What kind of war was there in 1939. Soviet-Finnish War

In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, long years was virtually forgotten. This was facilitated by its not very successful results and the peculiar “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more afraid than fire to offend any of its “friends,” and Finland after the Great Patriotic War was considered an ally of the USSR.

Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to famous words A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unfamous war”; today this war is very “famous”. One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention many articles in various magazines and collections. But this “celebrity” is very peculiar. The authors who have made denouncing the Soviet “evil empire” their profession cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied...

By the end of the 1930s near the northwestern borders Soviet Union there was a state that was clearly unfriendly to us. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces was a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who pushed Finland into Hitler’s camp through his actions prefer not to remember this. As well as why peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in an alliance with England and France.

Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy explored the question of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but Helsinki responded with a categorical refusal.

Those denouncing the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that manages its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to the exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began being deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis introduce a naval blockade of Liberty Island, and even more so, launch a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries, the location of the Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and was fully consistent with the norms international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start the 3rd world war, if the missiles are not removed. There is such a thing as a “sphere of vital interests”. For our country in 1939, a similar area included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Not even at all sympathetic Soviet power the former leader of the Cadet Party P. N. Milyukov, in a letter to I. P. Demidov, expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”

On November 26, a famous incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded. Today it is considered good manners to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish claims that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Maynila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began.

I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive line on December 4-10. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the sides switched to positional warfare.

What were the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the number of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to conduct full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.

Was not up to par Soviet intelligence, which was unable to reveal complete and reliable information about Finnish fortifications.

Finally, the Soviet leadership had unreasonable hopes for “class solidarity of the Finnish working people.” There was a widespread belief that the population of countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately “rise up and go over to the side of the Red Army,” that workers and peasants would come out to greet Soviet soldiers with flowers.

As a result, the required number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. Thus, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important site front, the Finnish side had in December 1939 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 crew battalions. On the Soviet side they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle-machine-gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 rifle battalions. If we compare the number personnel, then Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, Soviet troops - 169 thousand people. In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel.

Defeat or victory?

So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, a war is considered won if the winner ends up in better position than it was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?

As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and was ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this respect the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unruly bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was created there. Despite persecution by the Finnish authorities, by the time of its ban in December of the same year it had 40 thousand members. Such massive numbers indicate that not only communist supporters joined the Society, but also simply sensible people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with their great neighbor.

According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.

It should be noted that if at the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km and in exchange for twice the territory, as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.

It should also be taken into account that at the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the cost of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which they agreed to cede to us, we were talking about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would already run into many billions.

But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers under the Treaty of Nystadt, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.".

Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer to the USSR 350 sea and river transport vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages, significant number cars.

Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded.

Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times greater than Finnish ones. Similar ratio not surprising. Let's take for example Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, the Russians often lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the Port Arthur fortress, Japanese losses far exceeded Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation arose during the Soviet-Finnish War, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.

As a result, Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army had reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and about urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.

Speaking in Parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. For Russia this is a great victory» . However, one should not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.

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1. Units of the Red Army cross the bridge into Finnish territory. 1939

2. A Soviet soldier guarding a minefield in the area of ​​the former Finnish border outpost. 1939

3. Artillery crew at their gun in a firing position. 1939

4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain I.V. Kapustin, who landed with troops on the island of Seiskaari to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939

5. Soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

6. Border guard outfit on patrol. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the Finnish outpost of Beloostrov. 1939

8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border post of Japinen. 1939

9. Soldiers deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

10. Soldiers of the 7th Army fire at the enemy with rifles. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

11. A reconnaissance group of skiers receives instructions from the commander before going on reconnaissance. 1939

12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborg district. 1939

13. Fighter skiers on a hike. 1940

14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the area of ​​​​combat operations with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940

15. Fighters cooking food in the forest over a fire during a break between battles. 1939

16. Cooking lunch in field conditions at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940

17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940

18. Signalmen restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

19. Signal soldiers are restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns in Terijoki. 1939

20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terijoki station. 1939

21. Soldiers and commanders talk with residents of Terijoki. 1939

22. Signalmen on the front line negotiations near the Kemyarya station. 1940

23. Rest of the Red Army soldiers after the battle in the Kemyar area. 1940

24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army listens to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terijoki. 1939

25. View of Suojarva station, taken by Red Army soldiers. 1939

26. Red Army soldiers guard a gasoline pump in the town of Raivola. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

27. General form the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939

28. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939

29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940

30. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939

31. Sappers repairing a bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939

32. A Red Army soldier puts a letter in a field mail box. 1939

33. A group of Soviet commanders and soldiers inspects the Shyutskor banner captured from the Finns. 1939

34. B-4 howitzer on the front line. 1939

35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at height 65.5. 1940

36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by Red Army units. 1939

37. View of a destroyed bridge near the city of Koivisto, taken by units of the Red Army. 1939

38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940

39. Red Army soldiers at a captured gun left behind after the battles with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940

40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940

41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.

42. Soviet soldiers at a captured pillbox on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940

43. Units of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940

44. Red Army soldiers at fortifications in Vyborg. 1940

45. Ruins of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940

46. ​​Red Army soldiers clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940

47. Icebreaking steamer "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940

48. Soviet skiers are moving to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.

49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis for takeoff before a combat mission during the Soviet-Finnish war.

50. Finnish Foreign Minister Vaine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940

51. Crossing the Finnish border by Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939

52. Finnish prisoners talk with a Soviet political worker. The photo was taken in the Gryazovets NKVD camp. 1939-1940

53. Soviet soldiers talk with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939

54. Finnish Fokker C.X aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939

55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, junior lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) discharges a mine.

56. The crew of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at Finnish fortifications. 12/02/1939

57. Red Army commanders examine the captured Finnish Vickers Mk.E tank. March 1940

58. Hero of the Soviet Union, senior lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) with the I-16 fighter. 1940

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940. The reasons for the start, course and results of the war are still considered very controversial. The instigator of the war was the USSR, whose leadership was interested in territorial acquisitions in the Karelian Isthmus region. Western countries almost did not react to the Soviet-Finnish conflict. France, England and the United States tried to adhere to a position of non-interference in local conflicts, so as not to give Hitler a reason for new territorial seizures. Therefore, Finland was left without the support of its Western allies.

Reason and reasons for the war

The Soviet-Finnish war was provoked by a whole complex of reasons related, first of all, to the protection of the border between the two countries, as well as geopolitical differences.

• During 1918-1922 The Finns attacked the RSFSR twice. To prevent further conflicts in 1922, an agreement was signed on the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border; according to the same document, Finland received Petsamo or the Pecheneg region, the Rybachy Peninsula and part of the Sredny Peninsula. In the 1930s, Finland and the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact. At the same time, relations between the states remained tense, the leadership of both countries feared mutual territorial claims.
• Stalin regularly received information that Finland had signed secret agreements on support and assistance with the Baltic countries and Poland if the Soviet Union attacked one of them.
• At the end of the 1930s, Stalin and his circle were also concerned about the rise of Adolf Hitler. Despite the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, many in the USSR feared a military clash and considered it necessary to begin preparations for war. One of the most strategically important cities in the USSR was Leningrad, but the city was too close to the Soviet-Finnish border. In the event that Finland decided to support Germany (and this is exactly what happened), Leningrad would find itself in a very vulnerable position. Shortly before the start of the war, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Finland with a request to exchange part of the Karelian Isthmus for other territories. However, the Finns refused. Firstly, the lands offered in exchange were infertile, and secondly, in the area that interested the USSR, there were important military fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.
• Also, the Finnish side did not give its consent to the Soviet Union leasing several Finnish islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula. The USSR leadership planned to place its military bases in these territories.
• Soon the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland;
• Germany and the USSR signed a secret non-aggression treaty and secret protocols to it, according to which Finnish territory was to fall into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. To some extent, this agreement freed the hands of the Soviet leadership with regard to regulating the situation with Finland

The reason for the start of the Winter War was. On November 26, 1939, the village of Mainila, located on the Karelian Isthmus, was shelled from Finland. The Soviet border guards who were in the village at that time suffered the most from the shelling. Finland denied its involvement in this act and did not want the conflict to develop further. However, the Soviet leadership took advantage of the current situation and declared the start of war.

There is still no evidence confirming the guilt of the Finns in the shelling of Mainila. Although, however, there are no documents indicating the involvement of the Soviet military in the November provocation. The papers provided by both parties cannot be considered as unambiguous evidence of anyone’s guilt. Back at the end of November, Finland advocated the creation general commission to investigate the incident, but the Soviet Union rejected the offer.

On November 28, the leadership of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact (1932). Two days later, active hostilities began, which went down in history as the Soviet-Finnish war.

In Finland, the mobilization of those liable for military service was carried out; in the Soviet Union, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were brought into full combat readiness. A broad propaganda campaign was launched against the Finns in the Soviet media. In response, Finland began to carry out an anti-Soviet campaign in the press.

From mid-November 1939, the USSR deployed four armies against Finland, which included: 24 divisions ( total number military reached 425 thousand), 2.3 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand aircraft.

The Finns had only 14 divisions, in which 270 thousand people served, they had 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.

Course of events

The Winter War can be divided into two stages:

• November 1939 - January 1940: the USSR advanced in several directions at once, the fighting was quite fierce;
• February - March 1940: massive shelling of Finnish territory, attack on the Mannerheim Line, Finnish surrender and peace negotiations.

On November 30, 1939, Stalin gave the order to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, and on December 1, Soviet troops captured the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk).

In the occupied territory Soviet army established contacts with Otto Kuusinen, who was the head of the Finnish Communist Party and an active participant in the Comintern. With Stalin's support, he proclaimed the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic. Kuusinen became its president and began negotiations with the Soviet Union on behalf of the Finnish people. Official diplomatic relations were established between the FDR and the USSR.

The Soviet 7th Army moved very quickly towards the Mannerheim Line. The first chain of fortifications was broken through in the first ten days of 1939. The Soviet soldiers were unable to advance further. All attempts to break through the next lines of defense ended in losses and defeats. Failures on the line led to the suspension of further advance into the interior of the country.

Another army - the 8th - was advancing in the north of Lake Ladoga. In just a few days, the troops covered 80 kilometers, but were stopped by a lightning attack by the Finns, as a result of which half of the army was destroyed. Finland's success was due, first of all, to the fact that Soviet troops were tied to the roads. The Finns, moving in small mobile units, easily cut off equipment and people from the necessary communications. The 8th Army retreated with casualties, but did not leave the region until the very end of the war.

The most unsuccessful campaign of the Red Army during the Winter War is considered to be the attack on Central Karelia. Stalin sent the 9th Army here, which successfully advanced from the first days of the war. The troops were tasked with capturing the city of Oulu. This was supposed to cut Finland into two parts, demoralize and disorganize the army in northern regions countries. Already on December 7, 1939, the soldiers managed to capture the village of Suomussalmi, but the Finns were able to encircle the division. The Red Army switched to a perimeter defense, repelling attacks by Finnish skiers. Finnish detachments carried out their actions suddenly, and the main striking force of the Finns were almost elusive snipers. The clumsy and insufficiently mobile Soviet troops began to suffer enormous human losses, and equipment also broke down. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to help the encircled division, which also found itself surrounded by Finnish forces. Due to the fact that the two divisions were under constant fire, the 163rd Rifle Division gradually began to fight its way back. Almost 30% of the personnel died, more than 90% of the equipment was left to the Finns. The latter almost completely destroyed the 44th division and returned to their control state border in Central Karelia. In this direction, the actions of the Red Army were paralyzed, and the Finnish army received huge trophies. The victory over the enemy raised the morale of the soldiers, but Stalin repressed the leadership of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the Red Army.

In the area of ​​the Rybachy Peninsula, the 14th Army advanced quite successfully. During short term soldiers captured the city of Petsamo with its nickel mines and went straight to the border with Norway. Thus, Finland was cut off from access to the Barents Sea.

In January 1940, the Finns encircled the 54th Infantry Division (in the Suomussalmi area, in the south), but did not have the strength and resources to destroy it. Soviet soldiers were surrounded until March 1940. The same fate awaited the 168th Infantry Division, which tried to advance in the Sortavala area. Also, a Soviet tank division fell into Finnish encirclement near Lemetti-Yuzhny. She managed to escape from the encirclement, losing all her equipment and more than half her soldiers.

The Karelian Isthmus became the zone of the most active military operations. But by the end of December 1939, the fighting here stopped. This was due to the fact that the leadership of the Red Army began to understand the futility of attacks on the Mannerheim line. The Finns tried to use the lull in the war to maximum advantage and go on the attack. But all operations ended unsuccessfully with huge casualties.

By the end of the first stage of the war, in January 1940, the Red Army was in difficult situation. She fought in unfamiliar, practically unexplored territory; moving forward was dangerous due to numerous ambushes. In addition, the weather made planning operations difficult. The position of the Finns was also unenviable. They had problems with the number of soldiers and lacked equipment, but the country's population had enormous experience in guerrilla warfare. Such tactics made it possible to attack with small forces, inflicting significant losses on large Soviet detachments.

Second period of the Winter War

Already on February 1, 1940, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Red Army began a massive artillery shelling that lasted 10 days. The purpose of this action was to damage the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops, to exhaust the soldiers, and to break their morale. The actions taken achieved their goals, and on February 11, 1940, the Red Army began an offensive into the interior of the country.

Very fierce fighting began on the Karelian Isthmus. The Red Army first planned to deliver the main blow to the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. But the USSR army began to get stuck on foreign territory, suffering losses. As a result, the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhde. In the area of ​​this settlement, the Finnish defenses were broken through, which allowed the Red Army to pass through the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns began to withdraw their troops.

By the end of February 1940, the Soviet army also crossed Mannerheim’s second line of defense, breaking through it in several places. By the beginning of March, the Finns began to retreat because they were in a difficult situation. Reserves were depleted, the morale of the soldiers was broken. A different situation was observed in the Red Army, the main advantage of which was its huge reserves of equipment, materiel, and replenished personnel. In March 1940, the 7th Army approached Vyborg, where the Finns put up stiff resistance.

On March 13, hostilities ceased, which was initiated by the Finnish side. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

• Vyborg was one of major cities country, its loss could have a negative impact on the morale of citizens and the economy;
• After the capture of Vyborg, the Red Army could easily reach Helsinki, which threatened Finland with a complete loss of independence and independence.

Peace negotiations began on March 7, 1940 and took place in Moscow. Based on the results of the discussion, the parties decided to cease hostilities. The Soviet Union received all the territories on the Karelian Isthmus and the cities: Salla, Sortavala and Vyborg, located in Lapland. Stalin also achieved that the Hanko Peninsula be given to him on a long-term lease.

• The Red Army lost about 88 thousand people killed, dying from wounds and frostbite. Almost 40 thousand more people were missing, and 160 thousand were injured. Finland lost 26 thousand people killed, 40 thousand Finns were injured;
• The Soviet Union achieved one of its key foreign policy objectives - ensuring the security of Leningrad;
• The USSR strengthened its position on the Baltic coast, which was achieved through the acquisition of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, where Soviet military bases were moved;
• The Red Army gained vast experience in conducting military operations in difficult weather and tactical conditions, learning to break through fortified lines;
• In 1941 Finland supported Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR and allowed German troops through its territory, who managed to establish a blockade of Leningrad;
• The destruction of the Mannerheim Line was fatal for the USSR, since Germany was able to quickly capture Finland and enter the territory of the Soviet Union;
• The war showed Germany that the Red Army was unfit for combat in difficult weather conditions. The same opinion was formed among the leaders of other countries;
• Finland, under the terms of the peace agreement, had to build a railway track, with the help of which it was planned to connect the Kola Peninsula and the Gulf of Bothnia. The road was supposed to pass through the village of Alakurtia and connect with Tornio. But this part of the agreement was never implemented;
• On October 11, 1940, another agreement was signed between the USSR and Finland, which concerned the Åland Islands. The Soviet Union received the right to establish a consulate here, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone;
• The international organization League of Nations, created following the First World War, excluded the Soviet Union from its membership. This was due to the fact that the international community reacted negatively to the USSR intervention in Finland. The reasons for exclusion were also the constant aerial bombing of Finnish civilian targets. Incendiary bombs were often used during raids;

Thus, the Winter War became the reason for Germany and Finland to gradually move closer and interact. The Soviet Union tried to resist such cooperation, restraining the growing influence of Germany and trying to establish a loyal regime in Finland. All this led to the fact that with the outbreak of World War II, the Finns joined the Axis countries in order to free themselves from the USSR and return lost territories.

The armed conflict between the Soviet state and Finland is increasingly assessed by contemporaries as one of components Second World War. Let's try to isolate real reasons Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.
The origins of this war lie in the system itself international relations, which had developed by 1939. At that time, war, the destruction and violence it brought, were considered an extreme, but completely acceptable method of achieving geopolitical goals and protecting the interests of the state. Large countries were building up their armaments, small states were looking for allies and entered into agreements with them for assistance in case of war.

Soviet-Finnish relations from the very beginning could not be called friendly. Finnish nationalists wanted to return Soviet Karelia to the control of their country. And the activities of the Comintern, directly financed by the CPSU (b), were aimed at the speedy establishment of the power of the proletariat throughout the globe. It is most convenient to start the next campaign to overthrow bourgeois governments from neighboring states. This fact should already make the rulers of Finland worry.

Another exacerbation began in 1938. The Soviet Union predicted start soon war with Germany. And to prepare for this event, it was necessary to strengthen the western borders of the state. The city of Leningrad, which was the cradle of the October Revolution, was a large industrial center in those years. A loss former capital during the first days of hostilities would have been a serious blow for the USSR. Therefore, the Finnish leadership received a proposal to lease their Hanko Peninsula to create military bases there.

The permanent deployment of the armed forces of the USSR on the territory of a neighboring state was fraught with a violent change of power to “workers and peasants”. The Finns well remembered the events of the twenties, when Bolshevik activists tried to create a Soviet republic and annex Finland to the USSR. The activities of the Communist Party were banned in this country. Therefore, the Finnish government could not agree to such a proposal.

In addition, in the Finnish territories designated for transfer there was the famous Mannerheim defensive line, which was considered insurmountable. If it is voluntarily handed over to a potential enemy, then nothing will be able to restrain the Soviet troops from advancing forward. A similar trick had already been performed in Czechoslovakia by the Germans in 1939, so the Finnish leadership was clearly aware of the consequences of such a step.

On the other hand, Stalin had no compelling reason to believe that Finland's neutrality would remain unshakable during the upcoming big war. The political elites of capitalist countries generally saw the USSR as a threat to the stability of European states.
In short, the parties in 1939 could not and, perhaps, did not want to come to an agreement. The Soviet Union needed guarantees and a buffer zone in front of its territory. Finland needed to maintain its neutrality in order to be able to quickly change foreign policy and lean towards the favorite in the approaching big war.

Another reason for a military solution to the current situation seems to be a test of strength in a real war. Finnish fortifications were stormed in the harsh winter of 1939-1940, which was a difficult test for both military personnel and equipment.

Part of the community of historians cite the desire for the “Sovietization” of Finland as one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war. However, such assumptions are not confirmed by facts. In March 1940, the Finnish defensive fortifications fell, and the imminent defeat in the conflict became obvious. Without waiting for help from the Western allies, the government sent a delegation to Moscow to conclude a peace agreement.

For some reason, the Soviet leadership turned out to be extremely accommodating. Instead of quickly ending the war with the complete defeat of the enemy and the annexation of its territory to the Soviet Union, as was done, for example, with Belarus, a peace treaty was signed. By the way, this agreement also took into account the interests of the Finnish side, for example, the demilitarization of the Åland Islands. Probably in 1940 the USSR focused on preparing for war with Germany.

The formal reason for the start of the war of 1939-1940 was the artillery shelling of the positions of Soviet troops near the Finnish border. Which, naturally, the Finns were accused of. For this reason, Finland was asked to withdraw troops 25 kilometers in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. When the Finns refused, the outbreak of war became inevitable.

This was followed by a short but bloody war, which ended in 1940 with the victory of the Soviet side.

1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of ​​Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that accepting Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state and lead to Finland losing its neutrality and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) passed just 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was impossible to fulfill, because then Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30 at 8 a.m., troops of the Leningrad Front received orders to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyusti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During "perestroika" several versions of the Maynila incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret unit of the NKVD. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.

From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered certain directions from Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

The "Mannerheim Line" had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite obstacles up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational obstacles and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - troops Northwestern Front after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation they went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured for the most part Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the north-west, cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. In these circumstances, Finland turned to Soviet government asking for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.

The losses of Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.

(Additional

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet military forces amounted to 126 thousand 875 people. The Finnish army lost 21 thousand. 396 people killed. The total losses of Finnish troops amounted to 20% of their total personnel.
Well, what can you say about this? There is clearly yet another anti-Russian falsification covered by the authority of official historiography and the Minister of Defense himself (now former).

In order to understand the details of this nonsense, you will have to take an excursion to the original source to which everyone who cites this ridiculous figure in their works refers.

G.F. Krivosheev (edited). Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Losses of the armed forces

Dan information about the total number of irretrievable losses of personnel in the war (according to final reports from the troops on March 15, 1940):

• killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages 65,384;
• 14,043 were declared dead among the missing;
• died from wounds, concussions and illness in hospitals (as of March 1, 1941) 15,921.
• The total number of irretrievable losses amounted to 95,348 people.

Further, these figures are broken down in detail by categories of personnel, by armies, by branches of the military, etc.

Everything seems clear. But where do 126 thousand people of irreparable losses come from?

In 1949-1951 V As a result of lengthy and painstaking work to clarify the number of losses, the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Headquarters of the Ground Forces compiled personal lists of Red Army military personnel dead, dead and missing in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. In total, they included 126,875 fighters and commanders, workers and employees, who amounted to irretrievable losses. Their main summary indicators, calculated from personal lists, are presented in table 109.

Types of losses	Total number of irrecoverable losses		Exceeding the number of losses
	According to reports from the troops	According to named lists of losses
Killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages	65384	71214	5830
Died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals	15921	16292	371
Missing	14043	39369	25326
Total	95348	126875	31527

http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w04.htm-008

We read what is written there (quotes from this work are highlighted in green):

The number of irretrievable losses given in table 109 diverges greatly from the final data, which were calculated based on reports from troops received before the end of March 1940 and are contained in table 110.

The reason for the discrepancy that emerged is that the nominal lists included first of all out, unaccounted previously recorded losses of Air Force personnel, as well as military personnel who died in hospitals after March 1940, in Tue. oops, died Border guards and other military personnel who were not part of the Red Army were staying in the same hospitals for wounds and illnesses. In addition, the personal lists of irretrievable losses include a large number of military personnel who did not return home (based on requests from relatives), especially those who were called up in 1939-1940, contact with whom ceased during the Soviet-Finnish War. After searching unsuccessfully for many years, they were classified as missing. Note that these lists were compiled ten years after the Soviet-Finnish war. Ime But this explains the exorbitant presence on the lists large number missing persons - 39,369 people, which is 31% of all irretrievable losses in the Soviet-Finnish war. According to reports from the troops, a total of 14,043 military personnel went missing during the fighting.

Thus, we have what are the losses of the Red Army in Finnish war Inexplicably, more than 25 thousand people were included. those who disappeared are unclear where, unclear under what circumstances, and generally unclear when. Thus, researchers irrecoverable losses of the Red Army in the Finnish War are overestimated by more than a quarter.
On what basis?
However, inAs the final number of irretrievable human losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war, we accepted the number of all dead, missing and died from wounds and diseases, included in the personal lists, that is126,875 people This figure, in our opinion,more fully reflects the demographic irretrievable losses of the country in the war with Finland.
Just like that. To me, the opinion of the authors of this work seems completely unfounded.
firstly, because they do not justify this method of calculating losses in any way
secondly, because they don’t use it anywhere else. For example, to calculate losses in the Polish campaign.
Thirdly, because it is completely unclear on what grounds they actually declare the loss data presented by the headquarters “hotly” unreliable.
However, to justify Krivosheev and his co-authors, it should be noted that they did not insist that their (in a particular case) dubious assessments were the only correct ones and provided data from alternative, more accurate calculations. They can be understood.

But the authors of the Second Volume official History I refuse to understand the WWII who present these unreliable data as the ultimate truth.
The most curious thing from my point of view is that they do not consider the figures given by Krivosheev as the ultimate truth. This is what Krivosheev writes about the losses of the Finns
According to Finnish sources, the human losses of Finland in the war of 1939-1940. amounted to 48,243 people. killed, 43 thousand people. wounded

Compare with the above data on the losses of the Finnish army. They differ significantly!! But in the other direction.

So, let's summarize.
what we have?

Data on losses of the Red Army are overstated.
The losses of our opponents are underestimated.

I think it's pure water defeatist propaganda!