Fighting near Lake Khasan. Khasan battles (1938)

A kind of preface to the coming Sino-Japanese War was a cascade of limited territorial seizures carried out by troops of the Imperial Japanese Army in northeast China. Formed in 1931 on the Kwantung Peninsula, the Kwantung Group of Forces (Kanto-gun) in September of the same year, having staged a provocation by blowing up a railway near Mukden, launched an attack on Manchuria. Japanese troops quickly rushed deep into Chinese territory, capturing one city after another: Mukden, Girin, and Qiqihar fell in succession.

Japanese soldiers pass by Chinese peasants.

By that time, the Chinese state had already existed for three decades in conditions of continuous chaos. The fall of the Manchu Qing Empire during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1912 opened a series of civil strife, coups and attempts by various non-Han territories to break away from the Middle Power. Tibet actually became independent; the separatist Uighur movement in Xinjiang did not stop, where the East Turkestan Islamic Republic even arose in the early 30s. Outer Mongolia and Tuva separated, where the Mongolian and Tuvan People's Republics were formed. And in other regions of China there was no political stability. As soon as the Qing dynasty was overthrown, a struggle for power began, punctuated by ethnic and regional conflicts. The South fought with the North, the Han carried out bloody reprisals against the Manchus. After the unsuccessful attempt of the first President of the Republic of China, the commander of the Beiyang Army, Yuan Shikai, to restore the monarchy with himself as emperor, the country was drawn into a whirlpool of infighting between various cliques of militarists.

Sun Yat-sen is the father of the nation.

In fact, the only force that really fought for the reunification and revival of China was the Zhongguo Kuomintang party (Chinese National People's Party), founded by the outstanding political theorist and revolutionary Sun Yat-sen. But the Kuomintang was decidedly lacking in strength to pacify all regional juntas. After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, the position of the National People's Party was complicated by confrontation with the Soviet Union. Sun Yat-sen himself sought rapprochement with Soviet Russia, hoping with its help to overcome the fragmentation and foreign enslavement of China, and to achieve its rightful place in the world. On March 11, 1925, the day before his death, the founder of the Kuomintang wrote: "The time will come when the Soviet Union, as its best friend and ally, will welcome a mighty and free China, when great battle For the freedom of the oppressed nations of the world, both countries will go forward hand in hand and achieve victory.".

Chiang Kai-shek.

But with the death of Sun Yat-sen the situation changed dramatically. Firstly, the Kuomintang itself, which essentially represented a coalition of politicians of various stripes, from nationalists to socialists, began to split into different factions without its founder; secondly, the Kuomintang military leader Chiang Kai-shek, who actually headed the Kuomintang after the death of Sun Yat-sen, soon began to fight against the communists, which could not but lead to a worsening of Soviet-Chinese relations and resulted in a number of border disputes armed conflicts. True, Chiang Kai-shek was able, after conducting the Northern Expedition of 1926-1927, to at least unite most China under the rule of the Kuomintang government in Nanjing, but the ephemeral nature of this unification was beyond doubt: Tibet remained uncontrolled, centrifugal processes in Xinjiang only grew, and cliques of militarists in the north retained strength and influence, and their loyalty to the Nanjing government remained declarative at best.

Soldiers of the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang.

Under such conditions, it is not surprising that China, with its population of half a billion, could not provide a serious rebuff to Japan, which is poor in raw materials and has a population of 70 million. In addition, while Japan, after the Meiji Restoration, underwent modernization and had an outstanding industry by the standards of the Asia-Pacific region of that time, it was not possible to carry out industrialization in China, and the Republic of China was almost entirely dependent on foreign supplies to obtain modern equipment and weapons. As a result, a striking disparity in the technical equipment of the Japanese and Chinese troops was observed even at the lowest, most elementary level: while the Japanese infantryman was armed with an Arisaka repeating rifle, the infantrymen of the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang en masse had to fight with pistols and dadao blades, a technique the latter were often made in artisanal conditions. There is no need to even talk about the difference between the opponents in more complex types of equipment, as well as in organizational terms and military training.

Chinese soldiers with dadao.

In January 1932, the Japanese took the cities of Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan, approaching the eastern end of the Great Wall of China and capturing almost the entire territory of Manchuria. Having occupied Manchurian territory, the Japanese immediately ensured the seizure politically by organizing the All-Manchurian Assembly in March 1932, which declared the creation of the state of Manchukuo (Manchurian Power) and elected as ruler the last monarch of the Qing Empire, overthrown in 1912, Aisingyoro Pu Yi, from 1925 years under Japanese patronage. In 1934, Pu Yi was proclaimed emperor, and Manchukuo changed its name to Damanzhou Diguo (Great Manchu Empire).

Aisingyoro Pu I.

But no matter what names the “Great Manchu Empire” took, the essence of this fake state formation remained obvious: the loud name and the pretentious title of the monarch were nothing more than a translucent screen, behind which the Japanese occupation administration was quite clearly visible. The falsity of Damanzhou-Digo was visible in almost everything: for example, in the State Council, which was the center of political power in the country, each minister had a Japanese deputy, and in fact these Japanese deputies carried out the policy of Manchuria. The real supreme power of the country was the commander of the Kwantung Group of Forces, who simultaneously served as the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo. Also pro forma in Manchuria there was the Manchu Imperial Army, organized from the remnants of the Chinese Northeastern Army and largely staffed by Honghuzi, who often came to military service only to obtain funds for their usual craft, that is, banditry; Having acquired weapons and equipment, these newly minted “soldiers” deserted and joined the gangs. Those who did not desert or rebel usually fell into drunkenness and opium smoking, and many military units quickly turned into brothels. Naturally, the combat effectiveness of such “armed forces” tended to zero, and the Kwantung Group of Forces remained the real military force on the territory of Manchuria.

Soldiers of the Manchurian Imperial Army during exercises.

However, not the entire Manchu Imperial Army was a political decoration. In particular, it included formations recruited from Russian emigrants.
Here it is necessary to make a retreat and again pay attention to political system Manchukuo. In this public education Almost the entire internal political life revolved around the so-called “Manchukuo Harmony Society”, which by the end of the 30s was transformed by the Japanese into a typical anti-communist corporatist structure, but one political group, with the permission and encouragement of the Japanese, stood apart - these were the White emigrants. In the Russian diaspora in Manchuria, not just anti-communist, but fascist views have long been rooted. At the end of the 20s, Nikolai Ivanovich Nikiforov, a teacher at the Harbin Faculty of Law, formalized the Russian Fascist Organization, on the basis of which the Russian Fascist Party was established in 1931, whose general secretary was Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevsky, a member of the Russian Federation. In 1934, in Yokohama, the RFP united with Anastasy Andreevich Vosnyatsky, formed in the USA, into the All-Russian Fascist Party. The Russian fascists in Manchuria counted the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire in 1906-1911, Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin, among their harbingers.
In 1934, the “Bureau for Russian Emigrants in the Manchu Empire” (hereinafter referred to as BREM) was formed in Manchuria, the curator of which was Major of the Japanese Imperial Army, assistant to the head of the Japanese military mission in Harbin, Akikusa Xiong, who participated in the intervention in Soviet Russia during the years Civil War; in 1936, Akikusa joined the Japanese General Staff. Using ARVs, the Japanese placed the White emigrants in Manchuria under the command of the Kwantung Group of Forces. Under Japanese control, the formation of paramilitary and sabotage detachments from among white emigrants began. In accordance with the proposal of Colonel Kawabe Torashiro, in 1936 the unification of the White emigrant detachments into one military unit began. In 1938, the formation of this unit, called the Asano detachment after the name of its commander, Major Asano Makoto, was completed.
The formation of units from Russian fascists clearly demonstrated anti-Soviet sentiments among the Japanese elite. And this is not surprising, given the nature of the state regime that had developed in Japan by that time, especially since the Soviet Union, despite all the contradictions and conflicts with the Kuomintang, began to take steps towards supporting the Republic of China in the fight against Japanese intervention. In particular, in December 1932, on the initiative of the Soviet leadership, diplomatic relations with the Republic of China were restored.
The separation of Manchuria from China became the prologue to the Second World War. The Japanese elite made it clear that they would not limit themselves to Manchuria alone, and their plans were an order of magnitude larger and more ambitious. In 1933, the Empire of Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.

Japanese soldiers in Shanghai, 1937.

In the summer of 1937, limited military conflicts finally escalated into a full-scale war between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly called on representatives of the Western powers to help China, argued that only by creating a united international front can Japanese aggression be contained, and recalled the Washington Treaty of 1922, which confirmed the integrity and independence of China. But all his calls found no answer. The Republic of China found itself in conditions close to isolation. Foreign Minister of the Republic of China Wang Chunhui gloomily summed up the Chinese pre-war foreign policy: "We always hoped too much in England and America".

Japanese soldiers massacre Chinese prisoners of war.

Japanese troops rapidly advanced deep into Chinese territory, and already in December 1937, the capital of the republic, Nanjing, fell, where the Japanese committed an unprecedented massacre that ended the lives of tens, or even hundreds of thousands of people. Massive looting, torture, rape and murder continued for several weeks. The march of Japanese troops across China was marked by countless savages. In Manchuria, meanwhile, the activities of Detachment No. 731 under Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, which was developing bacteriological weapons and conducting inhumane experiments on people, were in full swing.

Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, commander of Detachment 731.

The Japanese continued to split China, creating political objects in the occupied territories that were even less similar to states than Manchukuo. Thus, in Inner Mongolia in 1937, the Principality of Mengjiang was proclaimed, led by Prince De Wang Demchigdonrov.
In the summer of 1937, the Chinese government turned to the Soviet Union for help. The Soviet leadership agreed to the supply of weapons and equipment, as well as to the dispatch of specialists: pilots, artillerymen, engineers, tank crews, etc. On August 21, a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and the Republic of China.

Soldiers of the National Revolutionary Army of China on the Yellow River. 1938

The fighting in China became increasingly large-scale. By the beginning of 1938, 800 thousand soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army fought on the fronts of the Sino-Japanese War. At the same time, the position of the Japanese armies became ambiguous. On the one hand, the subjects of the Mikado won victory after victory, inflicting colossal losses on the Kuomintang troops and the regional forces supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government; but on the other hand, there was no breakdown of the Chinese armed forces, and gradually the Japanese ground forces began to get bogged down in hostilities on the territory of the Middle Power. It became clear that the 500-million-strong China, even if lagging behind in industrial development, torn by strife and supported by almost no one, was too heavy an opponent for the 70-million-strong Japan with its meager resources; even the amorphous, inert, passive resistance of China and its people created too much tension for the Japanese forces. And military successes ceased to be continuous: in the Battle of Taierzhuang, which took place from March 24 to April 7, 1938, the troops of the National Revolutionary Army of China won their first major victory over the Japanese. According to available data, Japanese losses in this battle amounted to 2,369 killed, 719 captured and 9,615 wounded.

Chinese soldiers at the Battle of Taierzhuang.

In addition, Soviet military assistance became increasingly visible. Soviet pilots sent to China bombed Japanese communications and air bases and provided air cover for Chinese troops. One of the most effective actions of Soviet aviation was the raid of 28 SB bombers, led by Captain Fedor Petrovich Polynin, on the port of Hsinchu and the Japanese airfield in Taipei, located on the island, on February 23, 1938, on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Taiwan; Captain Polynin's bombers destroyed 40 Japanese planes on the ground, after which they returned safe and sound. This air raid shocked the Japanese, who had never expected enemy aircraft to appear over Taiwan. And by aviation actions Soviet aid was not limited: in units and formations of the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang, samples of Soviet-made weapons and equipment were increasingly discovered.
Of course, all of the above actions could not but arouse the wrath of the Japanese elite, and the views of the Japanese military leadership increasingly began to focus on the northern direction. Attention of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army to the borders of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic has increased greatly. But still, the Japanese did not consider it possible for themselves to attack their northern neighbors without having a sufficient understanding of their forces, and first they decided to test the defense capability of the Soviet Union on Far East. All that was needed was a reason, which the Japanese decided to create in a way known since ancient times - by making a territorial claim.

Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japanese Ambassador to Moscow.

On July 15, 1938, the Japanese charge d'affaires in the USSR showed up at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and officially demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the heights in the area of ​​Lake Khasan and the transfer of territories adjacent to this lake to the Japanese. The Soviet side responded by presenting the documents of the Hunchun Agreement, signed in 1886 between the Russian and Qing empires, and the map attached to them, which exhaustively testified to the location of the heights of Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya on Russian territory. The Japanese diplomat left, but the Japanese did not calm down: on July 20, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu Mamoru, repeated the demands of the Japanese government, and in the form of an ultimatum, threatening the use of force if Japanese demands were not met.

Japanese infantry unit on the march near Lake Khasan.

By that time, the Japanese command had already concentrated 3 infantry divisions, separate armored units, a cavalry regiment, 3 machine gun battalions, 3 armored trains and 70 aircraft near Khasan. The Japanese command assigned the main role in the coming conflict to the 20,000-strong 19th Infantry Division, which belonged to the Japanese occupation forces in Korea and reported directly to the imperial headquarters. A cruiser, 14 destroyers and 15 military boats approached the area of ​​the mouth of the Tumen-Ola River to support Japanese ground units. On July 22, 1938, the plan to attack the Soviet border received approval at the level of the Showa tenno (Hirohito).

Patrol of Soviet border guards in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.

The Japanese preparations for the attack did not go unnoticed by the Soviet border guards, who immediately began building defensive positions and reported to the commander of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Konstantinovich Blucher. But the latter, without informing either the People's Commissariat of Defense or the government, on July 24 went to the Zaozernaya hill, where he ordered the border guards to fill up the dug trenches and move the installed wire fences away from the no-man's land. The border troops did not obey the army leadership, due to which Blucher’s actions can only be regarded as a gross violation of subordination. However, on the same day, the Military Council of the Far Eastern Front gave the order to put units of the 40th Infantry Division on combat readiness, one of the battalions of which, together with the border outpost, was transferred to Lake Khasan.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Konstantinovich Blucher.

On July 29, the Japanese, with the help of two companies, attacked a Soviet border post located on the Bezymyannaya hill with a garrison of 11 border guards and penetrated into Soviet territory; Japanese infantrymen occupied the heights, but with the arrival of reinforcements, border guards and Red Army soldiers pushed them back. On July 30, the hills came under Japanese artillery fire, and then, as soon as the gunfire died down, the Japanese infantry again rushed into the attack, but the Soviet soldiers were able to repel it.

People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov.

On July 31, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov ordered the 1st Red Banner Army and the Pacific Fleet to be put on combat readiness. By that time, the Japanese, having concentrated two regiments of the 19th Infantry Division in the strike fist, captured the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills and advanced 4 kilometers deep into Soviet territory. Having good tactical training and considerable experience in combat operations in China, the Japanese soldiers immediately secured the captured lines by tearing off full-profile trenches and installing wire barriers in 3-4 rows. The counterattack of two battalions of the 40th Infantry Division failed, and the Red Army soldiers were forced to retreat to Zarechye and to height 194.0.

Japanese machine gunners in battles near Lake Khasan.

Meanwhile, the chief of staff of the front, commander Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, arrived at the site of hostilities on the instructions of Blucher (for unknown reasons, who did not go on his own, and also refused to use aviation to support ground troops, justifying his unwillingness to cause damage to the Korean civilian population), the chief of staff of the front, commander Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, accompanied by the deputy people's commissar of defense, army commissar Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis. Stern took command of the troops.

Komkor Grigory Mikhailovich Stern.

Army Commissar Lev Zakharovich Mehlis.

On August 1, units of the 40th Infantry Division converged on the lake. The concentration of forces was delayed, and in a telephone conversation between Blucher and the Main Military Council, Stalin directly asked Blucher: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? If you don’t have such a desire, tell me directly, as befits a communist, and if you have a desire, I would think that you should go to place immediately".

Soviet machine gunners in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.

On August 2, Blucher, after a conversation with Stalin, went to the combat area, ordered an attack on the Japanese without crossing the state border, and ordered the deployment of additional forces. The Red Army soldiers managed to overcome the wire fences with heavy losses and get close to the heights, but the Soviet riflemen did not have enough strength to take the heights themselves.

Soviet riflemen during the battles near Lake Khasan.

On August 3, Mehlis reported to Moscow about Blucher’s incompetence as a commander, after which he was removed from command of the troops. The task of launching a counterattack against the Japanese fell on the newly formed 39th Rifle Corps, which, in addition to the 40th Rifle Division, included the 32nd Rifle Division, the 2nd Separate Mechanized Brigade and a number of artillery units moving towards the battle area. In total, the corps numbered about 23 thousand people. It fell to Grigory Mikhailovich Stern to lead the operation.

The Soviet commander observes the battle in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.

On August 4, the concentration of forces of the 39th Rifle Corps was completed, and Commander Stern gave the order for an offensive to regain control of the state border. At four o'clock in the afternoon on August 6, 1938, as soon as the fog cleared over the banks of Khasan, Soviet aviation with 216 aircraft carried out a double bombardment of Japanese positions, and artillery carried out a 45-minute artillery barrage. At five o'clock, units of the 39th Rifle Corps launched an attack on the Zaozernaya, Bezymyannaya and Machine Gun hills. Fierce battles ensued for the heights and the surrounding area - on August 7 alone, Japanese infantry carried out 12 counterattacks. The Japanese fought with merciless ferocity and rare tenacity; confrontation with them required extraordinary courage from the Red Army soldiers, who were inferior in tactical training and experience, and from the commanders - will, self-control and flexibility. Japanese officers punished the slightest signs of panic without any sentimentality; in particular, Japanese artillery sergeant Toshio Ogawa recalled that when some Japanese soldiers fled during the bombing carried out by red star planes, “three of them were immediately shot by the officers of our division headquarters, and Lieutenant Itagi cut off the head of one with a sword.”.

Japanese machine gunners on a hill near Lake Khasan.

On August 8, units of the 40th Infantry Division captured Zaozernaya and began an assault on Bogomolnaya Heights. The Japanese, meanwhile, tried to divert the attention of the Soviet command with attacks on other sections of the border, but the Soviet border guards were able to fight back on their own, thwarting the enemy’s plans.

Artillerymen of the 39th corps artillery regiment in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.

On August 9, the 32nd Infantry Division knocked out Japanese units from Bezymyannaya, after which the final displacement of units of the Japanese 19th Infantry Division from Soviet territory began. In an attempt to hold back the Soviet onslaught with barrage artillery fire, the Japanese deployed several batteries on an island in the middle of the Tumen-Ola River, but the Mikado gunners lost the duel with the Soviet corps artillery.

A Red Army soldier watches the enemy.

On August 10, in Moscow, Shigemitsu visited the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Maksimovich Litvinov, with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. During these negotiations, the Japanese launched about a dozen more attacks, but all with unsuccessful results. The Soviet side agreed to a cessation of hostilities as of noon on August 11, leaving units in the positions they occupied at the end of August 10.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Maksimovich Litvinov.

Red Army soldiers take pictures at the end of the Khasan battles.

At half past two in the afternoon on August 11, the fighting on the shores of Lake Khasan subsided. The parties concluded a truce. On August 12-13, meetings between Soviet and Japanese representatives took place, at which the disposition of troops was clarified and the bodies of the fallen were exchanged.
The irretrievable losses of the Red Army, according to the study “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces,” amounted to 960 people, sanitary losses were estimated at 2,752 people wounded and 527 sick. Of the military equipment, the Soviet troops irrevocably lost 5 tanks, 1 gun and 4 aircraft (another 29 aircraft were damaged). Japanese losses, according to Japanese data, amounted to 526 people killed and 914 wounded; there is also data on the destruction of 3 anti-aircraft installations and 1 Japanese armored train.

Red Army warrior at his best.

In general, the results of the battles on the banks of Khasan completely satisfied the Japanese. They conducted reconnaissance in force and found that the Red Army troops, despite being more numerous and generally more modern in comparison with the Japanese weapons and equipment, had extremely poor training and were practically unfamiliar with the tactics of modern combat. In order to defeat well-trained, seasoned Japanese soldiers in a local clash, the Soviet leadership had to concentrate an entire corps against one actually operating Japanese division, not counting the border units, and ensure absolute superiority in aviation, and even under such favorable conditions for the Soviet side, the Japanese suffered fewer losses. The Japanese came to the conclusion that it was possible to fight against the USSR and especially the MPR, because the armed forces of the Soviet Union were weak. That is why the following year there was a conflict near the Mongolian Khalkhin Gol River.
However, one should not think that the Soviet side failed to derive any benefit from the clash that took place in the Far East. The Red Army gained practical combat experience, which very quickly became the object of study in Soviet military educational institutions and military units. In addition, Blücher's unsatisfactory leadership of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East was revealed, which made it possible to carry out personnel changes and take organizational measures. Blucher himself, after being removed from his post, was arrested and died in prison. Finally, the battles at Khalkhin Gol clearly demonstrated that an army recruited on the basis of the territorial-militia principle cannot be strong with any weapons, which became an additional incentive for the Soviet leadership to accelerate the transition to recruiting the armed forces on the basis of universal conscription.
In addition, the Soviet leadership derived a positive information effect for the USSR from the Khasan battles. The fact that the Red Army defended the territory, and the valor displayed in great numbers by Soviet soldiers, increased the authority of the armed forces in the country and caused a rise in patriotic sentiments. Many songs were written about the battles on the banks of Hassan, newspapers reported on the exploits of the heroes of the workers' and peasants' state. State awards were given to 6,532 combat participants, among them 47 women - wives and sisters of border guards. 26 conscientious citizens in the Khasan events became Heroes of the Soviet Union. You can read about one of these heroes here:

Soviet time

Conflict on Lake Khasan

Patrol of Soviet border guards in the area of ​​Lake Khasan, 1938

Throughout the 20-30s. In the 20th century, the aggressiveness of Japan steadily increased, trying to meet the growing needs of the economy and state at the expense of its Far Eastern neighbors. Active opposition of the Soviet Union to Japanese expansion in South-East Asia created tension in relations between states, manifested in numerous local conflicts. Only on the border with Manchuria in 1936-1938. More than 200 border skirmishes occurred. The Japanese were detained, accused of violating maritime boundaries Japan, several Soviet ships.

On July 15, 1938, the Charge d'Affaires of Japan in the USSR appeared at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the heights in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. After the Japanese representative was presented with the Hunchun Agreement between Russia and China of 1886 and the map attached to it, irrefutably indicating that Lake Khasan and the heights adjacent to it from the west are on Soviet territory and that, therefore, there are no violations in this no area, he retreated. However, on July 20, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu, repeated his claims to the Khasan area. When it was pointed out to him that such claims were unfounded, the ambassador said: if Japan's demands are not met, it will use force. It should be said that on July 19, 1938, the Soviet embassy in Tokyo was raided, and literally a few days later a border incident occurred between the USSR and Japan in the area of ​​Lake Khasan (Primorye).

The Red Army soldiers go on the attack. Surroundings of Lake Khasan

The reason for the conflict was the construction of a fortification by Soviet border guards, which, according to the Japanese, crossed the border line.

In response, on July 29, 1938, a Japanese company, under the cover of fog, violated the state border of the USSR, shouting “banzai” and attacked Bezymyannaya Height. The night before, a detachment of 11 border guards, led by the assistant head of the outpost, Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin, arrived at this height. The Japanese chains surrounded the trench more and more tightly, and the border guards were running out of ammunition. Eleven soldiers heroically repelled the onslaught of superior enemy forces for several hours, and several border guards died. Then Alexey Makhalin decides to break through the encirclement with hand-to-hand combat. He rises to his full height and says “Forward! For the Motherland! rushes with the fighters into a counterattack. They managed to break through the encirclement. But out of the eleven, six defenders of Nameless remained alive. Alexey Makhalin also died. (He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously). At the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese managed to take control of the heights. But soon a group of border guards and a rifle company under the command of Lieutenant D. Levchenko arrived at the battlefield. With a bold bayonet attack and grenades, our soldiers knocked out the invaders from the heights.

At dawn on July 30, enemy artillery brought down dense, concentrated fire onto the heights. And then the Japanese attacked several times, but Lieutenant Levchenko’s company fought to the death. The company commander himself was wounded three times, but did not leave the battle. A battery of anti-tank guns under Lieutenant I. Lazarev came to the aid of Levchenko’s unit and shot the Japanese with direct fire. One of our gunners died. Lazarev, wounded in the shoulder, took his place. The artillerymen managed to suppress several enemy machine guns and almost destroy the enemy company. It was with difficulty that the battery commander was forced to leave for dressing. A day later he was back in action and fought until final success.

Japanese soldiers dug in at Zaozernaya heights

The Japanese invaders decided to deliver a new and main blow in the area of ​​the Zaozernaya hill. Anticipating this, the command of the Posyet border detachment (Colonel K.E. Grebennik) organized the defense of Zaozernaya. The northern slope of the height was guarded by a detachment of border guards under the command of Lieutenant Tereshkin. In the center and on the southern slope of Zaozernaya there was a reserve outpost of Lieutenant Khristolubov and a squad of fighters of a maneuver group with two crews of heavy machine guns. On the southern bank of Khasan there was a branch of Gilfan Batarshin. Their task was to cover the command post of the squad leader and prevent the Japanese from reaching the rear of the border guards. Senior Lieutenant Bykhovtsev’s group strengthened on Bezymyannaya. Near the height was the 2nd company of the 119th regiment of the 40th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Levchenko. Each height was a small, independently operating stronghold. Approximately halfway between the heights there was a group of Lieutenant Ratnikov, covering the flanks with reinforced units. Ratnikov had 16 soldiers with a machine gun. In addition, it was assigned a platoon of small-caliber guns and four T-26 light tanks. However, when the battle began, it turned out that the forces of the border defenders were meager. The lesson at Bezymyannaya was useful for the Japanese, and they brought into action two reinforced divisions with a total number of up to 20 thousand people, about 200 guns and mortars, three armored trains, and a battalion of tanks. The Japanese pinned great hopes on their “suicide bombers” who also took part in the battle.

On the night of July 31, a Japanese regiment, with artillery support, attacked Zaozernaya. The defenders of the hill returned fire, and then counterattacked the enemy and drove him back. Four times the Japanese rushed to Zaozernaya and each time they were forced to retreat with losses. A powerful avalanche of Japanese troops, although at the cost of heavy losses, managed to push back our fighters and reach the lake. Then, by decision of the government, units of the First Maritime Army entered the battle; its soldiers and commanders fought heroically alongside the border guards. During fierce military clashes on August 9, 1938, Soviet troops managed to dislodge the enemy from only part of the disputed territories. The Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya hills were completely occupied later, after the conflict was resolved diplomatically.

Bombing of Zaozernaya Hill

The events on Lake Khasan, for all their complexity and ambiguity, clearly demonstrated the military power of the USSR. The experience of fighting with the regular Japanese army greatly helped the training of our soldiers and commanders during the battles at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 and in the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945.

Aviators, tank crews, and artillerymen also made a significant contribution to the overall success of repelling the enemy. Accurate bomb strikes fell on the heads of the invaders, the enemy was thrown to the ground by dashing tank attacks, and destroyed by irresistible and powerful artillery salvoes. The campaign of Japanese troops to Lake Khasan ended ingloriously. After August 9, the Japanese government had no choice but to enter into negotiations to end hostilities. On August 10, the USSR government proposed a truce to the Japanese side. The Japanese government accepted our terms, also agreeing to create a commission to resolve the controversial border issue. For mass heroism shown in the battles near Lake Khasan, thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded high state awards, many became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Settlements, streets, schools, and ships were named after the heroes.

Gabriel Tsobekhia

The conflict in the Lake Khasan area was caused by foreign policy factors and very difficult relations within the ruling elite of Japan. An important detail was the rivalry within the Japanese military-political machine itself, when funds were distributed to strengthen the army, and the presence of even an imaginary military threat could give the command of the Japanese Korean Army a good opportunity to remind itself, given that the priority at that time was the operations of Japanese troops in China, which never brought the desired result.

Another headache for Tokyo was the military aid flowing from the USSR to China. In this case, it was possible to exert military and political pressure by organizing a large-scale military provocation with a visible external effect. All that remained was to find a weak spot on the Soviet border, where an invasion could be successfully carried out and the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops could be tested. And such an area was found 35 km from Vladivostok.

Badge “Participant of the Khasan Battles”. Established June 5, 1939. Awarded to private andthe command staff of the Soviet troops who took part in the battles near Lake Khasan. Source: phalera. net

And if on the Japanese side in this section a railway and several highways approached the border, then on the Soviet side there was one dirt road, communication along which was often interrupted during summer rains. It is noteworthy that until 1938, this area, where there really was no clear boundary marking, was of no interest to anyone, and suddenly in July 1938, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively took up this problem.

Every day the conflict grew, threatening to develop into a big war

After the refusal of the Soviet side to withdraw troops and the incident with the death of a Japanese gendarme, shot by a Soviet border guard in the disputed area, tension began to increase day by day. On July 29, 1938, the Japanese launched an attack on the Soviet border post, but were repulsed after a hot battle. On the evening of July 31, the attack was repeated, and here the Japanese troops already managed to wedge 4 kilometers deep into Soviet territory. The first attempts to drive out the Japanese with the 40th Infantry Division were unsuccessful. However, everything was not going well for the Japanese either - every day the conflict grew, threatening to escalate into a big war, for which Japan, stuck in China, was not ready.

Richard Sorge reported to Moscow: “The Japanese General Staff is interested in a war with the USSR not now, but later. Active actions on the border were taken by the Japanese to show the Soviet Union that Japan was still capable of demonstrating its power." Meanwhile, in difficult off-road conditions and poor readiness of individual units, the concentration of forces of the 39th Rifle Corps of the Red Army continued. With great difficulty, it was possible to gather 15 thousand people in the combat area, armed with 237 guns, 285 tanks (out of 32 thousand people, 609 guns and 345 tanks available in the corps). 250 aircraft were sent to provide air support.

Sopka Zaozernaya. One of the key heights near Lake Khasan. Height 157 meters, steepnessslopes up to 45 degrees. Photo source: zastava-mahalina.narod.ru

If in the first days of the conflict, due to poor visibility and, apparently, the hope that the conflict could still be resolved diplomatically, Soviet aviation was not used, then starting from August 5, Japanese positions were subjected to massive air strikes. Aviation, including TB-3 heavy bombers, was brought in to destroy Japanese fortifications. Due to the lack of opposition in the air, Soviet fighters were used to carry out assault strikes on Japanese troops. Moreover, the targets of Soviet aviation were located not only on the captured hills, but also deep in Korean territory.

Japanese test of strength ended in failure

It was noted: “To defeat the Japanese infantry in the enemy’s trenches and artillery, they mainly used high-explosive bombs - 50, 82 and 100 kg, a total of 3,651 bombs were dropped. 6 high-explosive bombs of 1000 kg on the battlefield on 08/06/38 were used solely for the purpose of moral influence on enemy infantry, and these bombs were dropped into enemy infantry areas after these areas were thoroughly hit by groups of SB-bombs FAB-50 and 100 .

Scheme of military operations near Lake Khasan. Photo source: wikivisually.com

The enemy infantry rushed about in the defensive zone, not finding cover, since almost the entire main zone of their defense was covered with heavy fire from the explosions of bombs from our aircraft. 6 bombs of 1000 kg, dropped during this period in the area of ​​​​the Zaozernaya height, shook the air with strong explosions, the roar of these bombs exploding across the valleys and mountains of Korea was heard tens of kilometers away. After the explosion of 1000 kg of bombs, the Zaozernaya height was covered with smoke and dust for several minutes. It must be assumed that in those areas where these bombs were dropped, the Japanese infantry were 100% incapacitated from shell shock and stones thrown out of the craters by the explosion of the bombs.” Having completed 1003 sorties, Soviet aviation lost two aircraft to anti-aircraft artillery fire - one SB and one I-15. Small losses in aviation were due to the weakness of Japanese air defense. The enemy had no more than 18-20 anti-aircraft guns in the conflict area and could not provide serious resistance.

Soviet flag near the top of the Zaozernaya hill, August 1938. Photo source:mayorgb.livejournal.com

And throwing your own aviation into battle meant starting a large-scale war, for which neither the command of the Korean Army nor Tokyo were ready. From this moment on, the Japanese side began to frantically search for a way out of the current situation, which required both saving face and stopping hostilities, which no longer promised anything good for the Japanese infantry. The denouement came when Soviet troops launched a new offensive on August 8, having overwhelming military-technical superiority. The attack by tanks and infantry was carried out based on military expediency and without taking into account compliance with the border. As a result, Soviet troops managed to capture Bezymyannaya and a number of other heights, and also gain a foothold near the top of Zaozernaya, where the Soviet flag was hoisted. On August 10, the chief of staff of the 19th telegraphed the chief of staff of the Korean Army: “Every day the combat effectiveness of the division is declining. The enemy suffered great damage. He is using new methods of combat and increasing artillery fire. If this continues, there is a danger that the fighting will escalate into even more fierce battles. Within one to three days it is necessary to decide on further actions divisions... Until now, Japanese troops have already demonstrated their power to the enemy, and therefore, while it is still possible, it is necessary to take measures to resolve the conflict diplomatically.” On the same day, armistice negotiations began in Moscow and at noon on August 11, hostilities ceased.

In strategic and politically Japanese test of strength, and by and large the military adventure ended in failure. Not being prepared for a big war with the USSR, the Japanese units in the Khasan area found themselves hostage to the created situation, when further expansion of the conflict was impossible, and it was also impossible to retreat while preserving the prestige of the army. The Hassan conflict did not lead to a reduction in USSR military assistance to China. At the same time, the battles on Khasan revealed a number of weaknesses of both the troops of the Far Eastern Military District and the Red Army as a whole. The Soviet troops apparently suffered even greater losses than the enemy, weak at first initial stage The battles turned out to be interaction between infantry, tank units and artillery. Not on high level turned out to be reconnaissance that was unable to accurately identify the enemy’s positions. The losses of the Red Army amounted to 759 people killed, 100 people. died in hospitals, 95 people. missing and 6 people who died as a result of accidents. 2752 people was injured or sick (dysentery and colds). The Japanese admitted the loss of 650 killed and 2,500 people. wounded.

The battles on Khasan in July-August 1938 were far from the first and not the last military clash between the USSR and Japan in the Far East. Less than a year later, an undeclared war began in Mongolia on Khalkhin Gol, where Soviet troops would have to face units not of the Korean, but of the Kwantung Army of Japan.

Sources:

The classification has been removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts. Statistical research. M., 1993.

Koshkin A. Japanese Front of Marshal Stalin. Russia and Japan: the century-long shadow of Tsushima. M., 2003.

“The clouds are gloomy at the border.” Collection for the 65th anniversary of events at Lake Khasan. M., 2005.

Lead image: iskateli64.ru

Image for the announcement of the material on the main page: waralbum.ru

On September 4, 1938, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0040 was issued on the reasons for the failures and losses of the Red Army troops during the Khasan events.

In the battles on Lake Khasan, Soviet troops lost about a thousand people. Officially 865 killed and 95 missing. True, most researchers claim that this figure is inaccurate.
The Japanese claim to have lost 526 killed. True orientalist V.N. Usov (Doctor of Historical Sciences, chief researcher at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences) argued that there was a secret memorandum for Emperor Hirohito, in which the number of losses of Japanese troops significantly (one and a half times) exceeds the officially published data.

The Red Army gained experience in conducting combat operations with Japanese troops, which became the subject of study in special commissions, departments of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense, the USSR General Staff and military educational institutions and was practiced during exercises and maneuvers. The result was improved training of units and units of the Red Army for combat operations in difficult conditions, improved interaction between units in combat, and improved operational-tactical training of commanders and staffs. The experience gained was successfully applied on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and in Manchuria in 1945.
The fighting at Lake Khasan confirmed the increased importance of artillery and contributed to the further development of Soviet artillery: if during the Russo-Japanese War, the losses of Japanese troops from Russian artillery fire amounted to 23% of the total losses, then during the conflict at Lake Khasan in 1938, the losses of Japanese troops from artillery fire of the Red Army accounted for 37% of the total losses, and during the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 - 53% of the total losses of Japanese troops.

The bugs have been worked out.
In addition to the unpreparedness of the units, as well as the Far Eastern Front itself (about which in more detail below), other shortcomings also emerged.

Concentrated fire from the Japanese on T-26 command tanks (which differed from the linear rail antenna radio station on the tower) and their increased losses- led to the decision to install handrail antennas not only on command tanks, but also on line tanks.

"Charter of the military sanitary service of the Red Army" 1933 (UVSS-33) did not take into account some features of the theater of military operations and the situation, which resulted in an increase in losses. Battalion doctors were too close to the battle formations of the troops and, moreover, were involved in organizing the work of company areas to collect and evacuate the wounded, which resulted in large losses among doctors. As a result of the battles, changes were made to the work of the military medical service of the Red Army.

Well, about the organizational conclusions of the meeting of the Main Supreme Council of the Red Army and the order of the NGOs of the USSR, I will quote the story of a comrade andrey_19_73 :

. Results of Hasan: Organizational conclusions.

On August 31, 1938, a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army took place in Moscow. It summed up the results of the July battles in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.
At the meeting, a report was heard from the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov "On the position of the troops of the DK (note - Far Eastern Red Banner) Front in connection with the events on Lake Khasan." Reports were also heard from the commander of the Far Eastern Fleet V.K. Blucher and the head of the political department of the front, brigade commissar P.I. Mazepova.

VC. Blucher

P.I. Mazepov

The main result of the meeting was that the fate of the hero of the Civil War and the battles on the Chinese Eastern Railway, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Blucher, was decided.
He was charged with the fact that in May 1938 he “questioned the legality of the actions of the border guards on Lake Khasan.” Then com. The Far Eastern Front sent a commission to investigate the incident at the Zaozernaya height, which discovered a violation of the border by Soviet border guards to a shallow depth. Blucher then sent a telegram to the People's Commissar of Defense, in which he concluded that the conflict was caused by the actions of our side and demanded the arrest of the head of the border section.
There is an opinion that there was even a telephone conversation between Blucher and Stalin, in which Stalin asked the commander a question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? If there is no such desire, tell me directly.. ".
Blucher was also accused of disorganizing military command and control and as “unfit and discredited himself in the military and politically"removed from the leadership of the Far Eastern Front and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council. Subsequently arrested on October 22, 1938. On November 9, V.K. Blucher died in prison during the investigation.
Brigadier Commissioner P.I. Mazepov escaped with “a slight fright.” He was removed from his position as chief. political department of the Far Eastern Fleet and was appointed with a demotion as head of the political department of the Military Medical Academy named after. CM. Kirov.

The result of the meeting was the order of the USSR NKO No. 0040 issued on September 4, 1938 on the reasons for the failures and losses of the Red Army troops during the Khasan events. The order also determined the new staff of the front: in addition to the 1st ODKVA, another combined arms army, the 2nd OKA, was deployed in the front zone.
Below is the text of the order:

ORDER
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
On the results of the consideration by the Main Military Council of the issue of the events on Lake Khasan and measures for defense preparation of the Far Eastern theater of military operations

Moscow

On August 31, 1938, under my chairmanship, a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army took place, consisting of members of the military council: vol. Stalin, Shchadenko, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Kulik, Loktionov, Blucher and Pavlov, with the participation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade. Molotov and deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade. Frinovsky.

The Main Military Council considered the issue of events in the area of ​​Lake Khasan and, after hearing the explanations of Comrade Comrade. Blucher and deputy member of the military council of the CDfront comrade. Mazepov, came to the following conclusions:
1. The combat operations at Lake Khasan were a comprehensive test of the mobilization and combat readiness of not only those units that directly took part in them, but also of all troops of the CD Front without exception.
2. The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the state of the CD front. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It was discovered that the Far Eastern theater was poorly prepared for war (roads, bridges, communications).
Storage, conservation and accounting of mobilization and emergency reserves, both in front-line warehouses and in military units, turned out to be in a chaotic state.
In addition to all this, it was discovered that the most important directives of the Main Military Council and the People's Commissar of Defense were criminally not followed by the front command for a long time. As a result of such an unacceptable state of the front troops, we suffered significant losses in this relatively small clash - 408 people killed and 2807 people wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extreme difficulty of the terrain on which our troops had to operate, or by the three times greater losses of the Japanese.
The number of our troops, the participation of our aviation and tanks in operations gave us such advantages that our losses in battles could be much smaller.
And only thanks to the laxity, disorganization and combat unpreparedness of military units and the confusion of the command and political personnel, from the front to the regimental, we have hundreds of killed and thousands of wounded commanders, political workers and soldiers. Moreover, the percentage of losses of the command and political personnel is unnaturally high - 40%, which once again confirms that the Japanese were defeated and thrown beyond our borders only thanks to the fighting enthusiasm of the fighters, junior commanders, middle and senior command and political personnel, who were ready to sacrifice themselves in defense honor and inviolability of the territory of his great socialist Motherland, as well as thanks to the skillful leadership of operations against the Japanese by Comrade. Stern and proper leadership Comrade Rychagov by the actions of our aviation.
Thus, the main task set by the Government and the Main Military Council to the troops of the CD Front - to ensure full and constant mobilization and combat readiness of the front troops in the Far East - turned out to be unfulfilled.
3. The main shortcomings in the training and organization of troops, revealed by the fighting at Lake Khasan, are:
a) the criminal removal of fighters from combat units for all kinds of extraneous work is unacceptable.
The Main Military Council, knowing about these facts, back in May of this year. By his resolution (protocol No. 8), he categorically prohibited wasting Red Army soldiers on various types of economic work and demanded their return to the unit by July 1 of this year. all soldiers on such deployments. Despite this, the front command did nothing to return soldiers and commanders to their units, and the units continued to have a huge shortage of personnel, the units were disorganized. In this state they set out on alert to the border. As a result, during the period of hostilities we had to resort to cobbling together units from different units and individual fighters, allowing harmful organizational improvisation, creating impossible confusion, which could not but affect the actions of our troops;
b) the troops advanced to the border on combat alert completely unprepared. The emergency supply of weapons and other military equipment was not scheduled in advance and prepared for distribution to the units, which caused a number of outrageous outrages during the entire period of hostilities. The head of the front department and unit commanders did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other military supplies were available. In many cases, entire artillery batteries ended up at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unfired, and many soldiers and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division arrived at the front without rifles or gas masks at all. Despite the huge reserves of clothing, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn-out shoes, half-footed; a large number of Red Army soldiers were without overcoats. Commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area;
c) all types of troops, especially the infantry, showed an inability to act on the battlefield, to maneuver, to combine movement and fire, to adapt to the terrain, which in this situation, as in general in the conditions of the Far [East], replete with mountains and hills, is the ABC of combat and tactical training of troops.
The tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in material.
4. The culprits for these major shortcomings and for the excessive losses we suffered in a relatively small military clash are the commanders, commissars and commanders of all levels of the CDF, and first of all, the commander of the CDF, Marshal Blucher.
Instead of honestly devoting all his strength to the task of eliminating the consequences of sabotage and combat training of the CD Front and truthfully informing the People's Commissar and the Main Military Council about the shortcomings in the life of the front troops, Comrade Blucher systematically, from year to year, covered up his obviously bad work and inactivity with reports about successes, the growth of the front’s combat training and its general prosperous condition. In the same spirit, he made a multi-hour report at a meeting of the Main Military Council on May 28-31, 1938, in which he hid the true state of the KDF troops and argued that the front troops were well trained and combat-ready in all respects.
Numerous enemies of the people sitting next to Blucher skillfully hid behind his back, carrying out their criminal work to disorganize and disintegrate the troops of the CD Front. But even after the exposure and removal of traitors and spies from the army, Comrade Blucher was unable or unwilling to truly implement the cleansing of the front from the enemies of the people. Under the flag of special vigilance, he left hundreds of positions of commanders and heads of units and formations unfilled, contrary to the instructions of the Main Military Council and the People's Commissar, thus depriving the military units of leaders, leaving headquarters without workers, unable to carry out their tasks. Comrade Blucher explained this situation by the lack of people (which does not correspond to the truth) and thereby cultivated a sweeping distrust of all the commanding cadres of the CD Front.
5. The leadership of the commander of the CD Front, Marshal Blucher, during the fighting at Lake Khasan was completely unsatisfactory and bordered on conscious defeatism. His entire behavior in the time leading up to the hostilities and during the fighting itself was a combination of duplicity, indiscipline and sabotage of the armed resistance to the Japanese troops who had captured part of our territory. Knowing in advance about the impending Japanese provocation and about the Government's decisions on this matter, announced by Comrade. Litvinov to Ambassador Shigemitsu, having received on July 22 a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense to bring the entire front to combat readiness, - Comrade. Blucher limited himself to issuing the relevant orders and did nothing to check the preparation of troops to repel the enemy and did not take effective measures to support the border guards with field troops. Instead, quite unexpectedly on July 24, he questioned the legality of the actions of our border guards at Lake Khasan. In secret from a member of the military council, Comrade Mazepov, his chief of staff, Comrade Stern, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Comrade Mehlis and Deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Frinovsky, who were in Khabarovsk at that time, Comrade Blucher sent a commission to the Zaozernaya height and, without the participation of the head of the border section, conducted an investigation into the actions of our border guards. The commission created in such a suspicious manner discovered a “violation” of the Manchurian border by 3 meters by our border guards and, therefore, “established” our “guilt” in the conflict at Lake Khasan.
In view of this, Comrade Blucher sends a telegram to the People's Commissar of Defense about this alleged violation of the Manchurian border by us and demands the immediate arrest of the head of the border section and other “those responsible for provoking the conflict” with the Japanese. This telegram was sent by Comrade Blucher also in secret from the comrades listed above.
Even after receiving instructions from the Government to stop fussing with all sorts of commissions and investigations and to strictly implement the decisions of the Soviet government and the orders of the People's Commissar, Comrade Blucher does not change his defeatist position and continues to sabotage the organization of armed resistance to the Japanese. It got to the point that on August 1 of this year, when talking on a direct line TT. Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov with Comrade Blucher, Comrade. Stalin was forced to ask him a question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? If you don’t have such a desire, tell me directly, as befits a communist, and if you have a desire, I will I would think that you should go to the place immediately."
Comrade Blücher withdrew himself from any leadership of military operations, covering up this self-elimination with the message of Comrade NashtaFront. Stern to the combat area without any specific tasks or powers. Only after repeated instructions from the Government and the People's Commissar of Defense to stop the criminal confusion and eliminate disorganization in troop command and control, and only after the People's Commissar appointed Comrade. Stern as the commander of the corps operating near Lake Khasan, a special repeated requirement for the use of aviation, the introduction of which Comrade Blucher refused under the pretext of fear of defeats for the Korean population, only after Comrade Blucher was ordered to go to the scene of events. Comrade Blucher took on operational leadership. But with this more than strange leadership, he does not set clear tasks for the troops to destroy the enemy, interferes with the combat work of the commanders subordinate to him, in particular, the command of the 1st Army is actually removed from the leadership of its troops without any reason; disorganizes the work of front-line control and slows down the defeat of the Japanese troops located on our territory. At the same time, Comrade Blucher, having gone to the scene of events, in every possible way avoids establishing continuous communication with Moscow, despite the endless calls to him via direct wire from the People's Commissar of Defense. For three whole days, in the presence of a normally working telegraph connection, it was impossible to get a conversation with Comrade Blucher.
All this operational “activity” of Marshal Blucher was completed when on August 10 he gave the order to recruit 12 ages into the 1st Army. This illegal act was all the more incomprehensible since the Main Military Council in May of this year, with the participation of Comrade Blucher and at his own suggestion, decided to call up only 6 ages in wartime in the Far East. This order from Comrade Blucher provoked the Japanese to announce their mobilization and could drag us into a big war with Japan. The order was immediately canceled by the People's Commissar.
Based on the instructions of the Main Military Council;

I ORDER:

1. In order to quickly eliminate all identified major shortcomings in the combat training and condition of the military units of the KDF, replace the unfit and militarily and politically discredited command and improve the conditions of leadership, in the sense of bringing it closer to military units, as well as strengthening defense training activities The Far Eastern theater as a whole - the administration of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front should be disbanded.
2. Marshal Comrade Blucher should be removed from the post of commander of the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council of the Red Army.
3. Create two separate armies from the troops of the Far Eastern Front, with direct subordination to the People's Commissar of Defense:
a) the 1st Separate Red Banner Army as part of the troops in accordance with Appendix No. 1, subordinating the Pacific Fleet operationally to the military council of the 1st Army.
The army's deployment office is Voroshilov. The army will include the entire Ussuri region and part of the Khabarovsk and Primorsk regions. The dividing line with the 2nd Army is along the river. Bikin;
b) the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army as part of the troops in accordance with Appendix No. 2, subordinating the Amur Red Banner Flotilla to the military council of the 2nd Army in operational terms.
The army's headquarters will be located in Khabarovsk. The army will include the Lower Amur, Khabarovsk, Primorsky, Sakhalin, Kamchatka regions, the Jewish Autonomous Region, the Koryak, and Chukotka national districts;
c) transfer the personnel of the disbanded front-line department to staff the departments of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies.
4. Approve:
a) Commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army - corps commander Comrade. Stern G.M., member of the military council of the army - divisional commissar comrade. Semenovsky F.A., chief of staff - brigade commander comrade. Popova M.M.;
b) commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army - corps commander Comrade. Koneva I.S., member of the military council of the army - brigade commissar comrade. Biryukova N.I., chief of staff - brigade commander comrade. Melnik K.S.
5. The newly appointed army commanders should form army directorates according to the attached state draft No. ... (note - not attached)
6. Before the arrival in Khabarovsk of the commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army, comrade commander. Koneva I.S. Divisional commander comrade takes over temporary command. Romanovsky.
7. Start forming armies immediately and finish by September 15, 1938.
8. The head of the command personnel department of the Red Army should use the personnel of the disbanded department of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front to staff the departments of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies.
9. The Chief of the General Staff shall give appropriate instructions to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd armies on the distribution of warehouses, bases and other front-line property between the armies. Keep in mind the possibility of using the heads of the branches of the Red Army troops and their representatives located in given time in the Far East, to quickly complete this work.
10. To the Military Council of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army by October 1 of this year. restore control of the 18th and 20th Rifle Corps with deployment: 18 sk - Kuibyshevka and 20 sk - Birobidzhan.
The disbanding departments of the Khabarovsk Operational Group and the 2nd Army of the CD Front should be used to restore these corps departments.
11. Military Councils of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies:
a) immediately begin to restore order in the troops and ensure their full mobilization readiness as soon as possible; inform the military councils of the armies about the measures taken and their implementation to the People’s Commissar of Defense once every five days;
b) ensure the full implementation of orders of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 071 and 0165 - 1938. Report on the progress of the implementation of these orders every three days, starting from September 7, 1938;
c) it is strictly prohibited to separate soldiers, commanders and political workers for various types of work.
In cases of extreme necessity, military councils of armies are allowed, only with the approval of the People's Commissar of Defense, to involve military units in work, provided that they are used only in an organized manner, so that entire units headed by their commanders and political workers are at work, always maintaining their full combat readiness, for which units must be promptly replaced by others.
12. The commanders of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies should report to me by telegraph in code on September 8, 12 and 15 about the progress of the formation of directorates.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. VOROSHILOV Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Army Commander 1st Rank SHAPOSHNIKOV

Monument “Eternal glory to the heroes of the battles at Lake Khasan.” Pos. Razdolnoye, Nadezhdinsky district, Primorsky Krai

After Japan captured Manchuria in 1931-1932. The situation in the Far East has worsened. On March 9, 1932, the Japanese occupiers proclaimed the puppet state of Manchukuo on the territory of Northeast China bordering the USSR with the aim of using its territory for subsequent expansion against the USSR and China.

Japan's hostility towards the USSR increased noticeably after the conclusion of an allied treaty with Germany in November 1936 and the conclusion of the “Anti-Comintern Pact” with it. On November 25, speaking at this event, Japanese Foreign Minister H. Arita stated: “ Soviet Russia must understand that she has to stand face to face with Japan and Germany.” And these words were not an empty threat. The allies conducted secret negotiations on joint actions against the USSR and hatched plans to seize its territory. Japan, in order to demonstrate loyalty to Germany, its powerful Western ally, deployed the main forces of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and demonstratively built up “its muscles.” By the beginning of 1932 there were 64 thousand people, by the end of 1937 - 200 thousand, by the spring of 1938 - already 350 thousand people. In March 1938, this army was armed with 1,052 artillery pieces, 585 tanks and 355 aircraft. In addition, the Korean Japanese Army had more than 60 thousand people, 264 artillery pieces, 34 tanks and 90 aircraft. In the immediate vicinity of the borders of the USSR, 70 military airfields and about 100 landing sites were built, 11 powerful fortified areas were built, including 7 in Manchuria. Their purpose is to accumulate manpower and provide fire support for troops at the initial stage of the invasion of the USSR. Strong garrisons were stationed along the entire border, and new highways and railways were laid towards the USSR.

Combat training of Japanese troops was carried out in an environment close to natural conditions Soviet Far East: soldiers developed the ability to fight in the mountains and on plains, wooded and swampy areas, in hot and arid areas with a sharply continental climate.

On July 7, 1937, Japan, with the connivance of the great powers, launched a new large-scale aggression against China. In this difficult time for China, only the Soviet Union extended a helping hand and concluded a non-aggression pact with China, which was essentially an agreement on mutual struggle against the Japanese imperialists. The USSR provided China with large loans, provided it with modern weapons, and sent well-trained specialists and instructors to the country.

In this regard, Japan feared that the USSR could strike in the rear of the troops advancing in China, and in order to find out the combat capability and intentions of the Soviet Far Eastern armies, it conducted intensive reconnaissance and constantly expanded the number of military provocations. Only in 1936-1938. 231 violations were recorded on the border between Manchukuo and the USSR, including 35 major military clashes. In 1937, 3,826 trespassers were detained at this site, of whom 114 were subsequently exposed as Japanese intelligence agents.

The top political and military leadership of the Soviet Union had information about Japan's aggressive plans and took measures to strengthen the Far Eastern borders. By July 1937, Soviet troops in the Far East numbered 83,750 men, 946 guns, 890 tanks and 766 aircraft. The Pacific Fleet was replenished with two destroyers. In 1938, it was decided to strengthen the Far Eastern group by 105,800 people. True, all these considerable forces were dispersed over vast areas of Primorye and the Amur region.

July 1, 1938, by decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the basis of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army The Red Banner Far Eastern Front was deployed under the command of the Marshal of the Soviet Union. The corps commander became the chief of staff. The front included the 1st Primorskaya, 2nd Separate Red Banner Army and the Khabarovsk Group of Forces. The armies were respectively commanded by the brigade commander and the corps commander (the future Marshal of the Soviet Union). The 2nd Air Army was created from the Far Eastern aviation. The aviation group was commanded by the Hero of the Soviet Union, brigade commander.

The situation on the border was heating up. In July, it became obvious that Japan was preparing to attack the USSR and was only looking for an opportune moment and an appropriate reason for this. At this time, it became completely clear that to unleash a major military provocation, the Japanese chose the Posyetsky region - due to a number of natural and geographical conditions, the most remote, sparsely populated and poorly developed part of the Soviet Far East. From the east it is washed by the Sea of ​​Japan, from the west it borders on Korea and Manchuria. The strategic importance of this area and especially its southern part lay in the fact that, on the one hand, it provided approaches to our coast and Vladivostok, and on the other, it occupied a flank position in relation to the Hunchun fortified area, built by the Japanese on the approaches to the Soviet border.

The southern part of the Posyetsky region was a swampy lowland with many rivers, streams and lakes, making the actions of large military formations almost impossible. However, in the west, where the state border passes, the lowland turned into a mountain range. The most significant heights of this ridge were the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, reaching a height of 150 m. The state border passed along their peaks, and the high-rise buildings themselves were located 12-15 km from the shore of the Sea of ​​Japan. If these heights were captured, the enemy would be able to monitor a section of Soviet territory south and west of Posyet Bay and beyond Posyet Bay, and his artillery would be able to keep this entire area under fire.

Directly from the east, on the Soviet side, the lake adjoins the hills. Khasan (about 5 km long, 1 km wide). The distance between the lake and the border is very short - only 50-300 m. The terrain here is swampy and difficult to pass for troops and equipment. From the Soviet side, access to the hills could only be achieved through small corridors bypassing the lake. Hassan from the north or south.

At the same time, the Manchurian and Korean territories adjacent to the Soviet border were quite populated with a large number of settlements, highways, dirt roads and railways. One of them ran along the border at a distance of only 4-5 km. This allowed the Japanese, if necessary, to maneuver along the front with forces and equipment and even use artillery fire from armored trains. The enemy also had the opportunity to transport cargo by water.

As for the Soviet territory east and northeast of the lake. Hasan, it was absolutely flat, deserted, there was not a single tree or bush on it. The only railway Razdolnoye - Kraskino passed 160 km from the border. The area directly adjacent to the lake. Hassan had no roads at all. Planning an armed action in the lake area. Hassan, the Japanese command apparently took into account the unfavorable terrain conditions for the deployment of military operations by Soviet troops and their advantages in this regard.

Soviet intelligence established that the Japanese brought up significant forces to the Posietsky section of the Soviet border: 3 infantry divisions (19th, 15th and 20th), a cavalry regiment, a mechanized brigade, heavy and anti-aircraft artillery, 3 machine-gun battalions and several armored trains, and also 70 aircraft. Their actions were ready to be supported by a detachment of warships consisting of a cruiser, 14 destroyers and 15 military boats that approached the mouth of the Tumen-Ula River. The Japanese assumed that if the USSR decided to defend the entire coastal region, they could first pin down the Red Army forces in this area, and then, with a strike in the direction of the Kraskino-Razdolnoe road, encircle and destroy them.

In July 1938, the confrontation on the border began to develop into the stage of a real military threat. In this regard, the border guard of the Far Eastern Territory has strengthened measures to organize the defense of the state border and the heights located in close proximity to it. On July 9, 1938, on the Soviet part of the Zaozernaya height, which had previously been controlled only by border patrols, a horse patrol appeared and began “trench work.” On July 11, 40 Red Army soldiers were already working here, and on July 13, another 10 people. The head of the Posyet border detachment, the colonel, ordered to lay land mines at this height, equip stone throwers, make suspended rolling slingshots from stakes, bring in oil, gasoline, tow, i.e. prepare the height area for defense.

On July 15, a group of Japanese gendarmes violated the border in the Zaozernaya region. One of them was killed on our land 3 meters from the border line. On the same day, the Japanese attorney in Moscow protested and groundlessly demanded in the form of an ultimatum that the Soviet border guards be withdrawn from the heights west of the lake. Hasan, considering them to belong to Manchukuo. The diplomat was presented with the protocols of the Hunchun Agreement between Russia and China in 1886 with a map attached to them, which clearly showed that the area of ​​the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills indisputably belonged to the Soviet Union.

On July 20, the claims to the Khasan area were repeated in Moscow by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov, Ambassador of Japan to the USSR M. Shigemitsu. He stated: “Japan has rights and obligations to Manchukuo under which it can resort to force and force Soviet troops to evacuate the territory of Manchukuo they illegally occupied.” Litvinov was not frightened by this statement, and he remained adamant. Negotiations have reached a dead end.

At the same time, the Japanese government understood that its armed forces in this current situation were not yet ready to wage a major war with the USSR. According to their intelligence, the Soviet Union could field from 31 to 58 rifle divisions in the Far East, and Japan only 9 divisions (23 fought on the Chinese front - 2 were in the Metropolis). Therefore, Tokyo decided to carry out only a private, limited-scale operation.

The plan developed by the Japanese General Staff to oust the Soviet border guards from the heights of Zaozernaya provided: “Carry out battles, but not expand the scale of military operations beyond necessity. Eliminate the use of aviation. Allocate one division from the Korean Japanese Army to carry out the operation. Having captured the heights, do not take further action.” The Japanese side hoped that the Soviet Union, due to the insignificance of the border dispute, would not declare a large-scale war on Japan, since, according to them, the Soviet Union was clearly not ready for such a war.

On July 21, the general staff reported the provocation plan and its rationale to Emperor Hirohito. The next day, the General Staff's operational plan was approved by the Council of Five Ministers.

With this action, the Japanese military wanted to test the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops in Primorye, find out how Moscow would react to this provocation, and at the same time clarify the data on the state of defense of the Far Eastern Territory received from the head of the NKVD department for the Far Eastern Territory, who defected to them on June 13, 1938.

On July 19, the Military Council of the Far Eastern Front decided to send a military support unit from the 1st Army to reinforce the border guards entrenched on the Zaozernaya heights, but front commander V.K. On July 20, Blucher, apparently fearing responsibility and new diplomatic complications from Japan, ordered the return of this unit back, believing that “the border guards should fight first.”

At the same time, the situation at the border was becoming critical and required an immediate solution. In accordance with the directive of the Far Eastern Front, two reinforced battalions of the 118th and 119th Infantry Regiments began to move into the Zarechye-Sandokandze area, and a separate tank battalion of the 40th Infantry Division began moving into the Slavyanka area. At the same time, all other units of the 39th Rifle Corps of the 1st Army were put on combat readiness. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the Pacific Fleet was ordered to cover ground forces, as well as the areas of Vladivostok, Gulf of America and Posiet, with aviation and air defense (air defense), together with aviation of the 2nd Air Army, and be ready to launch air strikes on Korean ports and airfields. At the same time, it should be noted that all our hills are west of the lake. Hasan was still defended by border guards alone. Due to the lack of roads, the army support battalions of the 1st Army were still at a considerable distance from the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights.

The fighting began on July 29. At 16:00, the Japanese, having pulled up field troops and artillery to the border, in two columns of 70 people each, invaded Soviet territory. At this time, at the height of Bezymyannaya, on which the enemy was delivering the main blow, only 11 border guards with one heavy machine gun were defending. The border guards were commanded by the assistant chief of the outpost, lieutenant. Engineering work was carried out under the direction of Lieutenant. At the top of the hill, the soldiers managed to build trenches and cells for riflemen from soil and stones, and set up a position for a machine gun. They erected barbed wire barriers, laid land mines in the most dangerous directions, and prepared rock piles for action. The engineering fortifications they created and personal courage allowed the border guards to hold out for more than three hours. Assessing their actions, the Main Military Council of the Red Army noted in its resolution that the border guards “fought very bravely and courageously.”

The invaders’ lines could not withstand the dense fire of the hill’s defenders, they lay down repeatedly, but, urged on by the officers, they rushed into attacks again and again. IN various places the battle escalated into hand-to-hand combat. Both sides used grenades, bayonets, small sapper shovels and knives. Among the border guards there were killed and wounded. While leading the battle, Lieutenant A.E. died. Mahalin, and with him 4 more people. The 6 border guards who remained in service were all wounded, but continued to resist. The support company of the lieutenant from the 119th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division was the first to come to the aid of the brave men, and with it two reserve groups of border guards of the 59th Border Detachment under the command of Lieutenants G. Bykhovtsev and I.V. Ratnikova. The united attack of Soviet soldiers was successful. By 6 p.m., the Japanese were knocked out from the heights of Bezymyannaya and pushed 400 m deep into Manchurian territory.

Participation of border guards in hostilities near Lake Khasan in July 1938

Border guards Alexei Makhalin, David Yemtsov, Ivan Shmelev, Alexander Savinykh and Vasily Pozdeev who fell in battle were posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin, and their commander, Lieutenant A.E. Makhalin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The hero’s wife, Maria Makhalina, also distinguished herself in these battles. Hearing the sounds of the battle flaring up, she left a young child at the outpost and came to the aid of the border guards: she brought cartridges and bandaged the wounded. And when the machine gun crew went out of order, she took a place at the machine gun and opened fire on the enemy. The brave woman was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

The Japanese repeatedly tried to take the hill by storm, but, suffering heavy losses, rolled back. In these battles, only the company D.T. Levchenko repelled the attack of two enemy battalions. Three times the lieutenant himself led the soldiers in counterattacks, even while wounded. The company did not cede an inch of Soviet land to the Japanese. Its commander was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

However, intelligence reported that the Japanese were preparing for new attacks on the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya heights. Their forces amounted to two infantry regiments and a howitzer artillery regiment. The concentration of enemy troops ended on the night of July 31, and at 3 o'clock on August 1 the offensive began.

By this time, the Khasan sector area was defended by the 1st battalion of the 118th and 3rd battalion of the 119th rifle regiments of the 40th rifle division of the 1st Army with reinforcements and border guards of the 59th Posyet border detachment. Enemy artillery continuously fired at Soviet troops, while our artillerymen were prohibited from firing at targets on enemy territory. Counterattacks by the battalions of the 40th Infantry Division, unfortunately, were carried out in an insufficiently organized manner, sometimes scatteredly, without established interaction with artillery and tanks, and therefore most often did not bring the desired result.

But the Soviet soldiers fought with ferocity, throwing the enemy off the slope of the Zaozernaya height three times. In these battles, the crew of the tank of the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division, consisting of (tank commander), and. The tank destroyed several enemy firing points with well-aimed fire and broke through deep into its position, but was knocked out. The enemies offered the crew to surrender, but the tankers refused and fired back to the last shell and cartridge. Then the Japanese surrounded the combat vehicle, doused it with fuel and set it on fire. The crew died in the fire.

The commander of a fire platoon of the 53rd separate anti-tank fighter division of the 40th Infantry Division, a lieutenant, under enemy machine-gun fire, moved a gun into an open firing position in the infantry battle formations and supported its counterattacks. Lazarev was wounded, but continued to skillfully lead the platoon until the end of the battle.

The commander of the 59th Posyet border detachment, junior commander, skillfully suppressed enemy firing points. When the Japanese tried to surround his unit, he drew fire on himself, ensured the withdrawal of the wounded soldiers, and then himself, being seriously wounded, managed to pull the wounded commander from the battlefield.

By 6:00 on August 1, after a stubborn battle, the enemy still managed to push back our units and occupy the Zaozernaya height. At the same time, the advancing 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment of the enemy lost 24 killed and 100 wounded; the 2nd Battalion's losses were even greater. The Japanese fired hurricane artillery fire throughout the entire area from Nagornaya to Novoselka, Zarechye and further to the north. By 22:00 they managed to expand their success and capture the tactically important heights of Bezymyannaya, Machine Gun, 64.8, 86.8 and 68.8. The enemy advanced 4 km deep into Soviet land. This was real aggression on their part, because... all these heights were on the side of the sovereign state.

The main forces of the 40th Infantry Division were unable to provide assistance to their forward battalions, because were at that time moving through difficult terrain 30-40 km from the battle area.

The Japanese, having captured the heights north of the lake. Hassan, immediately began their engineering strengthening. Construction materials, including liquid concrete and armored caps, arrived hourly by rail directly to the fighting area. With the help of the mobilized Manchu population, new roads were laid, trenches were opened, and shelters were erected for infantry and artillery. They turned each hill into a heavily fortified area capable of conducting a long battle.

Japanese officers at Lake Khasan. August 1938

When the Japanese Emperor was informed of the results of these actions, he “expressed pleasure.” As for the Soviet military-political leadership, the news of the Japanese capture of the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights caused him great irritation. On August 1, a conversation took place via direct wire, V.M. Molotov and with front commander V.K. Blucher. The marshal was accused of defeatism, disorganization of command and control, non-use of aviation, setting unclear tasks for the troops, etc.

On the same day, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov gave the directive to immediately bring all front troops and the Pacific Fleet to full combat readiness, disperse aviation to airfields, and deploy air defense systems to wartime states. Orders were given on the logistics of the troops, especially in the Posyet direction. Voroshilov demanded that the troops of the Far Eastern Front “within our border sweep away and destroy the invaders who occupied the heights of Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya, using military aviation and artillery.” At the same time, the commander of the 40th Infantry Division received from the commander of the 1st Primorsky Army K.P. Podlas ordered to restore the situation at the height of Zaozernaya.

On August 1, at 13:30 - 17:30, front aviation in the amount of 117 aircraft carried out waves of raids on the heights of Zaozernaya and 68.8, which, however, did not give the desired results, because Most of the bombs fell into the lake and onto the slopes of the heights without causing harm to the enemy. The attack of the 40th Infantry Division, scheduled for 16:00, did not take place, because its units, making a difficult 200-kilometer march, arrived in the concentration area for the attack only at night. Therefore, by order of the chief of staff of the front, brigade commander G.M. Stern, the division's offensive was postponed to August 2.

At 8:00 in the morning, units of the 40th division were immediately thrown into battle without preliminary reconnaissance and reconnaissance of the area. The main attacks were carried out by the 119th and 120th rifle regiments, a tank battalion and two artillery divisions along the Bezymyannaya height from the north, and the auxiliary attacks were carried out by the 118th rifle regiment from the south. The infantrymen were essentially advancing blindly. The tanks got stuck in swamps and ditches, were hit by enemy anti-tank gun fire and could not effectively support the advance of the infantry, which suffered heavy losses. Aviation did not take part in the battle due to the dense fog that shrouded the hill; interaction between the military branches and control was unsatisfactory. For example, the commander of the 40th Rifle Division received orders and tasks simultaneously from the front commander, the military council of the 1st Primorsky Army and from the commander of the 39th Rifle Corps.

Unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the enemy from the hills continued until late at night. The front command, seeing the futility of the offensive actions of the troops, ordered to stop the attacks on the heights and return parts of the division to their previously occupied positions. The withdrawal of units of the 40th Division from the battle took place under the influence of heavy enemy fire and was completed only by the morning of August 5th. The division, despite its persistence in battle, was unable to complete its assigned task. She simply did not have enough strength for this.

In connection with the expansion of the conflict, on the instructions of People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov, front commander V.K. arrived in Posiet. Blucher. On his orders, units of the 32nd Infantry Division (commander - colonel), units and units of the 40th Infantry Division (commander - colonel) and units of the 2nd mechanized brigade (commander - colonel) began to arrive in the battle area. . All of them became part of the 39th Rifle Corps, command of which was taken over by corps commander G.M. Stern. He was given the task of defeating the invading enemy in the lake area. Hassan.

By this time, the corps troops were on the move to the concentration area. Due to the lack of roads, formations and units moved extremely slowly, their supply of fuel, fodder, food and drinking water was unsatisfactory. G.M. Stern, having understood the situation, believed that in such conditions it would be possible to begin an operation to defeat the enemy no earlier than August 5 after the regrouping of units of the 40th Infantry Division to the left flank of the front, replenishing it with people, ammunition, tanks, since in previous battles the division suffered heavy losses (up to 50% of riflemen and machine gunners).

On August 4, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Shigemitsu informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov about the Japanese government's readiness to resolve the military conflict in the area of ​​Lake Khasan through diplomatic means. It is obvious that by doing so it tried to gain time to concentrate and consolidate new forces at the conquered heights. The Soviet government unraveled the enemy's plan and confirmed its previously put forward demand for the immediate liberation by the Japanese of the territory of the USSR they had captured.

On August 4, the USSR NKO order No. 71ss was issued “On bringing the troops of the Democratic Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness in connection with the provocation of the Japanese military.” And on August 5, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR sent a directive to the commander of the Far Eastern Front, in which, emphasizing the uniqueness of the area around Zaozernaya, he actually allowed him to finally act in accordance with the situation, using an attack to bypass the enemy from the flanks across the state border line. “After clearing the Zaozernaya height,” the directive stated, “all troops should immediately withdraw beyond the border line. Zaozernaya Height must be in our hands under all conditions.”

Intelligence established that on the Japanese side, the Zaozernaya, Bezymyannaya and Machine Gun Hills were held by: the 19th Infantry Division, an infantry brigade, two artillery regiments and separate reinforcement units, including three machine gun battalions, with a total number of up to 20 thousand people. At any time these troops could be reinforced with significant reserves. All hills were fortified with full profile trenches and wire fences in 3-4 rows. In some places, the Japanese dug anti-tank ditches and installed armored caps over machine-gun and artillery nests. Heavy artillery was stationed on the islands and beyond the Tumen-Ula River.

Soviet troops were also actively preparing. By August 5, the concentration of troops was completed, and a new strike force was created. It consisted of 32 thousand people, about 600 guns and 345 tanks. The actions of ground troops were ready to support 180 bombers and 70 fighters. Directly in the combat area there were over 15 thousand people, 1014 machine guns, 237 guns, 285 tanks, which were part of the 40th and 32nd rifle divisions, the 2nd separate mechanized brigade, the rifle regiment of the 39th rifle division, 121 1st Cavalry and 39th Corps Artillery Regiments. The general offensive was scheduled for August 6.

Infantrymen of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division named after S. Ordzhonikidze practice combat coordination while being in the reserve of the advancing group. Zaozernaya height area, August 1938. Photo by V.A. Temina. Russian State Archive of Film and Photo Documents (RGAKFD)

The operation plan, developed on August 5 by brigade commander G.M. Stern, envisaged simultaneous attacks from the north and south to pin down and destroy enemy troops in the zone between the Tumen-Ula River and Lake Khasan. In accordance with the order given for the offensive, the 95th Infantry Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Division with the tank battalion of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade was to deliver the main attack from the north across the border to the Chernaya height, and the 96th Infantry Regiment was to capture the Bezymyannaya height.

The crew of the 76.2 mm gun reads a report from the combat area. 32nd Infantry Division, Khasan, August 1938. Photo by V.A. Temina. RGAKFD

The 40th Infantry Division with the tank and reconnaissance battalions of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade launched an auxiliary attack from the southeast in the direction of the Oryol heights (119th Infantry Regiment) and the Machine Gun Hill hills (120th and 118th Infantry Regiments), and then to Zaozernaya, where, together with the 32nd Division, which was performing the main task, they were supposed to finish off the enemy. The 39th Rifle Division with a cavalry regiment, motorized rifle and tank battalions of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade formed the reserve. It was supposed to protect the right flank of the 39th Rifle Corps from possible enemy outflanking. Before the start of the infantry attack, two air strikes of 15 minutes each and an artillery preparation lasting 45 minutes were planned. This plan was reviewed and approved by the front commander, Marshal V.K. Blucher, and then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov.

A cavalry platoon of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division named after S. Ordzhonikidze in an ambush. Zaozernaya height area, August 1938. Photo by V.A. Temina. RGAKFD

At 16:00 on August 6, the first air strike was carried out on enemy positions and areas where his reserves were located. Heavy bombers loaded with six 1000-kilogram and ten 500-kilogram bombs were especially effective. G.M. Stern later reported to I.V. at a meeting of the Main Military Council. Stalin that even on him, an experienced warrior, this bombing made a “terrible impression.” The hill was covered with smoke and dust. The roar of bomb explosions could be heard tens of kilometers away. In the areas where the bombers dropped their deadly payload, the Japanese infantry were overwhelmed and rendered 100% incapacitated. Then, after a short artillery preparation, at 16:55 the infantry rushed into the attack, accompanied by tanks.

However, on the hills occupied by the Japanese, not all fire weapons were suppressed, and they came to life, opening destructive fire on the advancing infantry. Numerous snipers hit targets from carefully camouflaged positions. Our tanks had difficulty crossing the swampy terrain, and the infantry often had to stop at the enemy's wire fences and manually make passages through them. The advance of the infantry was also hampered by artillery and mortar fire located across the river and on Machine Gun Hill.

In the evening, Soviet aviation repeated its strike. Artillery positions on Manchurian territory were bombed, from where enemy artillery fired at Soviet troops. The enemy's fire immediately weakened. By the end of the day, the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division stormed the Zaozernaya height. The lieutenant was the first to rush to the heights and hoist the Soviet banner on it.

Soldiers plant a victory banner on the Zaozernaya hill. 1938 Photo by V.A. Temina. RGAKFD

On this day, soldiers, commanders and political workers showed exceptional heroism and skillful leadership of the battle. So, on August 7, the commissar of the 5th reconnaissance battalion, senior political instructor, repeatedly raised the soldiers to attack. Being wounded, he remained in service and continued to inspire the soldiers by personal example. The brave warrior died in this battle.

The platoon commander of the 303rd separate tank battalion of the 32nd Infantry Division, a lieutenant, replaced the company commander who was out of action at a critical moment of the battle. Finding himself surrounded in a damaged tank, he bravely withstood a 27-hour siege. Under the cover of artillery fire, he got out of the tank and returned to his regiment.

Part of the forces of the 32nd Infantry Division advanced along the western shore of Lake Khasan towards the 40th Infantry Division. In this battle, the commander of one of the battalions of the 95th Infantry Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Division, Captain, especially distinguished himself. He led the fighters into the attack six times. Despite being wounded, he remained in service.

The commander of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division in the Zaozernaya Heights area successfully controlled the battle. He was wounded twice, but did not leave the unit and continued to carry out the task assigned to him.

The fighting continued with great intensity in the following days.

The enemy constantly carried out powerful counterattacks, trying to recapture the lost terrain. To repel enemy counterattacks, on August 8, the 115th Infantry Regiment of the 39th Infantry Division with a tank company was transferred to the Zaozernaya heights. The enemy offered strong resistance, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. But the Soviet soldiers fought to the death. On August 9, units of the 32nd Infantry Division knocked out the Japanese from Bezymyannaya Heights and threw them back across the border. The height of Machine Gun Hill was also liberated.

Scheme map. Defeat of Japanese troops at Lake Khasan. July 29 - August 11, 1938

The evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield was carried out exclusively by horse-drawn transport under heavy enemy fire, and then by ambulances and trucks to the nearest seaports. After a medical examination, the wounded were loaded onto fishing vessels, which, under the cover of fighters, proceeded to Posyet Bay. Further evacuation of the wounded was carried out by steamships, warships and seaplanes heading to Vladivostok, where military hospitals were established. A total of 2,848 wounded soldiers were transported by sea from Posiet to Vladivostok. Warships of the Pacific Fleet also carried out numerous military transports. They delivered 27,325 soldiers and commanders, 6,041 horses, 154 guns, 65 tanks and wedges, 154 heavy machine guns, 6 mortars, 9,960.7 tons of ammunition, 231 vehicles, 91 tractors, a lot of food and fodder to Posiet Bay. This one was great help to the soldiers of the 1st Primorsky Army, who fought with the enemy.

On August 9, all the territory previously captured by the Japanese was returned to the USSR, but the enemy’s counterattacks did not weaken. Soviet troops firmly held their positions. The enemy suffered heavy losses and was forced to withdraw on August 10.
On the same day, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR M. Shigemitsu proposed starting negotiations on a truce. The Soviet government, which has always strived for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, agreed. At noon on August 11 at 12:00, hostilities near Lake Khasan ceased. According to the armistice agreement, Soviet and Japanese troops were to remain on the lines they occupied on August 10 by 24:00 local time.

But the truce process itself was difficult. On November 26, 1938, Stern reported at a meeting of the Military Council of the USSR NGO (quoted from the transcript): “Corps headquarters received an order at 10:30 a.m. with instructions to cease hostilities at 12 o'clock. This order of the People's Commissar was brought to the bottom. It's 12 o'clock, and the Japanese are firing. 12 hours 10 minutes too, 12 hours 15 minutes. too - they report to me: in such and such an area there is heavy artillery fire from the Japanese. One was killed, and 7-8 people. wounded. Then, in agreement with the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, it was decided to launch an artillery raid. In 5 min. we fired 3010 shells at the targeted lines. As soon as this fire raid of ours ended, the fire from the Japanese stopped.”

This was the final point in the two-week war with Japan on Lake Khasan, in which the Soviet Union won a convincing victory.

Thus, the conflict ended in complete victory Soviet weapons. This was a serious blow to Japan's aggressive plans in the Far East. Soviet military art has been enriched by the experience of the massive use of aviation and tanks in modern combat, artillery support for the offensive, and the conduct of combat operations in special conditions.

For exemplary performance of combat missions, courage and bravery of its personnel, the 40th Infantry Division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 32nd Infantry Division and the 59th Posyet Border Detachment were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Soldiers and commanders who participated in the battles in the area of ​​Lake Khasan read the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On perpetuating the memory of the heroes of Khasan.” Battle area, 1939

26 participants in the battles (22 commanders and 4 Red Army soldiers) were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 6.5 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, including the Order of Lenin - 95 people, the Red Banner - 1985, the Red Star - 1935, medals " For courage" and "For military merit" - 2485 people. All participants in the battles were awarded a special badge “Participant in the battles on Lake Khasan”, and the Posyetsky district of the Primorsky Territory was renamed the Khasansky district.

Badge “Participant in the battles on Lake Khasan. 6 VIII-1938". Established July 5, 1939

Victory over the enemy was not easy. When repelling Japanese aggression in the area of ​​Lake Khasan, human losses during the period of hostilities alone amounted to: irrevocable - 989 people, sanitary losses - 3,279 people. In addition, 759 people were killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages, 100 people died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals, 95 people went missing, 2,752 people were wounded, shell-shocked and burned. There are other numbers of losses.

In August 1968 in the village. Kraskino on Krestovaya Sopka, a monument to the soldiers and commanders who died in battles near Lake Khasan in 1938 was unveiled. It represents a monumental figure of a warrior hoisting the Red Banner on one of the heights after expelling the enemy. On the pedestal there is an inscription: “To the Heroes of Hassan.” The authors of the monument are sculptor A.P. Faydysh-Krandievsky, architects - M.O. Barnes and A.A. Kolpina.

Memorial to those killed in battles near Lake Khasan. Pos. Kraskino, Krestovaya Sopka

In 1954, in Vladivostok, at the Marine Cemetery, where the ashes of those who died in the naval hospital after severe wounds were transferred, as well as those previously buried at the Egersheld Cemetery, a granite obelisk was erected. On the memorial plaque there is the inscription: “Memory of the heroes of Hassan - 1938.”

Material prepared by the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation