Conservatives, liberals and radicals of the second quarter of the 19th century. Reasons for the rise of the social movement
By the middle of the 19th century, the Russian intelligentsia was split into radical and liberal. Radicals maniacally focused on the painfully inflamed “social” issue. Formed Order of the Russian Intelligentsia with its characteristic features. Dedication to common revolutionary cause, utopian ideas about the main needs of society tear a person away from reality ( “The circle of these revolutionaries is narrow, they are terribly far from the people”- Lenin). Liberal The intelligentsia is inclined towards skeptical positivist contemplation with atheism and materialism. The socio-political worldview of a liberal society, due to its amorphous nature, is dependent on the radical flank.
Liberals shared the general intellectual baselessness. “Until now, our liberals have only come from two strata: the former landowner (abolished) and the seminary. And since both classes finally turned into perfect castes, into something completely special from the nation, and the further, the more, from generation to generation, then, therefore, everything that they did and are doing was completely not national... Not national; although in Russian, it is not national; and our liberals are not Russian, and our conservatives are not Russian, that’s all... And rest assured that the nation will not recognize anything that has been done by landowners and seminarians, neither now nor after.”(F.M. Dostoevsky).
Western liberalism developed in the depths of national cultures and was constructive. Non-nationality liberal Russian intelligentsia turns it into anti-national class: “What is liberalism... if not an attack (reasonable or erroneous, that’s another question) on the existing order of things?.. Russian liberalism is not an attack on the existing order of things, but an attack on the very essence of our things, on the things themselves, and not only one order, not the Russian order, but Russia itself. My liberal has gone so far as to deny Russia itself, that is, he hates and beats his mother. Every unfortunate and unfortunate Russian fact excites laughter and almost delight in him, he hates folk customs, Russian history, everything. If there is an excuse for him, is it that he does not understand what he is doing, and takes his hatred of Russia for the most fruitful liberalism (oh, you will often meet among us a liberal who is applauded by others and who, perhaps, in essence the most ridiculous, stupid and dangerous conservative, and he doesn’t even know it!). Not so long ago, some of our liberals took this hatred of Russia almost for true love for the fatherland and boasted that they saw better than others what it should consist of; but now they have become more frank and even the words “love of the fatherland” began to be ashamed, even the concept was expelled and eliminated as harmful and insignificant... This fact at the same time is such that nowhere and never, from time immemorial and among no people, has happened and never happened... Such a liberal cannot exist anywhere, who would hate his own fatherland.”(F.M. Dostoevsky).
Without religious foundations, the worldview of an educated society is filled with various phantoms: “Without faith in one’s soul and in its immortality, human existence is unnatural, unthinkable and unbearable... One of the most terrible fears for our future is precisely that, in my opinion, in a very, too large part of the Russian intelligentsia, to some special, strange... well, at least to predestination the perfect takes root more and more and with extreme progressive speed disbelief into your soul and its immortality. And not only is this disbelief rooted in conviction (we still have very few convictions in anything), but it is also rooted in a ubiquitous, strange way indifferentism to this highest idea of human existence, indifferentism, sometimes even mocking, God knows where and according to what laws apply to us, and not to this idea alone, but to everything that is vital, to truth of life, to everything that gives and nourishes life, gives it health, destroys decay and stench. This indifference... has long penetrated into the Russian intelligentsia family and has almost destroyed it. Without a higher idea, neither a person nor a nation can exist... And there is only one highest idea on earth, and that is the idea of the immortality of the human soul, for all other “higher” ideas of life by which a person can live flow only from this alone.”(F.M. Dostoevsky).
The denationalized culture formed generations with an ahistorical worldview and inadequate actions. The daughter of the Russian poet Anna Fedorovna Tyutcheva writes about the pernicious attitudes that were instilled through educational institutions: “This superficial and frivolous education is one of the many results of a purely external and ostentatious civilization, the gloss of which the Russian government, starting with Peter the Great, is trying to instill in our society, without caring at all that it is imbued with genuine and serious elements of culture. The lack of moral and religious education has opened the doors wide to propaganda nihilistic doctrines, which are currently nowhere as widespread as in state-owned educational institutions".
F.I. himself Tyutchev wrote bitterly about the anti-Russian sentiments widespread in liberal society: "This Russophobia some Russian people - by the way, very respected ones... Previously, they told us that in Russia they hated the lack of rights, the lack of freedom of the press, etc. etc., because it is precisely because they love Europe so dearly that it, undoubtedly, has everything that Russia does not have... And what do we see now? As Russia, seeking greater freedom, asserts itself more and more, the dislike of these gentlemen for it only intensifies.”.
The memoirs of book publisher M.V. are indicative. Sabashnikova. For generations, the merchants of Siberia developed the Russian economy. By the end of the 19th century, many business people realized that the accumulated wealth should also serve the cultural prosperity of the Motherland. The father of the Sabashnikov brothers is building a house in Moscow, which becomes a center of creative communication and support for the artistic elite. The brothers receive an excellent European education and become familiar with modern culture. They were brought up in the atmosphere of a Russian family, where mutual love and trust reigned. This wonderful human type was common in Russia late XIX- beginning of the 20th century. The Sabashnikov brothers continue their father’s charitable activities: they set up hospitals, build churches, help the hungry, and organize book publishing at their own expense. Patriotic service was no exception in the ranks of Russian industrialists, merchants and zemstvos. However, their consciousness was secularized, so they did not know the centuries-old Russian Orthodox culture, did not see the challenges of the era, and therefore were not capable of full service to society and the fatherland.
Why did people who grew up in Christian traditions become positivists, atheists, and materialists? Dostoevsky inquisitively sought an answer to the question: how and why did this dislocation occur in traditionally raised children? Russian boys? Like himself “descended from a Russian and pious family”, who has been a believer and fearer of God since childhood, has come to the point of denying God? “In our family, we learned the Gospel almost from our first childhood... Every time a visit to the Kremlin and Moscow cathedrals was something solemn for me”, - the writer recalled. He was forced to admit bitterly: “I will tell you about myself that I am a child of the century, a child of disbelief and doubt to this day and even (I know this) to the grave.”. Spiritual decay penetrated through the walls of Russian houses into families, destroying small Church, which was the last stronghold of national identity.
What did the Russian patriots Sabashnikovs consider necessary to publish to educate the people in the first place? The ideals that were considered the highest and the values of vital importance by the elite were reflected in the Sabashnikovs’ publishing program: books on the topics of idealism, rationalism, empiricism, positivism, and on the problems of modern science. In the background was the artistic foreign classics. This does not mean that such publications are not needed to educate society. Most of Christian culture - patristics, the writings of medieval Orthodox authors, modern Christian thinkers of Russia and the West - was inaccessible to the reading public in Russia, but remained outside the attention of Russian book publishing. The irreligion of completely respectable people turned into narrow-mindedness and insensitivity to the historically vital. The newly converted atheists were not able to comprehend the centuries-old Russian Orthodox civilization, which means they did not understand the main thing in the fate of Russia.
The Sabashnikovs did not publish works that met the spiritual needs of the people and could serve their true enlightenment and would help overcome alienation from the people living the Orthodox faith. Their publishing activities contributed progressive ideologization an educated society in which materialistic or abstract-idealistic views were affirmed. The flow of humanistic literature, not balanced by publications with a traditionally Russian, Orthodox view of the world, did not contribute to the growth of historical and national self-awareness of society. Critical reviews of published literature, with rare exceptions, were written by positivists, materialists and scientists, who introduced prejudices into the minds of readers as immutable axioms. The positions of anti-Christian-minded authors in Russian journalism grew stronger. Thus, the encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron, which was published in an idealistic and partly Christian spirit, when reissued, turned into the “New encyclopedic Dictionary"with a positivist bias under the form of "objective scientificity." Ideological omnivorousness (non-discernment of spirits) And spiritual anemia led to the fact that the social activity of many authoritative figures, in terms of the degree of de-Christianization, “outstripped” the level of their own drying up religiosity. An example of unscrupulousness is the activities of industrialist Morozov, who was not only a philanthropist, but also a lender to terrorists. At the hands of people who still considered themselves Christians, an essentially anti-Christian work was being done.
The dynamic Russian reality offered opportunities for survival diseases of consciousness, but representatives of the liberal intelligentsia remained true to their dogmas: “Pushed out of the political struggle, they retreat into everyday cultural work. These are excellent statisticians, builders of highways, schools and hospitals. All of Zemstvo Russia was created by them. They mainly maintain the social organization launched by a lazy, decadent bureaucracy. In the midst of life’s work, they gradually gain in groundedness, losing in “ideologicalness.” However, until the end, until the war of 1914, in the person of their most patriarchal and respectable elders, they remained atheists and anarchists. They do not emphasize this dogma, but it is the main member of their “I Believe”(G.P. Fedotov).
WITH mid-19th century creative energy Most of the educated society and the business class were interested in various types of ideomanias. Liberals developed a “new” worldview, nihilists took it to its logical extreme, and terrorists implemented radical principles in life. Liberals disparaged traditions, radicals rejected them, and revolutionaries overthrew the foundations. The society consisted of two columns destruction: liberals sowed “new” revolutionary ideas, radicals thought up extreme conclusions and completed what liberals, who only had to recognize and support left radicalism, did not dare to do. The real needs of the country and people remained unattended utopian social consciousness. How the thinking, conscientious Russian intellectual, the hero of the novel A.I., self-critically realizes. Solzhenitsyn: “This is how, for centuries, preoccupied only with ourselves, we kept the people in serfdom without rights, did not develop either spiritually or culturally - and handed over this concern to the revolutionaries.”.
In the great reforms of Alexander II, the liberal public did not hesitate to defend the terror that was sweeping the country: “And the hatred expressed with weapons did not subside for half a century. And between these and those shots he rushed about, fell to the ground, dropped his glasses, got up, raised his hands, persuaded and was ridiculed by the unfortunate Russian liberalism. However, let us note: he was not a third party, he was not impartial, he did not respond equally to shots and shouts from both sides, he was not even a liberal himself. Russian educated society, which had not forgiven the authorities for a long time, rejoiced, applauded the left-wing terrorists and demanded an undivided amnesty for all of them. The further into the nineties and nine hundred years, the more angrily the eloquence of the intelligentsia was directed against the government, but it seemed unacceptable to admonish the revolutionary youth, who knocked down lecturers and banned academic studies. Just as the Coriolis acceleration has a strictly determined direction throughout the entire Earth, and all river flows deflect the water in such a way that the right banks of the rivers are always washed and crumbled, and the flood goes to the left, so all forms of democratic liberalism on Earth, as far as can be seen, always strike to the right , always smooth to the left. Their sympathies are always to the left, they are able to cross their feet to the left, their heads bend to the left to listen to judgments - but it is shameful for them to give in to the right or accept even a word from the right... The most difficult thing is to draw the middle line of social development: it does not help, as at the edges, the throat, the fist, the bomb , lattice. The middle line requires the greatest self-control, the most solid courage, the most prudent patience, the most accurate knowledge."(A.I. Solzhenitsyn).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the processes of decomposition intensified in humanitarian creativity, writers from exposers of vices turn into molesters. I.A. Bunin described it this way process of spiritual degradation: “At the end of the nineties it had not yet arrived, but the “big wind from the desert” was already felt. And it was already corrupted in Russia for that “new” literature that somehow suddenly replaced the old one... But here’s what is extremely significant for those days when the “wind from the desert” is already approaching: the strength and abilities of almost all the innovators were quite low quality, vicious by nature, mixed with the vulgar, deceitful, speculative, with servility to the street, with a shameless thirst for success, scandals... This time was already a time of a sharp decline in literature of morals, honor, conscience, taste, intelligence, tact, measure... Rozanov at that time, very opportunely (with pride), he once stated: “Literature is my pants, I do whatever I want in them...” Subsequently, Blok wrote in his diary: “The literary environment stinks”... Blasphemy, blasphemy is one of the main properties of revolutionary times, began with the very first blows of the “wind from the desert”". About exalted atmosphere of decomposition is evidenced by the popular characterization that one of the publicists gave to his homeland: "All-Russian corpse swamp".
The creative intelligentsia enthusiastically finished off the remnants of traditions and served to prepare the phalanx of destroyers. As a result of the general ideological blindness that part of the educated society and the business class, which could have become the backbone of the transformation, ended up on the side of the overthrowers of Russia. It didn't pass fad and the traditionally conservative merchant class.
The denial of traditional culture and Orthodoxy in a liberal society and the orientation towards alien ideologies played a fatal role in the fate of Russia. Utopian reverie without moral rigor and without a sense of civic duty - not a harmless game of the mind. The element of empty fantasy undermines spiritual bonds, pushes to violate moral and spiritual norms. Uncritical receptivity to alien ideas corrupts consciousness. Any creativity without responsibility to the Creator can awaken disastrous elements. Social activity, civic activity without religious feeling - readiness for the future heavenly future- destructive for the earthly home - the fatherland. Total submission to private ideas of the most beautiful kind - illness of the spirit. Flirting with ideological “isms” leads to the consistent degradation of a person. Atheism sterilizes conscience and deprives one of spiritual orientation. This can be seen in the example of Belinsky’s atheism, who did not sense the monstrosity of his call for destruction one hundred thousand heads in the name of the triumph of socialism in the world. Materialism brings life interests and ideals down to earth. Rationalism emasculates the soul, formalizes and narrows consciousness, introduces confidence in possibilities arithmetic solution all problems. This cost Russia dearly self-confidence of reason! Formulas for future global social experiments were prepared at “ desk» Russian publicism and journalism, where he dominated manic tone, which Leskov called « slanderous terror in liberal taste» . The poisons that poisoned Russia accumulated in smoky talking shops Russian boys . Empiricism in turn, he freed his hands for thoughtless experiments on living things and life. Positivism he introduced “wise” indifference to what was happening to those who were able to understand something.
Victor Aksyuchits, philosopher, member of the Political Council of the Rodina party
Perhaps the strangest category in modern Russian socio-political rhetoric is the “liberal public”. She is often spoken about, but almost always in the third person. It’s rare to hear “I, like the entire liberal community, am deeply outraged” or “that’s not how it’s done in our liberal community.” But there are as many phrases as you like in the format “the liberal public will not survive this” or “the liberal public will be happy.” That is, the liberal public clearly plays some role in modern life, but does not appear on the stage; it exists mainly in speeches and articles.
What can be said for sure about the liberal public is that it is more of a social group than a political force. Political parties that have (or, in the past tense, had) a reputation for expressing the interests of liberals, last time overcame the five percent barrier in the State Duma elections in 1999.
Theoretically, one can estimate the size of the liberal public from opinion polls, in which 86 percent always approve of everything - that is, this is 14 percent of Russians. Another way to estimate is the protests of 2011-2012, when the generally accepted number of the first rallies was about 100 thousand people.
But this will be some kind of meaningless mathematics, because first of all it is not clear who exactly we are talking about. The dictionary definition of liberalism is too vague to be used seriously in relation to Russian realities. If we consider everyone who is “for freedom” to be liberals, then many people will have to be considered liberals, including Vladimir Putin and the entire party “ United Russia“They never said that they were against freedom. If we consider everyone who is “against Putin” to be liberals, it will be even worse - obvious illiberals of varying degrees of radicalism, up to Vladimir Kvachkov, also oppose Putin in one way or another.
If they do not directly oppose Putin, they tolerate him, coexist with him, believing that without him the people will deal with the liberals, and in any case it will be worse. Perhaps some liberals support Putin because they depend on the government financially (“system liberals”);
Support freedom of creativity in all forms and oppose any manifestations of public obscurantism or state pressure on culture; all the most high-profile stories of recent years - Serebrennikov, “Matilda”, “Tannhäuser”, Pussy Riot and further up to “Rosenthal’s Children” and the exhibition “Beware of Religion” - each time the attack on art became a point of consolidation of the entire liberal public, including “ systemic part of it. They treat “conservative” art with prejudice, they know about Mikhalkov’s next film even before its release that it will be bad, and even Zvyagintsev is perceived with caution - he is too much of a realist;
They adhere to a consensus regarding Stalinism and the inhumane manifestations of Soviet history in general, that is, a liberal will never say that Stalin was a controversial figure, and that condemning him for his crimes, one cannot fail to recognize his merits. As the velvet re-Stalinization takes place, carried out by the conservative part of society with the explicit and implicit support of the state, the Stalinist theme is updated and becomes more important for the liberal public than it was just a few years ago;
They are intolerant of nationalism and are even ready to approve Article 282 of the Criminal Code, believing that its main problem is not that it punishes thought crimes, but simply unsuccessful law enforcement;
They listen to “Echo of Moscow”, watch “Dozhd”, read “Novaya Gazeta” and, who are more advanced, “Medusa” - this is perhaps the most obvious criterion;
In the Ukrainian conflict they do not support the DLPR in any way. Either they simply condemn Russia for its military and political participation in the Ukrainian crisis, or they directly support the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian army, and they treat excesses in the rear (when a concert of a Russian singer is disrupted in Odessa or the windows of a store that is not loyal enough to the Maidan are smashed in Kyiv);
They do not believe in “Russia’s special path” and in a “multipolar world” and would clearly like Russia to be, albeit peripheral, but part of the Western world until it joins NATO;
Dissatisfied with the excessive presence of the state in the economy. They are afraid of Glazyev, they hate state corporations with the exception, perhaps, of Rusnano - and only because the icon of Russian liberals Chubais works there;
There are also several controversial, beyond political correctness, criteria for belonging to the liberal public; some critics (Zakhar Prilepin, Ulyana Skoybeda) at one time provoked considerable scandals by declaring or hinting that a liberal is, as a rule, a Jew.
That is, before us is a set of police signs by which we can begin the search for the liberal public. As befits verbal portraits, this portrait is deliberately inaccurate. What is Westernism in 2017 - if a person is rooting for Trump, Brexit and the French right, is he a Westerner or not? In general, speaking now about the West, what exactly are we talking about? The verbal portrait of a liberal does not answer this question. The same applies to Ukraine - the line between anti-imperialism and nationalism is too thin to walk without stumbling, and as a result, hypocrisy becomes inevitable, which its enemies readily take advantage of when criticizing the liberal public.
An interesting point - despite the fact that, minus the “system liberals”, the liberal public is one way or another anti-Putin, the main anti-Putin politician Navalny cannot be classified as a liberal public, he is an outsider in it (flirting with nationalists, excessive populism, etc.). But perhaps this is why there are so many of his supporters in the liberal public: there is a suspicion that they would support “one of their own” much more reluctantly, either having higher demands on him than on an outsider, or fearing that a real liberal will never find support among broad sections of society and it is better to immediately bet on an illiberal. In this sense, Navalny’s illiberalism paradoxically provides him with the support of liberals (it was the same with Yeltsin); he is a stranger, which is why they are interested in him, especially since they would have eaten their own long ago.
While it still matters - whose side the liberal public is on. Even now, in the most depressed state, deprived of everyone political opportunities it is still strong in the media, in the artistic environment, and in the format, the term is very inaccurate, but there is no other, “public diplomacy” both in international and domestic issues. Although the PR capabilities of the “system liberals” have been discredited (even Serebrennikov was not saved), they have not been destroyed - both some members of the Human Rights Council and those whom Putin values culturally are still able to reach the authorities, at least in the most scandalous cases.
And all this should be accompanied by remarks “yet”, “still”, “until now”. The liberal public is a fading nature, whose main strength is inertia.
After the murder of Boris Nemtsov, his place remained vacant forever, because among the liberal opposition leaders there were no longer holders of such a resume as Nemtsov’s, and in principle there was nowhere for them to come from: Nemtsov was a governor and deputy prime minister, and now governors and deputy prime ministers are completely other.
The liberal public does not reproduce itself, the liberal youth who come to replace the old people are deprived of its most basic (intellectual?) properties and are more like Putin’s young technocrats - look at Maxim Katz. The deliberate destruction of those environments in which the liberal public could exist, carried out by the authorities, made its death as a class a matter of time. Tomorrow from this social group there will be nothing left at all, and, probably, it would be reasonable to think now about how to live without her.
Publicity and liberalism
The revolution of 1905–1907 completely changed the context of Russian politics. The intelligentsia and the public, who previously had only timid and artificial contacts with a few peasants and workers, suddenly found themselves thrown into mass politics. Within a few short months they had to create political parties, draw up programs and present them to a population even less accustomed to politics than themselves.
The decisive change came with the manifesto of October 17, 1905, with which the Tsar guaranteed his subjects a wide range of civil rights and announced the establishment of a legislative assembly, State Duma, elected on a mass basis, including workers, peasants and non-Russian peoples. It was a triumph for the majority of political activists in the public, who had long called for an end to the autocracy.
The origins of the liberal movement dated back to the early 1890s and were associated with a surge of public opinion in response to the famine of 1891–1892. The picture of general poverty and incompetence of the authorities first prompted many young representatives of the intelligentsia to offer their services to provide food for the hungry and treat diseases, and then to try to at least change something in the conditions that caused such a disaster. The natural arena for this type of activity was the zemstvos, which were responsible for the economic aspects of local life. Another were autonomous scientific associations like the Moscow Society of Law and the St. Petersburg Free economic society with its branches, the St. Petersburg Literacy Committee.
In the 1890s, deliberative meetings of professional associations took on an increasingly pronounced political overtones. Most of all, the delegates were concerned about the barriers that separated the peasants from the rest of society: administrative isolation at the volost level, the guardianship of zemstvo bosses, the stigma corporal punishment. Many called for the introduction of universal primary education. The zemstvos also tried to unite their activities. In 1896, D. N. Shipov, chairman of the Moscow provincial zemstvo government, convened a meeting of colleagues during the Nizhny Novgorod fair to discuss problems, but when he tried to repeat it the next year, the police did not give permission.
However, the real unrest, as always, began in the universities. In February 1899, students of St. Petersburg University were denied the right to celebrate the traditional anniversary. The students ignored the ban, saying they had “rights,” and clashed with the police, who dispersed them by force. Students went on a protest strike and sent emissaries to other universities: a few days later, students in Moscow and Kyiv also boycotted lectures, calling for an end to oppressive discipline and police brutality. The authorities arrested the leaders of the strikers, but later, when the rest returned to classes, they released them.
The entire incident is typical of the tensions that existed between the authorities and the students. As Richard Pipes noted, “the government took a harmless display of youthful spirit as an act of rebellion. In response, radical intellectuals elevated students' complaints about police mistreatment to the level of a complete rejection of the "system."
As it turned out in subsequent years, this was just the beginning of chronic unrest in higher education institutions.
Discontent also grew in the zemstvos, although it was not expressed so violently. In the early years of the 20th century, faced with the complete inertia of the authorities, representatives of the “third estate” in private conversations began to discuss the creation of illegal political movements capable of bringing about change. In 1901, the liberal newspaper Osvobozhdenie was published in Stuttgart, and the editor was the former Marxist P. V. Struve (he wrote the first program of the Social Democratic Party). The following year in Switzerland, twenty representatives of zemstvos and radical intelligentsia formed the “Union of Liberation,” which aimed to eliminate the autocracy and establish a constitutional monarchy with a parliament elected on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage.
Following the failures in Russian-Japanese war The Union began a more open campaign within Russia, distributing its newspaper and holding "liberal banquets" that featured opposition speeches and raised money for the common cause. At some of the banquets demands were made to convene Constituent Assembly, the demands were more radical, since they left open the question of whether Russia should be a monarchy or a republic.
Although the Liberation Union remained a liberal movement and opposed violence as a means of regime change, the conditions in which it had to act forced it, willy-nilly, closer to the revolutionary socialist parties. In October 1904, in Paris, the Union held consultations with such parties. All present agreed to act together towards common goals, which at this stage were the abolition of the autocracy and the establishment of a democratically elected legislative assembly responsible for appointing the government.
Thus, the liberals found themselves in the same ranks with the revolutionaries, the public with the workers and peasants, and the moderates with the terrorists. An indiscriminate mixture of political views and methods continued for most of 1905. For all their differences, everyone agreed that the first priority was to get rid of autocracy. Zemstvo activists began to demand a democratically elected parliament, then - although not all of them - a Constituent Assembly, together with Osvobozhdenie, proclaiming the slogan “There are no enemies on the left!” The "Union of Unions", established in May 1905 to unite the political campaigns of the trade unions, was an example of this polymorphism. It consisted primarily of arts associations, as well as one workers' union and two small activist groups. Its members included professors, schoolteachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, journalists, pharmacists, veterinarians, accountants, railway workers and county employees, the Association for Women's Equality and the Association for Jewish Equality.
The circumstances surrounding the creation of the “Union of Unions” gave the Russian liberal movement radicalism and even revolutionism, which colored the subsequent political activity and prevented the achievement of fruitful working relations even with a reformist government committed to cooperation with the Duma. Subsequently, this tendency became even stronger as a result of the elections to the First Duma, during which the liberal electorate showed its radical nature.
The standard-bearer of Russian liberalism was the constitutional democratic party, founded in October 1905 under the leadership of P. N. Milyukov, professor of Russian history at Moscow University. The ponderous name reflected the fact that professors and lawyers set the tone, but it was soon shortened colloquially to “cadets.” From the very beginning it was a real party, with a network of branches in the provinces, where its members carried out propaganda work among the population, and regularly held congresses that determined the policy of the organization. Despite this, the cadets were never formally legalized by the regime because they refused to condemn revolutionary terrorism.
At its first two congresses, the new party rejected the October manifesto as insufficient and called for the establishment of a genuine "constitutional and parliamentary monarchy" based on universal suffrage. The program included the forced alienation of landowners' lands (with compensation) and the distribution of it to landless peasants; replacing indirect taxes with progressive income taxes; guarantee of civil rights; introduction of universal free and compulsory primary education; establishing an eight-hour working day and insurance for workers; as well as self-determination for all peoples of the empire.
Having almost no experience of political responsibility, the public's views have always leaned towards radicalism. Nevertheless, among the landowners and commercial bourgeoisie, a significant minority considered the cadet program to be rebellious and aimed more at undermining the social order than at preserving it. These more conservative liberals founded the Union of October 17, whose leader was A. I. Guchkov, a Moscow entrepreneur from a family of Old Believers. The Octobrists shared many of the views of the Cadets, but considered themselves moderate reformers and placed their main emphasis on strengthening the state and private property. As the name implies, the Octobrists did not claim to be political party and looked upon themselves as a union of political groups united common problems. Unlike the Cadets, they rejected and condemned revolutionary terrorism and accepted the political order envisaged by the October Manifesto, opposed the demands for the forced alienation of landowners' lands and advocated maintaining the unity of the empire even to the detriment of the interests of ethnic groups.
Despite the divergence of political opinions, the general public agreed that after the October manifesto, further attempts to violently overthrow the government were unjustified and should not be supported. Thus, the regime managed to achieve its goal and split its opponents. The majority of workers and peasants and, of course, the socialist parties remained dissatisfied with the concessions that the government had made and were ready for continued violence. Even the liberals and the peace-loving Cadet Party did not find the strength to condemn this violence: feeling pressure from below, the Cadets could not abandon the slogan “There are no enemies on the left!”
The main thing is the preservation of the old socio-political system and, first of all, the autocratic system with its political apparatus, the privileged position of the nobility, and the lack of democratic freedoms. No less significant reason- the unresolved agrarian-peasant issue, which remained central in the public life of the country. The half-hearted reforms of the 60-70s and fluctuations in government policy (either measures towards liberalization, or increased repression) also intensified the social movement. A special reason was the diversity and severity of social contradictions. To the old ones - between peasants and landowners - new ones were added, caused by the development of capitalism - between workers and entrepreneurs, the liberal bourgeoisie and the conservative nobility, between the autocracy and the peoples that were part of the Russian Empire.
A distinctive feature of the social life of Russia in the second half of the 19th century. there was a lack of powerful anti-government protests by the broad masses. The peasant unrest that broke out after 1861 quickly faded away, labor movement was in its infancy. The people retained tsarist illusions. The bourgeoisie also showed political inertia. All this provided the basis for the triumph of militant conservatism and determined an extremely narrow social basis for the activities of revolutionaries.
Conservatives. The social basis of this trend was the reactionary nobility, clergy, petty bourgeoisie, merchant class and a significant part of the peasantry.
Conservatism of the second half of the century. remained within the ideological framework of the theory of “official nationality”. Autocracy was still declared the most important structure of the state, ensuring the greatness and glory of Russia. Orthodoxy was proclaimed as the basis of the spiritual life of the people and was actively inculcated. Nationality meant the unity of the king with the people, which implied the absence of grounds for social conflicts. In this, conservatives saw the uniqueness of Russia's historical path.
In the domestic political sphere, conservatives fought for the inviolability of autocracy, against the implementation of liberal reforms in the 60s and 70s, and in subsequent decades they sought to limit their results. In the economic sphere, they advocated the inviolability of private property, the preservation of landownership and the community. In the social field, they insisted on strengthening the position of the nobility - the basis and maintaining the class division of society. In foreign policy they developed the ideas of Pan-Slavism - unity Slavic peoples around Russia. In the spiritual sphere, representatives of the conservative intelligentsia defended the principles of a patriarchal lifestyle, religiosity, and unconditional submission to authority. The main target for their criticism was the theory and practice of nihilists who rejected traditional moral principles.
The ideologists of the conservatives were K.P. Pobedonostsev, D.A. Tolstoy, M.N. Katkov. The spread of their ideas was facilitated by the bureaucratic apparatus, the church and the reactionary press. M.N. Katkov in the newspaper Moskovskie Vedomosti pushed the government’s activities in a reactionary direction, formulated the basic ideas of conservatism and shaped public opinion in this spirit.
Conservatives were statist guardians. They had a negative attitude towards any mass social action, advocating order, calm and tradition.
Liberals. The social basis of the liberal trend was made up of bourgeois landowners, part of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia (scientists, writers, journalists, doctors, etc.).
They defended the idea of a common path of historical development for Russia with Western Europe.
In the domestic political sphere, liberals insisted on the introduction of constitutional principles, democratic freedoms and the continuation of reforms. They advocated for an all-Russian elected body (Zemsky Sobor), expanding the rights and functions of local self-government bodies (Zemstvos). Their political ideal was a constitutional monarchy. Liberals advocated the preservation of a strong executive power, considering it a necessary factor for stability, and called for measures to be taken to promote the establishment of a rule-of-law state and civil society in Russia.
In the socio-economic sphere, they welcomed the development of capitalism and freedom of enterprise, advocated the preservation of private property and lower redemption payments. The demand to eliminate class privileges, recognition of the inviolability of the individual, his right to free spiritual development were the basis of their moral and ethical views.
Liberals stood for an evolutionary path of development, considering reforms the main method of socio-political modernization of Russia. They were ready to cooperate with the autocracy. Therefore, their activities mainly consisted of submitting “addresses” to the tsar - petitions proposing a program of reforms. The most “left-wing” liberals sometimes used conspiratorial meetings of their supporters.
The ideologists of the liberals were scientists, publicists, and zemstvo leaders (K.D. Kavelin, B.N. Chicherin, V.A. Goltsev, D.I. Shakhovskoy, F.I. Rodichev, P.A. Dolgorukov). Their organizational support was zemstvos, magazines (Russian Thought, Vestnik Evropy) and scientific societies. They wrote about the haste of reforms, about the psychological unpreparedness of some sections of the people for change. Therefore, the main thing, in their opinion, was to ensure a calm, shock-free “growth” of society into new forms of life. They had to fight both the preachers of “stagnation”, who were terribly afraid of changes in the country, and the radicals who stubbornly preached the idea of a social leap and rapid transformation of Russia (and on the principles of social equality). Liberals were frightened by calls for popular revenge on the oppressors that were heard from the camp of the radical raznochin intelligentsia. The liberals did not create a stable and organized opposition to the government.
Features of Russian liberalism: its noble character due to the political weakness of the bourgeoisie and its readiness for rapprochement with conservatives. They were united by the fear of popular “revolt” and the actions of radicals.
Russian liberalism had many different facets. With his left wing he touched the revolutionary underground, with his right - the guardian camp. Existing in post-reform Russia both as part of the political opposition and as part of the government (“liberal bureaucrats”), liberalism in contrast revolutionary radicalism and political security acted as a factor in civil reconciliation, which was so necessary for Russia at that time. Russian liberalism was weak, and this was predetermined by the underdevelopment of the country’s social structure, the virtual absence of a “third estate” in it, i.e. a fairly large bourgeoisie.
Radicals. Representatives of this trend launched active anti-government activities. Unlike conservatives and liberals, they sought violent methods of transforming Russia and a radical reorganization of society (the revolutionary path).
In the second half of the 19th century. The radicals did not have a broad social base, although objectively they expressed the interests of the working people (peasants and workers). The movement was attended by people from different strata of society (raznochintsy), who devoted themselves to serving the people.
Radicalism was largely provoked by the reactionary policies of the government and the conditions of Russian reality: police brutality, lack of freedom of speech, meetings and organizations. Therefore, only secret organizations could exist in Russia itself. Radical theorists were generally forced to emigrate and act abroad. This contributed to strengthening the ties between the Russian and Western European revolutionary movements.
In the radical direction of the second half of the 19th century. The dominant position was occupied by a movement whose ideological basis was the theory of the special, non-capitalist development of Russia and “public socialism.”
In the history of the radical movement of the second half of the 19th century. Three stages are distinguished: the 60s - the formation of revolutionary democratic ideology and the creation of secret raznochinsky circles; 70s - formalization of the populist doctrine, a special scope of propaganda and terrorist activities of revolutionary populist organizations; 80-90s - the activation of liberal populists and the beginning of the spread of Marxism, on the basis of which the first social democratic groups were created; in the mid-90s - the weakening of the popularity of populism and a short period of widespread enthusiasm for Marxist ideas among the democratically minded intelligentsia.
Conclusion. In the post-reform period, three directions in the social movement finally took shape - conservatives, liberals and radicals. They had different political goals, organizational forms and methods of struggle, spiritual and moral-ethnic positions.
Legal issues in the concepts of Slavophiles and Westerners were posed from the perspective of general cultural and historical issues. If Westerners included Russia in global development on equal terms with other nations, then Slavophiles preferred to talk about the uniqueness of Russian civilization and its superiority in relation to Western European culture. Thus, the dividing line between these two directions ran through different visions of the place and role of Russia in world culture. Accordingly, the central issue here was the choice of vector cultural development, and legal issues were of secondary importance. Another vector of Russian public life was the confrontation between two other directions: conservatives and liberals.
At the center of their discussions was the question of the most optimal political and legal system for Russia. Conservatives (from the Latin conservare - preserve) considered it necessary to focus on preserving the existing system and avoiding any serious changes - not only revolutionary upheavals, but also radical government reforms. Of the thinkers we studied, N.M. was close to this position. Karamzin. Liberals (from the Latin libertas - freedom) insisted on carrying out reforms, the purpose of which was to change the existing system and, through this, the maximum possible liberation of the human personality. M.M. was close to this direction. Speransky in his reform projects. Along with these two movements, there was also a radical direction, the goal of which was the violent (through revolution) overthrow of the political system and the establishment of social justice (this direction was consonant with the ideas formulated by A.N. Radishchev and P.I. Pestel).
Conservatism can be defined as a political ideology that focuses on the preservation of historically established forms of state and public life. The fundamental tenets of conservatism are considered to be: anti-rationalism, historicity, justification of traditional social hierarchy, recognition of imperfection human nature and as a result of this, the need for the educational role of the state and the church, the continuity of historical development, the priority of the whole (state, people, nation) over the part (individual). Russian conservative thought arose as a reaction, firstly, to liberal ideology (the ideas of the European Enlightenment, the French Revolution), and secondly, to the increasing orientation of Russian cultural development towards Europe. This is where two main elements in Russian protective ideology emerged: anti-revolutionism (illiberalism) and anti-Europeanism (nationalism).
Usually the first Russian conservative is considered to be Sergei Semenovich Uvarov (1786-1855), Minister of Public Education under Nicholas I. Uvarov’s political ideas are based on the thesis about national characteristics the Russian people, who, according to the thinker, are inert, weak-willed in matters of public administration. As the thinker writes, Russia cannot be judged by European theories - it moves forward only at the will of the authorities and therefore belongs rather to the East than to the West. Western legal ideology showed its inconsistency during the French Revolution, and only autocratic power can keep the Russian people from following the disastrous fate of Europe.
The political ideology competing with conservatism was liberalism. The main idea of liberalism is the liberation of the human personality, which is proclaimed highest value- in contrast to conservatism, where the highest value is the social whole.
One of the first theorists of liberalism in Russia was Timofey Nikolaevich Granovsky (1813–1855), a famous historian, lawyer and public figure. He received a law degree, but his scientific activity devotes himself to historical research.
Politically, Granovsky was close to the Westerners (he is sometimes referred to as the “late Westerners”), not considering the border between Russian and Western cultures, Orthodox and Catholic confessions of Christianity insurmountable. According to the thinker, the existing political and cultural system in Russia was far from perfect and should have developed in the same direction as Western European civilization as a whole.
This idea of a synthesis of personal and social principles formed one of the core elements of Russian political and legal discourse; it was developed by another outstanding representative of Russian liberalism - Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin (1818-1885), professor of the history of Russian law at Moscow University, the main representative of the state school of Russian history. The essence of the views of supporters of this school (to which also belonged S.M. Soloviev and a number of other outstanding Russian historians) came down to the thesis that the state principle prevailed in the historical development of the Russian people. The evolution of this beginning determined the life and culture of the Russian people, how its historical fate differed from the history of European peoples, where most of cultural development proceeded beyond the boundaries of government intervention, within the framework of self-organization of social groups.
This line of ideas was developed by another theorist of liberalism, one of the brightest and most important thinkers in the history of Russian legal thought - Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin (1828-1904), professor of state law at Moscow University. To understand Chicherin’s legal concept, it is important to take into account the fact that he, just like many other Russian thinkers of that time, he was influenced by the ideas of the German philosopher Hegel. Chicherin developed and supplemented these ideas, which allowed him to create a coherent and deep concept of law as a formal restriction of individual freedom. The thinker’s goal was to search for a harmonious agreement of “social interactions” of the four main unions of human society - family, civil society, church and state.
Conservatism and liberalism, as two main directions of legal thought in Russia in the 19th century, had different influences on the political course of the government and on the formation of public ideology. But these two directions converged on one most significant point - they had the same social basis. All the thinkers studied above belonged to the nobility. Therefore, it is not surprising that in disputes of different directions the very principle of social structure was not disputed - the discussion was about whether reforms were needed, but no one raised the question of whether the existence of society and existing social structures was justified.
Initially, the radical elements of Russian society were concentrated in the populism movement, which arose precisely after the reforms of Alexander I. The initiators of this movement were nobles who considered the past of Russia (serfdom) to be the fault of their class and considered it necessary to “go to the people and repay the debt to the people” for the serfdom past and for education, which was obtained thanks to the labor of the people.
Initially, there were three main directions in the populist movement. A rebellious trend, the members of which were tasked with going to the people and inciting rebellion, and destroying the existing system through a nationwide uprising. This formulation of the problem was based on the idea of organizing an immediate uprising, to which the Russian person, due to his character and hatred of the upper strata, would certainly have to join. The propaganda direction proceeded from slightly different premises: the people, due to their backwardness, are not ready for revolution. Therefore, propaganda is needed in order to explain to the people their goals and what they need to strive for - a revolution that replaces an unjust social system with a fair one. Supporters of the third, conspiratorial direction, believed that the masses would never be capable of revolutionary activity because of their inertia and conservatism. Therefore, the task of revolutionaries is to organize a narrow group that can secretly organize a coup and seize power; the Russian person, as a “communist by instinct” (Tkachev), will accept the new revolutionary government and support its transformations.
The failure of the mass outreach to the people is explained by the discrepancy between the ideas preached by the revolutionaries and the values and sentiments of the bulk of the peasantry. The peasants did not accept the agitation against the tsar and the church; the ideas of socialism were incomprehensible to them. In many cases, they themselves informed the authorities about the appearance of unknown troublemakers in the village. Faced with the real peasant world, participants in the movement became convinced of the utopianism of the ideas of the ideologists of populism about a peasant revolt. Its participants saw the reason for the failure of the mass campaign among the people in the absence of a single leadership center, a centralized party. The failures led to ideas about the need for gradual enlightenment of the backward masses and the creation of a fighting organization for this purpose.
Next stage populist movement - the creation in 1876 of a single organization “Land and Freedom” for centralized leadership of revolutionary activities. The landowners saw their goal not in immediately inciting a general rebellion, but in preparing the masses, awakening political consciousness among the people. Under the leadership of “Land and Freedom,” a new movement among the people began. This time, the intelligentsia went to the villages for propaganda work under the guise of teachers, doctors, and agronomists.
The main ideologist of the propaganda movement was Pyotr Lavrovich Lavrov (1823–1900), who considered the main and most important task of socialists in Russia to be rapprochement with the people in order to “prepare a coup that would bring about a better future.” Unlike Bakunin, Lavrov called on young people to educate the people, bring them out of a state of backwardness, and prepare them for a future social revolution. He saw the essence of historical progress in the improvement of man and society, the development of human solidarity, and the embodiment of the ideas of equality and justice in human society.
Lavrov was not a supporter of anarchism and considered it necessary to preserve the state. His legal views are set out in several articles, as well as in the main work on this topic - “The State Element in the Future Society” (1876).
The ideologist of the conspiratorial movement was Pyotr Nikitich Tkachev (1844-1885), who came from an impoverished noble family. Tkachev outlined his political views in the brochure “Tasks of Revolutionary Propaganda,” an open letter to Friedrich Engels, and a number of articles in the Nabat magazine he edited, which was published abroad from 1875 to 1881. Disagreeing with Bakunin and Lavrov, he considered the idea of a nationwide revolution. His main slogan is the seizure of power by a small group of revolutionaries, well organized and welded together by strong discipline.
After the seizure of power, a revolutionary dictatorship is created that will implement the main demands of the populist program: the transformation of the community into the main unit of economic and social life, the establishment of new relations between people on the principles of love, equality and brotherhood, the gradual elimination of the functions of the state.
The ideology of the conspiratorial trend was especially clearly manifested in the activities of Sergei Gennadievich Nechaev (1848–1882), the author of the “Catechism of a Revolutionary” outlining the main postulates of the revolutionary struggle. The revolutionary must completely break with the society around him, his way of life and morality. He has “no interests of his own, no feelings, no attachments, no property, not even a name.” Its only goal is the destruction of the existing system. Everything that contributes to the triumph of the revolution is moral. A revolutionary must be ready to die himself and destroy everything that interferes with his main goal.
Family relations and friendships should be considered only from the point of view of their expediency for the revolution. The entire society should be divided into several categories, which should be destroyed one by one. In 1869, he created a circle of students in Moscow. For suspicion of treason, Nechaev and his accomplices killed their fellow student Ivanov. Nechaev fled to Switzerland, but was extradited to the Russian government as a criminal. In 1872, a public trial was held. Sentenced to 20 years of hard labor, Nechaev died in prison in 1882. The word “Nechaevism” has become a household word and means a violation by revolutionaries moral standards in mutual relations, the use of blackmail and murder to achieve their goals.
In the late 80s - early 90s of the 19th century, Marxist groups and organizations arose in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities. People of different views were drawn to Marxism. Some tried to take control of the spontaneous movement of workers, to entice them to the path of struggle for the ideas of Marx’s Communist Manifesto, others went to the workers to help them defend their everyday interests. These humanistic ideas were shared by a considerable part of the Russian intelligentsia. The period of fascination with Marxism was experienced by the later famous philosophers and economists N.A. Berdyaev, S.N. Bulgakov, P.B. Struve and many others.
The latest direction of Russian radicalism XIX century, which remains for us to consider is Tolstoyism - a social movement founded by the great Russian writer Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy (1828-1910). The main position of this movement is the principle of non-resistance to evil through violence, which meant the rejection of all social forms, which are in one way or another connected with the use of organized coercion, including the right and the state.
Tolstoy was convinced that man is by nature predisposed to goodness; forcing him to comply with certain standards is immoral and therefore unacceptable.
According to the writer, the state, church and other coercive mechanisms for controlling people's behavior are unable to correct a person, violent coercion is useless and harmful; Only the internal rebirth of a person can lead to correction.