So they felt like people who had the right to insist. Insist and demand. And at the same time, they, as people not very experienced in such matters, tried very emotionally to challenge secondary matters.
- Why were the Chechens represented by Aslan Maskhadov? He was just a field commander...
It was quite obvious that Lebed and Maskhadov were the leaders of these negotiations. And this was not in doubt.
- What did the Chechen side argue with you about?
The Chechens, for example, very strongly insisted that Mr. Guldimann participate in the negotiations. I ask: “What status will he participate in? As a representative of the OSCE? They consulted and began to say that the OSCE should not be included - these are, they say, bilateral negotiations. Because the OSCE recognizes Russia within borders that include Chechnya. Chechens: “No, Chechnya does not need to be included anywhere.” I say: “If Chechnya does not need to be included, then let Guldimann leave.” No, let him not leave, the Chechens ask. They argued like this for an hour. Finally they agreed: if Guldimann does not leave, then let him remain as an observer, let him sit at a separate table and remain silent. As an observer, he can be present, but no more. The Chechens did not really grasp such subtle things of a professional nature, of course, but this is not surprising.
“In order to negotiate from a position of strength, it was necessary to pause”
- Which version of the agreement was ultimately adopted - Russian or Chechen?
Oddly enough, even before the discussion began, the Chechens were familiar with our version of the agreement and therefore immediately began to reject some points. For example, references to the Russian Constitution, other points presupposing the preservation of the integrity of the country, indicating that Chechnya, although with a special status, is a subject of the federation.
- How were the Chechens able to receive your version of the agreement in advance?
Even before we left, someone from Moscow sent them a document. Who did it and how, and most importantly, why they did it - I don’t know. Most likely, they had their own people among the officials in Moscow. Given the chaos that reigned at the time, this is not surprising.
- So you had to make concessions to the Chechens?
I didn’t like some things in the final document; I wish it had been different. The Chechens, for example, insisted that the document should not contain references to the Russian Constitution, so that the agreement would look like an interstate one. I objected, but Alexander Lebed was in a hurry. He understood: either we sign the agreement now, or later the slowdown will begin and everything else. And he insisted. Well, then Yeltsin also agreed with this agreement and accepted it. But the decisive thing in this agreement was, undoubtedly, that hostilities would cease, that the republic would receive material and other assistance, that illegal armed groups would be gradually eliminated.
But these fundamental things were not implemented and remained on paper. But the Russian side needed a break. A respite was needed both politically and militarily.
- In other words, Moscow could not cope with the situation in Chechnya?
It was obvious that our army was stuck there. Very serious measures were needed to strengthen the army. Strengthen it. To create a situation in which it would be possible to solve the problem, including with the help of military force. So, I think, for this purpose the federal authorities started negotiations with the Chechens. This became clear judging by the events that occurred in Chechnya later.
- What impression did Aslan Maskhadov make on you?
He impressed me as a man with the psychology of a professional Soviet officer. A man so straightforward like a soldier, but not a stupid man.
Shamil Basayev’s brother always stood behind Maskhadov. And so, silently, I watched our conversation. I had the impression that there were big internal conflicts, big disagreements. And military actions and a common enemy somehow smoothed out these differences. To some extent. But then they showed up with all their might. Therefore, it is difficult to say what each of them had intentions.
How was Aslan Maskhadov going to guarantee the implementation of agreements if he was so dependent on Basayev and other field commanders?
I think Maskhadov hoped that he would strengthen his power among this rebel conglomerate on the basis of victory, on the basis of the peak of his authority. It will strengthen and somehow push back extremist groups. But it turned out differently. He turned out to be incapable of this work, this scenario of events. Or he himself did not want this scenario.
- Why did the Russian military regard the Khasavyurt agreements as a betrayal?
I think that those military men who were directly involved in unsuccessful battles tried to save their face. After all, the military always lacks five minutes to achieve complete victory. Do you understand? That's why I think it was some kind of fist-waving after the fight. When they were pointed out their miscalculations and the fact that they had plenty of time to suppress the resistance of the militants, they fell silent.
On the other hand, there were great difficulties in terms of state discipline, in terms of state mobilization. Therefore, now it is easy to talk about how badly someone fought there, how badly someone acted. There was general laxity. Undocking. Well, then the situation was like this. That's why a break was needed to get things in order. This respite was obtained.
How it was used is another matter. In general, they used it normally, because the second war ended differently than the first. No matter what anyone says, I still believe that stopping the war then was the right decision, because otherwise the bloodshed would have continued and there would have been incomparably more casualties.
“I believe that it was possible to reach an agreement with Dudayev”
- Do you think the first Chechen war could have been avoided?
I think the federal center acted too harshly. I would say so, I negotiated inflexibly with Dzhokhar Dudayev (the first president of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, killed during a special operation in April 1996 - Kommersant). And I think that it was still possible to reach an agreement with Dudayev. Especially in the early stages. I would say this: if Kremlin officials had shown more tact and personal respect in dealing with Chechen leaders, I think there would have been no bloodshed.
- In your opinion, is there any historical explanation for what happened in the early 1990s in Chechnya?
Your question reminds me of the phrase of one very smart person: “The problem of the gods is too complex, and human life is too short.” Why are such revolutionary eras born? It's part of being human. In each of us there is a person who can intelligently solve issues and analyze. But suddenly something happens - as they say, I got up on the wrong foot - and an escape from reality begins in the direction of some heroic and unambiguous solution to the issue. This is how all revolutions begin. But we must also take into account the fact that Chechens have a reputation for being very courageous and very hot-tempered people, who often punch first and then think about what is happening. Then there are relatively many Chechens in the Caucasus in comparison with other peoples who were deported by the Stalinist regime. And the memory of the deportation, in my opinion, played an important role.