What is the thaw period in the USSR? Khrushchev's Thaw: a turning point in Soviet history
the first large-scale conscious attempt to destroy Stalinist totalitarianism, undertaken on the initiative of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. Khrushchev after the death of I. Stalin in March 1953. In its content, this is the system of the then reforms of N. Khrushchev. They made significant changes in social and political life Soviet Union, his domestic and foreign policies, put an end to gross lawlessness and massive repression. However, without destroying the social foundations of totalitarianism, the Thaw ended with the removal of N. Khrushchev from the leadership of the party and the country, and the entry of Soviet society into a period of stagnation and degradation.
Although the totalitarian system created under the leadership of I. Stalin - barracks pseudo-socialism - contradicted the essence of the views of Marx and Lenin, as well as the fundamental interests of working people, its destruction was not predetermined by the death of I. Stalin. Created by the “great helmsman” and the fourth classic, the totalitarian monoideology “Marxism-Leninism” sanctified the existing structure as the social system of working people (“victorious socialism”), and the party-state bureaucracy, nurtured under the auspices of I. Stalin, stood guard over public order, while how the people, intimidated and crushed by repression, continued to believe in the country’s successful advancement towards a glorious communist future.
Something else is also important. From the time when Stalin’s despotic power, having pushed the working class and its allies out of the leadership and management of the country, established the undivided dominance of the party-state bureaucracy, the contradiction between the working people, the masses and the administrative-bureaucratic forces became the center of the contradictions of Soviet society, and this itself the contradiction took the place of the main contradiction of Soviet society, remaining as such since the late 20s. The nature of this contradiction is far from simple. The undivided power of Stalin did not mean at all that under this power there were no attempts by certain representatives of the party-state apparatus to take the side of the people, the working people, to challenge the despotic rule of Stalin (repeated attempts of this kind precisely determined Stalin’s destruction of the “Leninist guard” in 30s).
Although attempts to change power did not lead to the desired results, their very appearance was inevitable and ineradicable. The fact is that the political dominance of the party-state bureaucracy contains in itself an insoluble contradiction. Its essence lies in the deep gap between content and form, words and deeds. After all, the dominance of the party-state bureaucracy is possible only in a society following the socialist path, where the need for the conscious implementation of the ideals of the working people makes the people managing this process an irreplaceable, key part of society, its political power. This means that by subordinating this process to its own selfish interests and goals, the bureaucracy is forced to pretend that it is realizing the interests of the working class, the working people. As a result, both the deceived workers and the bureaucracy, which is obliged to constantly deceive, are unhappy. This gives rise to periodic explosions of discontent on both sides of the contradiction - among the working people and among the nomenklatura, which indicates the fragility and fragility of bureaucratic domination, setting in motion leaders who are dissatisfied with the domination of the bureaucracy and all the falsehood, who want to return power to the working people. The death of Stalin just gave the opportunity for such a leader - N. Khrushchev - and the figures who supported him to become more active.
To realize the opportunity that presented itself, personal courage and remarkable abilities of the new leader were needed. N. Khrushchev was a political genius. We are talking not only about his political directness and spontaneity of temperament, but also about the peculiarity of his political thinking, which most often relied not on logical reasoning, but on intuition, which often helped him out.
Having headed the party in September 1953, N. Khrushchev faced the task of correctly assessing what was happening and outlining ways for further development. The new First Secretary saw and understood a lot, but not everything.
It must immediately be emphasized that for N. Khrushchev, who began the reforms, as well as for M. Gorbachev, who acted as the highest leaders of the CPSU, much later, there was no doubt about the truth of Marxism-Leninism, as they represented it (and both knew it, as did everything, through the Stalinist interpretation, because they didn’t teach another). Despite the fact that the miner and the lawyer perceived “Marxism-Leninism” individually differently, they had no doubt about the correctness of the socialist path chosen in October 1917. However, as it later turned out, each leader had his own assessment of what happened to the country after October.
For N. Khrushchev, all the troubles of Soviet (and world) socialism and the communist movement (if we do not forget about the constant pressure and “intrigues” of imperialism) were associated with the “cult of personality and its consequences,” i.e. with the grossest miscalculations, mistakes, and lawlessness of I. Stalin, whose comrade-in-arms for a long time was N. Khrushchev himself. Therefore, one general idea runs through all of N. Khrushchev’s reform activities: if one “cleanses oneself from Stalinism” and, first of all, from everything connected with mass repressions, and conducts business in the spirit of the general truths of Marxism-Leninism, then when fulfilling the proposal put forward at the XXII Congress of the CPSU in October 1961 Programs of “expanded construction of communism”, the communists will win both internally and on the world stage.
It was with this understanding that the main reforms and actions of N. Khrushchev were associated: the arrest, trial and execution of L. Beria, the destruction of the repressive apparatus, the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the closed report at it, condemning Stalin and his repressions, the 22nd Congress with innovative ideas and the removal of the body Stalin from the mausoleum, the exposure of the anti-party group in 1957, virgin lands, the housing epic, a whole array of innovative ideas in domestic and foreign policy and at the same time attacks on objectionable writers, poets, artists and other retreats and hesitations.
And yet, for all its inconsistencies and contradictions, the “Khrushchev thaw” became very important stage in Soviet development not only because, on behalf of the CPSU, it dealt a fatal blow to Stalinism, after which it could no longer rise. It was this period of Soviet history that became the cradle of nascent democracy, many reform initiatives, it was here that the galaxy of “sixties” began to form - the forerunners of perestroika, here not only A. Solzhenitsyn made himself known, but also conditions began to be created for the establishment of differences of opinion; Soviet citizens learned to discuss politics and criticize their own people without fear and without whispering political leaders, and the policy of peaceful coexistence ceased to be a slogan, a phrase became a reality, a meaningful system of measures.
But, condemning Stalinism and breaking with it, N. Khrushchev did not understand (later M. Gorbachev would repeat this mistake) that we must look much more broadly if we seriously talk about the troubles of Stalinism, because its essence is not just the villainy of the leader - AND .Stalin, and in a certain socio-political force, class - the party-state bureaucracy, the nomenklatura, which does not at all distort and pervert the scientific views of Marx and Lenin, but has its own ideology - Stalin’s “Marxism-Leninism”, its own social ideal - barracks pseudo-socialism , within the framework of which it exploits and oppresses the working people, reigns supreme, hiding behind socialist verbiage.
This mistake will cost N. Khrushchev his post, and for the Soviet people it will result in the loss of the opportunity to return to the socialist path.
At the end of his reform activities, N. Khrushchev will begin to understand that the omnipotence of the party and state bureaucracy is the main obstacle to the improvement of Soviet society. He will outline two decisive blows to the (party and state) nomenclature: the division of regional committees into urban and rural and the replacement of ministries with economic councils. However, the party-state bureaucracy, well understanding all the dangers threatening it emanating from the “corn farmer”, secretly, behind N. Khrushchev’s back, will prepare its answer: it will urgently convene the October (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, where it will remove the leader-reformer from all posts , and the Khrushchev thaw will become history.
Khrushchev's Thaw - The activities of individuals such as Khrushchev can serve as an illustration of the most serious attempts at reform in the USSR. Having become a member of the Politburo quite late, he only gradually approached the reformist current represented by Malenkov... However, after the 20th Congress and the expulsion of the anti-party group, everything changed very quickly. Aware of the objective necessity and unexplored possibilities of political development, Khrushchev, with the powerful support of Mikoyan, increasingly asserts himself as a defender of the growing strength and open anti-Stalinism... Agriculture, liberalization, peaceful coexistence - these are the three stable fundamental elements of Soviet anti-Stalinism.
This amazing policy, which in just a few years mobilized against itself a motley coalition stretching from the extreme right to the extreme left on the Soviet political horizon, was the expression of a kind of neo-populism, in its content and norms going back to a certain Leninist integratism. Thus, the themes of the withering away of the state and the building of communism have been used since the late 50s. in order to establish new, albeit utopian, relations with the masses. The partial failure of these attempts subsequently gave rise to an increasingly uncontrollable desire at the last stage of the Khrushchev leadership to dismantle the party apparatus itself. The permanent rotation of leading party workers, the division of the party into urban and rural - all this opened the way... to a kind of socio-political pluralism, unacceptable for the majority of party cadres. However, it should also be noted that Khrushchev was deeply hostile... to dialogue with the Soviet intelligentsia and with specialists in the field of economics. Until the very end, Khrushchev remained hostile to reforms in the field of management, preferring to encourage forms of industrial corporatism, and his speeches on cultural topics were characterized by rudeness , not even devoid of contempt.
Khrushchev's open statements about his anti-Stalinism should not give us the impression that these elements indicate a break with the past. In addition, the list of victims of Stalinism is almost symbolic, chosen Secretary General to be mentioned in the report read only to the Soviet delegates of the 20th Congress, indicates that certain boundaries were set for criticism of the past..., and collectivization and five-year plans were considered as correct strategic decisions that were carried out by a mythical collective leadership. This extremely cautious and even servile attitude towards orthodoxy in assessments of Soviet history is in itself a valuable indication of the limitations of the operation undertaken by Khrushchev.
Being a powerless witness to the moral coarsening of the top of the apparatus in the last years of Stalin’s rule, Khrushchev made an attempt, as Solzhenitsyn shows in his story “A Calf Butted an Oak Tree,” to direct the mass dynamics of Stalinism in a different direction, purifying Stalinism from its most brutal aspects and smoothing out its most blatant authoritarian tendencies...
Finding himself unable to really change the central mechanism of reproduction of the leadership of the party and state, Khrushchev turned to measures aimed at establishing a direct connection with the masses; he even began to invite “drummers” to meetings of the Central Committee and flaunt the private aspects of his life, appearing on film and television screens. Thus, he became the inventor of a kind of hardware "populism" with the goal of combining the authoritarian aspects of Stalinism with the popular base in a new synthesis, bold in words, but in practice not much different from the previous situation. The main aspect of “Khrushchevism” lies precisely in the desire to transfer into the hands of “the whole people” ... that part of the initiative that was confiscated from them by the party and the state, without essentially changing the previous type social development. In the field of agriculture, Khrushchev, having rejected proposals put forward earlier by Malenkov to expand the sphere of personal initiative, tried to get out of the situation by providing an appeal to the masses (the dissolution of the MTS, which, at least formally, allowed collective farmers to become owners of the means of production; the development of virgin lands) with traditional faith into the transformative power of technology received from above, with promises to improve the production of fertilizers, introduce new crops (for example, corn) and turn to Lysenko and other charlatans for advice. From the point of view of traditional structures, the most important reform that was implemented was the abolition of numerous ministries and the sharp limitation of the power of the State Planning Committee in favor of territorial-type associations.
In the last years of the Khrushchev period (1962-1964), more significant changes took place: the priority of heavy industry was questioned, and public opinion appeared autonomous in relation to the party. Lieberman published his first articles on the need to introduce new criteria for economic management. It was at this moment that Khrushchev’s conservative allies came to the conclusion that the rubicon beyond which the crisis of power began had already been crossed.
Similar “voluntarist” positions can be traced in Khrushchev’s foreign policy. The Soviet leadership, demonstrating goodwill, sought to expand the anti-imperialist struggle. The opening of doors towards Tito and Mao, the sometimes adventuristic support of Fidel Castro and Nasser, were the most significant steps in this attempt at a “return to Lenin”, which included an obvious revision of the concept of internationalism. But here, too, the lack of understanding of the relationship between the USSR and the world revolutionary movement caused a sudden hangover almost everywhere.
“Khrushchevism” appears before us as a policy, in fact, not without a certain consistency, as a mass neo-populist political line, designed to overcome the Stalinist legacy by connecting new social elements to political life that had previously been excluded from the sphere of power, i.e. .e. peasantry, national minorities. However, the refusal to reach a real agreement with authoritative representatives of these elements very soon completely stopped the reform movement. Nevertheless, criticism, even if only verbal, of Stalinist dogmatism increasingly united those yearning for past times, so that the right and extreme right, i.e. The Stalinists managed to launch their counter-offensive, while the social strata interested in reforms did not have time to mobilize in support of populism, which in this case revealed not only its uncertainty, but even its inability to defend itself. Of course, Khrushchev could take credit for the significant acceleration of the economic development of the USSR, when, during his 10-year reign, untapped opportunities for extensive development of agriculture and industry were realized, which was accompanied by rapid social upsurge, as well as the latest revolutionary results of decolonization. However, having exhausted this capital, the Secretary General's policy entered a period of obvious crisis. It was obvious that much more decisive and less improvised action was needed to implement a consistent and decisive policy of economic reform and peaceful coexistence.
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The Khrushchev Thaw period is the conventional name for a period in history that lasted from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. A feature of the period was a partial retreat from the totalitarian policies of the Stalin era. The Khrushchev Thaw is the first attempt to understand the consequences of the Stalinist regime, which revealed the features of the socio-political policy of the Stalin era. The main event of this period is considered to be the 20th Congress of the CPSU, which criticized and condemned Stalin’s personality cult and criticized the implementation of repressive policies. February 1956 marked the beginning of a new era, which aimed to change social and political life, change the domestic and foreign policies of the state.
Events of the Khrushchev Thaw
The period of the Khrushchev Thaw is characterized by the following events:
- The process of rehabilitation of victims of repression began, the innocently convicted population was granted amnesty, and relatives of “enemies of the people” became innocent.
- The republics of the USSR received more political and legal rights.
- The year 1957 was marked by the return of Chechens and Balkars to their lands, from which they had been evicted in Stalin's time in connection with accusations of treason. But such a decision did not apply to the Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars.
- Also, 1957 is famous for the International Festival of Youth and Students, which in turn speaks of the “opening of the Iron Curtain” and the easing of censorship.
- The result of these processes is the emergence of new public organizations. Trade union bodies are undergoing reorganization: the staff of the top level of the trade union system has been reduced, and the rights of primary organizations have been expanded.
- Passports were issued to people living in villages and collective farms.
- Rapid development of light industry and agriculture.
- Active construction of cities.
- Improving the standard of living of the population.
One of the main achievements of the policy of 1953 - 1964. there was the implementation of social reforms, which included solving the issue of pensions, increasing incomes of the population, solving the housing problem, and introducing a five-day week. The period of the Khrushchev Thaw was a difficult time in the history of the Soviet state. For so much a short time(10 years) many transformations and innovations were carried out. The most important achievement was the exposure of the crimes of the Stalinist system, the population discovered the consequences of totalitarianism.
Results
So, the policy of the Khrushchev Thaw was superficial and did not affect the foundations of the totalitarian system. The dominant one-party system was preserved using the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev did not intend to carry out complete de-Stalinization, because it meant admitting his own crimes. And since it was not possible to completely renounce Stalin’s time, Khrushchev’s transformations did not take root for long. In 1964, a conspiracy against Khrushchev matured, and from this period a new era in the history of the Soviet Union began.
On the evening of March 5, 1953, after several days of sudden illness, I.V. died. Stalin. In the last hours of his life, the leader’s inner circle shared power, trying to legitimize their position and revise the decisions of the 19th Congress of the CPSU. The head of the government was G.M. Malenkov. L.P. Beria received the post of Minister of Internal Affairs, which included the Ministry of State Security. N.S. Khrushchev remained Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The “disgraced” Mikoyan and Molotov regained their positions. Until now there are different versions about Stalin's illness and death: natural death, murder, deliberate delay in calling doctors. It is clear that Stalin's death was beneficial to many of those around him.
The struggle for power in the spring-summer of 1953 was associated with determining the country's development strategy. Numerous problems required solutions. The country could not maintain a huge army, have 2.5 million prisoners, spend money on “great construction projects,” continue to exploit the peasantry, incite conflicts around the world, and create new enemies. The instability of the ruling layer and threats of repression worsened the controllability of the state. All members of the political leadership understood the need for change. But everyone determined the priorities and depth of the inevitable changes in their own way. The first ideologists of the reforms were Beria and Malenkov. Since June 1953, Khrushchev became a supporter of reforms. A more conservative position was taken by Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov.
At the initiative of Beria, on March 27, 1953, an amnesty decree was adopted, according to which about 1 million people sentenced to up to 5 years were released: those who were late for work and truants, women with children under 10 years old, the elderly, etc. Contrary to popular belief, the amnesty did not apply to murderers and bandits, but it did not affect political prisoners either. This action (more than a third of prisoners who had acquired criminal experience in the camps and were not equipped in the everyday sense were released) caused a wave of crime in the cities.
At the beginning of April 1953, the “doctors’ case” was terminated. The official report spoke for the first time about the responsibility of Ministry of Internal Affairs employees who used “prohibited interrogation methods.” Soon, those convicted in other post-war political trials (“Mingrelian case”, “Aviators’ case”) were released. In June 1953, Beria submitted to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee a proposal to limit the rights of the Special Meeting under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Steps were taken to reform the Gulag system “due to economic inefficiency”; a number of enterprises were transferred to line ministries.
Beria's initiatives went beyond the competence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He advocated changing the personnel policy in the republics, proposing, in particular, broad promotion of national personnel to the leadership. Beria insisted on normalizing relations with Yugoslavia, as well as abandoning the costly construction of socialism in the GDR and creating a neutral, united Germany. The phenomenon of Beria in the history of the USSR has not yet been fully explored. He gained a reputation as a villain and executioner. It seems that such an assessment suffers from simplicity.
Of course, Beria is responsible for crimes committed by the authorities, but to the same extent as his comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Khrushchev and others. Beria, by virtue of his position, was the most informed person in the leadership, knowing better than anyone the “pain points” of the system, all the information about what the population of the country was primarily opposed to flowed to him through the security agencies. Beria's activity aroused fears among other members of the political leadership of his “sworn friends.”
Beria was feared and hated by the army leadership. The local nomenklatura was controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was not responsible for anything, but interfered in everything. His comrades began to suspect Beria of preparing his own dictatorship. Thus, Beria became a symbol of threat. He was feared and hated by all major political forces. By preliminary agreement between Malenkov, Khrushchev and Defense Minister Bulganin, on June 26, 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, Beria was arrested. The performers of the “operation” were Marshal Zhukov, commander of the Moscow Military District Moskalenko and several officers.
At the beginning of July 1953, a plenum of the Central Committee was held, at which the image of a state criminal, a spy of “international imperialism”, a conspirator, “an enemy who wanted to restore power for the restoration of capitalism” was created. From now on, Beria becomes, according to modern researcher R.G. Pihoi, “a kind of drain of the history of the party, the source of everything that did not correspond to the canonized ideas about the role of the party.” Thus, a specific “political intriguer” was declared guilty of everything, and not the system of power, not Stalin. In December 1953, at a closed meeting Supreme Court USSR Beria and his closest assistants were sentenced to death for treason.
The beginning of the "thaw".
The “Beria case” acquired a powerful public resonance, raising hopes for a change in the political atmosphere in the country. An important result of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was the confirmation of the principle of party leadership. The logical result was the introduction at the September 1953 plenum of the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which Khrushchev received. It was he who gradually began to seize the initiative for transformations, later called the “Khrushchev Thaw.”
Time from late 1953 to early 1955. characterized by a power struggle between Khrushchev and Malenkov. Their rivalry unfolded against the backdrop of determining the country's economic development strategy. Malenkov intended to change priorities in economic development by increasing the share of production of consumer goods. Khrushchev insisted on maintaining the previous Stalinist course on the primary development of the heavy defense industry. A particularly acute situation arose in agriculture, which had to be brought out of a state of complete devastation.
In August 1953, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Malenkov announced a reduction in taxes from peasants and the provision of basic social rights to peasants (primarily the partial issuance of passports). The new agricultural policy was finally formulated at the September (1953) plenum. It was directly stated about the dire situation in the countryside. Khrushchev announced a significant increase in government purchase prices for agricultural products, the cancellation of collective farm debt, and the need to increase investment in the agricultural sector of the economy.
These measures made it possible to somewhat improve the food situation, stimulated the development of private production of meat, milk, and vegetables, and made life easier for millions of citizens of the USSR. In 1954, to solve the grain problem, the development of virgin and fallow lands began in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan.
The next step was the selective rehabilitation of victims of Stalin's terror. In April 1954, those convicted in the so-called “Leningrad case” were rehabilitated. During 1953-1955 All major political cases of the post-war period were reviewed, extrajudicial bodies were abolished, their rights were restored and prosecutorial supervision was strengthened, etc. But the political processes of the 1930s were practically not revised.
In addition, rehabilitation was very slow. In 1954-1955 Only 88 thousand prisoners were released. At this rate, it would take decades to process millions of applications. Strikes and uprisings began in the camps themselves. One of the largest was the uprising in Kengir (Kazakhstan) in the spring and summer of 1954 under the slogan “Long live the Soviet Constitution!” The uprising lasted 42 days and was suppressed only with the help of tanks and infantry.
The “undercover” struggle between Khrushchev and Malenkov ended in victory for the former. In February 1955, a session of the Supreme Council relieved Malenkov from the post of head of government. At the previous January (1955) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Malenkov was blamed for his economic and foreign policy views (for example, discussions about the possible death of humanity in a nuclear war). A weighty argument was his involvement in the repressions.
He was for the first time publicly accused of collaborating with Beria, of being responsible for the “Leningrad affair” and a number of others. political processes 40s early 50s. The consequence of this was new rehabilitations. During 1955-1956 The topic of repression and attitude towards Stalin is gradually becoming the main one in society. Not only the fate of the party and political leadership, but also the party’s place in the country’s political system depended on its decision.
Considering the history of the first post-Stalin decade, we should especially note the importance XX Congress of the CPSU. It became a turning point in the development of Soviet society and radically changed the situation in the international communist movement thanks to Khrushchev’s secret report “On the cult of personality and its consequences,” read on February 25, 1956 at a closed meeting.
The decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to read this report at the congress was not unanimous. The report came as a shock to the vast majority of delegates. For the first time, many learned about Lenin’s so-called “testament” and his proposal to remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee. The report spoke of purges and “illegal methods of investigation,” with the help of which absolutely incredible confessions were wrested from thousands of communists.
Khrushchev painted the image of Stalin as an executioner, guilty of the destruction of the “Leninist Guard”, who shot the 17th Congress. Thus, Khrushchev sought to blame Stalin, Yezhov and Beria for everything bad in the past and thereby rehabilitate the party, the ideas of socialism and communism. This made it possible to bypass the question of the system of organization of power, in the depths of which the debunked “cult” matured and developed.
Khrushchev particularly focused on Stalin’s guilt in the initial period of the war. But there was no complete picture of the repressions: the revelations did not concern collectivization, the famine of the 1930s, repressions against ordinary citizens, and the fight against Trotskyists and oppositionists of “all stripes” was recognized as one of Stalin’s most important achievements. In general, the report did not claim theoretical depth and analysis of such a phenomenon as Stalinism.
The closed meeting of the 20th Party Congress was not recorded in shorthand and the debate was not opened. It was decided to familiarize communists and Komsomol members with the “secret report,” as well as “non-party activists,” without publishing it in the press. They read an already edited version of Khrushchev’s report. This caused a huge public outcry. The entire spectrum of opinions was present: from disappointment with the incompleteness of the question of the “cult”, demands of the party trial of Stalin, to rejection of such a quick and sharp rejection of values that were unshakable just yesterday. There was a growing desire in society to get answers to numerous questions: about the cost of transformation; about what of the tragedies of the past was generated by Stalin personally, and what was predetermined by the party itself and the idea of building a “bright future.”
The desire to introduce criticism within a certain framework was manifested in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of June 30, 1956 “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences.” It was a step back compared to the “secret report” at the 20th Congress. Stalin was now characterized as “a man who fought for the cause of socialism,” and his crimes as “certain restrictions on intra-party Soviet democracy, inevitable in conditions of a fierce struggle against the class enemy.” In this way, Stalin's activities were explained and justified. The application of the principle: on the one hand, an outstanding figure devoted to the cause of socialism, on the other, a person who abused power, was supposed to remove the severity of criticism of the orders of the recent past, and even more so not to transfer this criticism to the present.
Over the next 30 years, criticism of Stalin in Soviet historiography was limited and opportunistic. This was manifested in the fact that, firstly, Stalin’s activities were separated from the construction of socialism and thereby, in essence, the administrative command system was justified. Secondly, the full scale of the repressions was not revealed and Lenin’s closest associates Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev and others were not rehabilitated. Thirdly, the question of personal responsibility of Stalin’s closest circle and numerous perpetrators of terror was not raised.
Nevertheless, the significance of criticism of Stalin’s personality cult cannot be overestimated. There has been a turn towards democracy and reforms in society. The system of total fear was largely destroyed. The decisions of the 20th Congress meant a renunciation of the use of repression and terror in the internal party struggle and guaranteed security for the upper and middle layers of the party nomenklatura. The rehabilitation process not only took on a massive, ubiquitous character, but was also embodied in the restoration of the rights of entire peoples who suffered during Stalin’s time.
The policy of de-Stalinization pursued by Khrushchev, his numerous economic initiatives, which were not always distinguished by thoughtfulness and integrity, and adventurous statements (the slogan “Catch up and surpass America in meat and milk production per capita,” put forward in May 1957) caused growing discontent among the conservative part of the party. state apparatus. An expression of this was the speech of the so-called “anti-party group” within the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.
Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, using the support of the majority, tried at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in June 1957 to remove Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee (it was planned to eliminate this post altogether) and appoint him Minister of Agriculture. Accusations were brought against him of violating the principles of “collective leadership”, of forming a cult of his own personality, and of rash foreign policy actions. However, Khrushchev, having secured the support of members of the Central Committee, demanded the urgent convening of a plenum. An important role was played by the support of Khrushchev by the Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov.
At the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the actions of Khrushchev's opponents were condemned. A manifestation of some democratization of the party was the fact that for the first time in many decades, the plenum of the Central Committee, rather than a narrow circle of members of the Presidium, acted as the decisive authority. Finally, the oppositionists themselves remained free and members of the party. They were removed from the Central Committee and demoted. Khrushchev was given the opportunity to continue his reform activities. However, the rational that was contained in Khrushchev’s criticism was not noticed for the time being by either himself or his circle.
The role of G.K. Zhukova in June 1957 showed the leadership the potential for army intervention in the political life of the country. During Zhukov’s visit to Yugoslavia and Albania in the fall of 1957, Khrushchev indiscriminately accused him of “Bonapartism” and overestimating his military merits. He was accused of “severing” the Armed Forces from the party and creating the prototype of the future special forces without the approval of the Central Committee of the Central Intelligence School. At the end of October 1957, Zhukov was removed from the post of Minister of Defense. From March 1958, Khrushchev began to combine leadership of the party and the state (he took the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), which was the beginning of his sole rule.
He owed his triumph to the political elite of that time and, above all, to the party apparatus. This largely determined his future political line and forced adaptation to the interests of this layer. At the same time, the defeat of the “anti-party group”, the removal of Zhukov and the transformation of Khrushchev into the sole leader deprived him of any legal opposition that would restrain his not always thoughtful steps and warn against mistakes.
Socio-economic reforms.
The primary task of the economic policy of the new leadership was some decentralization of industry management and the transfer of enterprises to republican subordination. Another direction was the course to accelerate technological progress. The result was the emergence nuclear power plant and icebreaker, commercial jet aircraft Tu104, accelerated development of the chemical industry.
In the military sphere, nuclear submarines and missile-carrying aircraft appeared. Epochal events that go far beyond the scope of purely scientific achievements were the launch on October 4, 1957 of the world's first artificial Earth satellite and on April 12, 1961. spaceship with a person on board. The first cosmonaut in the world was Yu.A. Gagarin.
In 1957, a restructuring of economic management began, main goal which was a transition from a sectoral to a territorial principle. A Council was created in each economic region National economy. In total, 105 economic councils were created and 141 ministries were liquidated. The reform pursued the following goals: decentralization of management, strengthening of territorial and interdepartmental relations, increasing the independence of production subjects.
Initially, the reform brought tangible results: the decision-making path was shortened, counter transportation of goods was reduced, and hundreds of similar small industries were closed. In the 50s, according to some researchers, the growth rate industrial production and national income were the highest in Soviet history. But this did not fundamentally change the dead-end economic system itself. The fundamentals of the administrative command system remained unchanged. Moreover, the capital's bureaucracy, which had lost part of its power, showed dissatisfaction.
Reforms in the agricultural sector were even less successful. Here Khrushchev’s impulsiveness and improvisation were especially clearly manifested. For example, the introduction of corn was in itself a reasonable step for the development of livestock farming, but the development of new varieties in relation to Russian conditions required at least 10 years, and the return was expected immediately. In addition, the “queen of the fields” was planted all the way to the northern regions of the Arkhangelsk region.
The development of virgin lands turned into yet another campaign, supposedly capable of immediately solving all food problems. But after a short-term growth (in 1956-1958, virgin lands produced more than half of the harvested bread), harvests there fell sharply due to soil erosion, droughts and other natural phenomena that scientists warned about. This was an extensive development path.
Since the late 50s. the principles of material interest of collective farmers in the results of labor began to be violated again. Administrative reorganizations and campaigns began, inevitable in the existing system. A striking example was the “meat campaign in Ryazan”: a promise to triple meat production in 3 years.
The result was a sharp reduction in the number of cows put under the knife, and the suicide of the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU. Similar things, albeit on a smaller scale, happened everywhere. At the same time, under the banner of eliminating differences between city and countryside and building communism, restrictions and even elimination of peasants’ personal farmsteads began. The outflow of rural residents and, above all, young people to cities has increased. All this caused irreparable damage to the village.
The most successful were social reforms. Illiteracy was finally eliminated. The practice of forced (so-called “voluntary”) government loans has ceased. Since 1957, industrial production began housing construction in cities there are “Khrushchev’s” five-story buildings. They began a change in the type of housing for millions of people: from communal apartments to separate apartments.
In 1956, old-age pensions were introduced in all state sectors (before that they were received by a limited number of workers), and in 1964 they began to be issued to collective farmers for the first time. Anti-worker laws were repealed: criminal liability for absenteeism and systematic lateness to work. Salaries have increased significantly, the population's consumption of industrial and food products. There was a reduction in the working day (up to 7 hours) and the working week.
Spiritual life.
The first decade after Stalin's death was marked by significant changes in spiritual life. “The Thaw” (after the title of I. G. Ehrenburg’s story) marked the beginning of the liberation of public consciousness from dogmas and ideological stereotypes. Representatives of literature were the first to respond to the changes that began in society (works by Dudintsev, Granin, Panova, Rozov, etc.).
The work of Babel, Bulgakov, Tynyanov and others was rehabilitated. After the 20th Congress, the magazines “Moscow”, “Neva”, “Youth”, “Foreign Literature”, “Friendship of Peoples” and others appeared. A special role was played by the magazine “New World”, headed by Tvardovsky. Here, in November 1962, Solzhenitsyn’s story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” was published, telling about the life of prisoners.
The decision to publish it was made at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee under personal pressure from Khrushchev. A feature of the “thaw” was the emergence of so-called “pop” poetry; young authors Voznesensky, Yevtushenko, Rozhdestvensky, Akhmadulina gathered large audiences in Moscow. Cinema achieved significant success during this period. Best films: “The Cranes Are Flying” (dir. Kalatozov), “Ballad of a Soldier” (dir. Chukhrai), “The Fate of a Man” (dir. Bondarchuk) received recognition not only in the USSR, but also in the world. The CPSU Central Committee recognized the previous assessments of the work of outstanding composers Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian and others as unfair.
However, the “thaw” in spiritual life was also a contradictory phenomenon, since it had well-defined boundaries. The authorities found new methods of influencing the intelligentsia. Since 1957, meetings between the leaders of the CPSU Central Committee and figures of art and literature have become regular. At these meetings, everything that did not fit into the official ideology was condemned. At the same time, everything that was personally incomprehensible to Khrushchev himself was denied. The personal tastes of the country's leader acquired the character of official assessments.
The loudest scandal erupted in December 1962, when Khrushchev, while visiting an exhibition in the Manege, criticized the works of young avant-garde artists, which were difficult for him to understand. One of the most striking examples of persecution of cultural figures was the “Pasternak case.” Publication in the West of the novel Doctor Zhivago, which was not allowed to be published in the USSR by censors, and the award to B.N. Pasternak's Nobel Prize resulted in persecution of the writer. He was expelled from the Writers' Union and, in order to avoid expulsion from the country, refused the Nobel Prize. The intelligentsia was still required to be “soldiers of the party” or to adapt to the existing order.
Foreign policy.
Considering foreign policy in the Khrushchev decade, it is necessary to note its contradictory nature. In the summer of 1953, a compromise was reached between the USSR and the USA, which resulted in the signing of an armistice in Korea. In the mid-50s, Europe consisted of two opposing blocs. In response to West Germany's accession to NATO, in 1955 the countries of the socialist bloc created the Warsaw Pact Organization.
But at the same time, the foundations for stabilization in this part of the world began to be laid. The USSR normalized relations with Yugoslavia. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, theses were substantiated about the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, about their peaceful competition, about the possibility of preventing wars in modern era, about the variety of transition forms various countries to socialism. At the same time, the actions of the Soviet leadership in the international arena were not always in line with these ideas.
The process initiated by the 20th Congress caused a crisis within the socialist camp. In countries of Eastern Europe who built socialism on the Stalinist model, began to move away from this model. These processes became especially acute in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, the Communist Party managed to maintain power by updating the country's leadership. In Hungary in October 1956, thousands of anti-Soviet demonstrations began, which escalated into armed action. Bloody reprisals began against state security and party officials. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union used armed force.
The pockets of armed resistance were suppressed. On November 7, 1956, the new leader of Hungary, J. Kadar, arrived in Budapest in a Soviet armored vehicle. The USSR created a precedent when disputes in the socialist camp were resolved using Soviet weapons and fulfilled the well-known rule in Europe in the first half of the 19th century. the role of Russia as a gendarme who brought “order” to Poland and Hungary.
In the USSR, helping one's ally was considered an international duty. Maintaining a forceful balance between the USSR and the USA, as well as ensuring peace “from a position of strength” after the events in Hungary became the main line of foreign policy behavior of the Soviet Union. The Hungarian events were also reflected in the USSR. They became one of the reasons for the student unrest that swept across almost the entire country.
Berlin remained one of the hottest spots in the world from 1958 to 1961. In August 1961, by decision of the political leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Berlin Wall a strip of fortifications that completely isolated West Berlin from the rest of the GDR. She became a symbol cold war" The main instrument for maintaining the balance of power was the arms race, which concerned, first of all, the production of nuclear charges and the means of delivering them to targets. In August 1953, the USSR announced the successful testing of a hydrogen bomb, and the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles continued.
At the same time, Moscow understood the danger of further escalation of arms. The Soviet Union launched a series of disarmament initiatives, unilaterally reducing the size of its army by 3.3 million people. But these measures were not successful. One of the reasons was that peace initiatives were accompanied by constant saber-rattling. In addition, peace-loving statements were often combined with impulsive improvisations by Khrushchev, such as “We will bury you (that is, the USA)!” or that the USSR makes “rockets like sausages.”
The Cold War reached its climax in the fall of 1962, when the Cuban Missile Crisis broke out. In 1959, revolutionary rebels led by F. Castro came to power in Cuba. In April 1961, with US support, Castro's opponents tried to land on the island. The landing force was destroyed. A rapid rapprochement between Cuba and the USSR began. In the summer of 1962, Soviet missiles appeared in Cuba, posing a direct threat to the United States. The confrontation reached its peak at the end of October 1962. For several days the world was on the brink of nuclear war. It was avoided only thanks to a secret compromise between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba in exchange for the US promise to renounce aggression against this country and the dismantling of American nuclear missiles in Turkey.
After the Caribbean crisis, a period of relative detente began in Soviet-American relations and international relations in general. A direct line of communication was established between the Kremlin and the White House. But after Kennedy's assassination (1963) and Khrushchev's resignation, this process was interrupted.
The events of 1962 deepened the split in Soviet-Chinese relations, which began after the 20th Congress. Chinese leader Mao Zedong believed that there was no need to fear a nuclear war and accused Khrushchev of capitulation. Much attention was paid to the development of relations with the states of the “third world” (developing countries). During these years, the colonial system collapsed. Dozens of new states were being formed, primarily in Africa. The USSR sought to extend its influence to these parts of the world. In 1956, the Egyptian leadership nationalized the Suez Canal.
In October 1956, Israel, England and France began military operations against Egypt. The Soviet ultimatum played a huge role in stopping them. At the same time, economic cooperation with Egypt, India, Indonesia and other countries is developing. The USSR provided them with assistance in the construction of industrial and agricultural facilities and personnel training. The main foreign policy result of this period was to prove that, with mutual desire, both superpowers (the USSR and the USA) can conduct a dialogue with each other and overcome international crises.
The Thaw Crisis.
High growth rates of industrial production in the 50s. served as the basis for optimistic forecasts. In 1959, the XXI Congress of the CPSU declared that socialism in the USSR had won a complete and final victory. The new, third Party Program adopted at the XXII Congress (1961) set the task of creating the material and technical base of communism by 1980. For this, the task was put forward to “catch up and overtake America in the main types of industrial and agricultural products.” The utopianism of the program goals of this document is obvious today. Only a small part of the planned plans was achieved.
At the same time, the propaganda of the communist myth became increasingly disconnected from reality. In 1963, a food crisis broke out in the country. There was not enough bread in the cities, and huge queues lined up for it. For the first time in the history of the USSR, grain was purchased abroad (in the first year, 12 million tons were purchased, which cost the state $1 billion). After this, purchases of imported grain became the norm. In 1962, the government announced an increase in prices for meat and dairy products (in fact, the first price increase officially announced by the state after the war and the abolition of the rationing system).
This immediately caused mass discontent and indignation, especially in the working environment. Workers' discontent reached its apogee in Novocherkassk, where a 7,000-strong workers' demonstration took place. With the knowledge of the top leaders of the CPSU Mikoyan and Kozlov, she was shot by the troops. 23 people died, 49 were arrested, seven of them were sentenced to death.
Removal of N.S. Khrushchev.
All this led to a decline in Khrushchev's authority. His failure was obvious domestic policy. In army circles, dissatisfaction with Khrushchev was caused by large-scale cuts in the armed forces. Officers who served for many years were forced to go into civilian life without a profession, without a sufficient pension, and without the opportunity to find the desired job. Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were deprived of a number of privileges. The party and economic bureaucracy was dissatisfied with countless reorganizations management structures, leading to frequent personnel changes. In addition, the new Party Charter adopted at the XXII Congress provided for the rotation (renewal) of personnel, which especially affected the interests of the nomenklatura, which sought to get rid of the “irrepressible reformer.”
Khrushchev's vulnerability was significantly increased by his mistakes in personnel policy and certain personal qualities: impulsiveness, a tendency to make ill-conceived, hasty decisions, and a low level of culture. Moreover, it was in 1962-1963. An ideological campaign to excessively praise Khrushchev (“the great Leninist”, “the great fighter for peace”, etc.) began to grow, which, against the backdrop of economic difficulties and the recent exposure of the cult of Stalin, further undermined his authority.
By the fall of 1964, Khrushchev’s opponents had secured the support of the leaders of the army, the KGB and the party apparatus. On October 13, 1964, Khrushchev, who was on vacation in Pitsunda (Caucasus), was summoned to Moscow for a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, at which he was presented with a long list of charges. Only Mikoyan spoke in his defense. At the plenum of the Central Committee that opened after this, Khrushchev was removed from all his posts and sent into retirement. Officially, this was explained by the state of health of the country's leader. L.I. was elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Brezhnev, and the post of head of government was taken by A.N. Kosygin. Plenum participants emphasized the need for collective leadership.
Thus, Khrushchev’s removal occurred as a result of a formally legal act at the Plenum of the Central Committee, “by simple voting.” This resolution of the conflict without arrests and repression can be considered the main result of the past decade. Khrushchev's resignation, despite the fact that it was the result of a conspiracy, did not cause discontent in the country. Both the population and the nomenclature greeted the decisions of the plenum with approval. Society longed for stability. Few people realized that along with Khrushchev’s resignation, the era of the “thaw” also ended.
A conventional name assigned to the period of the second half of the 50s - early 60s, associated with the political course in domestic and foreign policy.
The term was introduced by the Soviet writer I. Ehrenburg, who published the story “The Thaw” in the magazine “New World” in 1954. Signs of the “Thaw” appeared in the life of the country after Stalin’s death: there was a relative liberalization in the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR.
Report onXX congress. Criticism of the cult of personality.
A landmark event in the political life of the country was the report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” read by Khrushchev at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 and which became an absolute surprise for the delegates of the congress. The report spoke for the first time about the crimes of I.V. Stalin against the party, he was opposed to V.I. Lenin. It contained not only general discussions, but also a story about the fate of several arrestees. These were members of the Central Committee and the Politburo: N. Voskresensky, A. Kuznetsov, N. Postyshev and others. Khrushchev spoke about the torture of them and about their letters before execution. Interestingly, in the USSR full text Khrushchev's report was first published in the open press only in 1989.
In 1957, a decree was issued prohibiting the naming of states and public figures to streets and cities during their lifetime. On the other hand, criticism of the “cult of personality” allowed Khrushchev to deal with his political opponents within the country, as well as to change leadership in a number of countries in Eastern Europe. The foreign policy effect of the report was also ambiguous and led to a serious cooling of relations with Albania, China, North Korea and Romania. In 1956 there were major unrest in Poland and Hungary.
Rehabilitation.
The rehabilitation of victims of Stalinism began almost immediately after the death of I.V. Stalin and the execution of L.P. Beria, but it gained greater scope after the report of N.S. Khrushchev, when a commission was created headed by him to investigate violations of the law during the period of the cult of personality. By the fall of 1956, the majority of political prisoners were released, among them were party leaders, as well as miraculously surviving Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. At the same time, the rehabilitation did not affect the “dispossessed” and a number of prominent party figures: G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva, N.I. Bukharin and others. A legislative reform was carried out: “declaring an enemy of the people” was excluded from the list of punishments, and the number of articles on liability for political crimes was reduced. The number of Gulag prisoners was reduced by more than 2 times.
In 1956-1957 The statehood of a number of republics, arbitrarily liquidated under Stalin, was restored, and their residents (Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, etc.) were allowed to return to their homes. However, here too the leaders of the CPSU were inconsistent: the Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans were not given such permission.
At the XXII Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, the words of N.S. were again heard. Khrushchev, who condemned Stalin and his defenders. According to the resolution of the congress, on the night of October 31 to November 1, Stalin’s body was taken out of the Mausoleum and buried in a grave near the Kremlin wall. Monuments to Stalin were also secretly demolished throughout the country. The only exception was the monument in his hometown of Gori. On November 30, the Moscow metro station named after the leader was renamed Semenovskaya. Stalin's closest associates, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Molotov, who were retired, were expelled from the party.
Economic and social reforms.
During the “thaw” period, the Soviet economy was modernized, space exploration began, and in 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first person to fly into space. The state's social obligations expanded, pensions were introduced, the working day was shortened, education fees were abolished, and the standard of living in the city and countryside increased noticeably. However, acute social contradictions also persisted, which led to conflicts, the most famous of which were unrest in
Foreign policy.
Economic successes allowed the USSR to solve broad foreign policy problems - to maintain its sphere of influence (including by military means, as in the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956) and expand the “socialist camp”. One of the first initiatives of N.S. Khrushchev was the restoration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1955. In the 50-60s. Communists and their allies came to power in several countries in Asia and Africa, and even in close proximity to the United States in Cuba. The new principles of the USSR's foreign policy were proclaimed: the diversity of forms of transition of various countries to socialism, the need for peaceful coexistence, and the possibility of preventing military action.
In confirmation of the new foreign policy course, the USSR reduced its armed forces by almost 2 times. From 5.8 million people at the beginning of 1955, the number was increased to 3.6 million people by December 1959. As part of this, military bases around the world were eliminated. In the spring of 1958, thermal testing stopped nuclear weapons.
The first post-war meetings take place on top level between the USSR and the USA. Despite this, in 1962 an acute crisis broke out, putting the world in immediate danger of a nuclear war. IN next year There was a split in the “socialist camp” associated with the Soviet-Chinese conflict.
"Sixties".
Criticism of the “cult of personality”, the beginning of the rehabilitation of the repressed, some freedom and successes of Soviet society (in science and technology) aroused the enthusiasm of the intelligentsia, especially young people, who later formed a whole generation of the social movement known as the “sixties”. This was the title of an article by S. Rassadin, published in the magazine “Yunost” in 1960, which dealt with writers and readers of the new generation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the art song genre became popular. The founder and most prominent representative of this trend was Bulat Okudzhava. Together with talented poets of that time: R.I. Rozhdestvensky, E.A. Evtushenko, A.A. Voznesensky and B.A. Akhmadulina, he performed at extremely popular evenings at the Polytechnic Museum. At the same time, both in society and in the party there were heated discussions between “physicists” (technocrats) and “lyricists” (humanitarians), between Stalinists and anti-Stalinists.
Expansion of cultural ties.
Cultural contacts between the USSR and the outside world are expanding. In 1956, on the initiative of I. Ehrenburg, the first exhibition of forty works by Picasso took place in Moscow. She immediately revealed an ambivalent attitude towards him - a restrained official reaction and queues of thousands at the Museum of Fine Arts. A.C. Pushkin, where it took place. In the summer of 1957, the International Festival of Youth and Students was held in Moscow. In 1959, on the initiative of the Minister of Culture E.A. Furtseva resumed the Moscow International Film Festival. The festival's big prize was won by S. Bondarchuk's film “The Fate of a Man.” In 1963, a scandal broke out because the main prize was given to Frederico Fellini's film fantasy "8 ½".
Literary magazines.
For the first time in the history of the USSR, literary magazines became platforms where supporters of different opinions had the opportunity to publish their articles. Conservative authors, who considered the “thaw” a harmful deviation from the course towards building communism, published mainly in the magazines “October” and “Neva”. Anti-Stalinist positions were taken by the editors of the magazines Yunost and Novy Mir, as well as Literaturnaya Gazeta (since 1959). At the same time, supporters of both directions referred to the ideas of Lenin, but had different attitudes towards the era of Stalin. In the 1950s films were released that both glorified the party ("Communist", directed by Yu. Raizman) and ridiculed the Soviet leaders ("Carnival Night", directed by E.A. Ryazanov). Films also appeared that were not ideological in nature, but addressed the theme of war in a new way: G.N. Chukhrai “Ballad of a Soldier”, M.M. Kalatozov’s “The Cranes Are Flying,” which won the Palme d’Or at the 1958 Cannes International Film Festival.
Participants in legal disputes of that time did not go beyond the ideology of building socialism. Attempts by even famous writers to go beyond these boundaries were considered unacceptable. Thus, in 1957, he published the novel “Doctor Zhivago” in the West, which described the events of the civil war from a non-Bolshevik perspective. For this novel in 1958 B.L. Pasternak was awarded the prestigious international Nobel Prize in the field of literature. But in the USSR, Pasternak’s work was condemned as anti-Soviet, and under pressure from the authorities he was forced to refuse the prize.
Attitude to the church.
At the end of the 50s. in connection with the course towards building communism, the state policy towards the church is again becoming tougher, persecution of the Russian Church has resumed Orthodox Church. Secretary of the Central Committee L.F. Ilyichev, in a speech in December 1961, declared: “Religion, which has always been in modern conditions an anachronism, is now becoming an intolerable obstacle on our path to communism.” Achieving a “society without religion” was declared a program goal. Not only did atheist propaganda intensify, but also the number of religious associations decreased. So in 1958 there were only 18.6 thousand, including Orthodox - 13.4 thousand, in 1961 - 16 and 11 thousand, respectively.
The end of the "thaw".
On December 1, 1962, an exhibition dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Moscow branch of the Union of Artists (MOSH) of the USSR was to open in the Moscow Manege. The exhibition received the approval of E.A. Furtseva. Part of the exhibition’s works was presented in the “New Reality” exposition, prepared by more than 60 artists representing the artistic direction organized in the late 1940s by the painter E.M. Belyutin, who carried out the traditions of the Russian avant-garde of the early 20th century. Khrushchev, who came to the exhibition, walked around the large hall three times where the exhibition was located. He then rapidly moved from one picture to another, then returned back, gradually losing his temper, he began to abuse the artists and their works. The next day, immediately after the publication of the Pravda newspaper with an accusatory article, many Muscovites came to the Manege, but the exhibition had already been removed. However, there was no persecution of the artists.
On November 29, 1963, the feuilleton “Near-Literary Drone” appeared in print, in which the poet Joseph Brodsky was ridiculed. The writer was arrested and sentenced to 5 years of exile for parasitism. After which something unprecedented happened for Soviet society: an open campaign began in defense of the poet. About two dozen writers spoke out for his acquittal. Letters in defense of Brodsky were signed by D.D. Shostakovich, S.Ya. Marshak, K.I. Chukovsky, K.G. Paustovsky, A.T. Tvardovsky, Yu.P. German and others. Under pressure from wide public outcry, in 1965 the poet was returned from exile. In 1972, I. Brodsky left the country, and in 1987 he became a Nobel Prize laureate.
As part of the campaign to debunk the “cult of personality” I.V. Stalin, former prisoner A. Solzhenitsyn was allowed to publish the story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,” which tells about life in Stalin’s camps. This story, shocking in its brutal truth, was published in November 1962 in Novy Mir with special permission from the Presidium of the Central Committee, and brought Solzhenitsyn great fame. The magazine issue became a real rarity, many began to rewrite the story by hand, and this is how “samizdat” arose. The duality of the “Thaw” era is evidenced by the fact that, having allowed the publication of “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,” the party leadership at the same time banned the publication of a novel in “The First Circle,” which tells about Solzhenitsyn’s work during the years of imprisonment in the “sharashka” in Marfino.
The strengthening of voluntarism in Khrushchev’s policies, endless reforms and transformations, plans for reforming the party, the introduction of the principle of rotation in appointments to positions, as well as the First Secretary’s rudeness in communication gradually led him to isolation and undermined Khrushchev’s authority both among the people and in the party leadership. Under these conditions, Khrushchev’s inner circle decided to remove him from power, which was done at the October plenum of 1964. The country calmly greeted Khrushchev’s removal from office and the end of the “thaw.” This is what N.S. himself wrote. Khrushchev in his memoirs about this controversial period: “Deciding on the coming of the thaw, and going towards it consciously, the leadership of the USSR, including me, was at the same time afraid of it: lest it lead to a flood that would overwhelm us, and with which we it will be difficult to cope... We wanted to release the creative powers of people, but in such a way that new creations would contribute to the strengthening of socialism. It’s like what, as people say, you want it, and you inject it, and your mother doesn’t tell you to. That's how it was."
55. Khrushchev’s “thaw”.
The Khrushchev Thaw period is the conventional name for a period in history that lasted from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. A feature of the period was a partial retreat from the totalitarian policies of the Stalin era. The Khrushchev Thaw is the first attempt to understand the consequences of the Stalinist regime, which revealed the features of the socio-political policy of the Stalin era. The main event of this period is considered to be the 20th Congress of the CPSU, which criticized and condemned Stalin’s personality cult and criticized the implementation of repressive policies. February 1956 marked the beginning of a new era, which aimed to change social and political life, change the domestic and foreign policies of the state.
Events of the Khrushchev Thaw
The period of the Khrushchev Thaw is characterized by the following events:
The process of rehabilitation of victims of repression began, the innocently convicted population was granted amnesty, and relatives of “enemies of the people” became innocent.
The republics of the USSR received more political and legal rights.
The year 1957 was marked by the return of Chechens and Balkars to their lands, from which they were evicted during Stalin's time due to accusations of treason. But such a decision did not apply to the Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars.
Also, 1957 is famous for the International Festival of Youth and Students, which in turn speaks of the “opening of the Iron Curtain” and the easing of censorship.
The result of these processes is the emergence of new public organizations. Trade union bodies are undergoing reorganization: the staff of the top level of the trade union system has been reduced, and the rights of primary organizations have been expanded.
Passports were issued to people living in villages and collective farms.
Rapid development of light industry and agriculture.
Active construction of cities.
Improving the standard of living of the population.
One of the main achievements of the policy of 1953–1964. there was the implementation of social reforms, which included solving the issue of pensions, increasing incomes of the population, solving the housing problem, and introducing a five-day week. The period of the Khrushchev Thaw was a difficult time in the history of the Soviet state. In such a short time (10 years), many transformations and innovations have been carried out. The most important achievement was the exposure of the crimes of the Stalinist system, the population discovered the consequences of totalitarianism.
So, the policy of the Khrushchev Thaw was superficial and did not affect the foundations of the totalitarian system. The dominant one-party system was preserved using the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Mikhail Sergeevich Khrushchev did not intend to carry out complete de-Stalinization, because it meant admitting his own crimes. And since it was not possible to completely renounce Stalin’s time, Khrushchev’s transformations did not take root for long. In 1964, a conspiracy against Khrushchev matured, and from this period a new era in the history of the Soviet Union began.
56. Confrontation of two world systems in the 60-80s of the XX century. Collapse of the colonial system, arms race.
The arms race was voluntarily suspended by the mid-60s.
A number of treaties were concluded limiting the accumulation of weapons. Such
such as the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, in
outer space and submarines (08/05/1963), Treaty on
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, creation of nuclear-free zones (1968),
agreement on SALT 1 (limitation and reduction of strategic weapons)
(1972), Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling
stockpiles of bacteriological and toxin weapons and their destruction
(1972) and many others. Another “front” of the Cold War was...
Since achieving strategic parity (early sixties
years) the military component of the arms race is gradually being pushed back to
background, while on stage the struggle for influence in the countries of the third is played out
peace. The term itself was introduced into use due to the increasing influence
non-aligned countries that have not openly joined one of the
warring parties. If at first, the very fact of confrontation
two powerful systems on the world map led to landslide decolonization
(the period of liberation of Africa), then in a later period a circle was formed
states openly and very effectively using their political choice
orientation towards one or another superpower. To a certain extent it is possible here
include the countries of so-called Arab socialism, which decided at the expense of the USSR
their specific narrow national tasks. (1, p.298)
The Cold War was fought not only in politics, but also in
culture, sports. For example, the USA and many Western European countries
boycotted the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. In response, athletes from countries
Eastern Europeans boycotted the next Olympics in Los Angeles in 1984
year. The Cold War was widely reflected in cinema, and
Propaganda films were made by both sides. In the USA it is: “Red Dawn”,
"America", "Rimbaud, First Blood, Part II", "Iron Eagle", "Invasion of
USA". In the USSR they filmed: “Night Without Mercy”, “Neutral Waters”, “Incident in
square 36 – 80”, “Solo sailing” and many others. Despite,
that the films are completely different, with different degrees of talent in them,
it showed how bad “they” are and what good guys serve in our army.
A unique and very accurate manifestation of the Cold War in art
reflected in a line from a popular song “and even in the field of ballet, we
ahead of the rest..."
It is quite obvious that the enormous costs incurred
superpowers could not continue indefinitely, and as a result the confrontation
the two systems were decided in the economic sphere. It is this component
turned out to be decisive in the end. More efficient Western economies
made it possible not only to maintain military and political parity, but also
satisfy the growing needs of modern man, which, due to
She knew how to competently manipulate purely market economic mechanisms. IN
at the same time heavyweight, focused only on the production of weapons
and means of production, the economy of the USSR, could not, and did not intend to
compete in this area with the West. IN Eventually, this affected
political level, the USSR began to lose the fight not only for influence in
third world countries, but also for influence within the socialist
Commonwealth.
2.2. The international position of the USSR from the mid-60s to the early 80s.
By the mid-60s. compared with the first post-war years, the world
found himself in a significantly changed situation. The then-identified
the contradictions between the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition have now spilled over
into a severe contradiction between two established socio-political systems.
Eastern Europe was under complete control of the USSR, while Western Europe was
in a strong military-political and economic alliance with the United States. "Cold War"
was in full swing. The main object of the struggle between “socialism” and “capitalism”
were the countries of the “third world”, formed on the ruins of the world
colonial system. The USSR and the USA, the main military forces behind them
political blocs NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization avoided direct
military confrontation. However, competition for influence in developing
countries remained very acute, and often led to local wars
conflicts.
The competition between the two systems also developed in the economic sphere,
Moreover, in the 60s - 80s it became more and more strict. The West had
it had a clear advantage: the starting positions were more profitable, and in the USA in
During the Second World War, economic potential increased significantly. More
The system of cooperation of developed countries was also perfect, while in
The “socialist bloc” included, in addition to the USSR, countries that played
insignificant role in the world economy, many of which suffered huge
damage during the war. The protracted formation of the mechanism of international
division of labor within the framework of CMEA interfered with the coordination of national economic
plans and implementation of joint projects. As a result, already in the mid-80s
s in Western Europe, the level of international division of labor turned out to be
an order of magnitude higher than in Eastern. A major step forward in the integration of countries
The CMEA was adopted in 1971 as a comprehensive program for further deepening
and improving cooperation, designed for 15-20 years. Most
large-scale joint economic projects were construction
the Druzhba oil pipeline and the Soyuz gas pipeline, the participation of allied countries in
development of raw materials resources of Siberia and Central Asia, construction
industrial enterprises in different countries. The Soviet Union put in
Eastern European countries in 1965 8.3 million tons of oil, in 1975 - about
50 million, and by the beginning of the 80s - 508 million tons. Soviet oil prices were
significantly lower than world prices, since the USSR assumed an obligation
supplies of raw materials at lower prices.
Cooperation was actively developing within the framework of the Warsaw
Agreement (OVD). Almost every year in the 1980s general maneuvers were carried out, in
mainly on the territory of the USSR, Poland and the GDR.
Partial reforms of the “Soviet model of socialism” in none of the countries
Eastern European bloc did not lead to a qualitative increase in efficiency
production. (4, p.334)
The reaction to the crisis of the “Soviet model of socialism” in the countries of Eastern
Europe and the events of the “Czechoslovak Spring” of 1968, the so-called
"Brezhnev Doctrine". Its main content was the “theory of limited
sovereignty" of socialist countries. She was proclaimed by the General
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the V Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in
November 1968. Her nomination testified to the great attention
which was paid to foreign policy in the late 60s - early 70s.
The Brezhnev Doctrine recognized the presence of weak links in
socialist front, the possibility of restoring capitalism due to
objective difficulties and errors of a subjective nature, the likelihood of war
with the imperialist encirclement, the extreme nature of such an action as a military one
assistance to a friendly country in the defense of socialist sovereignty. L.
Brezhnev emphasized that the sovereignty of a socialist state is
the common heritage of all Marxist-Leninists: “When a threat arises to the cause
socialism in one country, a threat to the security of socialist
community as a whole - this is no longer just a problem for the people of a given
countries, but also common problem, the concern of all socialist countries."
The policy of "non-interference", in his opinion, was directly contrary to the interests of
defense of brotherly states. In order not to give in, not to give up
bourgeoisie not a grain of what has been won, not to allow a retreat from Marxism-
Leninism requires firmly adhering to the “general laws
socialist construction."
The term “doctrine” as a system of attitudes did not take root in Soviet
foreign policy lexicon, it is not in any official party or
state document. But the existence of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” will never
was refuted by the political leaders of the USSR, since it expanded
proletarian internationalism." At the same time, the “Brezhnev Doctrine”
expressed a policy aimed at consolidating the territorial
government structure in Europe in the post-war period.
Attempts at people's democratic reforms were suppressed both from outside
(the introduction of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia in 1968), and
from within (the Solidarity movement in 1980-1981 and its ban with the introduction
military rule in Poland).
The Chinese version of the reforms of the 50-60s led to tough
confrontation between the USSR and China. In 1969, on the Soviet-Chinese border there were
armed clashes (in the area of Damansky Island, etc.). Only after death
Mao Zedong in 1976 and the death of Brezhnev in 1982, the relationship between the two
countries have returned to normal. To the Maoist trend in the period after the Prague
communist parties, priority of national values, denial of “dictatorship
proletariat" and the establishment of democratic mechanisms for coming to power and
mainly in those third world countries that received military
financial and technical assistance from the USSR. For the Soviet Union it was still
one item of huge expenses to the detriment of one’s own economic and
social programs.57. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD ECONOMY for 1945-1991. The dominant role of the USA. Scientific and technological progress and its influence on the course of world social development