Flags of temporary state entities. Western Ukrainian People's Republic

Today Galicia may seem like an eternal bastion of nationalism. In the Russian-speaking segment of the Internet, this region is often associated with torchlight processions, a ban on celebrating Victory Day, as well as with deputies who fire minibus drivers for singing Russian-language songs and hang around kindergartens, demanding that children say their names in Ukrainian. Of course, such facts took place. But they are often used to spread myths and stereotypes. As a result, the winners are the forces seeking to pit Galicia and Donbass against each other, receiving dividends from the war.

The real history of this distinctive and amazingly beautiful Ukrainian region is closely connected with multiculturalism, tolerance, and the fight for social justice. Although, for political reasons, the modern “elite” does not like to remember these pages of history.

Galician way

From the Middle Ages to the 18th century. a vast region, including modern Western Ukraine, as well as the eastern and southeastern lands of modern Poland, was called Red Russia. Like every region of such a large country as our Motherland, it had its own characteristics of historical development. At the same time, the Rusyns (that is, “sons of Rus'”), as the inhabitants of the region called themselves until the twentieth century, always recognized themselves as part of the same people with the population of Naddnepryansk Ukraine.

Red Rus' has a rich history, in which there was a heroic struggle of the Galician princes against the Horde and Western (Polish and Hungarian) invaders, and long-term foreign rule, as a result of which Galicia was deeply, although not completely, integrated into Western civilization.

The name of the region probably comes from the group of ancient Cherven cities along the upper reaches of the Western Bug, its tributaries Guchva and Luga, and the upper reaches of the Styr. These included Cherven, Luchesk, Suteisk, Brody and others. The cities were annexed to Kievan Rus by the Kievan Prince Vladimir the Great, and subsequently the Galician-Volyn principality arose here. Its creator, Orthodox prince Roman Mstislavich, was the first in Rus' to claim the titles of the Byzantine emperor - tsar (“Caesar”) and autocrat (“autocrat”).

Contrary to the widespread myth about the rural nature of Galician culture, Chervonnaya Rus has almost a thousand years of continuous urban tradition. Since ancient times, cities have been multi-ethnic. Representatives lived here different nations and religions: Rusyns, Poles, Jews, Germans, Armenians, Czechs. The Galician princes actively invited foreign artisans and merchants to the cities, who brought the practice of city self-government - Magdeburg law.

As part of the Polish-Lithuanian state - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - Lviv, along with Ostrog and Kiev, was one of the centers of Orthodox culture. The peculiarities of the development of Ukrainian lands determined the importance of the “Russian” (Orthodox) faith, which acted as a guarantor of the preservation of the “old-time Russian people” in the Catholic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The Orthodox Church has become synonymous with the identity of the Russian people. The fraternal movement, a local analogue of the European Reformation, actively developed here. Brotherhoods were created by Orthodox townspeople (artisans and merchants) and part of the gentry to protect the interests of the Orthodox population. They founded schools, credit unions, and printing houses.

In 1574, with the money of the Lviv Brotherhood in Lviv, Ivan Fedorov published the first in Ukraine printed books in Slavic - “Apostle” and “Primer”.

It is curious that of all the Ukrainian bishops, only Lviv and Przemysl (Przemysl is now a city in Poland) rejected the Union of Brest of 1596, which proclaimed the unification of Orthodox and Catholics of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under the rule of the Pope.

An important feature of the historical path of Galicia was the absence of a Cossack system here, although many Galicians became Cossacks. But the Cossacks were a phenomenon of the steppe and borderland. As a result of this, Red Rus' remained under the rule of the gentry until at the end of the 18th century. was not captured by the Austrian Habsburg Empire.

Lviv under the red flag

Long separation of Galicia from the rest of the territory former Rus' put the national issue on the agenda, since the Galicians were constantly threatened with assimilation. Therefore, the top of local society (priests, landowners, intelligentsia) gave priority to the national factor over the social one. At the same time, the working masses - peasants and wage workers - first of all, strived for social justice. This first appeared during the Austrian Revolution of 1848-1849.

On the night of November 1-2, 1848, a red flag was raised over the Lviv Town Hall for the first time on the territory of Ukraine. Events of 1848-1849 went down in history as the “Spring of Nations”. The peoples of France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Hungary came out en masse against their monarchs. People demanded the convening of parliaments, freedom of speech, assembly, and religion.

Polish caricature from 1934. Behind the wire, according to the Poles, are Ukrainian terrorists and “separatists” (From the book: Wojciech Sleszynski. Obóz odosobnienia w Berezie Kartuskiej 1934-1939

During the interwar period, the struggle for social and national rights of Western Ukrainians continued. The Ukrainian movement was represented by a wide range of political forces: from clerics and conservatives to... the Communist Party of Western Ukraine. The nascent nationalist organizations immediately chose non-parliamentary forms of struggle, including terror. During the years of Ukrainization, the idea of ​​unity with Soviet Ukraine was very popular.

World economic crisis 1929-1933 led to a sharp impoverishment of the population. Throughout Europe, conservative, reactionary and fascist forces took advantage of this, seeking to establish dictatorial regimes under the populist slogans of establishing order with a “strong hand.” The threat of fascism, which carried the gene of world war, forced progressive forces to look for a platform for unification.

April 16, 1936 in Lviv under the flag of the anti-fascist popular front A mass anti-fascist demonstration took place, in which about 100 thousand people. The demonstration escalated into barricade fighting, during which 46 people were killed and more than 300 were wounded.

The current Shevchenko Avenue in Lviv after the battles of Western Ukrainian anti-fascists with the Polish police. April 16, 1936

In May 1936, the Anti-Fascist Congress was held in Lvov, which was attended by representatives of the intelligentsia of Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Famous writers gave anti-Nazi speeches there. Wanda Vasilevskaya, Yaroslav Galan, Stepan Tudor. The approved resolution called on the intelligentsia of Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to participate in the nationwide struggle against Nazism, to stop preparations for war, and for the free development of science and culture.

In Poland itself at that time, right-wing radical parties gained at least 20% of the elections, and the largest of them National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe) and the National Democratic Party ( Narodowa Demokracja, or endecja) had hundreds of thousands of members. Endetsia consistently received the highest percentage of votes in Galicia in Seimas elections.

This is how the marches of the large parliamentary Polish party National took place in the 30s.

The dictator of Poland, Jozef Pilsudski, welcomed Hitler's rise to power. On January 26, 1934, a non-aggression pact was concluded between Poland and Germany

Adolf Hitler during the funeral service for Pilsudski in Warsaw, 1935.

Ukrainian anti-fascists against General Franco

Anti-fascists from Western Ukraine stood up against fascism with arms in hand three years before the start of World War II. In distant Spain, a military rebellion under the leadership of General Franco began against the young democratic republic. Fascist Italy and Hitler's Germany came to the aid of the putschists. Thousands of internationalists from all over the world went to defend the republic. Among the first to defend Madrid in August 1936 were 37 natives of Western Ukraine who worked in mines and metallurgical plants in Belgium and France.

Following them, another 180 volunteers illegally set off from Galicia and Volyn to Spain through the Carpathian Yavornik pass on the then Polish-Czechoslovak border. Even political prisoners of Polish prisons Dmitry Zaharuk and Simon Kraevsky, natives of the Ivano-Frankivsk region, escaped from their places of detention and reached Spain to help their comrades.

In the summer of 1937, a Ukrainian company named after Taras Shevchenko was formed. It was part of the 13th international brigade named after Yaroslav Dombrovsky, named after a native of Zhitomir, a hero of the Paris Commune. The ideological assets of the company were members of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, among whom was the famous journalist Yuri Velikanovych.

Soldiers of the Dombrovsky International Brigade swear allegiance to the Spanish Republic

The commander of the company named after Taras Shevchenko S. Tomashevich wrote in the brigade newspaper: “ From the point of view of combat training, the company named after Taras Shevchenko stands very high thanks to the experience of a significant part of its comrades who have previously served in other armies. We have Ukrainian officers, such as lieutenants Ivanovich and Lytvyn, we have Ukrainian sergeants and corporals...

In Spanish villages and cities, a wonderful Ukrainian song is often heard - this is the company named after Taras Shevchenko. And during difficult transitions, the battalion commander turns to the Shevchenkoites: “Maybe the Ukrainians will start singing?” A powerful song sounds, and a difficult transition becomes easier».

The Shevchenkoites received their first baptism of fire in July in the battle of Brunete: the Moroccan cavalry of the Francoists was completely defeated by the Ukrainians and Poles; enemy positions near Villa Franco del Castil and Romanillos were also captured. In those fierce battles, the company lost almost half of its personnel. Later, Shevchenko’s men fought bravely near Zaragoza on the Aragonese front. In these bloody battles, company commander Stanislav Tomashevich, his deputy Pavel Ivanovich, soldiers Vasily Lozovoy, Nazar Demyanchuk, Joseph Konovaluk, Valentin Pavlusevich, Joseph Petrash and many others showed miracles of heroism. Most of them died on Spanish soil.

Soldiers of the Dombrovsky International Brigade after the Battle of Guadalajara

Historian F. Shevchenko wrote that this “ there were people full of heroism, self-sacrifice, they shed their blood, gave their lives for the bright future of humanity. The combat path of the Taras Shevchenko company in the fight against fascism in Spain is one of the best monuments to the great revolutionary poet" According to a participant in the Spanish Civil War, Soviet General A. Rodimtsev, the number of natives of Western Ukraine in the international brigades that fought against the Nazis reached a thousand people.

At the end of 1937, a newspaper in the Ukrainian language “Fight” began to be published for soldiers, which published poems and stories by Taras Shevchenko, as well as publications about him. The newspaper “News from Western Ukraine” was published for recruits in Albacete.

In December 1937 - February 1938, the Shevchenko company fought for the Sierra Quemado mountain range in a terrible snowstorm: at an altitude of 2 thousand meters, the soldiers repelled attacks during the battles for Teruel. They managed to capture a large number of Franco weapons. Brothers Polycarp and Simon Kraevskie single-handedly dealt with the machine gunners, destroying two crews and capturing their positions. In those battles, company commander Tomashevich, political instructor Demyanchuk, sergeant Sieradzsky and Polikarp Kraevsky were killed. In March 1938, the company was surrounded on the Andalusian front and managed to break through the ring four times, despite endless enemy attacks on the heights near Caspe. In those battles, commander Stanislav Voropai (Voropaev) and political instructor Simon Kraevsky fell.

For the Shevchenkoites, the war ended on September 28, 1938, when the Republican government of Spain published a decree on the withdrawal of international brigades from the country. On October 28, a ceremonial farewell to the International Brigade members took place in Barcelona; the Spaniards and Catalans showered them with flowers. And the Polish gendarmes were waiting at home for the survivors to send them to the Bereza Kartuzskaya concentration camp.

Yuri Latysh, Candidate of Historical Sciences

Yaroslav Shimov

The westernmost regions of modern Ukraine - Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia - were the easternmost provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918. For almost a century and a half (and Transcarpathia - much longer) they were under the scepter of the Habsburgs, whose domestic and foreign policy in the 19th - early 20th centuries could not but influence the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism and the development of the national culture and language of not only these regions, but and, to a certain extent, all of Ukraine. Galicia went to the Habsburgs as a result of the first (1772) and third (1795) sections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Austria did not participate in the second section). Bukovina was conquered by Austria from Ottoman Turkey in 1774 and annexed to Galicia; it was allocated as a separate province in the middle of the 19th century. It is characteristic that Maria Theresa, during whose reign the first partition took place, opposed the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian state and with great chagrin yielded to the pragmatic arguments of her son and co-ruler Joseph II. " Only the weakness of the Turks, the fact that we could not count on the help of England and France, the fears of a possible war with Russia and Prussia, the poverty and famine that had fallen on our lands, forced me to take that unrighteous step that tainted my reign and poisoned my days", the queen complained. However, as the long-time rival of the Habsburgs, the Prussian king Frederick II, noted with his characteristic causticity, “ she cried, but she took her due". The relative liberalism of the Habsburg regime, whose policy in the territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was noticeably softer than Russian or Prussian, may be to some extent explained precisely by the fact that “Galicia and Lodomeria” were annexed to the Danube monarchy for purely geopolitical reasons. In any case, the Habsburgs did not seek ideological justification for this step. For Prussia, participation in the partitions was a continuation of the long-standing German strategy of “pressure to the east,” and the Russian Empire claimed that it was returning the lands of Western Rus', once captured by Lithuania and Poland.

At first, due to the ethnic, cultural and linguistic affiliation of the nobility of Galicia, this province was perceived as Polish in the Habsburg Empire. As for Transcarpathia, at the beginning of the 13th century it became part of the Kingdom of Hungary, where the dominant role had long been assigned to the Hungarian culture. The East Slavic population of these lands - descendants of the inhabitants of the Galician-Volyn principality, which was part of Kievan Rus, at that time did not recognize themselves as a single ethnic group. They have formed only a local one, i.e. linguistic and religious identity associated with the place of residence (in this region, starting from the 17th century, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) religion prevailed). According to the famous Czech researcher Miroslav Groch, this situation is quite typical for Central and Eastern Europe, where the “foreign” ruling class dominated ethnic groups that occupied a compact territory but had neither their own nobility and political institutions, nor a long literary tradition.

The question of the (self)name of the East Slavic population of the provinces that were transferred to Russia and the Habsburg Empire as a result of the divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is both clear and quite confusing. We are talking about those about whom the Austrian traveler and diplomat Sigismund Herberstein wrote back in the 16th century: “ ...This people, speaking a Slavic language, professing the faith of Christ according to the Greek rite, calling themselves Russi in their native language, and in Latin called Rutheni ". But even during the time of Herberstein in various East Slavic lands the word Russi(Russian)Rusyns had different meanings, which, moreover, changed over the centuries. In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 14th–17th centuries, the ethnonym “ross” – “Rusyn” – “Russian” served to designate regional and/or confessional affiliation within the framework of a broader state-political community. In the Moscow state and the Russian Empire that grew out of it, the word “Russian” began to mean, first of all, territorial and political affiliation with Russia, citizenship.

The Rus/Russians/Rusyns, who lived in different areas of the vast region they inhabited, have been subject to various ethnocultural and political influences since the time of Kievan Rus: Balto-Germanic in the northwest, West Slavic in the west and southwest, Turkic in the south, Finno-Ugric and Turkic-Mongolian in the northeast. Diversification of the ethnic community in question - in principle, not united from the very beginning, because the inhabitants of the ancient Russian state, as is known, belonged to different tribes - gradually led to the formation of three East Slavic peoples: Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. It is important to note that the process of formation of the respective nations in all three cases began relatively late and, in a certain sense, is not completed to this day. The already complicated question of the origin of Rus'-Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the ethnonyms “Rusyn”, “Russian”, “Ukrainian”, “Belarusian”, etc., is complicated by deliberate ideologization. The author of this article, speaking about the East Slavic (Orthodox and Greek Catholic) population of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, uses mainly the ethnonym “Rusyns”, since it is the most neutral from a political and ideological point of view. Moreover, this is exactly how (in German Ruthenen) called the representatives of this people in the Habsburg Empire.

Before mid-19th century national movement Eastern Slavs in the Austrian Empire cannot be considered as an independent socio-political factor. We can only talk about the modest achievements of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church and the emerging Ruthenian intelligentsia in the field of public education, as well as in the development of local writing and literature. For the few (due to the low level of literacy) Rusyn readers, liturgical and other literature was published under the patronage of the Uniate Church in the so-called “Slavic Russian” language. It was an adverb that had little in common with the living speech of the Rusyns; in fact, it was a Church Slavonic language interspersed with local vocabulary, which activists of the Ukrainian national movement later called “paganism.” The first Galician publicists and educators emerged from among priests and theologians.

In 1836, Markian Shashkevich, who studied at the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv, wrote a treatise in which he argued that Rusyn texts should be written in Cyrillic, and criticized attempts to use the Latin alphabet for this purpose, guided by the rules of Polish orthography. Shashkevich together with Ivan Vagilevich and Yakov Golovatsky (the so-called “ ruska", or " Galician triytsya") published a collection " Mermaid Dnistrovaya" It included folk songs, ballads, Shashkevich's own stories and translations from Serbian and Czech. This was the first publication in a language close to spoken Rusyn (Western Ukrainian) dialects and using Church Slavonic alphabet, but a secular Cyrillic font (“citizen”). In general, the issue of codifying local dialects and creating a literary language on their basis was considered one of the most important by the figures of the national revival in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia until the end of the 19th century.

The revolution of 1848–1849 gave a strong impetus to the national movements of all peoples under Habsburg rule. In March 1848, as a result of mass protests in Vienna, the regime of Chancellor Clemens Metternich was overthrown. The unrest spread to the provinces. Galician Poles created Radu Narodov(National Council), which demanded broad autonomy from the imperial government. The hierarchs of the Greek Catholic Church and the small Ruthenian intelligentsia saw the rise of the Polish movement in Galicia as a threat to their interests. By that time, very tense relations had developed between the Polish and Rusyn populations in this province - however, the reasons for the tension were more social than national. When an uprising inspired by Polish revolutionaries from the nobility broke out in Krakow in 1846, the surrounding Galician peasants rose up against the landowners, finding themselves actually allies of the Austrian government. The Galician Massacre claimed the lives of more than two thousand Polish landowners and their families. In some districts, for example Tarnovsky, almost 90% of estates were looted and burned. The authorities punished the particularly cruel participants in this “jaquerie,” but some of its leaders received incentives and even awards.

The Habsburg government made it clear that it was ready to use the national and social contradictions in Galicia in its political interests. The governor of Galicia, Count Franz Stadion, trying to prevent Galicia from becoming a “Polish Piedmont” - a springboard from which the restoration of an independent Polish state could begin, encouraged the Ruthenian movement. As the Ukrainian-Canadian historian Orest Subtelny notes, the Stadium “ attracted and supported in every possible way... the timid Western Ukrainian elite, hoping to use it as a counterbalance to the more aggressive Poles". Not without his support, the Golovna Ruska Rada (Main Rusyn Council) was created, headed by the Greek Catholic Bishop Grigory Yakhimovich. The newspaper “Zorya Galitska” began publishing in Lviv. On May 15, 1848, she published an appeal from the Rada, which supported the constitutional reform of Emperor Ferdinand I. The appeal put forward demands for administrative autonomy and the free development of national culture and language for the Rusyns of Galicia - “ part of the great Ruthenian (Russian) people, who speak the same language and number 15 million people» .

The Manifesto of the Head Rada is considered the first official document that promotes the idea of ​​a commonality between the Ruthenian population of the Habsburg monarchy and the people of Ukraine-Little Russia, which was part of the Russian Empire. But neither in this nor in subsequent documents and publications of the Rada, which existed until 1851, will we find the names “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians”. The leaders of the Rada carefully emphasized that they represented only Rusyns, Ruthenen, a people different from the Russians ( Russen), and from the Poles, giving no reason to suspect the East Slavic population of the provinces bordering Russia of either irredentism or support for the Polish movement. Simultaneously with the Rada, the Russian Cathedral arose in Galicia, an organization that promoted the idea of ​​close Rusyn-Polish cooperation, effectively declaring the Rusyns Poles professing Catholicism of the Eastern (Greek) rite. The organ of the Council - the newspaper "Rusky Diary" - was edited by one of the members of the "Galician Trinity" Ivan Vagilevich. The cathedral, which, however, did not receive such popularity as the Rada, was supported by the Poles.

Representatives of the Golovnaya Rada, where the hierarchs of the Uniate Church predominated, also resorted to religious argumentation when defining Rusyn identity. They emphasized that, despite their common cultural roots and linguistic proximity, the Rusyns should not be identified with Russians (Great Russians) - adherents of Orthodoxy, i.e., in the eyes of Catholics and Uniates, “schismatics.” The interests of the Rusyns for the time being coincided with the interests of Vienna - perhaps that is why the Habsburg policy towards them was quite liberal. In 1847, 32 Rusyn publications were published in Galicia, in 1848 - already 156 (however, this record was not broken over the next 30 years). In addition to “Dawn of Galicia,” which was published until 1857, other Rusyn periodicals began to be published. The network of Rusyn primary schools grew rapidly, and a department of Rusyn language and literature was opened at the Faculty of Philosophy of Lviv University.

During the revolution of 1848-1849, the Ruthenian population remained loyal to the Habsburg monarchy. Pro-Russian sentiments spread among some of the Rusyns after troops sent by Nicholas I to help Franz Joseph I to suppress the Hungarian revolution arrived in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia. However, the enthusiasm with which local residents greeted the Russian army did not prevent the famous Ruthenian activist from Transcarpathia, Adolf Dobryansky, who was elected to the Hungarian parliament in 1848, from resolutely rejecting accusations of pan-Slavism. " Hungarian freedom is dearer to us than Russian autocracy, just as the mild climate of Hungary is preferable to the Siberian winter", he said. The gradually harsh policy of the Hungarian authorities aimed at assimilating ethnic minorities - both during the revolution of 1848–1849 and after the formation of the dual Austria-Hungary in 1867 - pushed some leaders of the Rusyn national movement away from Budapest, making them convinced Russophiles (the same Dobryansky later emigrated to Russia). At the same time, the Magyaron direction was also growing stronger, whose supporters considered the assimilation of the Rusyns as a way to join the more developed Hungarian culture and had nothing against their people turning into “Hungarians of the Greek Catholic faith.”

So, the revolutionary upsurge of 1848–1849 contributed to the fact that the cultural and educational activities of the Rusyn intelligentsia of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia took organizational form and turned into a national-political movement. Two currents competed in it: one was loyal to the Habsburgs, the other, “Muscovophile,” was oriented toward Russia. (The Polonophilia of the activists of the “Russian Cathedral” gradually almost disappeared.) By the 70-80s, Ukrainophile views began to quickly spread among Rusyn activists, especially among young people. Representatives of this trend were called “narodovtsy”. Rejecting the possibility of a compromise with the Galician Poles, they could not accept the main ideologeme of the “Muscovophiles,” who considered the Rusyns to be part of the Russian people. The “Narodovtsy” identified the local Rusyns with the Little Russian Ukrainians, insisting that both were a single ethnic group, which differed in language and culture from the Russian. Now the formation of the Rusyn national identity depended on the success of the implementation of one or another national-political project. Each of these projects was based on a certain - Russian or Ukrainian - interpretation of the origin of the Rusyns and their ethnocultural identity.

The national policy of the Habsburg government, as well as the policy of Tsarist Russia in relation to the Ukrainian national movement that arose in Little Russia, also had a noticeable influence on the competition between the “Muscovophiles” and the “Narodovtsy”. At the beginning of his reign, Alexander II adhered to a moderately liberal course and did not seriously oppress Little Russian “Ukrainophiles.” But later, after the defeat of the January uprising of 1863–1864, which engulfed not only the Kingdom of Poland, but also part of the territory of Lithuania and Belarus, St. Petersburg switched to harsh repressive measures against activists who promoted the Ukrainian language and culture. In 1876, the “Ems Decree” was issued, prohibiting the publication of literature in the Ukrainian language on the territory of the empire. However, "p The authorities' policy on the Ukrainian issue suffered from the absence of any substantial activity of a non-repressive nature. The authorities failed to fix effective system primary education in Russian, effectively use other assimilation tools available to them". Since the Russification measures were not very successful, the social base of the Ukrainian movement on the territory of the empire could not be eliminated.

The repressive course of the Russian government contributed to the fact that the center of the Ukrainian national movement moved to Galicia. Over the years, such figures as Mikhail Drahomanov, Mikhail Grushevsky and Dmitry Dontsov, in particular, moved there. As Drahomanov noted in his “Letters to Naddniepryansk Ukraine”, “ Russian Ukrainians enter into closer ties with Austrian ones, appear in Bukovina and Hungarian Rus' (Transcarpathia), where no Ukrainophile had ever set foot before, Ukrainian libraries are created in Vienna, in Chernivtsi, numerous Ukrainian books are brought into Hungarian Rus', where no one has seen them before". The fairly liberal policy of the Austrian authorities does not prevent the emergence of Ukrainian educational and scientific societies (Prosvita, Taras Shevchenko Society), which are rapidly expanding the range of their activities. Cooperatives and mutual lending societies appear. Thus, by 1906, the Lviv society “Prosvita” had 39 branches in Eastern Galicia. From 1869 to 1914, it opened 1,700 reading rooms and published 82 book titles with a total circulation of 655 thousand copies.

IN last years In the 19th century, the growing Galician Ukrainophilism was painted in distinctly leftist, socialist tones, which added to its popularity, mainly among the intelligentsia and youth. In 1890, the Ukrainian Radical Party emerged, among the founders of which was the classic of Ukrainian literature Ivan Franko. Five years later, one of the activists of this party, Yulian Bachynsky, published his essay “Ukraine irredenta” (“Independent Ukraine”), in which for the first time the idea of ​​political independence of the Ukrainian people was openly proclaimed. Baczynski states that this idea " gains support among the Galician-Ukrainian intelligentsia and proletariat". The work of Bachynsky - by the way, who called himself a Marxist - is assessed by many today's Ukrainian historians as “ one of the bricks that should form the basis of the state building of Ukraine, creatively used during the formation of a sovereign Ukrainian state in modern conditions". In 1900, a brochure by a native of Ukraine-Little Russia, Russian subject Nikolai Mikhnovsky “Independent Ukraine” was published in Lvov, which put forward a radical program for the creation of “ one, united, indivisible, free, independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus» .

The ideas of creating an independent Ukrainian state threatened the integrity of both the Romanov empire and the Habsburg monarchy, so they could not help but worry not only the Russians, but also the Austrian authorities. But still, for St. Petersburg, the spread of these ideas posed a much greater danger than for Vienna, if only because the Russian Empire contained a much larger part of the lands with a Ukrainian population than part of Austria-Hungary. Note that, unlike Russia, in the Habsburg monarchy, at least in the Austrian part of it, which included Galicia and Bukovina, there was no dominant, “titular” ethnic group; the ruling dynasty, German in language and culture, associated itself not with the Germans or any other people of the empire, but with the empire as a whole. The national policy of the Habsburg authorities (in “greater” Austria, but not in Hungary!) was not repressive, but at the same time Vienna skillfully played on the contradictions between the Polish and Ukrainian national movements.

In Russia, both in the ruling circles of the empire, and among part of the Russian public, under the last three tsars “ the opinion was widespread that the state bureaucracy (primarily in the western regions of the empire. - Ya. Sh.) called upon to constantly fulfill the mission of defender of the Russian people from the threat of denationalization and economic exploitation by the Poles, Germans and other peoples". Since Ukrainians and Belarusians, according to the official ideology, were also considered part of the Russian people, the “fight against denationalization” in Ukrainian and Belarusian lands often turned into Russification. As already mentioned, the assimilation policy of the Russian authorities was neither flexible nor consistent. Therefore, it was doomed to failure - despite the fact that the “enemy” was not so terrible: both the Ukrainian and Belarusian national movements until the beginning of the twentieth century were represented by relatively small groups of local intelligentsia and youth of various ranks. The question of awakening the national self-awareness of the peasant majority, whether a national identity would be formed on the basis of a local or regional one, still remained open.

Both Ukrainophilism and Russophilism in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia became factors in the internal politics of not only the Habsburg Empire, but also the Russian Empire. As relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary deteriorated (mainly due to the clash of their interests in the Balkans), both powers had to increasingly reckon with these trends. At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the vast majority of Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainophiles were loyal to the Austrian authorities and the imperial house. Their immediate political goal was to provide administrative and cultural autonomy to the eastern part of Galicia, where the Ruthenian population predominated, and they still considered the local Poles their main enemy. As the American historian Timothy Snyder rightly notes, “ For Ukrainian activists, Poles were models, rulers and rivals. The example is how they managed to achieve significant autonomy within Austria. Rulers - because... power was concentrated in their hands: more than 90 percent of the highest administrative posts in Galicia were in the hands of the Poles. They were rivals as Polish political forces associated with modern nationalism, such as the National Democrats, sought to spread Polish culture as a single national culture throughout Galicia» .

Ivan Franko insisted that the Poles " must once and for all abandon the idea of ​​recreating “historical” Poland on non-Polish lands and accept, as we do, the idea of ​​ethnic Poland". This was not easy to achieve, since in 1867-70 the imperial government made several important concessions to the Galician Poles, uniting the western part of Galicia (where the Polish population predominated) with the eastern part (with a predominance of Rusyns) and approved a number of measures that included the polonization of the system higher education in the province. Since 1869, Polish has enjoyed official status in Galicia ( Landesprache). Since, until the beginning of the twentieth century, the political interests of the Galician Poles were represented by people from the ranks of the large landed aristocracy, “socially close” to the imperial court and the Austrian aristocrats, Polish political influence in Vienna was incomparably stronger than the Ruthenian.

The Ukrainian movement in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia had another notable rival: the Russophile movement in these provinces numbered thousands of activists in its ranks and had its own network of scientific and educational societies and cultural centers. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the influence of supporters of “paganism” with its Church Slavonic basis was still strong among Russophiles, but gradually most of them tended to use the Russian language, at least in written texts. The Austrian authorities treated “Muscophiles” much harsher than they treated Ukrainian activists, seeing them as agents of Russian influence. Indeed, St. Petersburg provided support to Russophile circles in Galicia - in particular, by financing the newspaper “Slovo” published in Lvov. However, we must follow the Russian historian Alexei Miller in recognizing that “ high-ranking officials... the newspaper was expected not so much to strengthen Russian influence in Galicia, but to counteract Ukrainophilia in the South-Western region... Plans for the annexation of Galicia never completely disappeared from the agenda in St. Petersburg, but it would be a mistake to believe that they were a priority and that Russia was ready to take advantage of any opportunity to implement them» .

Repressions against Russophiles, in particular the trial of several pro-Russian activists in Galicia in the early 80s, and a significant intensification of Ukrainophilia (“ people's art") led to a gradual weakening of the “Muscovophile” orientation in the Rusyn movement. Many pro-Russian Galicians emigrated to Russia, while Ukrainophiles, on the contrary, moved from Little Russia to Galicia, joining the local Ukrainian national movement. And although right up to the First World War “Muscovophilism” remained a noticeable factor in the life of the region, already from the beginning of the twentieth century, and especially after 1907, when universal suffrage was introduced in Galicia, the “Muscovophiles” in their opposition to the “Narodovtsy” were forced to seek allies. These allies sometimes turned out to be unexpected: for example, during the election campaign of 1907–1908, activists from pro-Russian circles in Galicia collaborated with Polish national democrats and the local conservative Polish administration.

It should be noted, however, that the severity of the national question in Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia was not the same. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, a harmonious balance gradually emerged in Bukovina between various ethnic communities. This provision was reinforced by the electoral reform of 1911, according to which each community was ensured proportional representation in the local legislative assembly (not counting seats "up for grabs" in free general elections). Bukovina electoral system was considered as a possible model for solving national problems in other multi-ethnic provinces of Austria-Hungary.

In Transcarpathia, the national identity of the Rusyns was seriously threatened by the Magyarization policy pursued by the Hungarian government and supported by the Magyarons. If in 1907 there were 23 in Transcarpathia primary schools with education only in the Rusyn language, then the very next year they were all closed, only 34 bilingual (Rusyn-Hungarian) schools remained. Otherwise, the education system was completely Magyarized. Since 1898, the loyalist People's Committee of Hungarians of the Greek Catholic confession operated in Budapest. But along with the movements of the Magyaron, pro-Russian and Ukrainophile orientation in Transcarpathia, there were also supporters of the independent identity of local Rusyns, which was not identical with either Great Russian, Ukrainian, or Hungarian. One of the leaders of this movement, Augustin Voloshin, complained in 1909 that “ the terrible ills of Ukrainianism and radicalism that spread in Galicia led to a schism and alienated the Ruthenian from his church, his language and even from the Ruthenian name itself» .

In Galicia, at the beginning of 1908, the results of elections to the local legislative assembly (Landtag, or Diet) were announced, bringing unexpected success to Russophile parties - despite the fact that a few months earlier, Ukrainophiles won a landslide victory in the elections to the Imperial Council (Reichsrat). Activists of the Ukrainian movement accused the authorities of falsifying the voting results. The conflict turned into a tragedy: on April 12, 1908, Ukrainian student Miroslav Sichinsky shot and killed the imperial governor in Galicia, the Polish aristocrat Andrzej Potocki. Interethnic and political tension in the region grew. This was also facilitated by the further deterioration of relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia after the Bosnian crisis of 1908–1909. The Ukrainian movement in Galicia increasingly shifted to anti-Russian and at the same time loyalist, pro-Habsburg positions. Its leaders hoped that the victory of Austria-Hungary, allied with Germany, in a possible war against Russia could lead to the formation of a Ukrainian state - or, at least, to the granting of broad national autonomy to the Ukrainians under the scepter of the Habsburgs. Therefore, the statement adopted in December 1912 following a meeting of representatives of Ukrainian political forces in Galicia directly stated: “ In the name of the future of the Ukrainian people on both sides of the border, in the event of war between Austria and Russia, the entire Ukrainian community will unanimously and decisively side with Austria against the Russian Empire as the greatest enemy of Ukraine» .

Before the war, the pro-Russian movement also intensified. In response, the Austrian-Hungarian authorities intensified their persecution. At the beginning of 1914, several Rusyn activists of the “Muscovophile” trend appeared in court in Hungary. The well-known Russian Duma politician, representative of the right, Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, acted as one of the defense witnesses at the trial. He used his trip to support Russophile sentiments in Austria-Hungary and to popularize the Russian position on the issue of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia. In an interview with one of the French newspapers, Bobrinsky stated that among the Rusyns “ no need for propaganda. They themselves know that they are Russian". Of course, this was not entirely true: a certain part of the Rusyn population really considered themselves Russians, but no less a smaller proportion identified themselves with Ukrainians; finally, there were many who had not yet decided on ethnic self-identification. Actually, one of the main problems of national self-determination of the indigenous population of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia was precisely that this process was extremely politicized and complicated by the intervention of both the Austrian and Hungarian political elites, and Russia, i.e. forces external to the region. All this ultimately led to the tragedy that took place here during the First World War.

In 1914–1916, Galicia became one of the main theaters of military operations. In August–September 1914, an attempt by the Austro-Hungarian offensive deep into Russian territory failed, then Russian troops launched a counterattack, as a result of which they occupied most of Galicia and Bukovina. The Russian occupation administration limited teaching in the Ukrainian language, took certain measures against Ukrainian activists and against the Uniate Church, which was seen as a conductor of Austrian influence. In particular, the Greek Catholic metropolitan, outstanding church and cultural figure Andrei Sheptytsky was interned and then deported to Russia, where he remained until the spring of 1918. However, the repressive measures applied by Russia cannot be compared with the persecution to which the Austro-Hungarian authorities subjected true and imaginary “Muscophiles.” Waves of repression swept through Galicia, Bukovina and (to a lesser extent) Transcarpathia, first during the retreat of the Habsburg troops, and then after, with the support of its German ally, Austria-Hungary in 1915 ousted the Russians from most of the territory they had occupied the year before. Hundreds of death sentences were carried out by courts-martial for collaborating with Russian troops and the administration. Thousands of people, including the elderly, women and children, were deported to the concentration camps Thalerhof (in the area of ​​Graz in Austria) and Theresienstadt (now Terezin in the Czech Republic). According to various sources, from 15 to 30 thousand people were kept in Talerhof in 1914–1917, at least three thousand prisoners died. It was only in May 1917 that the new Emperor Charles I, to his credit, ordered the closure of the Thalerhof camp, which had tarnished the reputation of the Habsburg monarchy in the last years of its existence.

The events of the first two years of the First World War had a profound negative impact on Rusyn (Western Ukrainian) society. Repressions, both Austro-Hungarian and Russian, were accompanied not just by mutual attacks by Ukrainophile and Russophile activists, but by the mass surrender of national-political opponents to the military authorities of the opposing powers. In 1915, along with the retreating Russian troops, active “Muscovophiles” with their families also left Galicia and Bukovina - more than 25 thousand people in total. Austro-Hungarian repressions completed the job: the pro-Russian political movement in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia practically disappeared. Of course, the revolutionary events of 1917 and subsequent years in Russia also played a role here: the Orthodox Romanov empire ceased to exist, and with it the political and cultural center of attraction for Galician and Bukovinian Russophiles disappeared, because Bolshevik Russia evoked completely different feelings...

As for the Ukrainian movement in Galicia and Bukovina, it very actively contributed to the war efforts of the Habsburg monarchy. Already in the first days of the war in Lvov, with the permission of the Austrian authorities, a Head of Ukrainian Rada(Main Ukrainian Council). At the same time, a group of Ukrainian activists - emigrants from the Russian Empire - organized the Union of Liberation of Ukraine (SVU, Union for the Liberation of Ukraine). In May 1915, the Golovna Rada was transformed into the Zahalna Ukrainian Rada (General Ukrainian Council), which included 24 representatives of Galicia, 7 of Bukovina and 3 activists of the Ukrainian Foreign Army. The leading role in the Rada was played by members of the Austrian Parliament Kost Levitsky and Mykola Vasilko. The maximum program that guided these figures was formulated in one of the Ukrainian propaganda brochures published in Vienna in 1915: “ All Ukrainians, who are not silenced by the fist of the Russian autocracy, spoke out in favor of the creation or restoration of an independent Ukrainian state. (...) It is clear that at the moment of the collapse of Russia an independent Ukrainian state would arise. Ukraine is too large to be annexed to Austria or another state". At the call of the Rada, the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen was created, which fought as part of the 25th Corps of the Austro-Hungarian Army. About 28 thousand volunteers registered to join the “Sich”, but the Austrian command limited their number to only two and a half thousand.

Main rivals Ukrainian nationalists activists of the Polish national movement spoke. The Poles blocked the Ukrainian demand for the division of Galicia and granting its eastern part broad autonomy. The Polish elite of Galicia pinned hopes for the restoration of independent Poland on the expected victory of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Indeed, starting in 1915, when German troops occupied most of the Kingdom of Poland, which was part of the Russian Empire, the leaders of the Central Powers bloc discussed the issue of the future structure of the Polish state. It was possible that it would be ruled by a monarch from the Habsburg or Hohenzollern dynasty. The restoration of the Kingdom of Poland was officially announced by a joint Austro-German manifesto on November 5, 1916. The decision on the borders of this state and who would lead it was postponed until the post-war period. A day earlier, Franz Joseph I signed a decree granting autonomy to Galicia - without dividing it, which meant consolidating the political dominance of the Poles throughout the province.

Vienna's decision sparked violent protests from Ukrainian activists. It's already November 6th Zagalna Ukrainian Rada adopted a resolution expressing dissatisfaction with the fact that the conditions for granting autonomy were not discussed with representatives of the Ukrainian people and that the government broke promises made to a number of Galician-Ukrainian leaders that Galicia would be divided into two provinces. The Zagalna Rada proclaimed that from now on, in order to achieve its political goals, the Ukrainian movement in Austria-Hungary would rely primarily on own strength. There were changes in the leadership of the Rada: it was headed by K. Levitsky’s rival, Evgen Petrushevich. In the last two years of the Habsburg monarchy, the Ukrainian movement gradually radicalized. This is noticeable, first of all, in the speeches of the Galician-Ukrainian deputies of the Reichsrat, reconvened by the young Emperor Charles I in the spring of 1917. However, the complete break between the Ukrainophiles and Vienna occurred only when the Habsburg monarchy actually ceased to exist.

On November 7 (20), 1917, the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) was proclaimed in Kyiv, initially as an autonomous one within Russia. On January 25, 1918, the government of the republic, the Central Rada, announced the complete independence of Ukraine. In March 1918, the Bolshevik government of Russia concluded Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the powers of the Central Bloc. Article 6 of this treaty meant recognition of the independence of the newly formed Ukrainian state, although de facto the Rada only partially controlled the territory it claimed. The position of Ukrainian activists in Austria-Hungary became somewhat ambiguous: after all, Eastern Galicia, the most important center of the Ukrainian national movement, remained part of the Habsburg monarchy, whose authorities did not consider the possibility of transferring this province to Ukraine. Many Galician figures flocked to the UPR to take part in the work of its state institutions. However, the vicissitudes of the military-political struggle led to a split in the Ukrainian movement. Thus, the “Sich Riflemen” supported the Central Rada in the fight against the pro-German regime of Hetman Skoropadsky, who came to power in the spring of 1918 (apparently, the author, firstly, confuses the Austrian “Ukrainian Sich Riflemen” and the “Kiev” “Sich Riflemen”, created under the Central Rada from Austro-Hungarian volunteer prisoners of war. Secondly, the author may be confusing the events of the “Hetman’s Coup” “in April 1918, during which the entire Ukrainian Kiev garrison was disarmed, including the “Sich”, and the “Uprising of the Directory” in the fall of the same year, supported by the “Sich Riflemen” restored by the hetman - Dmitry Adamenko). Later, during the Civil War in Ukraine, units that had experience in combat operations as part of the Austro-Hungarian army turned out to be perhaps the most combat-ready formations of the troops of the Directory - the Ukrainian government led by Simon Petliura, which waged war simultaneously with the Bolsheviks, White Guards and - until the spring 1920 - with Poland.

In the fall of 1918, when defeat in the war and internal crisis led to the uncontrollable collapse of Austria-Hungary, Ukrainian activists in Galicia were ready to take power in the province. On November 1, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUNR) was proclaimed in Lviv, which was to include not only Eastern Galicia, but also part of Bukovina and Transcarpathia. In the future, the reunification of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic with the Ukrainian People's Republic was envisaged. This caused fierce opposition from the Poles, who wanted to include all of Galicia in the new independent Poland. The Polish-Ukrainian war began, which lasted several months. It claimed the lives of a total of about 25 thousand people. As a result of the fighting of 1918-1920 and the redistribution of territories following three wars - the First World War, the Civil War and the Soviet-Polish War, Galicia and part of Bukovina became part of Poland, the other part of Bukovina went to Romania, and Transcarpathia to Czechoslovakia. In 1940, Transcarpathia was briefly annexed to Hungary, and after World War II and a new revision of borders in Central and Eastern Europe, almost all Ruthenian (Western Ukrainian) lands that were under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before 1918 became part of the Ukrainian SSR. But these events are beyond the scope of this article.

Staying under the scepter of the Habsburgs, in their multinational and multicultural empire, had a great influence on the development of the Ukrainian national movement and identity. But it would hardly be correct to consider the formation of the Ukrainian nation as a process with a predetermined result. A modern nation, according to M. Groch’s definition, is “ a large community of people, equal to each other and connected by a combination of connections that were often formed over centuries - linguistic, cultural, political, geographical, economic, etc. X" . The Ukrainian nation was not something given in advance - it is wrong to think that in order to “awaken” the corresponding identity among millions of people, only the efforts of a small group of nationally oriented activists were required. “Project Ukraine” was formed in the process of transition from a traditional agrarian society to a modern society on a vast culturally and historically heterogeneous territory, which, moreover, from the second half of the 17th century was under the rule of several powers: the Moscow State and its successor - the Russian Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburg Empire.

It so happened that it was on the territory of the latter that in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries conditions developed that were most favorable for the development of the Ukrainian national movement. Ukrainian identity competed with alternative national-cultural and state-political projects: Little Russian regional identity within the framework of the “all-Russian” national and state identity; its mirror image - Ukrainian identity within the framework of the “all-Polish” identity; Russian identity for the Rusyns of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia and, finally, an independent Rusyn identity, different from both Polish and Russian, and from Ukrainian. That the Ukrainian version of nation-building was the most successful was the result of a combination of a number of historical factors. A special role was played by the combination of the moderate national policy of the Habsburgs in Galicia and the tough one of the Romanovs in Ukraine-Little Russia.

Participation in political life Austria-Hungary at the level of the Reichsrat, the legislative assemblies of Galicia and Bukovina, and local governments allowed representatives of the Ukrainian national movement and their electorate to gain valuable democratic experience. But we should not forget that the Austrian authorities skillfully used the principle of “divide and conquer.” The national policy of the Habsburgs, on the one hand, contributed to the growth of interethnic tensions in relations between Ukrainians and Poles, on the other hand, it did not interfere with the fierce struggle of Ukrainophiles and Russophiles in the Rusyn movement (while the authorities supported the former). During the First World War and later, simmering conflicts that arose in previous decades led to tragedies. During the Second World War, Western Ukraine became notorious not only for the genocide of Jews, which was carried out by the Nazi occupiers and their local accomplices, but also for the fierce confrontation between the partisans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Polish Home Army, during which both sides, but primarily the UPA, resorted to ethnic purges. The tragic final chord was the first post-war years, when the west of the Ukrainian SSR and the south-east of Poland turned into an arena of mass repressions and deportations organized by the new communist authorities.

The turbulent history of the region after 1918 largely contributed to the fact that the Habsburg era, with its long decades of peace, progressive economic development (although Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia were among the least developed provinces of the empire) and relative internal political stability, became in the historical memory of the inhabitants of what is now Western Ukraine a kind of “golden age”. The Habsburg heritage of Ukraine, however, does not need idealization, but a thorough and, if possible, unbiased study. Of course, it to some extent influences the current situation in western Ukraine, determining political preferences, socio-psychological stereotypes and the cultural specifics of the region. Without much exaggeration, we can say that the diversity and diversity of modern Ukraine brings it closer to the long-vanished Danube monarchy. Time will tell whether today's Ukrainians will be able to preserve this diversity without sacrificing national-state unity. In any case, residents of both the west and east of Ukraine should remember the simple and wise motto inscribed on the coat of arms of Franz Joseph I - “Viribus unitis” (“United efforts”).

Notes

Although in 1809 the northwestern regions of Galicia were included in the Duchy of Warsaw created by Napoleon, and in 1815, by decision of the Congress of Vienna, into the Kingdom of Poland, which became part of the Russian Empire, the Habsburgs retained most of the territory of the province.

Quote by: Magenschab H. Josef II. Revolucionar Bozi merci. Praha, 1999. S. 104.

However, it was not exclusively Magyar in linguistic terms: until 1844 in Hungary, Latin remained the main language of legal proceedings, parliamentary debates, administrative acts, etc. The first scientific work dedicated to the Slavs of Transcarpathia was written in this language - the treatise of the court librarian A. F. Kollar “On the origin, history and life of the Rusyns of Hungary” (1749).

Grokh M. From national movements to a fully formed nation: the process of nation-building in Europe // Nations and Nationalism. M.: Praxis, 2002. P. 123.

Herberstein S. Notes on Muscovy. M.: Moscow State University Publishing House, 1988. P. 58.

The question of the origin of the names “Russia”, “Ukraine”, “Russians”, “Little Russians”, “Ukrainians”, etc., as well as the historical, political and ideological vicissitudes that accompanied the use of these historical and geographical concepts and ethnonyms, is discussed in detail. for example, in the monograph: Mylnikov A.S. Picture of the Slavic World: A View from Eastern Europe. Ideas about ethnic nomination and ethnicity of the 16th–18th centuries. St. Petersburg: Petersburg Oriental Studies, 2000.

For more information about the role of the Uniate Church, see, for example, in the article: Khimka I. P. Religion and nationality in Ukraine in the other half of the 18th-20th century // Ark. Scientific collection of church history. Lviv, 2004. T. 4. pp. 55–66.

See: Wandycz P. S. The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918. Seattle & London, 1996. P. 135.

Piedmont is a historical region that played a leading role in the unification of Italy.

Subtelny O. Ukraine: history. Kiev, 1993. Quoted. from: http://www.unitest.com/uahist/subtelny/s53.phtml.

Quote by: Levitsky K. History of the political thoughts of Galician Ukrainians, 1848-1914. Lviv, 1926. Part I. P. 21.

Irredentism is the desire of an ethnocultural minority to reunite with the ethnic community living on the other side of the border, which in many cases is the titular ethnic group for the neighboring side.

Magocsi P. R. A History of Ukraine. Seattle, 1998. P. 413.

Pop I. Podkarpatska Rus. Praha, 2005. S. 78.

Western outskirts of the Russian Empire / Ed. M. Dolbilov, A. Miller. M.: NLO, 2006. P. 284.

Drahomanov M. Leaves to the Nadnipryansk Ukraine. Colomia, 1894. Quote. from: www.ukrstor.com/ukrstor/dragomanov_listy4.htm.

Magocsi P. R. Op. cit. P. 442.

Ukrainian Suspil-Political Thought in the 20th Century / Ed. T. Hunchak, R. Solchanik. New York, 1983. T. I. P. 33.

Yarty A. Ukrainian national idea in the scientific-theoretical decline of Julian Bachynsky // Bulletin of Lviv University. Series: philosophy. Sciences. 2002. VIP. 4. P. 318.

Mikhnovsky M. Independent Ukraine. Lviv, 1900. Quote. from: http://www.ukrstor.com/ukrstor/mihnowskij-samostijnaukraina.html

Since 1867, the Habsburg Empire was divided into two parts, which enjoyed great independence in internal affairs: Kingdom of Hungary (“lands of the crown of St. Stephen”) and “lands represented in the Imperial Council”, commonly called Cisleithania (i.e. “on this side of Leith” - the river that divided the two halves of the empire on one of the border sections) or - conditionally - "Austria". The “lands represented in the Imperial Council” included, in addition to Austria itself, also Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, Bukovina, present-day Slovenia and some other territories. Both parts of the empire, in addition to the person of the monarch, were united by a single army and foreign policy.

Novak A. The struggle for the outskirts, the struggle for survival: the Russian Empire of the 19th century. and Poles, Poles and Empire (review of modern Polish historiography) // Western outskirts of the Russian Empire. P. 457.

Snyder T. The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. New Haven & London, 2003. P. 127.

Quote from: Rudnytsky I. L. The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule // Austrian History Yearbook. 1967. Vol. 3. Pt. 2. P. 407.

Thus, the Polish aristocrat, governor of Galicia (1888), Count K. Badeni, held the post of prime minister of the Austrian part of the dual monarchy in 1895-1897, and the son of another Galician governor, Count A. Golukhovsky, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1895-1906 Austria-Hungary.

Miller A. “The Ukrainian Question” in the policy of the authorities and Russian public opinion (second half of the 19th century). St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2000. pp. 250–251. Pop I. Op. cit. S. 98.

Magocsi P. R. Op. cit. P. 456.

Austria-Hungary's 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been ruled by the Habsburg monarchy since 1878 while nominally remaining part of the Ottoman Empire, caused a diplomatic crisis of European proportions.

Levitsky K. History of the political thoughts of Galician Ukrainians, 1848-1914. Lviv, 1927. Part II. P. 634.

Quote by: Susta J. Svetova politika v letech 1871-1914. Prague, 1931. Sv. 6. S. 305.

For more information about Thalerhof, see, for example: War crimes of the Habsburg Monarchy 1914-1917: Galician Golgotha. Trumbull, Conn., 1964; Vavrik V. R. Terezin and Talerhof. New York, 1966; Cervinka V. Moje rakouske zalare. Praha, 1928; Kwilecki A. Lemkowie: Zagadnienie Migracji i Asymilacji. Warszawa, 1974, etc.

Levitsky subsequently described in detail the activities of Ukrainian organizations in Austria-Hungary in his multi-volume work: Levitsky K. History of free liberation of Galician Ukrainians during the hour of the World War. Lviv, 1929-1930.

Tsegelsky L. Independent Ukraine. Viden, 1915. S. 4, 9.

For more details, see: Abbott P., Pinak E. Ukrainian Armies 1914-1955. Oxford, 2004. P. 7-8.

See, for example: Zahradnicek T. Jak vyhrat cizi valku. Cesi, Polaci a Ukrajinci 1914-1918. Praha, 2000. S.61.

Hroch M. Na prahu narodni existence. Praha, 1999. S 8.

Despite the fact that Ukrainians formally represent an independent ethnic group, there are still certain differences between Westerners and other representatives of Independence, and often significant ones. These differences are largely due to the influence of other countries with which different regions of Ukraine neighbor.

Language is not the same everywhere

Residents of Lvov and Dnepropetrovsk can be easily distinguished by their dialect - they place different emphasis on the same words, pronouncing them with the intonation characteristic of a particular region: “lystopaAd” and “listOpad”, for a Dnepropetrovsk resident - “we have come”, and for a Lviv resident - "We are Prively." This difference is especially noticeable when using verb forms.

The southeast of Ukraine neighbors Russia, so the Russian language is more popular there. The linguistic palette of residents of the western regions of the country is influenced by the proximity to Moldova, Slovakia, Hungary, Belarus, Romania and Poland. Accordingly, the language of Westerners is replete with words borrowed from these neighbors.

Geography influences character

According to scientists, Ukrainians belong to one anthropological type, but it is divided into several subtypes. According to the Ukrainian scientist Sergei Szegeda, the majority of “average” Ukrainians have a typical appearance, and its “shades” have long been erased historically. However, the psychotypes of the residents different regions Ukraine is still different.

Southerners are joyful and emotional

Ukrainian psychologist Sergei Steblinsky classified the residents of Square depending on the regions in which they live.

He believes that the character of Ukrainians is seriously influenced by the climate of the area and its location. So, southerners are more joyful and emotional than others. This is noticeable at least in the example of Odessa residents. Southerners living by the sea are witty and enterprising. Moldovans, Romanians and Bulgarians are considered their distant relatives.

Westerners are irreconcilable

Residents of Western Ukraine, living in mountainous areas, have a hardened, persistent character. Highlanders are characterized by intransigence and a keen sense of justice. Outwardly, they differ most from other Ukrainians - Westerners, as a rule, are very short in stature, and their eye color is darker than that of other representatives of the ethnic group. The presumptive ancestors of people from Western Ukraine are Balkan peoples.

Averages are averaged

Residents of the central part of Ukraine have everything that is statistically average, including their appearance. In this habitat, the paths of a variety of tribes crossed at one time, and among the middle peasants there are even descendants of Turkish-speaking peoples.

The population of this area is characterized by a contradictory character, which is characterized by mood swings.

Northerners are gloomy rational skeptics

The cold climate leaves its mark on the character of the inhabitants of the northern regions of Ukraine. Outwardly, they are fair-haired, of medium height, with a massive chin and furrowed eyebrows. The inhabitants of Polesie are descendants of the northern peoples who lived during the Mesolithic and Neolithic eras.

Northerners are emotional, cheerful and determined. These are people with an active lifestyle. Upper Dnieper Ukrainians are considered descendants of the Ilmen-Dnieper peoples who once inhabited the northwestern European part of modern Russia.

Artem Davidenko, Vasyl Mykhailyshyn, for "Khvyli"

How many theories do you know about why Russians are not very liked in Western Ukraine? If you look hard enough, you can find many explanations. Most of them differ from each other primarily in the flight of imagination of the authorsand the main villains, but it is unlikely that any of them will be able to surpass the theory about the Austrian General Staff.

In short, Austria wanted to weaken its dangerous neighbor, the Russian Empire, which became especially reasonable for Vienna during the First World War, when both countries were on opposite sides of the front line. And what could be better thought of than to undermine the foundations of the unity of the Romanov Empire - to quarrel"brotherly peoples" , the pillars on which the Russian state is based. Without thinking for long, the insidious Austrian General Staff began to implement a cunning plan and came up with the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian culture, and the word “Ukraine” itself. True, history does not tell how the cunning Habsburgs managed to teach a language invented only yesterday to millions of people. And how did it happen that this very language is already for a long time used in worship, in literature and folklore, no one explains either.

There are many similar pseudoscientific theories and all of them are good only upon superficial acquaintance. Ukraine and Ukrainians were “invented” by everyone: Poles, Germans, Freemasons, Jews, Americans. But, however, always with one goal - to destroy Russia and quarrel “brotherly peoples”. Of course, they know nothing about these plans either in Warsaw, or in the Masonic lodges, or in Tel Aviv, Berlin or Washington. Ukrainians will also laugh at these theories - even their grandmothers’ grandmothers sang lullabies to their children in Ukrainian. Therefore, these stories can afford the luxury of claiming to be scientific only in one country.

Today, thousands of Russians travel to Western Ukraine on business and as tourists and, imagine, they return home safe and sound, and even take with them fresh positive impressions. But you can’t argue with the facts - according to the data opinion polls It is in Western Ukraine that the largest number of people consider Russia to be an unfriendly state, it is here that the number of supporters of the EU and NATO is steadily growing, and it is here that nationalist parties with anti-Russian rhetoric have the greatest support. The situation was the same before the events of 2014.

So what's the deal? Why do Western Ukrainians “dislike” Russians so much? If you discard all pseudoscientific theories and arm yourself with facts, the reasons will seem much more prosaic than intricate fiction about the insidious Austrian General Staff. This issue is quite complex and one article will not be enough to cover all its problems. We'll try give simplified in presentation, but at the same time not answer that simplifies the facts.

To this end, we will briefly go through the history of Western Ukraine as part of Austria-Hungary, Poland and the USSR in search of an answer to the question of when and why the image of the Russians as an enemy was formed, with whom Western Ukraine had the most tense relations and why in 1939 Lviv met Red Army with flowers.

Western Ukraine within the Austrian Empire

The phenomenon of “Western Ukraine” in its modern borders appeared after the three divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the 18th century. Galicia, Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathia became part of the Austrian Empire, all other Ukrainian lands became part of Russia. This division was finally consolidated after the defeat of Napoleon in Europe and the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Western Ukraine as part of states 1815-1914

At that time, the national identity of Ukrainians was just emerging. If you had a chance to ask a resident of Galicia who he is, you would hardly hear “Ukrainian.” Most likely “Rusyn” or “Uniate” or even “local”. Approximately the same would have happened in the rest of the territory of modern Ukraine (replace only “Uniate” with “Orthodox”). You will be surprised, but you would have heard something similar in Europe - in Germany, Italy and even France. Decades will pass before states build a unified education system and, accordingly, a national mythology.

It was much more difficult for Ukrainians, because they did not have a state and no one created a single national mythology. This was done by separate, multidirectional circles of intellectuals. The most influential were the Moquophiles (Russophiles) and the Narodniks (not to be confused with the Narodniks in the Russian Empire). Muscovophiles saw the future of Western Ukrainians in an alliance with Orthodox Russia, while Narodivists saw the future in Ukrainian (Rusyn) autonomy, which should be created in Galicia.

Both trends did not arise simultaneously. Muscovophiles have been active since the very beginning of X 9th century. Their ideas of unity with Orthodox Russia were understandable to the majority of the population, who then identified themselves primarily on religious grounds. Greek Catholicism, which was then professed by the majority of Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina, was opposed to the Catholicism of the Poles, and accordingly, sought support from Orthodoxy. Muscophiles even began a movement to de-Latinize the Greek Catholic Church in order to bring it as close as possible to the Orthodox Church.

But in the 1860s, a new movement began to gain popularity - the Narodovtsy. It appeared as a response to the activity of Muscovophiles and promoted completely different ideas. The Narodovites also advocated the unification of all Ukrainians in one state - independent Ukraine.

And here we cannot fail to mention another problem that Western Ukrainians immediately encountered. After all, not only they considered Galicia theirs; the Poles claimed their rights to it. And let’s say right away that the positions of the Poles were much stronger - after all, they made up the majority of the intelligentsia, the administrative apparatus, and in general, could boast of centuries-old state traditions.

Both Muscovophiles and Narodivists saw the Poles as their main opponents. The Poles could not allow either the annexation of Galicia to Russia, which the Muscovophiles demanded, or national Ukrainian autonomy, which the Narodivists sought. Therefore, a paradoxical, but at the same time logical situation arose: Western Ukrainians considered the enemy not the Austrians, as the main “enslavers,” but the Poles, with whom they essentially shared the same fate of a people without a state. For example, an indicative fact: during the so-called “Spring of Nations” in 1848, a revolution broke out throughout the Austrian Empire, the Poles Same began a national uprising in Galicia. Ukrainians behaved like a conservative force that advocated the preservation of the Austrian Empire. It is here that the roots of the theory about the Ukrainian nation as the brainchild of the Austrian General Staff grow. In fact, everything was much simpler - the Ukrainians could not allow the Poles to strengthen in Galicia and therefore supported a force that could restrain this strengthening.

The influence of the Poles increased even more after the transformation of the Austrian Empire into the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867 after defeat in the Austro-Prussian War. The monarchy weakened and the Polish aristocracy in Galicia took advantage of this, achieving the highest level of autonomy for the crown region. Of course, it was the Poles who played first fiddle in his political and economic life.

This led to the strengthening of the national movement of Ukrainians in Galicia. In the 1890s, the Populists created the majority of political parties. Muscophiles lost their popularity over time. Some compromised themselves with espionage and subversive activities paid for by Russia, others switched to Ukrainian national democratic positions. By the beginning of the First World War, the Populist movement, organized into political parties, dominated the political life of Western Ukrainians.

World War I

During the First World War, Muscovophiles again expanded their activity. True, now as an openly subversive trend of collaborationists, Austria-Hungary could well call them “invented by the Russian General Staff.” Created by Muscovophiles in August 1914, the “Carpatho-Russian Liberation Committee” openly campaigned for the surrender of Galicia to the Russian army, and during the occupation of the region by Russia in September 1914 – June 1915, it actively collaborated with the occupation authorities. After the Austro-German offensive in May-August 1915, the Muscovophiles were either interned in the Thalerhof camp by the Austro-Hungarian authorities or fled east along with the retreating Russian army.

But the best vaccine against Muscophilia in Galicia was the actual policy of the occupation authorities in 1914-1915.

Firstly, the Russians actively fought against the Greek Catholic Church. Local priests were removed from worship, arrested and expelled. In particular, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, was also expelled. In their place, Orthodox priests were sent from Russia, and church parishes were forcibly transferred to Orthodoxy. During the occupation in Galicia, from 86 to 113 priests of the Russian Orthodox Church worked in parishes.

Secondly, the practice of taking hostages has become common. Mainly representatives of the elite of society were taken hostage - bankers, entrepreneurs, cultural figures, and intellectuals. Most of them were accused of espionage and sent to the Russian hinterland to live in settlements.

When the Russian army retreated, an order was issued to resettle the male population of Galicia to Russia so that men could not be mobilized into the Austro-Hungarian army. Although this measure could not be implemented on a large scale, more than 100 thousand men in 1915 ended up in the territory of Volyn, controlled by the Russian Empire.

Such a policy canmay not seem very tough - for us, who from history courses know about mass executions, concentration camps, gas chambers and other delights of totalitarian regimes. But for people in Western Ukraine in 1914, this was all new. Therefore, the majority of people have lost sympathy for the Russians.

It is obvious that the People’s people, who immediately supported Austria-Hungary from the beginning of the war, gained much greater favor with the Austrians, as well as popularity among the Galicians. The authorities allowed and welcomed the creation of Ukrainian national units (Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen). Here, too, the legs of the Russian propaganda myth about the Austrian General Staff are growing - they say they created an army of Galicians to fight against the “brotherly people”. In fact, the Austrians limited the patriotic zeal of Western Ukrainians. More than 10,000 Ukrainians responded to the call of the people from the Main Ukrainian Rada to form the Legion, but it was allowed to create a unit of only 2,500 people. Once again, the Poles interfered, using all their influence in the empire to limit the size of the “Ukrainian army.”

The Sichovykh Riflemen Legion successfully fought at the front and never experienced a shortage of volunteers to make up for losses. In July 1917, in the battle near Konyukhi, the Legion, almost in its entirety, was captured. Paradoxically, this defeat opened a new page in the glorious history of the Streltsy - namely, their participation in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 - 1921.

Ukrainian revolution

In February 1917, a revolution broke out in Petrograd. The people are tired of constant shortages, unnecessary deaths and impoverishment. Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne, power was in the hands of the provisional government.

But the paradox was that the revolution, which began as a protest against the war, did not put an end to the war itself.In July, Russia's last great offensive in World War I began, named after the head of the Provisional Government, the “Kerensky Offensive.”. It was during this offensive that the Sich Riflemen were captured.

At this time, a revolution also began in Kyiv, but with a national tint. In March, the Ukrainian Central Rada began its work under the leadership of history professor Mikhail Grushevsky. The leaders of the Rada were very careful in their ambitions - they did not fight for an independent Ukrainian state, but only for the national-territorial autonomy of Ukrainians as part of a “democratic federal Russia”. They also decided not to create a Ukrainian army - they were going to live in peace with Russia. Separate armed detachments from former front-line soldiers were created with great difficulty by the strength of enthusiasts.

History has punished the Central Rada for this mistake. In October 1917, the Bolsheviks came to power under the slogan “Freedom for the peoples!” begin to build a new empire. In December, the Reds captured Kharkov and proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic - with an eye on all of Ukraine.

But let's return to the Sich Riflemen. After the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1917, Western Ukrainian prisoners of war were released and they formed the Galician-Bukovinian kuren of the Sich Riflemen. Since December, he found his permanent commander - Yevgeny Konovalets, who providedsupply, training and ideological spirit of the archers.

It was the policy of the Central Rada that led to the fact that the small kuren (about 400 people) was almost the most combat-ready unit in the Ukrainian army in January 1918 . They resisted the Reds, who were advancing on Kyiv, suppressed the Bolshevik rebellion in Kyiv, and guarded the Central Rada after the evacuation from the capital.

After the hetman's coup in April 1918, Konovalets and many streltsy went underground and returned to the arena of the Ukrainian revolution only in November, under the banners of the Army Directory of the UPR. They remained faithful to it until the final defeat of the Ukrainian revolution in 1921.

Meanwhile, a revolution was also brewing in Galicia. In October 1918, it was clear to everyone that Germany and Austria-Hungary would lose the war. Everywhere in the empire, national movements arose in support of the independence of their peoples from Austria. The Ukrainians were no exception either - in November, the centurion of the Sich Riflemen Vitovsky with a small detachment captured key buildings in Lviv, hanging a yellow-blue flag. The same thing happened in others major cities Western Ukraine. The Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUNR) was proclaimed, which was supposed to extend to the territory of Galicia and Northern Bukovina.

But again the Poles interfered. They began actively building their state, and of course did not forget about Galicia, which they considered theirs. After stubborn resistance, the Ukrainian Galician Army, and with it the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, was defeated until June 1919. The military retreated across the Zbruch River, where they joined the UPR Army, which was then fighting off the Bolsheviks and Whites.

The Ukrainian Galician Army managed to fight both in alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic (July-November 1919), and together with the whites of A. Denikin (November 1919 - January 1920), and even as part of the Red Army (January - April 1920). But there was never any alliance with the Poles - until the end of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921, the Galicians considered the Poles their main enemy. Warsaw anti-Bolshevik Pact between the leader of the UPR Symon Petliura andHead of the Polish-Lithuanian CommonwealthGalicians perceived Józef Pilsudski as treason on the part of Kyiv.

Second Polish Republic

The First World War was not only the last gasp of the four great empires - Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German and Russian - but also gave birth to new countries. This fate did not spare the Poles, who had long dreamed of their own state. In 1918, one of the points of the Paris Peace Conference, at which the fate of the post-war world was decided, provided for the creation of a Polish state - the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

But the creation of new countries then raises one of the most painful issues for all states – the issue of borders. It was, of course, necessary to take advantage of the unique historical moment and gain as many territories as possible in the chaos that reigned then. And given the fact that especially the border lands in Europe are ethnically heterogeneous, there were more than enough reasons to seize part of the territories from a neighboring state.

The first head of the revived Poland, Józef Pilsudski, also understood this, saying that Poland’s borders in the West depended on the decisions of the Entente (the coalition led by France and Great Britain that won the First World War), and the borders in the East depended on itself. oh Warsaw s. As a result, the Poles defeated the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, repelled the Bolshevik offensive and consolidated their position in these lands, as they thought, forever.

Western Ukrainians found themselves in new political realities - now they are citizens of Poland, and the capital of their new homeland is Warsaw. But not only Ukrainians found themselves hostage to the Polish dream of their own state, since 30% of the population of Poland were not Poles - 15% were Ukrainians, and the remaining 15% included Belarusians, Germans, Lithuanians, etc. Taking these facts into account, the national question in the Second The Polish Republic, of course, could not but be relevant.

Officially in Poland, the right of Ukrainians to realize their interests through local governments was secured, and the rights of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian language were also guaranteed. But it never came to fruition. And although Poland in the early 1920s. and seemed outwardly to be a democratic state, one of the leitmotifs of its national policy was the assimilation of the Ukrainian population.

It all started in 1921 with the adoption of the Constitution, which did not provide for national minorities the scope of rights and freedoms that they initially expected. A year later, parliamentary elections were to take place, which almost all Ukrainian parties, as well as the clergy, called for a boycott. The Polish government saw this as nothing more than subversive activities of Soviet Ukraine and began to zealously arrest Ukrainian politicians.

The aggressiveness of Polish policy towards Western Ukraine is explained primarily by Warsaw’s uncertainty in its ability to retain these territories, the population of which until recently fought with those who are now their government. The situation really did not develop towards a peaceful scenario. The policy of polonization (implantation of Polish culture and language) and the distribution of land in regions with a predominant Ukrainian population to Polish military personnel caused protests among the Ukrainian population, including against military service.

But against the backdrop of worsening Polish-Ukrainian relations and with the direct support of the USSR, the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) operated in Poland. Sympathy for the Soviet Union and the idea of ​​joining the USSR enjoyed good popularity in the 20s, but almost completely disappeared after news of forced collectivization, mass repressions and the Holodomor in the Ukrainian SSR. And the leaders of the KPZU themselves were later almost all recalled to the USSR and sentenced to death on trumped-up cases.

But it was not the communists alone who presented the ideas of resistance to the Poles - Ukrainian nationalist organizations began to emerge in Poland, as well as in neighboring Czechoslovakia and Austria. For example, in 1920, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) was created in Prague, headed by Yevgeny Konovalets, the core of which was made up of former Sich Riflemen. The organization was engaged in sabotage and subversive activities and political assassinations, which included an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Jozef Pilsudski. As a response, 5 thousand people were arrested and the authorities began to pursue the so-called “pacification” policy, searching Ukrainian villages in search of “UVO militants.” In response to these actions, the nationalists switched to tactics of individual terror, emphasizing both their anti-Polish and anti-Bolshevik orientation.

For example, the attempt by OUN member M. Lemik on the life of a Soviet consulate employee O. Mailov was widely publicized - the former’s goal was to protest during the trial against the Soviet Union’s hushing up of an artificial famine in Ukraine.

But the OUN was not the only one that represented the political interests of Ukrainians. For example, the most popular was the Ukrainian National Democratic Association (UNDO) of anti-communist and democratic persuasion, which set as its goal the creation of a Ukrainian state, but rejected violence as a method of achieving goals. However, the actions of both Ukrainians and Poles only inflamed an already difficult situation, making it even more difficult through attempts to enlist the support of external players. The potential for conflict increased, and the positions of both sides became more and more radical.

On September 1, 1939, German troops invade Poland from the West, and 17 days later the Red Army invades the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the East. The young Polish state, which barely had time to celebrate its twentieth anniversary, found itself squeezed between a rock and a hard place.

Division of Poland between the Third Reich and the USSR

But what was a tragedy for the Poles was, not without reason, considered by the Ukrainians of Poland as a new historical chance, which fate does not often like to throw away. A month after the start of hostilities, they already found themselves in new political realities that could change, as it seemed then, their lives for the better.

Today this may seem like a fantastic scenario, but Lvov welcomed the Red Army with joy. Twenty years of extremely difficult relations with the Poles and the arrival of “brothers and Soviet Ukraine” created an atmosphere of hope for long-awaited changes for the better, although most of the intelligentsia were extremely skeptical about this turn of events.

Red Army in Lvov, 1939

Red Army in Lvov, 1939

Lviv residents welcome the Red Army

The music played for a while

The euphoria passed quickly. Stage one – culture shock. The unkempt-looking “liberators,” who found themselves outside the USSR for the first time, greedily bought goods that were in short supply in the Union, causing justifiable surprise to the local population. Not only “capitalists hostile to the working class,” but also ordinary people suffered from expropriation and frequent cases of robbery; and the public use of night "ducks" by the families of Soviet officers as containers for milk and nighties as evening dresses became the talk of the town throughout the occupied territory.

Stage two is the legalization of annexation. Of course, it was necessary to cement the new borders with the will of the local population, which the Soviet regime always did well. On October 22, 1939, elections were held in which, according to official statistics, 93% of the population took part and 91% supported the proposed candidates. The formed People's Assembly of Western Ukraine unanimously thanked Stalin for the “liberation” and turned to the First Secretary of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Nikita Khrushchev with a request to officially include the territory of Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR.

Petition for the admission of Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR

People's Assembly of Western Ukraine

Stage three – repression. The first to be deported were former Polish officials and police officers. One of the most famous events for its tragedy occurred in the spring of 1940 - in the forest near Katyn (Smolensk region), the NKVDists shot more than 20,000 Polish soldiers. The turn of the Ukrainians came: the activities of organizations not controlled by the councils were stopped, political parties were liquidated, and all those who, in the opinion of the Bolsheviks, could pose any danger were persecuted. The only major political force in opposition to the Bolsheviks remained the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which was forced to go underground.

There is no trace left of past gratitude to the “liberators.” Prisons were filled at a rapid pace, forced collectivization was carried out, death sentences were imposed, and in less than two years hundreds of thousands of people were taken to Siberia - the exact number of their victims is not known to this day. The details of Stalin's repressions began to be investigated back in the 80s, when a mass grave of NKVD victims was discovered near Kiev near the village of Bykivnya. But even today no one can say for sure how many were killed then, or how many of these “Bykiven” are located throughout Ukraine.

Victims of Soviet atrocities

The arrival of the Germans

Soviet power in Western Ukraine did not last long - just two years later, on June 22, 1941, the Third Reich attacked its former ally, with whose help it had recently redrawn the borders of European states. A few weeks later, Western Ukraine was completely occupied by the Wehrmacht. At first, many Ukrainians greeted the Germans with joy - even before the Third Reich attacked the USSR, thousands of people from Western Ukraine were forced to flee to Nazi-occupied Poland. In addition, Ukrainian nationalists pinned their hopes on the Germans for the revival of the Ukrainian state and initially saw them as allies in the fight against the communists and Poles.

On June 30, 1941, the German Nachtigal battalion, consisting mainly of Ukrainian nationalists, took Lviv together with Wehrmacht units. On the same day, the Act of Restoration of Ukrainian Statehood was proclaimed on Market Square in the presence of the general public and church representatives. But these plans ran counter to the German vision of the future of Ukraine, and therefore, already on July 5, many OUN leaders, including Stepan Bandera, were arrested and some were shot.

The Germans gave a clear signal that the creation of a Ukrainian state, even a union one, is not part of their plans. When Nachtigal learned about the arrest of the OUN leaders, the military demanded their release, for which the battalion was recalled from the front to the rear, and was soon disbanded. The future commander-in-chief of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych, managed to avoid arrest, and most of the Nachtigal soldiers later formed the backbone of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

So, in 1941, it became clear that neither the Poles, nor the communists, nor the Nazis promised anything good to the Ukrainians, however, hopes for an independent state still smoldered. There were also people ready to fight for them. Repressions against the civilian population by the German occupation administration led to the creation of local self-defense units, whose No. 1 enemy was the Nazis.

The process of creating armed units to fight the Germans was led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. From disparate groups in Volyn and Galicia, self-defense units began to be created, which united in 1943 into the UPA known to us. Before the Bolsheviks came to these lands, the UPA took part mainly in battles with the Nazis, setting itself the goal of complicating, and ideally ending, the exploitation of Ukrainian villages by the Germans.

With the transition of the territories of Western Ukraine under the control of the USSR, the UPA switched to the fight against the communists, who again showed the local population what deportations, collectivization and mass repressions were. The memory of the recent crimes of the Bolsheviks rallied thousands of people in the UPA, ready to prevent at any cost a repetition of the tragedy of 1939-41. The rebels organized acts of sabotage, and they targeted everyone who collaborated with the Bolsheviks - heads of village councils, workers of district party committees, local activists and others. And the support of the local population for the actions of the UPA and their general hatred of the Bolsheviks made life significantly more difficult for the occupiers.

Western Ukraine as part of states since 1945

To combat the rebels, special groups of the NKVD were created, the so-called agent combat groups (ABG). The main tactics of the ABG was to carry out provocative actions under the guise of the UPA - disguised NKVDists killed people, looted and burned houses in order to discredit the insurgent movement.

What now?

After the Second World War, Germany underwent a full course of denazification - the Nuremberg trials and subsequent courts punished Nazi criminals, in the post-war years the Germans were all possible ways democracy was instilled, and the German economic miracle was one of the proofs that economic progress does not require the strong hand of a dictator. To prevent a relapse into dictatorship, the German Constitution even included Article 20, which enshrines the right of Germans to rebel against a government that is destroying the democratic foundations of Germany. The payment of reparations to the injured parties once again showed an admission of guilt and demonstrated a desire to somehow atone for it, and the apogee of this policy was, of course, gesture personally affected his from the Nazis in German Wow Chancellor Willy Brandt , who knelt in front of the monument to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943. Thanks, among other things, to repentance and atonement, Germany today is associated primarily with progress and economic power, and not with the terrible events of World War II.

A more ambiguous situation has developed today in Ukrainian-Polish relations. If we do not take into account the openly biased and radical positions of some both Polish and Ukrainian historians, who blame exclusively the other side for all troubles, Ukraine and Poland as a whole manage to take the path of reconciliation, although so far without any particular results. Also in In the second half of the 90s, a symbolic reconciliation of the two peoples was carried out by the then presidents Kuchma and Kwasniewski, But At the personal level of perception of the conflict, this changed little. Today, after a many-year break, the dialogue between the Ukrainian and Polish Institutes of National Memory has resumed regarding the most acute and controversial aspects of bilateral relations. After all, objective history is history written by two sides.

A completely different situation has developed with Russia. Neither Beria nor Stalin are alive now, and the Soviet Union has collapsed. But, unfortunately, imperial thinking, imperial mythology, pain for the “lost power” and rehabilitation of the killers of millions of people not only live in today’s Russia, but are also successfully cultivated. Realizing that part of the population of Ukraine did not find a new identity after the collapse of the Union, the Russian propaganda machine began to offer them its own, imposing myths about the “three fraternal peoples,” “holy Rus'” and the “Russian world.” This matter cannot be done without creating an image of the enemy - “decaying West”, “aggressive NATO”, “vile State Department”. At the Ukrainian level, the top three “enemies” include Mazepa, Petlyura and, of course, Bandera. And the stronghold of all these “alien and hostile” ideas to Ukrainians is Western Ukraine, which has learned the tragic lesson of the 20th century better than all other parts of our country. about our Russian “brothers” and certainly said goodbye to her Soviet past earlier than others. And while we are trying to find ourselves in this new world, in Moscow they are talking about the aggressiveness of Lvov while the “little green men” are occupying Crimea. By shelling the cities and villages of Donbass, Western Ukrainians in Russia are called Banderaites, fascists and Russophobes. And “mourning those killed in the civil war in Ukraine” a new column of Grads is being sent from Moscow across the border. It's all so Russian.

The character of the Polish regime was not democratic. Its main features are authoritarianism with occupational management features. Also, Polish veterans were resettled to Galicia, to whom 12% of all land was transferred over several years.

Journalism often displays nostalgia for the “civilized European world” created by the Polish authorities after the First World War and destroyed by the Soviets in 1939-1941.

It even goes as far as asserting the positive result of Polish domination in the region during 1918-1939, denying its occupational nature, saying that Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia and Western Volyn) was annexed not by Poland, but by the Council of Ambassadors of the League of Nations [an international organization that arose after the First World War led by the victors - Britain, France, Italy and Japan - IP] in 1923, and the Poles developed cities and ensured economic and cultural development.

Such assertions are reinforced by anecdotes common in Lviv about the “first soviets” who washed their hands in toilets, and the wives of commissars in negligees went to the Opera.

However, the character of the Polish regime was not democratic. Its main features are authoritarianism with occupational management features.

Historians determine the nature of the occupation power according to the following criteria:

— establishing control over territory through military intervention;

- carrying out policies (in the spheres of political, economic, cultural life) on the occupied lands in the interests of the occupation authorities;

— suppression of national uprisings of the local population in the occupied territory by force (creation of operational special forces, use of the regular army, a network of special institutions of the penitentiary system);

— purposeful policy of national assimilation;

— restricting access of residents of the occupied territory to senior government positions;

— deportation of the local population of the occupied territories;

- attracting the local population to serve in the armed forces of the occupying state.

Difference 36th infantry regiment for participation in the “Russian” (i.e. Polish-Ukrainian) war 1918-1919 Photo: www.znak-auction.ru

So, let's consider the situation according to these points.

On November 1, 1918, on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Lviv, a Ukrainian state arose - the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, which on its birthday began a war against the Poles who wanted to take control of Galicia.

The Polish uprising in Lviv received support from the government of the newly created Second Polish Commonwealth and escalated into an interstate war.

This war lasted until the summer of 1919 and ended with the defeat of the Ukrainian Galician Army from the Haller Army [a Polish army of about 80 thousand soldiers, formed on French territory by the efforts of the Entente and the United States for the war against Bolshevik Russia - IP].

After this, the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic went abroad, the UGA retreated beyond the Zbruch to help the Active Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the war with the Bolsheviks, and Polish troops occupied Western Ukraine.

After the Soviet-Polish War in 1921, the League of Nations, following the points of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, made concessions to the Chairman of the Committee of Political Emigration Kostya Levitsky (former head of the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic) and agreed to determine the international legal status of Galicia in 1922.

The talk was about holding a referendum in the region on the issue of its status and about granting political autonomy to the region within Poland. However, in 1923, the Council of Ambassadors approved the eastern border of Poland without a referendum with a proposal to the Polish government to grant autonomy to Galicia, which the latter rejected.

Despite the fact that the status of Western Ukraine within Poland was not determined until 1923, and the region itself was under the protectorate of the League of Nations, the Polish authorities felt like masters here.

Incorporation processes expanded and were accompanied by oppression in all areas of activity.

In 1918 The political autonomy of the region was eliminated - the Galician Regional Sejm and the Regional Vydil (local budget) were abolished.

In the field of education, on August 16, 1919, a ban was introduced on Ukrainian youth who had accepted Polish citizenship but had not served military service in the Polish army from studying at Lviv universities.

In 1920 The Polish authorities conducted an illegitimate census of the population of Western Ukraine with the aim of conscripting Ukrainians in 1921 to serve in the Polish Army.

Since March 1920 The term “Małopolske Wschodne” was introduced into official records and the use of the name Western Ukraine was prohibited.

Also, instead of the ethnonym “Ukrainian”, they introduced the ancient definition from the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - “Rusyn”, “Russki” and “Rusynski”.

In local government, by complicating the election procedure, according to the law of March 23, 1933, the number of Ukrainians was limited.

A ban and restrictions were imposed on the activities of Ukrainian socio-political, cultural, educational and sports organizations and societies: "Plast" was banned in 1928 in Volyn, and in 1930 - in Galicia, the "Sich" society - in 1924, Sokol's activities were limited only to the territory of Galicia.

Numerous pogroms of “Prosvit” took place during the policy of pacification [literally “pacification” - IP] of 1930, and strict control was established over the activities of the educational society “Ridna Shkola”.

In the system of executive bodies of state power, leading positions were occupied exclusively by Poles, and in the legislative bodies of the Polish government (Sejm and Senate), the participation of Ukrainians was hampered by the new Polish constitution of 1935.

Meanwhile, this happened during the conclusion of a political peace between the Polish government and the Ukrainian National Democratic Union [- Ukrainian legal party, the only parliamentary one, its deputies represented the interests of Ukrainians in the Sejm] - the so-called. "normalization" policies.

An extensive system of state police served as a separate means of establishing the occupation regime. To its law enforcement functions, functions of political pressure were added: since 1921, the police investigated political affairs, prepared quarterly reports on the mood of the Ukrainian population, and characterized political and public organizations.

Ukrainian employees were monitored, reports contained information about specific individuals, their national and social origin, membership in political and public organizations and the “degree of danger” they pose to the Polish authorities.

For example, here is what they wrote about a Ukrainian who worked at the Lviv post office in July 1931: “Kostyshin is a Rusyn, held a position in the Ukrainian Rada in 1919 during the Ukrainian war, head of the letters department. Is in contact with Ukrainian organizations. In the pre-war period, he was known as an ardent haidamak [supporter of an independent Ukrainian state - author]. He needs to be retired."

Similar supervision was established even over members of the above-mentioned UNDO.

The position of “confidant” was introduced in the state police - a secret agent whose task was to supply the police with information about anti-state actions.

His work was limited to observing and describing Ukrainian national celebrations, in particular, the Heroes' Holidays (honoring the graves of the Sich Riflemen, accompanied by memorial services and patriotic speeches).

Confidant Skvaretsky recorded on June 11, 1923 the Ukrainian “religious manifestation campaign”, which took place on May 23, 1923.

In this protocol, in addition to a description of the action itself, its participants and a summary of their speeches, there was an assessment of the situation among the Ukrainian public: political views, methods of implementing these views, active and influential Ukrainian organizations.

The agent notes the division of the Ukrainian intelligentsia into two parts.

The first of them is “subject to peaceful coexistence with the Polish community within the Polish state,” and the second part, being much more active, acts towards “creating an independent Ukraine.” The participants in the latter group are predominantly young Ukrainian intellectuals, led by priests.

And already in the 30s, the police moved from protocols and dismissals to decisive actions to disperse peaceful demonstrations with the help of mounted municipal police.

Special departments were created in the state police (2nd and 4th departments), whose task was to suppress protests against the Polish authorities.

The second department, the so-called “two”, was a counterintelligence agent and directed his activities against the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (the “fifth column” of the USSR). Department IV of the Main Commandant's Office of the State Police (Vydział IV Głównej Komendy Policiji Państwowej) - primarily directed investigative activities against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which had the goal of creating an independent Ukrainian state.

It should be noted that in the criminal code of the then Poland there was no concept of a political crime, as it was in the Soviet one (a special part of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR is “counter-revolutionary crimes” with the notorious 54th article). However, internal police documentation used the term “anti-state.”

During arrests, the Polish police were noted for their rudeness and use of physical torture against arrested Ukrainians. In the spring of 1931, the arrested regional leader Stepan Okhrimovich was subjected to investigation and torture. As a result, S. Okhrimovich died from beatings.

Yulian Golovinsky (1894-1930) — regional commandant of the Ukrainian Military Organization and commander of the “Flying Brigade” of the UVO (1924-1926), regional leader of the OUN (1930). Photo 1920s yy

But there were also unprecedented cases: in 1930, the arrested Yulian Golovinsky [pictured above], the regional leader of the OUN, was taken by police from Lvov to Bibrki and shot without trial, chained to a tree. Official version: killed while trying to escape.

To protect the Ukrainians, on March 22, 1932, Yuri Berezinsky killed in Lviv Subcommissar Emilian Chekhovsky, the head of the brigade for the fight against anti-state criminals, who was noted for his rude behavior during interrogations and did not hesitate to beat young girls who distributed OUN leaflets.

Since 1919, in Western Ukraine it was introduced state of emergency(constant readiness of the army to suppress uprisings, restrictions on movement, curfew). The security forces were especially active in 1923 - they were preparing to suppress the uprising against the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of the League of Nations.

And in September-November 1930, about 2,000 police officers and several Uhlan squadrons 6- th Corps of the Polish Army.

To conduct legal proceedings in the Polish state, several types of courts were introduced.

Since 1918, there were emergency courts-martial (sąd doraźne), in the terminology of that time they were called “brazen courts” (fast courts).

“Arrogant courts” existed until 1934. They considered cases and rendered verdicts within 12 hours, and an appeal could be filed within 24 hours (in Wielkopolska - within 48).

These courts were given the right to impose death sentences in 1920, and it was precisely such a court that in 1932 sentenced Ukrainian nationalists Vasily Bilas and Dmitry Danylyshyn to death by hanging. The appeal was refused.

In general, the Polish judicial system was actively involved in political repression in the region: “arrogant courts” considered cases against political opponents of the Polish government. Another type of civil courts—district courts—heard cases of “crimes” of the following nature: duplicating and distributing illegal literature or leaflets with anti-Polish content.

To isolate and re-educate “dangerous Ukrainians” from the OUN, a concentration camp for political prisoners was created in 1934 in the town of Bereza-Kartuzka (now the town of Bereza in Belarus).

One of its first prisoners was Dmitry Gritsai, the future UPA general and chief of the UPA Main Military Staff. Among the famous prisoners of the camp were Ivan Klymiv and many others. The concentration camp was planned as temporary (for one year), but the profitability of its existence ensured the activity of the concentration camp until the end of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

To isolate dangerous people, there was a prison-monastery of the Holy Cross (Sventa Krzyz, 1884-1939). Stepan Bandera and Nikolai Lebed were sent here to life imprisonment in 1936.

It is interesting that former militants of the Polish Socialist Party, comrades of Marshal Pilsudski in the revolutionary struggle, will send a telegram to the then President of Poland Moscicki with a request to “pardon in the name of human principles three Ukrainians sentenced to death by an insolent court in Lvov and who in their convictions fought for the will of their people "

Only Zhurakovsky will be pardoned - he will be given 15 years. Bilas and Danylyshyn will be hanged on December 23, 1932, and through the efforts of OUN propagandists they will become icons for the Ukrainian youth of Galicia.

Polish politics also interfered in church affairs, especially in the Kholm region, where the Orthodox Church was widespread. Lacking protection, she became a convenient target.

By 1938, about 150 Orthodox churches were closed and church lands were confiscated. But they built Polish churches.

The intercession of the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Andrey Sheptytsky, who appealed to the Vatican with a demand to stop the Catholicization (= Polonization) of the region, did not help either. Some of the churches that came under the jurisdiction of the UGCC were saved.

Ukrainian education also suffered significant losses. At Lviv University, teaching of Ukrainian studios, which existed during Austrian rule, was abolished. The number of Ukrainian students was limited.

Since the 1930s, an attack on secondary education began - gymnasiums, where the teaching of subjects in Polish was actively introduced. There was strict supervision over the activities of teachers.

The Polish government carried out active assimilation processes, starting the so-called. policy of siege. Families of Polish military personnel, mainly veterans of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-1919, were sent to Western Ukraine, where they were provided (taking away from the previous owners) land to create colonies with all the social benefits.

These policies created severe social inequality and corruption as Ukrainians in their ethnic lands were oppressed.

In 1938, 35,000 siege farms were created (all in the Ternopil region and Volyn), which owned 12% of all land.

Deportations of Ukrainians were not carried out during this period, but in the 1930s there were sentiments among Polish national democrats to implement such a plan. These intentions were reflected in the secret resolution of the Council of Ministers of March 1939 on the deportation of Ukrainians from ethnic lands in Western Poland.