Tank battles documentary film watch online. Five of the largest tank battles in history

Battle of Dubno: a forgotten feat
When and where did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually take place?

History, both as a science and as a social instrument, is unfortunately subject to too much political influence. And it often happens that for some reason - most often ideological - some events are extolled, while others are forgotten or remain underestimated. Thus, the overwhelming majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up during the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the battle of Prokhorovka to be the largest tank battle in history - component battle on the Kursk Bulge. On this topic: First tank battle of WWII | The Potapov factor | |

Destroyed T-26 tanks of various modifications from the 19th Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps on the Voinitsa-Lutsk highway

But in fairness, it is worth noting that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually took place two years earlier and half a thousand kilometers to the west. Within a week, two tank armadas met in the triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody total number about 4,500 armored vehicles. Counterattack on the second day of the war

The actual beginning of the Battle of Dubno, which is also called the Battle of Brody or the Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was June 23, 1941. It was on this day that the tank corps - at that time they were usually called mechanized - corps of the Red Army, stationed in the Kiev Military District, launched the first serious counterattacks against the advancing German troops. Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, insisted on counterattacking the Germans. Initially, the attack on the flanks of Army Group South was carried out by the 4th, 15th and 22nd mechanized corps, which were in the first echelon. And after them, the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the second echelon, joined the operation.

Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, which was part of Army Group South and was rushing towards Kyiv in order to encircle and destroy it. In addition, the battles of the first day, when some Soviet divisions - such as the 87th division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - managed to stop the superior forces of the Germans, gave hope that this plan could be realized.

In addition, the Soviet troops in this sector had a significant superiority in tanks. On the eve of the war, the Kiev Special Military District was considered the strongest of the Soviet districts, and in the event of an attack, it was assigned the role of executing the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here first and in large quantities, and the training of the personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterattack, the troops of the district, which by that time had already become the Southwestern Front, had no less than 3,695 tanks. And on the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.

In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision on an offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which Soviet troops were defeated.

Tanks fight tanks for the first time

When the tank units of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps reached the front line and entered the battle from the march, this resulted in an oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Although the concept of wars of the mid-twentieth century did not allow such battles. It was believed that tanks were a tool for breaking through enemy defenses or creating chaos on his communications. “Tanks do not fight tanks” - this is how this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery, as well as carefully dug-in infantry, had to fight the tanks. And the battle of Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions went literally head-on into German tanks. And they lost.

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the German troops were much more active and smarter than the Soviet ones, they used all types of communications, and coordination of efforts various types and the branches of troops in the Wehrmacht at that moment were, unfortunately, head and shoulders above those in the Red Army. In the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: the rifle units moved on their own and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves, at the level above the battalion, acted without general coordination, on their own. It often happened that one mechanized corps was already rushing west, deep into the German defense, and the other, which could support it, began to regroup or retreat from occupied positions...

Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno / Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA

Contrary to concepts and instructions

The second reason for the mass destruction of Soviet tanks in the Battle of Dubno, which needs to be discussed separately, was their unpreparedness for tank combat - a consequence of those same pre-war concepts “tanks do not fight tanks.” Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks accompanying infantry and raid warfare, created in the early to mid-1930s, were the majority.

More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, there were 2,803 tanks in five Soviet mechanized corps - the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd. Of these, there are 171 medium tanks (all T-34), heavy tanks- 217 pieces (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks of the T-26, T-27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7 types , which can be considered the most modern. And the 4th Mechanized Corps, which fought just west of Brody, had another 892 tanks, but exactly half of them were modern - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.

Soviet light tanks, due to the specific tasks assigned to them, had bulletproof or anti-fragmentation armor. Light tanks are an excellent tool for deep raids behind enemy lines and operations on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuited for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strong and weak sides armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours in both quality and weapons, in defense, negating all the advantages of Soviet technology.

German field artillery also had its say in this battle. And if, as a rule, it was not dangerous for the T-34 and KV, then the light tanks had a hard time. And against the Wehrmacht’s 88-mm anti-aircraft guns deployed for direct fire, even the armor of the new “thirty-fours” was powerless. Only the heavy KVs and T-35s resisted them with dignity. The light T-26 and BT, as stated in the reports, “were partially destroyed as a result of being hit by anti-aircraft shells,” and did not simply stop. But the Germans in this direction used not only anti-aircraft guns in anti-tank defense.

The defeat that brought victory closer

And yet, Soviet tankers, even with such “inappropriate” vehicles, went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, which is why German aircraft knocked out almost half of the columns on the march. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes penetrated even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communication and at your own peril and risk. But they walked.

They went and got their way. In the first two days of the counteroffensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other, achieved success. On the fourth day, Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to achieve success, in some areas throwing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. In the evening of June 26, Soviet tank crews even took the city of Dubno in battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat... to the east!

Destroyed German tank PzKpfw II

And yet, the Wehrmacht’s advantage in infantry units, without which in that war tankers could only operate fully in rear raids, soon began to take their toll. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all the vanguard units of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And with each passing hour, the tankers increasingly lacked serviceable vehicles, shells, spare parts and fuel. It got to the point that they had to retreat, leaving the enemy with almost undamaged tanks: there was no time or opportunity to put them on the move and take them with them.

Today you can come across the opinion that if the leadership of the front, contrary to the order of Georgy Zhukov, had not given the command to move from offensive to defensive, the Red Army, they say, would have turned back the Germans at Dubno. I wouldn't turn back. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active cooperation with other branches of the military. But the Battle of Dubno played its role in thwarting Hitler’s Barbarossa plan. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the Wehrmacht command to bring into battle reserves that were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And after this battle the direction to Kyiv itself began to be considered a priority.

And this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, it broke them - and broke them so much that the tempo of the offensive was catastrophically lost. And although the difficult autumn and winter of 1941 lay ahead, the largest tank battle had already spoken its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This, the battle of Dubno, echoed two years later on the fields near Kursk and Orel - and was echoed in the first volleys of victorious fireworks...

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle of World War II took place.

Battle of Prokhorovka became the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation, which went down in history as one that was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War.

The events of those days unfolded as follows. Hitler's command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. For this purpose, it was developed and approved in April 1943 military operation codenamed "Citadel".
Having information about the preparation of fascist German troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk ledge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces. Thereby it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.
July 12, 1943 in the area railway station Prokhorovka(56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards). Initially, the main German attack was on the southern front Kursk Bulge was heading west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from railway Kursk - Belgorod by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchka region (northern) - Kalinin by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack, delivered by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.
Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psel River . The change in direction of the attack was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the superior Soviet tank reserves. If the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the arrival of Soviet tank reserves, it was planned to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to take advantage of the advantageous terrain, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain. the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantage by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Destroyed German tank

By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence data about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" supporting its flanks conducted active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd Panzer Division covering the left flank The SS Totenkopf expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, managing to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of an attack through the defile). By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The concentration area of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Tank Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovsk direction. On the other hand, the choice of the indicated area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy group (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defender in this direction of the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

Destroyed German tank

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.
At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. High battle density, during which tanks fought on short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.
To the south of the main battle, the German tank group “Kempf” was advancing, which tried to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.
At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.
By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

This day was the coldest in the history of weather observations. July, 12 was in 1887 year, when the average daily temperature in Moscow was +4.7 degrees Celsius, and the warmest was in 1903 year. That day the temperature rose to +34.5 degrees.

Cavalry without horses

When planning the movement of troops to Belgium according to the Diehl plan, the Allied command decided that the most vulnerable area was the area between the cities of Wavre and Namur. Here, between the Dyle and Meuse rivers, lies the Gembloux plateau - flat, dry, convenient for tank operations. To cover this gap, the French command sent here the 1st Cavalry Corps of the 1st Army under the command of Lieutenant General Rene Priou. The general recently turned 61 years old, he studied at the Saint-Cyr Military Academy, and ended the First World War as commander of the 5th Dragoon Regiment. From February 1939, Priou served as Inspector General of the Cavalry.

The commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps is Lieutenant General René-Jacques-Adolphe Priou.
alamy.com

Priu's corps was called cavalry only by tradition and consisted of two light mechanized divisions. Initially, they were cavalry, but in the early 30s, on the initiative of the cavalry inspector General Flavigny, some of the cavalry divisions began to be reorganized into light mechanized ones - DLM (Division Legere Mecanisee). They were reinforced with tanks and armored vehicles, horses were replaced with Renault UE and Lorraine cars and armored personnel carriers.

The first such formation was the 4th Cavalry Division. Back in the early 30s, it became an experimental training ground for testing the interaction of cavalry with tanks, and in July 1935 it was renamed the 1st Light Mechanized Division. Such a division of the 1935 model should have included:

reconnaissance regiment of two motorcycle squadrons and two squadrons of armored vehicles (AMD - Automitrailleuse de Découverte);
a combat brigade consisting of two regiments, each with two squadrons of cavalry tanks - cannon AMC (Auto-mitrailleuse de Combat) or machine gun AMR (Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance);
a motorized brigade, consisting of two motorized dragoon regiments of two battalions each (one regiment had to be transported on tracked transporters, the other on regular trucks);
motorized artillery regiment.

The re-equipment of the 4th Cavalry Division proceeded slowly: the cavalry wanted to equip its combat brigade only with the Somua S35 medium tanks, but due to their shortage it was necessary to use the light Hotchkiss H35 tanks. As a result, there were fewer tanks in the formation than planned, but the equipment of vehicles increased.

Medium tank "Somua" S35 from the exhibition of the museum in Aberdeen (USA).
sfw.so

The motorized brigade was reduced to one motorized dragoon regiment of three battalions, equipped with Lorraine and Laffley tracked tractors. Squadrons of AMR machine gun tanks were transferred to a motorized dragoon regiment, and combat regiments, in addition to the S35, were equipped with H35 light vehicles. Over time, they were replaced by medium tanks, but this replacement was not completed before the start of the war. The reconnaissance regiment was armed with powerful Panar-178 armored vehicles with a 25-mm anti-tank gun.

German soldiers inspect a Panhard-178 (AMD-35) cannon armored vehicle abandoned near Le Panne (Dunkirque area).
waralbum.ru

In 1936, General Flavigny took command of his creation, the 1st Light Mechanized Division. In 1937, the creation of a second similar division began under the command of General Altmaier on the basis of the 5th Cavalry Division. The 3rd Light Mechanized Division began to form already during the " strange war"in February 1940 - this unit was another step in the mechanization of the cavalry, as the AMR machine gun tanks in it were replaced the latest cars"Hotchkiss" H39.

Note that until the end of the 30s, “real” cavalry divisions (DC - Divisions de Cavalerie) remained in the French army. In the summer of 1939, on the initiative of the cavalry inspector, supported by General Gamelin, their reorganization began under a new staff. It was decided that in open ground cavalry was powerless against modern infantry weapons and too vulnerable to air attack. The new light cavalry divisions (DLC - Division Legere de Cavalerie) were to be used in mountainous or wooded areas, where horses provided them with the best cross-country ability. First of all, such areas were the Ardennes and the Swiss border, where new formations developed.

The light cavalry division consisted of two brigades - light motorized and cavalry; the first had a dragoon (tank) regiment and a regiment of armored cars, the second was partially motorized, but still had about 1,200 horses. Initially, the dragoon regiment was also planned to be equipped with the Somua S35 medium tanks, but due to their slow production, the light Hotchkiss H35 tanks began to enter service - well armored, but relatively slow-moving and with a weak 37-mm cannon 18 calibers long.

The Hotchkiss H35 light tank is the main vehicle of the Priu cavalry corps.
waralbum.ru

Composition of the Priu body

The Prieu Cavalry Corps was formed in September 1939 from the 1st and 2nd Light Mechanized Divisions. But in March 1940, the 1st Division was transferred as a motorized reinforcement to the left flank 7th Army, and in its place Priou received the newly formed 3rd DLM. The 4th DLM was never formed; at the end of May, part of it was transferred to the 4th Armored (Cuirassier) Division of the reserve, and the other part was sent to the 7th Army as the “De Langle Group”.

The light mechanized division turned out to be a very successful combat formation - more mobile than the heavy tank division (DCr - Division Cuirassée), and at the same time more balanced. It is believed that the first two divisions were the best prepared, although the actions of the 1st DLM in Holland as part of the 7th Army showed that this was not the case. At the same time, the 3rd DLM that replaced it began to form only during the war; the personnel of this unit were recruited mainly from reservists, and officers were allocated from other mechanized divisions.

Light French tank AMR-35.
militaryimages.net

By May 1940, each light mechanized division consisted of three motorized infantry battalions, about 10,400 soldiers and 3,400 Vehicle. The amount of equipment they contained varied greatly:

2ndDLM:

light tanks "Hotchkiss" H35 - 84;
light machine gun tanks AMR33 and AMR35 ZT1 – 67;
105 mm field guns – 12;

3rdDLM:

medium tanks "Somua" S35 - 88;
light tanks "Hotchkiss" H39 - 129 (60 of them with a 37-mm long-barreled gun of 38 calibers);
light tanks "Hotchkiss" H35 - 22;
cannon armored vehicles "Panar-178" - 40;
105 mm field guns – 12;
75-mm field guns (model 1897) – 24;
47-mm anti-tank guns SA37 L/53 – 8;
25-mm anti-tank guns SA34/37 L/72 – 12;
25-mm anti-aircraft guns "Hotchkiss" - 6.

In total, Priu's cavalry corps had 478 tanks (including 411 cannon tanks) and 80 cannon armored vehicles. Half of the tanks (236 units) had 47 mm or long-barreled 37 mm guns, capable of fighting almost any armored vehicle of that time.

The Hotchkiss H39 with a 38-caliber gun is the best French light tank. Photo of the exhibition of the tank museum in Saumur, France.

Enemy: 16th Motorized Corps of the Wehrmacht

While the Priu divisions were advancing to the intended line of defense, they were met by the vanguard of the 6th German Army - the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, united under the command of Lieutenant General Erich Hoepner into the 16th Motorized Corps. Moving to the left with a large lag was the 20th Motorized Division, whose task was to cover Hoepner's flank from possible counterattacks from Namur.

The general course of hostilities in northeastern Belgium from May 10 to May 17, 1940.
D. M. Projector. War in Europe. 1939–1941

On May 11, both tank divisions crossed the Albert Canal and overthrew units of the 2nd and 3rd Belgian Army Corps near Tirlemont. On the night of May 11-12, the Belgians retreated to the line of the Dyle River, where the allied forces were planned to exit - the 1st French Army of General Georges Blanchard and the British Expeditionary Force of General John Gort.

IN 3rd Panzer Division General Horst Stumpf included two tank regiments (5th and 6th), united into the 3rd tank brigade under the command of Colonel Kühn. In addition, the division included the 3rd motorized infantry brigade (3rd motorized infantry regiment and 3rd motorcycle battalion), 75th artillery regiment, 39th anti-tank fighter division, 3rd reconnaissance battalion, 39th engineer battalion, 39th Signal Battalion and 83rd Supply Detachment.

The German light tank Pz.I is the most popular vehicle in the 16th Motorized Corps.
tank2.ru

In total, the 3rd Panzer Division had:

command tanks - 27;
light machine gun tanks Pz.I – 117;
light tanks Pz.II – 129;
medium tanks Pz.III – 42;
medium support tanks Pz.IV – 26;
armored vehicles - 56 (including 23 vehicles with a 20-mm cannon).

German light tank Pz.II is the main cannon tank of the 16th Motorized Corps.
Osprey Publishing

4th Panzer Division Major General Johann Shtever had two tank regiments (35th and 36th), united in the 5th tank brigade. In addition, the division included the 4th motorized infantry brigade (12th and 33rd motorized infantry regiments, as well as the 34th motorcycle battalion, 103rd artillery regiment, 49th anti-tank fighter division, 7th reconnaissance battalion , 79th Engineer Battalion, 79th Signal Battalion and 84th Supply Detachment.The 4th Tank Division consisted of:

command tanks - 10;
light machine gun tanks Pz.I – 135;
light tanks Pz.II – 105;
medium tanks Pz.III – 40;
medium support tanks Pz.IV – 24.

Each German tank division had a serious artillery component:

150 mm howitzers – 12;
105 mm howitzers – 14;
75 mm infantry guns – 24;
88-mm anti-aircraft guns – 9;
37 mm anti-tank guns – 51;
20-mm anti-aircraft guns – 24.

In addition, the divisions were assigned two anti-tank fighter divisions (12 37-mm anti-tank guns in each).

So, both divisions of the 16th Tank Corps had 655 vehicles, including 50 “fours”, 82 “threes”, 234 “twos”, 252 machine-gun “ones” and 37 command tanks, which also had only machine-gun armament (some historians put the figure at 632 tanks). Of these vehicles, only 366 were cannon, and only medium-sized German vehicles could fight the bulk of enemy tanks, and even then not all of them - the S35 with its sloped 36-mm hull armor and 56-mm turret was too tough for the German 37-mm cannon only from short distances. At the same time, the 47-mm French cannon penetrated the armor of medium German tanks at a distance of over 2 km.

Some researchers, describing the battle on the Gembloux plateau, claim the superiority of Hoepner's 16th Panzer Corps over Priou's cavalry corps in terms of the number and quality of tanks. Outwardly, this was indeed the case (the Germans had 655 tanks against 478 French), but 40% of them were machine-gun Pz.I, capable of fighting only infantry. For 366 German cannon tanks, there were 411 French cannon vehicles, and the 20-mm cannons of the German “twos” could only cause damage to the French AMR machine-gun tanks.

The Germans had 132 units of equipment capable of effectively fighting enemy tanks (“troikas” and “fours”), while the French had almost twice as many - 236 vehicles, even not counting the Renault and Hotchkiss with short-barreled 37-mm guns.

Commander of the 16th Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Erich Hoepner.
Bundesarchiv, Bild 146–1971–068–10 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

True, the German tank division had noticeably more anti-tank weapons: up to one and a half hundred 37-mm guns, and most importantly, 18 heavy 88-mm mechanically-propelled anti-aircraft guns, capable of destroying any tank in its visibility zone. And this is against 40 anti-tank guns in the entire Priu body! However, due to the rapid advance of the Germans, most of their artillery fell behind and did not take part in the first stage of the battle. In fact, on May 12–13, 1940, a real battle of machines unfolded near the town of Annu, northeast of the city of Gembloux: tanks against tanks.

May 12: counter battle

The 3rd Light Mechanized Division was the first to come into contact with the enemy. Its section east of Gembloux was divided into two sectors: in the north there were 44 tanks and 40 armored vehicles; in the south - 196 medium and light tanks, as well as the bulk of the artillery. The first line of defense was in the area of Annu and the village of Kreen. The 2nd Division was supposed to take positions on the right flank of the 3rd from Crehan to the banks of the Meuse, but by this time it was only advancing to the intended line with its advanced detachments - three infantry battalions and 67 AMR light tanks. The natural dividing line between the divisions was the hilly watershed ridge that stretched from Anna through Crehen and Meerdorp. Thus, the direction of the German attack was completely obvious: along the water barriers through the “corridor” formed by the Meen and Grand Gette rivers and leading directly to Gemble.

Early in the morning of May 12, the “Eberbach Panzer Group” (the vanguard of the 4th German Panzer Division) reached the town of Annu in the very center of the line that Priou’s troops were supposed to occupy. Here the Germans encountered reconnaissance patrols of the 3rd Light Mechanized Division. A little north of Anna, French tanks, machine gunners and motorcyclists occupied Crehen.

From 9 a.m. to noon, tank and anti-tank artillery of both sides engaged in a fierce exchange of gunfire. The French tried to counterattack with the advance detachments of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, but light German Pz.II tanks reached the very center of Annu. 21 light Hotchkiss H35s took part in the new counterattack, but they were unlucky - they came under fire from German Pz.III and Pz.IV. The thick armor did not help the French: in close street battles at a distance of a hundred meters, it was easily penetrated by 37-mm German cannons, while short-barreled French guns were powerless against medium German tanks. As a result, the French lost 11 Hotchkisses, the Germans lost 5 vehicles. The remaining French tanks left the city. After a short battle, the French retreated to the west - to the Wavre-Gembloux line (part of the pre-planned "Diele Position"). It was here that the main battle broke out on May 13–14.

Tanks of the 1st battalion of the 35th German tank regiment tried to pursue the enemy and reached the city of Tins, where they destroyed four Hotchkiss, but were forced to return because they were left without motorized infantry escort. By nightfall there was silence at the positions. As a result of the battle, each side considered that the enemy’s losses were significantly higher than its own.

Battle of Annu May 12–14, 1940.
Ernest R. May. Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France

May 13: difficult success for the Germans

The morning of this day was quiet, only towards 9 o’clock a German reconnaissance plane appeared in the sky. After this, as stated in the memoirs of Priu himself, “the battle began with renewed vigor along the entire front from Tirlemont to Guy”. By this time, the main forces of the German 16th Panzer and French Cavalry Corps had arrived here; south of Anna, the lagging units of the 3rd German Panzer Division deployed. Both sides gathered all their tank forces for the battle. A large-scale tank battle broke out - it was a counter battle, as both sides tried to attack.

The actions of Hoepner's tank divisions were supported by nearly two hundred dive bombers of the 8th Air Corps of the 2nd Air Fleet. French air support was weaker and consisted mainly of fighter cover. But Priu had superiority in artillery: he managed to bring up his 75- and 105-mm guns, which opened effective fire on German positions and advancing tanks. As one of the German tank crews, Captain Ernst von Jungenfeld, wrote a year and a half later, the French artillery literally gave the Germans "volcano of fire", the density and efficiency of which was reminiscent of the worst times of the First World War. At the same time, the artillery of the German tank divisions lagged behind; the bulk of it had not yet managed to reach the battlefield.

The French were the first to launch an offensive on this day - six S35s from the 2nd Light Mechanized Division, which had not previously participated in the battle, attacked the southern flank of the 4th Panzer Division. Alas, the Germans managed to deploy 88-mm guns here and met the enemy with fire. At 9 o'clock in the morning, after an attack by dive bombers, German tanks attacked the village of Gendrenouille in the center of the French position (in the zone of the 3rd Light Mechanized Division), concentrating a large number of tanks on a narrow five-kilometer front.

The French tank crews suffered significant losses from the attack by dive bombers, but did not flinch. Moreover, they decided to counterattack the enemy - but not head-on, but from the flank. Deploying north of Gendrenouille, two squadrons of Somois tanks from the fresh 1st Cavalry Regiment of the 3rd Light Mechanized Division (42 combat vehicles) launched a flank attack on the unfolding battle formations of the 4th Panzer Division.

This blow thwarted German plans and turned the battle into a counter battle. According to French data, about 50 German tanks were destroyed. True, by evening only 16 combat-ready vehicles remained of the two French squadrons - the rest either died or required lengthy repairs. The tank of the commander of one of the platoons left the battle, having used up all the shells and having traces of 29 hits, but did not receive serious damage.

The squadron of S35 medium tanks of the 2nd Light Mechanized Division operated especially successfully on the right flank - in Crehen, through which the Germans tried to bypass French positions from the south. Here, Lieutenant Lociski's platoon was able to destroy 4 German tanks, a battery of anti-tank guns and several trucks. It turned out that German tanks were powerless against medium French tanks - their 37 mm cannons could penetrate the Somois armor only from a very short distance, while the French 47 mm cannons hit German vehicles at any distance.

Pz.III from the 4th Panzer Division overcomes a stone fence blown up by sappers. The photo was taken on May 13, 1940 in the Annu area.
Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen

In the town of Tins, a couple of kilometers west of Annou, the French again managed to stop the German advance. The tank of the commander of the 35th Tank Regiment, Colonel Eberbach (who later became the commander of the 4th Tank Division), was also destroyed here. By the end of the day, the S35s had destroyed several more German tanks, but by the evening the French were forced to leave Tines and Crehan under pressure from approaching German infantry. French tanks and infantry retreated 5 km to the west, to the second line of defense (Meerdorp, Zhandrenouil and Zhandren), covered by the Or-Zhosh River.

Already at 8 o'clock in the evening the Germans tried to attack in the direction of Meerdorp, but their artillery preparation turned out to be very weak and only warned the enemy. A firefight between tanks at a long distance (about a kilometer) had no effect, although the Germans noted hits from the short-barreled 75-mm cannons of their Pz.IV. German tanks passed north of Meerdorp, the French first met them with fire from tank and anti-tank guns, and then counterattacked on the flank with the Somua squadron. The report of the 35th German Tank Regiment stated:

“...11 enemy tanks came out of Meerdorp and attacked the motorized infantry. The 1st Battalion immediately turned around and opened fire on the enemy tanks from a distance of 400 to 600 meters. Eight enemy tanks remained motionless, three more managed to escape.”

On the contrary, French sources write about the success of this attack and that French medium tanks turned out to be completely invulnerable to German vehicles: they left the battle with from two to four dozen direct hits from 20- and 37-mm shells, but without breaking through the armor.

However, the Germans learned quickly. Immediately after the battle, instructions appeared prohibiting light German Pz.IIs from engaging in battle with enemy medium tanks. The S35 was to be destroyed primarily by 88mm anti-aircraft guns and 105mm direct fire howitzers, as well as medium tanks and anti-tank guns.

Late in the evening the Germans went on the offensive again. On the southern flank of the 3rd Light Mechanized Division, the 2nd Cuirassier Regiment, already battered the day before, was forced to defend against units of the 3rd Panzer Division with its last forces - ten surviving Somuas and the same number of Hotchkisses. As a result, by midnight the 3rd Division had to retreat another 2-3 km, taking up defense at the Zhosh-Ramily line. The 2nd Light Mechanized Division retreated much further, on the night of 13/14 May, moving south from Perve beyond the Belgian anti-tank ditch prepared for the Dyle line. Only then did the Germans pause their advance, awaiting the arrival of the rear with ammunition and fuel. It was still 15 km from here to Gembloux.

To be continued

Literature:

D. M. Projector. War in Europe. 1939–1941 M.: Voenizdat, 1963
Ernest R. May. Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. New York, Hill & Wang, 2000
Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. 1933–1942. Schiffer Military History, Atglen PA, 1996
Jonathan F. Keiler. The 1940 Battle of Gembloux (http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-1940-battle-of-gembloux/)

70 years ago: the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War July 2nd, 2011

Usually in the USSR the biggest tank battle of the war was called the oncoming one. battle near Prokhorovka during Battle of Kursk(July 1943). But 826 Soviet vehicles fought there against 416 German ones (although a little less took part in the battle itself on both sides). But two years earlier, from June 24 to June 30, 1941, between the cities Lutsk, Dubno and Brody the battle took place much more grandiose: 5 Soviet mechanized corps (about 2500 tanks) stood in the way of the III German tank group (more than 800 tanks).

The Soviet corps received orders to attack the advancing enemy and tried to fight head-on. But our command did not have a unified plan, and tank formations struck at the advancing Germans one by one. The old light tanks were not scary for the enemy, but the new tanks of the Red Army (T-34, T-35 and KV) turned out to be stronger than the German ones, so the Nazis began to evade battle with them, withdraw their vehicles, put their infantry in the way of the Soviet mechanized corps and anti-tank artillery.

(Photos taken from site waralbum.ru - there are many pictures taken by all the warring parties
Stalin's generals with their divisions under the influence of "" (where it was ordered to "capture the Lublin region", that is, to invade Poland) rushed forward, lost supply lines, and then our tankers had to abandon completely intact tanks along the roads, left without fuel and ammunition. The Germans looked at them with surprise - especially powerful vehicles with strong armor and several turrets.

The terrible massacre ended on July 2, when the Soviet units surrounded near Dubno broke through to their front, retreating in the direction of Kyiv.

On June 25, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps of generals Rokossovsky (his memories of those days) and Feklenko dealt such a powerful blow to the invaders that they drove them back Smooth, to which the German tankers were already only a few kilometers away. On June 27, an equally powerful blow to the area Dubno was inflicted by the tank division of Commissar Popel (his memories).
Trying to surround the enemy who had broken through, Soviet formations kept running into anti-tank defenses put up by the enemy on the flanks. During the assault on these lines, up to half of the tanks perished in one day, as happened on June 24 under Lutsk and June 25 under Radekhov.
There were almost no Soviet fighters in the air: they died on the first day of the war (many at airfields). German pilots felt like “kings of the air.” General Ryabyshev's 8th mechanized corps, hurrying to the front, lost half of its tanks during a 500-kilometer march from enemy air strikes (Ryabyshev's emars).
The Soviet infantry could not keep up with their tanks, while the German infantry was much more mobile - it moved on trucks and motorcycles. There was a case when the tank units of the 15th mechanized corps of General Carpezo were outflanked and almost immobilized by enemy infantry.
On June 28, the Germans finally broke into Smooth. On June 29, Soviet troops were surrounded by Dubno(On July 2, they were still able to escape from the encirclement). On June 30, the Nazis occupied Brody. The general retreat of the Southwestern Front began, and Soviet troops left Lvov, to avoid being surrounded.
During the days of fighting, more than 2,000 tanks were lost on the Soviet side, and either “about 200” or “more than 300” on the German side. But the Germans took their tanks, took them to the rear and tried to repair them. The Red Army was losing its armored vehicles forever. Moreover, the Germans later repainted some tanks, painted crosses on them and put their armored units into service.