Fights for Lake Khasan. Fighting near Lake Khasan

R.Ya. Malinovsky,
Marshal Soviet Union

Tanker March Music: Dm. and Dan. Pokrass Words: B. Laskin 1939.
More than seventy years have passed since the Khasan events. They belong to history, which is always ready to teach useful lessons and enrich us with the necessary experience.
In the 1930s, the Soviet Union constantly strived for peaceful relations with neighboring countries in Far East, including with Japan, which was in common interests. However, this policy did not find a response from the then ruling circles of Japan.

Japanese leaders and the press conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and openly declared the need to prepare for war against the Soviet Union. General S. Hayashi, who came to power in February 1937, at the very first meeting of the government he led, declared that “the policy of liberalism towards the communists will be ended.”

Openly anti-Soviet articles began to appear in Japanese newspapers calling for a “march to the Urals.”
In May-June 1938, a propaganda campaign was launched in Japan around supposedly “disputed territories” on the border of Manchukuo with Russian Primorye. At the beginning of July 1938, the Japanese border troops located west of Lake Khasan were reinforced with field units that concentrated on the eastern bank of the Tumen-Ula River. And immediately before the start of the conflict, the Japanese army command sent a division stationed in Korea (numbering about 10 thousand people), a heavy artillery division and about 2 thousand soldiers of the Kwantung Army to the Zaozernaya Heights area. This group was led by Colonel Isamu Nagai, a member of the nationalist “Sakura Society”, an active participant in Japan’s capture of Northeast China in 1931.

The Japanese side explained the preparation for hostilities and the concentration of their troops to the area of ​​Lake Khasan by the fact that the USSR border zone near this lake is supposedly Manchurian territory.
On July 15, 1938, the Charge d'Affaires of Japan in the USSR appeared at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the heights in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. After the Japanese representative was presented with the Hunchun Agreement between Russia and China of 1886 and the map attached to it, irrefutably indicating that Lake Khasan and the heights adjacent to it from the west are on Soviet territory and that, therefore, there are no violations in this no area, he retreated. However, on July 20, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu, repeated his claims to the Khasan area. When it was pointed out to him that such claims were unfounded, the ambassador said: if Japan's demands are not met, it will use force.

Naturally, there was no question of fulfilling the unfounded territorial claims of the Japanese.

And then, in the early morning of July 29, 1938, a Japanese company, under the cover of fog, violated state border The USSR, shouting “banzai”, attacked the Nameless height. The night before, a detachment of 11 border guards, led by the assistant head of the outpost, Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin, arrived at this height.
...The Japanese chains surrounded the trench more and more tightly, and the border guards were running out of ammunition. Eleven soldiers heroically repelled the onslaught of superior enemy forces for several hours, and several border guards died. Then Alexey Makhalin decides to break through the encirclement with hand-to-hand combat. He rises to full height and with the words “Forward! For the Motherland!” rushes with the fighters into a counterattack.

They managed to break through the encirclement. But out of the eleven, six defenders of Nameless remained alive. Alexey Makhalin also died. At the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese managed to take control of the heights. But soon a group of border guards and a rifle company under the command of Lieutenant D. Levchenko arrived at the battlefield. With a bold bayonet attack and grenades, our soldiers knocked out the invaders from the heights.

At dawn on July 30, enemy artillery brought down dense, concentrated fire onto the heights. And then the Japanese attacked several times, but Lieutenant Levchenko’s company fought to the death. The company commander himself was wounded three times, but did not leave the battle. A battery of anti-tank guns under Lieutenant I. Lazarev came to the aid of Levchenko’s unit and shot the Japanese with direct fire. One of our gunners died. Lazarev, wounded in the shoulder, took his place. The artillerymen managed to suppress several enemy machine guns and destroy almost a company of the enemy. It was with difficulty that the battery commander was forced to leave for dressing. A day later he was back in action and fought until final success. . . And Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).

The Japanese invaders decided to strike a new and main blow in the area of ​​the Zaozernaya hill. Anticipating this, the command of the Posyet border detachment - Colonel K.E. Grebennik - organized the defense of Zaozernaya. The northern slope of the height was guarded by a detachment of border guards under the command of Lieutenant Tereshkin. In the center and on the southern slope of Zaozernaya there was a reserve outpost of Lieutenant Khristolubov and a squad of fighters of a maneuver group with two crews of heavy machine guns. On the southern bank of Khasan there was a branch of Gilfan Batarshin. Their task was to cover the command post of the squad leader and prevent the Japanese from reaching the rear of the border guards. Senior Lieutenant Bykhovtsev’s group strengthened on Bezymyannaya. Near the height was the 2nd company of the 119th regiment of the 40th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Levchenko. Each height was a small, independently operating stronghold. Approximately halfway between the heights there was a group of Lieutenant Ratnikov, covering the flanks with reinforced units. Ratnikov had 16 soldiers with a machine gun. In addition, he was given a platoon of small-caliber guns and four light T-26 tanks.

However, when the battle began, it turned out that the forces of the border defenders were meager. The lesson at Bezymyannaya was useful to the Japanese, and they brought into action two reinforced divisions total number up to 20 thousand people, about 200 guns and mortars, three armored trains, a battalion of tanks. The Japanese pinned great hopes on their “suicide bombers” who also took part in the battle.
On the night of July 31, a Japanese regiment, with artillery support, attacked Zaozernaya. The defenders of the hill returned fire, and then counterattacked the enemy and drove him back. Four times the Japanese rushed to Zaozernaya and each time they were forced to retreat with losses. A powerful avalanche of Japanese troops, although at the cost of heavy losses, managed to push back our fighters and reach the lake.
Then, by decision of the government, units of the First Primorsky Army entered the battle. Its soldiers and commanders, heroically fighting together with the border guards, cleared our territory of Japanese invaders after fierce military clashes on August 9, 1938.

Aviators, tank crews, and artillerymen also made a significant contribution to the overall success of repelling the enemy. Accurate bomb strikes fell on the heads of the invaders, the enemy was thrown to the ground by dashing tank attacks, and destroyed by irresistible and powerful artillery salvoes.
The campaign of Japanese troops to Lake Khasan ended ingloriously. After August 9, the Japanese government had no choice but to enter into negotiations to end hostilities. On August 10, the USSR government proposed a truce to the Japanese side. The Japanese government accepted our terms, also agreeing to create a commission to resolve the controversial border issue.
For the massive heroism shown in the battles near Lake Khasan, thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded high state awards, many became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Settlements, streets, schools, and ships were named after the heroes. The memory of the valiant warriors is still preserved in the hearts of Russians, in the hearts of the Far Easterners.

60 years separate us from the time of the conflict at Lake Khasan. But even today this event continues to attract the attention of political and military leaders, historians in our country and abroad.
In the conflict at Lake Khasan, domestic troops not only entered into battle with an experienced enemy army for the first time since the Civil War. The provocative actions of the Japanese had a long-range aim: local conflict for the Japanese General Staff could only become a prelude to larger-scale actions. Maybe - to war.

Hence the enduring significance of the victorious successes at Hasan, which is rightly celebrated today, sixty years later. And then, in the thirties, this victory also contributed to the intensification of the national liberation war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders: during the battles on Khasan, the Japanese army practically stopped the offensive on the Chinese front.
No less important was the military-political side of this conflict. Defeat imperial army became the first of a number of reasons that kept Japan from speaking out against the USSR during the Second World War. As noted in documents of that time: “Our firm position in these events forced the presumptuous adventurers both in Tokyo and Berlin to come to their senses. . . There is no doubt that by doing this the Soviet Union rendered the greatest service to the cause of peace.”

However, just as the sea is reflected in a drop of water, the Khasan events highlighted not only positives, but also a number of negative aspects, characteristic of the state of the country and the army in those years.

Yes, the Far Eastern fighters and commanders fought heroically and did not retreat, but their lack of preparation for battles and confusion during them should have made them think about it in anticipation of future formidable trials. “We now not only know the price of our enemy, but also saw those shortcomings in the combat training of the Red Army units and border troops, which were not noticed by many before the Khasan operation. We will make a huge mistake if, based on the experience of the Khasan operation, we fail to move into top class ability to defeat the enemy,” this is how experts in hot pursuit assessed what happened. However, not all of Hassan’s lessons were learned: June 1941 turned out to be so tragically similar to the first days of the fighting at Hassan, so much of what preceded them coincided! In the light of Hassan, the catastrophic situation that had developed by 1939 in the command echelons of the Red Army is assessed in a new way; it is enough to analyze the actions of the command staff in the operation. And perhaps today, 60 years later, we understand this more clearly, more comprehensively.

And yet, the events on Khasan, with all their complexity and ambiguity, clearly demonstrated the military power of the USSR. The experience of fighting with the regular Japanese army greatly helped the training of our soldiers and commanders during the battles at Khalkin Gol in 1939 and in the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945.

To understand everything, you need to know everything. The time has come to rediscover Khasan - for serious research by scientists, historians, local historians, writers, all Russian people. And not for the duration of the holiday campaign, but for many years.

From 1936 to 1938, more than 300 incidents were noted on the Soviet-Japanese border, the most famous of which occurred at the junction of the borders of the USSR, Manchuria and Korea at Lake Khasan in July-August 1938.

At the origins of the conflict

The conflict in the Lake Khasan area was caused by a number of both foreign policy factors and very difficult relations within the ruling elite of Japan. An important detail was the rivalry within the Japanese military-political machine itself, when funds were distributed to strengthen the army, and the presence of even an imaginary military threat could have given the command of the Korean Army to Japan a good opportunity to remind itself, given that the priority at that time was the operations of Japanese troops in China, which did not bring the desired result.

Another headache for Tokyo was the military aid flowing from the USSR to China. In this case, it was possible to exert military and political pressure by organizing a large-scale military provocation with a visible external effect. All that remained was to find a weak spot on the Soviet border, where an invasion could be successfully carried out and the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops could be tested. And such an area was found 35 km from Vladivostok.

And while on the Japanese side the border was approached by a railroad and several highways, on the Soviet side there was only one dirt road. . It is noteworthy that until 1938, this area, where there really was no clear boundary marking, was of no interest to anyone, and suddenly in July 1938, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively took up this problem.

After the refusal of the Soviet side to withdraw troops and the incident with the death of a Japanese gendarme, shot by a Soviet border guard in the disputed area, tension began to increase day by day.

On July 29, the Japanese launched an attack on the Soviet border post, but after a hot battle they were driven back. On the evening of July 31, the attack was repeated, and here the Japanese troops already managed to wedge 4 kilometers deep into Soviet territory. The first attempts to drive out the Japanese with the 40th Infantry Division were unsuccessful. However, everything was not going well for the Japanese either - every day the conflict grew, threatening to develop into big war, for which Japan, stuck in China, was not ready.

Richard Sorge reported to Moscow: “The Japanese General Staff is interested in a war with the USSR not now, but later. Active actions on the border were taken by the Japanese to show the Soviet Union that Japan was still capable of demonstrating its power."

Meanwhile, in difficult off-road conditions and poor readiness of individual units, the concentration of forces of the 39th Rifle Corps continued. With great difficulty, they managed to gather 15 thousand people, 1014 machine guns, 237 guns, and 285 tanks in the combat area. In total, the 39th Rifle Corps consisted of up to 32 thousand people, 609 guns and 345 tanks. 250 aircraft were sent to provide air support.

Hostages of provocation

If in the first days of the conflict, due to poor visibility and, apparently, the hope that the conflict could still be resolved diplomatically, Soviet aviation was not used, then starting from August 5, Japanese positions were subjected to massive air strikes.

Aviation, including TB-3 heavy bombers, was brought in to destroy Japanese fortifications. The fighters carried out a series of assault strikes on Japanese troops. Moreover, the targets of Soviet aviation were located not only on the captured hills, but also deep in Korean territory.

It was later noted: “To defeat the Japanese infantry in the enemy’s trenches and artillery, high-explosive bombs were mainly used - 50, 82 and 100 kg, a total of 3,651 bombs were dropped. 6 pieces of high-explosive bombs 1000 kg on the battlefield 08/06/38. were used solely for the purpose moral impact on the enemy infantry, and these bombs were dropped into the enemy infantry areas after these areas had been thoroughly hit by groups of SB-bombs FAB-50 and 100. The enemy infantry rushed about in the defensive zone, not finding cover, since almost the entire main zone of their The defense was covered in heavy fire from the explosions of bombs from our aircraft. 6 bombs of 1000 kg, dropped during this period in the area of ​​​​the Zaozernaya height, shook the air with strong explosions, the roar of these bombs exploding across the valleys and mountains of Korea was heard tens of kilometers away. After the explosion of 1000 kg of bombs, the Zaozernaya height was covered with smoke and dust for several minutes. It must be assumed that in those areas where these bombs were dropped, the Japanese infantry were 100% incapacitated from shell shock and stones thrown out of the craters by the explosion of the bombs.”

Having completed 1003 sorties, Soviet aviation lost two aircraft - one SB and one I-15. The Japanese, having no more than 18-20 anti-aircraft guns in the conflict area, could not provide serious resistance. And throwing your own aviation into battle meant starting a large-scale war, for which neither the command of the Korean Army nor Tokyo were ready. From this moment on, the Japanese side began to frantically search for a way out of the current situation, which required both saving face and stopping hostilities, which no longer promised anything good for the Japanese infantry.

Denouement

The denouement came when Soviet troops launched a new offensive on August 8, having overwhelming military-technical superiority. The attack by tanks and infantry was carried out based on military expediency and without taking into account compliance with the border. As a result, Soviet troops managed to capture Bezymyannaya and a number of other heights, and also gain a foothold near the top of Zaozernaya, where the Soviet flag was hoisted.

On August 10, the chief of staff of the 19th telegraphed the chief of staff of the Korean Army: “Every day the combat effectiveness of the division is declining. The enemy suffered great damage. He is using new methods of combat and increasing artillery fire. If this continues, there is a danger that the fighting will escalate into even more fierce battles. Within one to three days it is necessary to decide on further actions divisions... Until now, Japanese troops have already demonstrated their power to the enemy, and therefore, while it is still possible, it is necessary to take measures to resolve the conflict diplomatically.”

On the same day, armistice negotiations began in Moscow and at noon on August 11, hostilities ceased. Strategically and politically, the Japanese test of strength, and by and large the military adventure ended in failure. Not being prepared for a major war with the USSR, the Japanese units in the Khasan area found themselves hostage to the created situation, when further expansion of the conflict was impossible, and it was also impossible to retreat while preserving the prestige of the army.

The Hassan conflict did not lead to a reduction military assistance USSR to China. At the same time, the battles on Hassan revealed a number of weak points both the troops of the Far Eastern Military District and the Red Army as a whole. The Soviet troops apparently suffered even greater losses than the enemy; at the initial stage of the fighting, the interaction between the infantry, tank units and artillery turned out to be weak. Not on high level turned out to be reconnaissance that failed to reveal enemy positions.

The losses of the Red Army amounted to 759 people killed, 100 people died in hospitals, 95 people missing and 6 people killed in accidents. 2752 people was injured or sick (dysentery and colds). The Japanese admitted the loss to 650 killed and 2,500 wounded. At the same time, the battles on Khasan were far from the last military clash between the USSR and Japan in the Far East. Less than a year later, an undeclared war began in Mongolia on Khalkhin Gol, where, however, the forces of the Japanese Kwantung Army, rather than the Korean ones, would be involved.

Having occupied Northern Manchuria, Japan considered (under favorable conditions) the possibility of transferring military operations to the border areas of the USSR. To check the combat status of OKDVA units, Japanese troops periodically organized provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border. Japanese aviation demonstratively invaded the airspace of the USSR, mainly for reconnaissance purposes. From June 11 to June 29, 1937, its planes violated air borders in Primorye 7 times, staying over Soviet territory for 2 to 12 minutes.

On April 11, 1938, the airspace of the Soviet Union was violated large group Japanese planes, one of which was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from border troops. Pilot Maeda was captured. During his interrogation, it became clear that the Japanese side was carefully studying air routes in the border zone in the Soviet Far East in case of hostilities.

Providing effective assistance Republic of China during, the armed forces of the USSR had been fighting for almost a year (with the help of military advisers and volunteers, up to 4 thousand people) with Japanese troops on Chinese territory. A full-scale war between the Soviet Union and Japan was only a matter of time. In the second half of the 1930s. The general staff of the Japanese ground forces had already prepared a plan for a military invasion of the USSR in three directions - eastern (coastal), northern (Amur) and western (Khingan). Particular emphasis was placed on the use of air forces. According to the General Staff of the Red Army, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, Japan could quickly concentrate up to 1,000 ground aircraft near our borders.

Anticipating the possibility of such a scenario developing, the Soviet military leadership took appropriate measures. On July 1, 1938, OKDVA, further reinforced by personnel and military equipment, was transformed into the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (KDF, 2 armies) and the Northern Group of Forces of central subordination. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher became the commander of the Far Eastern Fleet, and his deputy for aviation was. The 2nd Air Army was created from the Far Eastern aviation.

On the 20th of July 1938, increased activity of Japanese troops was noticed in the coastal area, accompanied by rifle and machine-gun shelling of the Soviet border territory. Our border guards have received instructions to use weapons in the event of a direct violation of the border. Units of the 1st Primorsky Army of the Far Eastern Fleet were put on high alert.

Meanwhile, the Japanese side chose the Posyetsky district in the Primorsky Territory, at the junction of the borders of the USSR, the puppet state of Manchukuo and Korea, to attack the USSR, seeking to seize disputed territories (Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights) in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.

On July 29, 1938, an armed conflict broke out. In the following days, regardless of losses, the enemy managed to capture the dominant heights, which he short term turned into a heavily fortified position.

The commander of the Far Eastern Fleet troops was given the task of defeating the enemy in a short time and liberating the border strip he had captured (without invading the adjacent territory of Manchukuo). To conduct combat operations in the air, an advanced aviation group was created: 21 R-5 SSS attack aircraft of the 2nd chapter (Shkotovo airfield or Shkotovskaya Valley), 15 I-15 fighters of the 40th IAP (Augustovka), 12 36th SBA (Knevichi ) and 41 I-15 (11 from and 30 from the 48th IAP, Zaimka Filippovsky airfield).

On August 1, our aviation with the forces of 4 squadrons (40 I-15, 8 R-Z) carried out a bombing attack on Japanese troops, causing them minor damage. This was followed by other raids by bomber, attack and fighter aircraft. To combat Soviet aircraft, the Japanese side used only 2 anti-aircraft batteries (18-20 guns) located on the territory of Manchukuo, which damaged 3 Soviet aircraft (1 I-15, 2 SB) with their fire. The next day, our air raids continued.

Fearing retaliatory actions from the Japanese Air Force, in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army dated August 4, 1938 No. 0071 “On bringing the troops of the Far Eastern Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness in connection with the provocation of the Japanese military Lake Khasan" in large air defense points of the Far East and Transbaikalia, it was prescribed: “install artillery and machine-gun units in position, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, checking the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit.”

August 5th from one of submarines The Pacific Fleet received unverified information about 98 Japanese bombers approaching Vladivostok. The city's air defense was urgently put on full alert. Up to 50 fighters were taken into the air. Fortunately, the information turned out to be false.

The task was also to provide air defense facilities to field airfields, rifle, cavalry and tank units located in camps or bivouacs. For this purpose, 5 anti-aircraft divisions were involved (32nd, 39th, 40th rifle divisions; 39th and 43rd rifle corps).

The measures taken were based on the presence of an aviation group (up to 70 aircraft) on the Japanese side in the lake area. Hassan. However, she was almost never involved in battles. As a result, the 69th Fighter Aviation Brigade, armed with and, refocused on conducting aerial reconnaissance, protecting its aircraft and bombing enemy positions.

On August 4-9, Soviet troops, actively supported from the air by aviation, managed to defeat the Japanese-Manchurian group in the area of ​​Lake Khasan and push it out of the territory of the USSR. On August 11, the conflict was settled, which was officially recognized in Tokyo.

During the period of hostilities near Lake Khasan, Soviet aviation carried out 1003 sorties, of which: - 41, SB - 346, I-15 -534, SSS - 53, R-Z - 29, I-16 - 25. 4265 were dropped on the enemy bombs of various calibers (total weight about 209 tons), 303,250 rounds of ammunition were spent.

Japanese anti-aircraft artillery shot down 1 SB and 1 I-15 (Lieutenant Soloviev). From anti-aircraft gun and machine gun fire, 29 aircraft had minor holes and damage, of which: 18 - I-15, 7 - SB and 4 - TB-3RN. Two more I-15 fighters were considered lost for non-combat reasons. Pilot Koreshev crashed a fighter while landing at an unfamiliar airfield - the plane fell into a ditch and crashed. Another car was crushed when it landed unsuccessfully on the airfield.

The reluctance of the Japanese side to use its air force in an armed conflict was probably caused by the danger of air strikes from Soviet bomber aircraft not only in the area of ​​Lake Khasan, but also on Japanese territory.

According to the publication: 100 years of the Russian Air Force (1912 - 2012)/ [Dashkov A. Yu., Golotyuk V. D.] ; under general ed. V. N. Bondareva. - M.: Russian Knights Foundation, 2012. - 792 p. : ill.

The conflict in the Lake Khasan area was caused by foreign policy factors and very difficult relations within the ruling elite of Japan. An important detail was the rivalry within the Japanese military-political machine itself, when funds were distributed to strengthen the army, and the presence of even an imaginary military threat could give the command of the Japanese Korean Army a good opportunity to remind itself, given that the priority at that time was the operations of Japanese troops in China, which never brought the desired result.

Another headache for Tokyo was the military aid flowing from the USSR to China. In this case, it was possible to exert military and political pressure by organizing a large-scale military provocation with a visible external effect. All that remained was to find a weak spot on the Soviet border, where an invasion could be successfully carried out and the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops could be tested. And such an area was found 35 km from Vladivostok.

Badge “Participant of the Khasan Battles”. Established June 5, 1939. Awarded to private andthe command staff of the Soviet troops who took part in the battles near Lake Khasan. Source: phalera. net

And if from the Japanese side on this area There was a railway and several highways approaching the border, but on the Soviet side there was one dirt road, communication along which was often interrupted during summer rains. It is noteworthy that until 1938, this area, where there really was no clear boundary marking, was of no interest to anyone, and suddenly in July 1938, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively took up this problem.

Every day the conflict grew, threatening to develop into a big war

After the refusal of the Soviet side to withdraw troops and the incident with the death of a Japanese gendarme, shot by a Soviet border guard in the disputed area, tension began to increase day by day. On July 29, 1938, the Japanese launched an attack on the Soviet border post, but were repulsed after a hot battle. On the evening of July 31, the attack was repeated, and here the Japanese troops already managed to wedge 4 kilometers deep into Soviet territory. The first attempts to drive out the Japanese with the 40th Infantry Division were unsuccessful. However, everything was not going well for the Japanese either - every day the conflict grew, threatening to escalate into a big war, for which Japan, stuck in China, was not ready.

Richard Sorge reported to Moscow: “The Japanese General Staff is interested in a war with the USSR not now, but later. Active actions on the border were taken by the Japanese to show the Soviet Union that Japan was still capable of demonstrating its power." Meanwhile, in difficult off-road conditions and poor readiness of individual units, the concentration of forces of the 39th Rifle Corps of the Red Army continued. With great difficulty, it was possible to gather 15 thousand people in the combat area, armed with 237 guns, 285 tanks (out of 32 thousand people, 609 guns and 345 tanks available in the corps). 250 aircraft were sent to provide air support.

Sopka Zaozernaya. One of the key heights near Lake Khasan. Height 157 meters, steepnessslopes up to 45 degrees. Photo source: zastava-mahalina.narod.ru

If in the first days of the conflict, due to poor visibility and, apparently, the hope that the conflict could still be resolved diplomatically, Soviet aviation was not used, then starting from August 5, Japanese positions were subjected to massive air strikes. Aviation, including TB-3 heavy bombers, was brought in to destroy Japanese fortifications. Due to the lack of opposition in the air, Soviet fighters were used to carry out assault strikes on Japanese troops. Moreover, the targets of Soviet aviation were located not only on the captured hills, but also deep in Korean territory.

Japanese test of strength ended in failure

It was noted: “To defeat the Japanese infantry in the enemy’s trenches and artillery, they mainly used high-explosive bombs - 50, 82 and 100 kg, a total of 3,651 bombs were dropped. 6 high-explosive bombs of 1000 kg on the battlefield on 08/06/38 were used solely for the purpose of moral influence on enemy infantry, and these bombs were dropped into enemy infantry areas after these areas were thoroughly hit by groups of SB-bombs FAB-50 and 100 .

Scheme of military operations near Lake Khasan. Photo source: wikivisually.com

The enemy infantry rushed about in the defensive zone, not finding cover, since almost the entire main zone of their defense was covered with heavy fire from the explosions of bombs from our aircraft. 6 bombs of 1000 kg, dropped during this period in the area of ​​​​the Zaozernaya height, shook the air with strong explosions, the roar of these bombs exploding across the valleys and mountains of Korea was heard tens of kilometers away. After the explosion of 1000 kg of bombs, the Zaozernaya height was covered with smoke and dust for several minutes. It must be assumed that in those areas where these bombs were dropped, the Japanese infantry were 100% incapacitated from shell shock and stones thrown out of the craters by the explosion of the bombs.” Having completed 1003 sorties, Soviet aviation lost two aircraft to anti-aircraft artillery fire - one SB and one I-15. Small losses in aviation were due to the weakness of Japanese air defense. The enemy had no more than 18-20 anti-aircraft guns in the conflict area and could not provide serious resistance.

Soviet flag near the top of the Zaozernaya hill, August 1938. Photo source:mayorgb.livejournal.com

And throwing your own aviation into battle meant starting a large-scale war, for which neither the command of the Korean Army nor Tokyo were ready. From this moment on, the Japanese side began to frantically search for a way out of the current situation, which required both saving face and stopping hostilities, which no longer promised anything good for the Japanese infantry. The denouement came when Soviet troops launched a new offensive on August 8, having overwhelming military-technical superiority. The attack by tanks and infantry was carried out based on military expediency and without taking into account compliance with the border. As a result, Soviet troops managed to capture Bezymyannaya and a number of other heights, and also gain a foothold near the top of Zaozernaya, where the Soviet flag was hoisted. On August 10, the chief of staff of the 19th telegraphed the chief of staff of the Korean Army: “Every day the combat effectiveness of the division is declining. The enemy suffered great damage. He is using new methods of combat and increasing artillery fire. If this continues, there is a danger that the fighting will escalate into even more fierce battles. Within one to three days it is necessary to decide on the division’s further actions... Until now, Japanese troops have already demonstrated their power to the enemy, and therefore, while it is still possible, it is necessary to take measures to resolve the conflict diplomatically.” On the same day, armistice negotiations began in Moscow and at noon on August 11, hostilities ceased.

In strategic and political terms, the Japanese test of strength, and by and large a military adventure, ended in failure. Not being prepared for a big war with the USSR, the Japanese units in the Khasan area found themselves hostage to the created situation, when further expansion of the conflict was impossible, and it was also impossible to retreat while preserving the prestige of the army. The Hassan conflict did not lead to a reduction in USSR military assistance to China. At the same time, the battles on Khasan revealed a number of weaknesses of both the troops of the Far Eastern Military District and the Red Army as a whole. The Soviet troops apparently suffered even greater losses than the enemy; at the initial stage of the fighting, the interaction between the infantry, tank units and artillery turned out to be weak. The reconnaissance was not at a high level, unable to accurately identify the enemy’s positions. The losses of the Red Army amounted to 759 people killed, 100 people. died in hospitals, 95 people. missing and 6 people who died as a result of accidents. 2752 people was injured or sick (dysentery and colds). The Japanese admitted the loss of 650 killed and 2,500 people. wounded.

The battles on Khasan in July-August 1938 were far from the first and not the last military clash between the USSR and Japan in the Far East. Less than a year later, an undeclared war began in Mongolia on Khalkhin Gol, where Soviet troops would have to face units not of the Korean, but of the Kwantung Army of Japan.

Sources:

The classification has been removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts. Statistical research. M., 1993.

Koshkin A. Japanese Front of Marshal Stalin. Russia and Japan: the century-long shadow of Tsushima. M., 2003.

“The clouds are gloomy at the border.” Collection for the 65th anniversary of events at Lake Khasan. M., 2005.

Lead image: iskateli64.ru

Image for the announcement of the material on the main page: waralbum.ru

Conflict on Lake Khasan

“In July 1938, the Japanese command concentrated 3 infantry divisions, a mechanized brigade, a cavalry regiment, 3 machine-gun battalions and about 70 aircraft on the Soviet border... On July 29, Japanese troops suddenly invaded the territory of the USSR at the Bezymyannaya Height, but were driven back. On July 31, the Japanese, using their numerical advantage, captured the tactically important Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights. To defeat the Japanese troops that invaded the territory of the USSR, the reinforced 39th Corps was allocated... Near Lake Khasan Soviet army for the first time since Civil War entered into battle with the experienced personnel army of the imperialists. Soviet troops gained well-known experience in the use of aviation and tanks and in organizing artillery support for the offensive. For heroism and courage, the 40th Infantry Division was awarded the Order of Lenin, the 32nd Infantry Division and the Posyetsky border detachment were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. 26 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 6.5 thousand people were awarded orders and medals,” this is how the international conflict on the Soviet-Japanese border is presented in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

When reading the above TSB article, one gets the impression that for the Red Army the battle on Lake Khasan was something like an exercise that was as close as possible to combat conditions, and the experience it gained was extremely positive. Of course, this is a misconception. In reality, things were not so simple.

Throughout the 30s of the 20th century, the situation in the Far East gradually became tense. Having captured Manchuria and invaded Central China, Japan turned out to be a neighbor of the USSR and “set its sights” on Soviet Primorye. A large group of troops was concentrated here; samurai from time to time staged provocations on the border, repeatedly violating it. Even 5 months before the start of the conflict, intelligence officer Richard Sorge warned Moscow about the impending Japanese attack. And he was not wrong.

The first armed incident between the border guards of the Soviet Union and Japanese soldiers occurred on July 15, 1938, when a group of the latter crossed the border and began photographing military fortifications. Fire was opened on the intruders, and in response, the Japanese captured Mount Shirumi. The situation was becoming critical, but the reaction of the Soviet command was inadequate. The border troops received the order: “Do not open fire.” While carrying out this task, they did not respond to the Japanese shelling of the detachment in the area of ​​border checkpoint No. 7. Meanwhile, the samurai continued to build up their forces, which by July 28 amounted to 13 infantry battalions with artillery. The Soviet side could only oppose this force with 3 battalions. In such a situation, the command of the border outpost began to ask for reinforcements, which was refused. Marshal Blucher commented on this: “The border guards themselves got involved. Let them get out of it themselves.”

We really had to “get out” ourselves. On July 29, a battle broke out at the height of Bezymyannaya, in which the border guards had to retreat. Within an hour 11 Soviet soldiers They held the line and retreated only after the death of 5 comrades. Reinforcements from two border groups arrived in time and “saved” the situation: the advancing Japanese were thrown back beyond the border line. Only then was the order given: “Immediately destroy the Japanese advancing on the Zaozernaya heights without crossing the border.” This significantly constrained the actions of the border guards. On the night of July 31, as a result of the attack, the Japanese captured the Zaozernaya heights, as well as the Bezymyannaya, Chernaya, and Bogomolnaya heights. The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 93 people killed and 90 wounded.

The conflict ceased to be a border incident. Only towards the end of the day on August 1, reinforcements arrived, but the conditions in which the troops were placed seriously made it difficult to complete the combat mission. The advancing Soviet units were caught between the border line and Lake Khasan, which put them under Japanese flanking fire. Following the order, the border guards could not use either aviation or artillery. It is not surprising that in such a disadvantageous position the attack of the Soviet troops faltered.

They immediately began to prepare a new offensive, and this time the command allowed them to also operate on enemy territory. The assault on Zaozernaya Heights was carried out by the 39th Rifle Corps and lasted 5 days - from August 6 to 11. The task was completed, the Japanese were thrown back abroad. Immediately after the end of the assault, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR gave the order to end hostilities. Victory was won, provocations on the border stopped. The conflict ended, the Japanese were repulsed, but the miscalculations made should have been analyzed more carefully.

For example, the arriving reinforcements were not fully equipped: some battalions had only 50% of their regular strength. The artillery did not have enough ammunition. Logistics support was poorly organized. The field hospital arrived at the site of hostilities seven days late, and only three of the doctors required by the staff arrived. To all this Soviet military leaders made decisions only after their approval in Moscow. Of course, in the latter case, it is not so much the individual commanders who are to blame, but the excessive centralization and fear of taking initiative and responsibility that dominated the country and army.

The fighting on Lake Khasan cost the Red Army 472 killed, 2,981 wounded and 93 missing. But in fact, the consequences of mistakes made and then not corrected were much more severe. As the head of the Far Eastern Directorate of the NKVD later noted, victory was achieved “only through heroism and enthusiasm personnel units whose fighting impulse was not ensured by high organization of combat and skillful use of numerous military equipment.” The experience of 1938 was not sufficiently taken into account both from the point of view of the organization of the army and from the point of view of the tactics of modern combat. It is no coincidence that the Red Army would make similar mistakes in the summer of 1941. If all the mistakes of the fighting on Lake Khasan had been taken into account, the consequences of the first months of the Great Patriotic War might not have been so tragic for the Soviet people.