Reasons for Khrushchev's reforms. How Khrushchev’s “reforms” destroyed the USSR

Transformations N.S. Khrushchev was affected different sides life of Soviet society and were partly associated with criticism of the personality cult of I. Stalin.

Management reform

At the end of January 1957, a note from N.S. was sent to a wide circle of the country’s leaders for discussion. Khrushchev on improving the management of industry and construction. The essence of the note was a proposal to abolish the departmental subordination of enterprises and place them under the jurisdiction of the regions.

After discussion, in May 1957, a law was adopted on the management of industry through the Councils of the National Economy (Soviet Economic Councils), subordinate directly to the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics. The reform consisted of dividing the territory of the USSR into so-called “economic administrative regions” with the creation within the regions, territories and republics of the USSR of a network of territorial councils of the national economy, under whose jurisdiction enterprises that were previously subordinate to industrial and agro-industrial ministries were transferred. At the same time, many ministries, both federal and republican, were abolished.

In November 1962, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, on the initiative of Khrushchev, set a course for restructuring all governing bodies along the production principle. Party organizations - from regional and lower - were divided into industrial and rural. After this, regional organizations and departments of communications, trade, public education, and health care, subordinate to both industrial and rural party and Soviet bodies, began to receive duplicate resolutions and orders on the same issues every day.

In 1962-1963 There was a further consolidation of the economic councils, and new bodies were built over them (republican and all-Union Councils of National Economy). In March 1963, the Supreme Council of the National Economy was created, which essentially revived the centralized structure of economic management.

To implement a unified technical policy, instead of the abolished industrial ministries, state production committees were formed - sectoral management bodies, which concentrated under their jurisdiction research, design and design organizations to provide direct assistance to enterprises subordinate to the economic councils. They moved from decentralization to centralization, but attempts to adjust the reform still failed to provide the necessary impetus for economic development, since it was formed back in the 30s. The command-administrative management system continued to exist even when there was an attempt to introduce some features of territorial management.

In July 1964, Khrushchev proposed the idea of ​​another restructuring of agricultural management: it was planned to create about a dozen specialized central departments responsible for the production of certain types of products. He proposed to boost agriculture and increase the production of consumer goods by reducing spending on the army and weapons.

Industry

In the 50s, the USSR carried out the first stage of the scientific and technological revolution of the 20th century, which was expressed in the development of new sectors of the economy, such as electronics, nuclear energy, and astronautics. At the same time, heavy industry developed at a faster pace, enterprises of group “B” (light, food and other industries) developed more slowly, but their growth was doubled. During the Khrushchev years there were 2 five-year plans (1951-1955; 1955-1958) and a seven-year plan (1959-1965).

Average annual growth rates of industrial production in the USSR in 1951-1955. were, according to official data, 13.1%, and 1956-1960. - 10.3%, in 1961-1965. - 8.6%.

On June 27, 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk gave power. In June 1959, the Angara was closed, where the Bratsk hydroelectric power station was being built, which, after the introduction of all capacities, became the most powerful in the world in 1964.

The course for restructuring the country's fuel and energy complex was taken in 1956-1961, the USSR gradually moved away from the use of coal in favor of gas and oil. The development of the gas industry in the North Caucasus and Volga region made it possible to gasify more than 160 cities. In 1962, the development of the first oil-rich fields in Siberia began. By 1963, the total production of oil and gas for the first time in the history of the USSR exceeded the share of coal fuel.

Agrarian reform

The new course, proclaimed in August 1953 at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, proclaimed, among others, the rise of agriculture, which was going through difficult times. The foundations of the new agrarian policy were approved at the September plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1953. Since that time, the economic position of collective farms has been strengthened, the amount of agricultural tax has been reduced, and purchase prices have increased. Farms were provided with loans, new equipment arrived. To strengthen the leadership cadres of collective farms, party workers (“thirty thousanders”) were sent to work there.

In 1954, a campaign was launched to develop virgin lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals and Povolozhye. Already in the first three years of the campaign, 32 million hectares of new land were developed. A sharp rise followed with bumper harvests. The Komsomol conscription played a major role in the development of virgin lands. But due to wind erosion of the soil, most of the developed land had to be converted to pasture. The non-black earth center of the country fell into complete decline due to increased attention to the virgin lands (all equipment and young people were sent there).

In 1957, Khrushchev declared that in the coming years the USSR would not only catch up, but also surpass the United States in the production of meat, milk and butter per capita. This competition turned into an embarrassment associated with registrations and mass slaughter of livestock. The most famous case occurred in Ryazan, the secretary of the local regional committee A.N. Larionov received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, but at the end of 1960 the deception was revealed and the secretary shot himself.

In February 1958, a decision was made to reorganize machine-motor stations (MTS) into repair and tractor stations on collective farms. Such a merger placed a heavy burden on poor collective farms, which were forced to purchase equipment. To solve this problem, Khrushchev proposed consolidating collective farms - transforming them into state farms. Then economic councils were created.

In order to quickly achieve the goals of communist construction, the authorities launched an offensive on private farms. Collective farmers' land plots were again cut (from 1.5 acres per collective farm yard in 1955-1956 to one hundred square meters in 1959-1960; in 1950-1952 there were 32 acres), livestock was forcibly bought out. Against this background, a campaign of public condemnation of traders and money-grubbers and a struggle against the invaders of collective farm lands unfolded. As a result, there was a decline in private farming.

After the visit of the leader of the USSR to the USA in 1959, the corn epic also became part of Khrushchev’s image - this crop began to be intensively planted everywhere, even where it could not grow in principle. The reduction in rye and wheat crops for corn led to a general decrease in grain harvest. Therefore, the crop failure of 1962 led to a shortage of wheat and rye. The deficit had to be made up by purchasing wheat from the United States. After this, it became clear that agriculture needed other ways out of the crisis. In December 1963, the plenum of the Central Committee adopted a special resolution on the development of the chemical industry, which was tasked with developing mineral fertilizers in agriculture. The impact of these measures came already in the 70s.

Social reforms

Working time standards have been established, in particular - a 6-hour working day for teenagers 16 years old. In 1956, the working day of workers and employees on Saturdays and pre-holidays was reduced by 2 hours; in 1957, the transition to a seven-hour working day began. In March 1957, taxes on workers and employees were reduced.

The housing stock was actively expanding, while housing construction was based on industrial methods; the Moscow Cheryomushki became a symbol of the new standard housing construction. In the late 50s - first half of the 60s. In terms of the pace of construction and the amount of residential space commissioned, the USSR came out on top in the world. The country's housing stock is increasing by 40% over the seven-year period. This stimulated the development of construction-related sectors of the economy. True, the housing that was built went down in history under the name “Khrushchev”, but the housing crisis was resolved in the country, and communal apartments gradually began to become a thing of the past. For 1956-1960 Almost 54 million people moved to new apartments.

Since September 1956, a decision was made to abolish tuition fees in high schools and universities. In 1958, instead of the seven-year school, a compulsory eight-year polytechnic school was created. Those wishing to receive a complete secondary education had to continue their studies at a secondary polytechnic school (in a vocational school, in an evening or correspondence school), and for those who wanted to continue their education at a university, mandatory work experience was introduced. But such a reform did not achieve desired effect, the level of education fell, and from 1964 high school again became ten years old.

Under Khrushchev, a radical reform of pension legislation took place; from July 1956, men began to receive pensions after 60 years of age and women over 55 years of age. In February 1958, the gradual certification of collective farmers began. In July-November 1964, a set of measures was adopted to pay pensions to peasants, which was the last initiative in N.S.’s career. Khrushchev. For the first time in the history of the Soviet village, old-age pensions began to be received by men at the age of 65, and women - by 60 years. Payments were made from a fund created using funds from collective farms and the state budget. But it should be noted that the pensions of collective farmers were significantly lower than those of workers and employees.

Results of reforms

The positive result of the reforms by N.S. Khrushchev had impressive quantitative economic indicators compared to economically developed countries. In particular, by 1965, the national income of the USSR increased by 53% compared to 1958, production assets increased by 91%, and industrial production by 84%. Real incomes of the population increased by one third.

At the same time, numerous reforms have failed to resolve the issue of economic modernization. After the failures of N.S. Khrushchev’s controversial transformative activities, a syndrome of fatigue from constant reform arose in society, and after it the era of “stagnation” began.

The struggle for power and the vicissitudes of economic policy. The absence of legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of power in the USSR, concentrated in the hands of Stalin for almost three decades, after his death caused a protracted struggle in the country's top leadership. The choice of ways to further develop the economy, as well as the country as a whole, was determined by the outcome of the struggle within the party and state elite. However, the general direction towards some softening beyond the centralism of management, the degree and scale of non-economic coercion, and the gradual abandonment of emergency methods was set from the very beginning. The causes of the “thaw” were rooted in the overstrain of the national economy, which for a long time was in a state of extreme mobilization: forced industrialization, war, then restoration and acceleration of the formation of the military-industrial complex, which resulted in the ruin of the countryside, a low standard of living for the vast majority of the population, as well as an economy colossal in scale prisoners. All these factors not only held back the further development of the country, but also threatened a social explosion. The most important role in the departure from the Stalinist course was played by the desire of the highest echelons of the party and state to guarantee themselves against the resumption of repression.

At first, the leader of the post-Stalin “collective leadership” was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov. L. Beria, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, was considered his ally. It was they who immediately opposed the cult of Stalin and put forward the most radical proposals for reforming the country. L. Beria showed particular radicalism. This was explained both by his awareness of the real problems of Soviet society and, apparently, by his desire to change his image and increase his opportunities in the future. He, like other leaders, did not have a well-thought-out economic strategy. On his initiative, an amnesty of unprecedented scale was declared in 1953, during which 1.2 million people were released. Already on March 6, 1953, L. Beria gave instructions to transfer the Main Directorate of camps to the Ministry of Justice, and the construction departments under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the relevant ministries.

L. Beria spoke out for the redistribution of power from the party to state bodies, questioning the effectiveness of collective farm production and called for abandoning the creation of collective farms in Eastern Europe. On his initiative, the construction of the Main Turkmen Canal, the Volga-Baltic Waterway, the Volga-Ural Canal, the Chum-Salekhard-Igarka railway and other grandiose structures was stopped. Finally, Beria proposed radically improving relations with Yugoslavia, abandoning the construction of socialism in Eastern Europe and uniting the GDR and West Germany into a neutral democratic state.

However, other members of the leadership of the party and state, not excluding Malenkov, were afraid of Beria, who made a number of miscalculations, frightening them with his “radicalism,” and most importantly, giving them reason to suspect himself of claiming leadership and playing a double game in relation to his comrades. This allowed N. Khrushchev (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, from September 1953 - First Secretary of the Central Committee) to unite all the top leadership of the country, including G. Malenkov. On June 26, 1953, L. Beria was arrested, and in December of the same year, after a short investigation and trial, he and six other leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were shot.

The elimination of L. Beria led to the discretization of many of his reformist proposals. Nevertheless, the line towards moderate democratization of society and reorientation of economic policy remained. At the July (1953) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, G. Malenkov admitted “ significant shortcomings"in the economic activities of the party and pointed out the presence of a considerable number of "lagging enterprises and even entire industries, as well as collective farms and entire agricultural regions." But the main thing was to analyze economic miscalculations. G. Malenkov considered the decisive factor in the lag of agriculture to be the insufficient material interest of collective farmers in increasing the production of agricultural products. G. Malenkov called ensuring this interest the “fundamental issue” of agricultural development. No less important was the statement of insufficient satisfaction of the needs of the people as a whole.

In August 1953, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, G. Malenkov formulated a new course providing for the social reorientation of the economy and the priority development of light industry. The latter, however, was forced. Large-scale subsidies to the light and food industries, together with a significant reduction in prices (at the end of 1953, bread was 3 times cheaper than in 1948), led to an increase in the deficit and a revision of the current plan in favor of accelerated growth in the production of consumer goods. Another key direction of economic policy was the revival of the village. Already in 1954, mandatory supplies of agricultural products to the state were sharply reduced, debts from collective farms were written off, and taxes on personal plots and sales of agricultural products on the market were reduced. At the same time, procurement prices for agricultural products were increased by 1.5-5.5 times, investments and supplies of equipment increased, and the size of household plots was increased. Procurement and purchasing prices for basic agricultural products by the end of the 1950s. increased 3 times.

Since the mid-1950s. Agriculture became profitable for the first time in many years. State allocations for the development of the agricultural sector in 1954-1955. amounted to 34.4 billion rubles, which is 38% more than for the entire 4th five-year plan. The share of state budget expenditures on agriculture increased from 7.6% in 1950 to 18% in 1955. And in just 1953–1954. investments in agriculture increased 4 times.

The flow of tractors, combines, and cars sent to the villages has increased. 120 thousand agricultural specialists were sent from various institutions and scientific institutes to collective farms to provide real help agriculture. The practice of carrying out agricultural work from the center was abolished. Now the decision about where, when and what to sow was made in the regions.

The decision to increase the size of personal subsidiary plots and the right to keep livestock and poultry in them significantly improved the financial situation not only of peasants, but also of residents of cities and large industrial centers, where the level of food supply has noticeably increased. Despite the fact that personal subsidiary plots were very small, their productivity was quite high. The number of cows in personal use was in 1959-1965. 42 55% of the total population in the country; pigs 31-37%.

At the September (1953) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, N. Khrushchev made a proposal to raise virgin and fallow lands, but it did not receive adequate support from other leaders of the party and state. And only at the Plenum of the Central Committee in February - March 1954 this program was adopted and in the same year the mass development of virgin lands began. The implementation of this program will be discussed in more detail below.

Great changes took place not only in the agricultural sector, but also in other sectors of the economy. Thus, noticeable attention was paid to industry, especially its technical level. In 1955, at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the “theory” about the absence of obsolescence of technology under socialism, which was widespread in science, was condemned as erroneous. It was emphasized that the most important thing for industry at present is “the comprehensive increase in the technological level of production based on electrification, comprehensive mechanization and automation.”

In the mid-1950s. It became obvious that without recognition of the priority development of new directions in science, the USSR would be difficult to withstand not just economic, but, above all, military confrontation with the West. It was at the turn of the 1950-1960s. the slogan appeared: “Science must become a direct productive force in the socialist economy.” Huge financial, material and human resources were directed towards the development of certain areas of fundamental sciences and natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, cybernetics, space research), to train highly qualified scientific personnel, as a result of which a significant breakthrough was made in Soviet science and technology. In 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant was put into operation in Obninsk, and in 1959 the first nuclear icebreaker "Lenin" was built, in 1957 the first Earth satellite was launched into low-Earth orbit, in 1961 - the first spaceship with Yuri Gagarin into orbit.

During those same years, the country's energy base was rapidly developing. A number of hydroelectric power plants were built on the Volga, Dnieper, Angara, and other rivers, and many thermal power plants of local importance. As a result, electricity production increased from 150.6 billion kWh. in 1954 to 507.7 billion kWh in 1965. At the same time, a powerful impetus was given to the development of oil and gas production, primarily in Siberia. Oil production increased from 52.7 million tons in 1954 to 347.3 million tons. in 1965. The growth of the energy base made it possible to transfer railway transport from steam locomotives to motor ships. The chemical industry, metallurgy, coal mining, etc. have received noticeable development.

However, the development of industry was due to extensive factors. As before, thousands of enterprises were built, but little attention was paid to improving the efficiency of existing facilities. Structural imbalances gradually increased: if in 1940 heavy industry accounted for 62.2 percent of all output, then in 1960 this figure increased to 72.5%, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the volume of manufactured items consumption. The program for the development of light industry sectors, proclaimed by G. Malenkov in 1953, was almost forgotten. Moreover, when the issue of his resignation in 1955 was being decided, this speech was recognized as erroneous, the desire to gain “cheap popularity among the people,” for which G. Malenkov had to repent before the participants of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Studying this period, we have to admit that the Soviet leadership, embarking on large-scale reforms, did not have a promising program for the further development of the country. This explains the numerous turns of economic policy, depending on the impatience of leaders and their desire to immediately improve the situation. This led to haste in determining the time frame for achieving the intended goals and in choosing methods for their implementation, which often devalued the positive effect of innovations.

An example is the proposal put forward by N. Khrushchev in 1957 to catch up with the United States in the production of meat, butter and milk within 3-4 years. The unreality of this proposal was clear, since in 1956 the USA produced 16 million tons of meat, and the USSR - 7.5 million tons, and there were no conditions to reduce such a gap: sufficient quantity feed for livestock, housing for livestock, mechanization equipment, etc.

Considering the efforts made, a certain result was achieved. In the first year of the Soviet-American competition, meat production in the USSR increased by only 301 thousand tons, and in 1960 - by another 1 million 007 thousand tons. In 1964, meat production in the USSR reached a level of 8.3 million tons. N. Khrushchev’s idea of ​​the forced introduction of corn for grain throughout the country was just as insufficiently thought out. Inspired by what he saw during his trips to the USA, Khrushchev became obsessed with the idea of ​​organizing the widespread cultivation of corn for grain and for livestock feed, not taking into account the fact that this grain crop requires a hot climate, which is absent in the mainly grain-growing regions of the USSR, located much further north than in the USA. At the very peak of the corn campaign (1962), at least 37 million hectares were sown with this crop, but it could only ripen on 7 million hectares. The attempt to bring this idea to life ended in 1964-1965, and since then the crops of this crop have remained only in the traditional southern regions of the country.

In the same way, the campaign to eliminate grass crop rotations and exclude clean fallows from circulation ended. All these innovations did not lead to an improvement in the grain situation in the country; the average yield almost did not grow. After some growth (from 7.9 centners/ha in 1950 to 11 centners/ha in 1958), the yield even began to decline and only in 1964 it reached 1958 (11.4 centners/ha) . In 1958, it was decided to liquidate MTS and sell the equipment to collective farms. But since wholesale prices for equipment rose sharply at that time, MTS began to sell it at increased prices. However, the collective farms did not have the funds to purchase this equipment. Collective farms' debts to banks for agricultural machinery amounted to more than 2 billion rubles in 1961.

Many machine operators who worked in MTS did not want to join the collective farms whose fields they worked and sought to find work in other places. Agriculture immediately lost half of its qualified workers. In the villages, “Selkhoztekhnika” organizations began to be created to check the technical condition and repair of machines, but this did not lead to a noticeable improvement in the situation. The state tried to help collective farms by reducing prices for cars, tractors, equipment, spare parts, and fuel. But due to the lack of funds from farms, the stable domestic demand for agricultural engineering products, which previously existed from MTS, sharply decreased.

Just a few years after the start of the reforms, they began to stall. Already in 1959, many previously announced benefits were withdrawn. City residents were again prohibited from having livestock on their farms, which had to be sold to collective and state farms. Restrictions were introduced on the sale and procurement of feed for private farms, and a campaign against “profiteering” in collective farm markets began. In 1962, the number of cows in individual ownership of collective farmers and state farm workers amounted to 10 million, while in 1958 there were 22 million.

In 1963, due to unfavorable weather conditions, a very low harvest was harvested - only 107.5 million tons (in 1962 - 140 million tons). The main breadbaskets suffered from drought: North Caucasus, Southern Ukraine, etc. The state failed to accumulate the necessary food resources, the problem with bread worsened in many regions of the country, queues began to appear in cities again, and the sale of bread per person was limited. For the first time in the history of the USSR, mass purchases of bread began abroad using the available gold reserves in order to prevent a repetition of the famine of past years. The volume of imported bread exceeded 13 million tons.

It became clear that the extensive development of new cultivated areas in the eastern regions does not provide annual guaranteed harvests. The land needed new technology, fertilizers, and renewal. In 1963, a new program for the chemicalization of agriculture was adopted, in accordance with which it was planned to increase the production of mineral fertilizers to 80 million tons by 1970, and to 150-170 million tons by 1980, despite the fact that in 1963, less than 20 million tons were produced. In 1970, 53.4 million tons were produced, and in 1977 - 96.8 million tons, since the capacities were not ready for the planned production volumes.

The process of consolidation and merger of collective farms continued. If by 1955 their number was 91 thousand, then by 1965 it had decreased to 29 thousand. Based on the thesis about the temporary nature of collective farm-cooperative property, in the second half of the 1950s. The mass transformation of collective farms into state farms began, the transformation of collective farmers into agricultural workers. The number of state farms increased from 4857 (1953) to 10078 (1964). During these same years, the process of liquidating unpromising villages and hamlets became widespread. Residents of thousands of rural settlements left places inhabited by many generations and moved to the central estates of state and collective farms.

At the same time, a rather unique sector of the economy that had remained since the time of the NEP began to be eliminated - industrial cooperation, which in 1955 accounted for 8% of all industrial production. Industrial cooperatives produced a variety of everyday products and provided various services. In 1956 in state property the largest industrial martels were transferred, and in 1960 fishing cooperation completely ceased to exist.

At the beginning of 1962, a restructuring of the agricultural management system was carried out. Collective and state farm administrations were established at the district level, and collective and state farm committees were established in regions, territories, and republics. Under them, party organizers of the CPSU Central Committee, regional committees and district committees began to function again. Regional party committees were divided according to production: industrial and agricultural. The results were as follows. According to the plan for 1959 - 1965. The volume of gross agricultural output was supposed to increase by 70%, but in fact the increase over these years was 10%. Average grain yield in 1960-1964. increased by 0.8% per year. Growth rate of large livestock cattle decreased by half compared to the previous five years. Milk yield per cow decreased by an average of 370 kg. in year.

Due to the fact that there were significant discrepancies between planned and actual indicators of economic development, adjustments to current plans were required. For example, a detailed plan for the fifth five-year plan (1951-1955) was never drawn up, and the Directives of the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU became the starting document that guided the work of the economy for five years. These were just the outlines of a five-year plan, but not a specific plan. The same situation arose with the sixth five-year plan (1956-1960). In February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Main Indicators of the Sixth Five-Year Plan were approved, but already in December of this year it became clear that the plan needed significant adjustments. A transition plan for two years was drawn up, and then a seven-year plan for the development of the national economy (1959 - 1965) appeared, the implementation of which would make it possible to catch up and overtake the United States. Due to the significance of this period, let us dwell on it especially.

In 1959, when this plan was adopted, the task of intensifying production was first set, with the secondary promotion of which the reforms of the 80s began. Industry, like the entire national economy, can develop either extensively or intensively. The extensive path is the path of quantitative growth through an increase in production capacity, the number of employees and the amount of processed resources. In certain periods, for example, during the post-war reconstruction of the economy, extensive growth can be very significant.

Intensification is an increase in production due to an increase in labor productivity, due to technical progress. The need for a transition to intensification was dictated by the fact that it is impossible to increase production per capita and improve the standard of living in an extensive way. Meanwhile, peaceful conditions of development, when it was no longer necessary to concentrate efforts on economic restoration or industrialization, brought to the fore the task of increasing living standards. The extensive path means that the amount of production per worker employed in production does not increase, and therefore, it does not increase per capita. It is possible to increase production per capita only through increased labor productivity. Although there is practically no “purely” extensive growth. The development of the economy is based on a combination of extensive and intensive factors so that we can only talk about the predominance of one or another direction of development. Obviously, based on the task of intensifying production, it is necessary to analyze the development of industry in the 60s and 70s.

At first glance, industry developed quite successfully during the Seven Year Plan. It was planned to increase production by 80%, but it increased by 84%, so the quantitative plan was exceeded. Structural changes occurred, reflecting technological progress. Ferrous metallurgy increased production by 66–67%, and non-ferrous metallurgy by 2–3 times. For the manufacture of new machines, not as much ferrous metal was required as before, but more non-ferrous alloys were required. Coal production increased only by 16%, and oil production by 2.2 times; new engines required liquid fuel. The chemical industry increased production by 2.5 times: the production of synthetic materials was one of the leading areas in technical progress of that time. However, some of these progressive structural changes occurred belatedly: the coal industry and ferrous metallurgy became “old” industries after the First World War; now the scientific and technical progress sectors came to the fore - robotics, microelectronics, etc. However, technical progress during the Seven Year Plan was expressed not only in structural changes. It was at this time that the transition to industrial methods took place, and construction sites turned into assembly sites. On railways moved from steam locomotives to diesel locomotives and electric locomotives.

But over the years of the seven-year plan, the growth rate of labor productivity did not increase, but decreased, capital productivity decreased, i.e. output per unit of funds. Product output increased by 84 percent, and fixed assets increased by 100%. But with intensification, capital productivity should increase: new funds, new equipment are more productive. Thus, those indicators that reflect the process of intensification indicated a slowdown in this process. The slogan of intensification was not supported by economic incentives. The planned system excluded competition; without it, enterprises were not interested in accelerating technical progress, therefore it was carried out primarily by administrative methods (by issuing tasks from above). The gap between the USSR and developed countries in terms of the technical level of industry has increased.

In the 50s - 60s. In the country, attempts were made to improve the structure of the production apparatus, to endow it with new rights, or, conversely, to limit their powers, to divide existing planning bodies and create new ones, etc. As a method of such reforms, one can name an attempt to restructure management along territorial lines (1957). During this reform, many sectoral union ministries were abolished, and territorial councils of the national economy (economic councils) appeared in their place. The only ministries in charge of military production, the Ministry of Defense, Foreign and Internal Affairs, and some others, were not affected by this restructuring. As a result, 140 union and union-republican ministries were abolished and 105 economic councils were created.

Thus, an attempt was made to decentralize management, ensure control over economic bodies from below, create conditions for the integrated development of the economy within a given economic council, reduce and reduce the cost of the state apparatus, etc. This reform took place in an atmosphere of haste. On March 30, 1957, theses on the upcoming reorganization were published, and already at the session of the Supreme Council on May 7 of the same year, the Law “On further improvement of the organization of industry and construction management” was adopted. By July 1, it was ordered to complete the restructuring of management structures, despite the fact that it was already the middle of the year and the entire economy was working as before. The All-Union Council of National Economy - VSNKh - was also created, thereby reducing the functions of the USSR State Planning Committee. The USSR State Planning Committee has only general planning and coordination of territorial and sectoral plans, distribution of the most important funds among the Union republics. To carry out a unified scientific and technical policy, state committees were established under the Council of Ministers of the USSR: on automation, aircraft engineering, mechanical engineering, radio electronics, etc.

The proposed innovation had ambiguous consequences. The reform produced a certain economic effect due to a sharp reduction in the number of interdepartmental barriers, increased management efficiency, the establishment of rational cooperation, etc. Already in 1958, that is, a year after it began, the increase in national income was 12.4% (compared to 7% in 1957). The process of creating and introducing new equipment into production has accelerated. But we must keep in mind that the resulting effect is not only a consequence of perestroika itself. The point is also that for some period the enterprises turned out to be ownerless (when the ministries actually no longer functioned and economic councils had not yet been formed), and it was during this period that they began to work noticeably more efficiently, without feeling any leadership “from above.” The effect of the reform was manifested until the governing bodies had yet formed into a stable system, until the very logic of the development of the system led to the consolidation of economic councils and the actual restoration of the departmental-sectoral management system within the territorial one.

Thus, while preserving the essence of the previous system, the reform seemed to replace the shortcomings of the sectoral management system with the shortcomings of the territorial management system with sectoral imbalance, parochial tendencies, and a swollen management apparatus that soon appeared. Localism was manifested in the fact that economic councils sought to fulfill, first of all, planned tasks for the production of those products that were required for its own consumption, and at the same time, in every possible way refused tasks for the production of products for other economic councils. And although outwardly the new, economic council system of management was significantly different from the previous, ministerial one, its essence remained the same. The previous principle of distribution of raw materials and products, the same dictate of the supplier in relation to the consumer, was preserved.

Economic levers simply could not become decisive under the conditions of the absolute dominance of the planned system. The division in 1962 of party and Soviet bodies according to the production principle into industrial and rural (as mentioned above) was the last link in the chain of transformations. It gradually became clear that without significant reform of the entire economic mechanism, the system of incentives for workers and enterprises, it is impossible to solve economic problems. Moreover, if in 1951–1955. industrial production increased by 85%, agricultural production - by 20.5, and in 1956-1960, by 64.3 and 30%, respectively (and the growth of agricultural production was mainly due to the development of new lands), then in 1961-1965 gg. these figures began to decline and amounted to 51 and 11%

So, centrifugal forces noticeably weakened the country’s economic potential; many economic councils turned out to be incapable of solving major production problems. Already in 1959, the consolidation of economic councils began: the weaker ones began to be annexed, and the more powerful ones (by analogy with the consolidation of collective farms). The centripetal tendency turned out to be stronger. Soon enough, the previous hierarchical structure of the economic country's departments was restored.

Economic situation at the turn of the 1950s – 1960s. remained quite tense. Considerable attention, as indicated above, continued to be paid to the development of agriculture. Under the influence of those adopted in 1953 - 1954. decisions that eased the economic pressure on the countryside, the rate of agricultural development increased 5 times. In 1953 - 1958 the average annual growth rate of agricultural production was approximately 9% versus 1.6 in 1950–1963. At first, the development of virgin and fallow lands also made a significant contribution to the growth of agricultural production. In 1956–1959 The country received more than 50% of its harvested grain from virgin lands. The share of investment in agricultural production has risen to almost 1/3 compared to 1/5 at the beginning of the decade. Cash income of collective farms from 1953 to 1958 increased more than 3 times. However, the revival of the village was short-lived - it was a continuation of what began in 1953 - 1954. agricultural policy lacked funds.

Due to political and social considerations, it was decided not to raise retail prices, transferring to them an approximately threefold increase in procurement prices for agricultural products and other large-scale subsidies received by collective farms in 1953-1958. The reorganization of the MTS in 1958, with forced the purchase by collective farms of the equipment they had, although it allowed some funds to be withdrawn from the village, nevertheless, it sharply worsened financial position most farms, and most importantly, could not solve the problem of investment in agriculture.

The deep causes of the agricultural crisis were rooted in the fact that the elimination of the Stalinist system of repression contributed to the disintegration of the collective farm system, based on the dictates of the state. The beginning of the issuance of passports to collective farmers allowed them to gain freedom of movement and move en masse to the cities. Eliminating the threat of reprisals for failure to complete tasks undermined the most important incentive to work in the public economy. This circumstance, as well as the desire to move closer to a fully socialized economy, prompted the need to try to eliminate private peasant farming. However, this measure did not make collective farms work better. On the contrary, it has damaged agriculture and pushed millions of people into cities.

As a consequence, the average annual growth rate of agricultural production in 1959-1964. decreased by approximately 5 times, amounting to 1.5%, which corresponded to the period 1950-1953. The average annual grain production per capita barely exceeded the level of 1913. The development of virgin lands, which required huge investments, although it initially yielded good results, nevertheless could not solve the grain problem in the USSR, since due to soil erosion and droughts, yields in the virgin lands declined fall quickly. In the early 60s. In cities, there was an acute shortage of food products, including bakery, meat products and other consumer goods. In 1962, retail prices for meat (by 30%) and butter (by 25%) were increased. However, this did not solve the shortage problem. As mentioned above, the USSR began to constantly and in increasing quantities export these products from abroad.

The forced cessation of the transfer of resources from villages to cities eliminated the most important source of accumulation of the Soviet economy, which at one time allowed for accelerated industrialization and post-war economic recovery. Moreover, agriculture itself began to require enormous resources, both in the form of direct investment and large-scale imports of food (mainly feed grains). The state of affairs in this sector of the economy had a huge impact on the national economy and society as a whole. The need to save money was one of the the most important factors reduction of the army and conventional weapons. Only in 1955 - 1958. the armed forces, then numbering 5.8 million people, were reduced by more than 2.1 million people. However, these savings were relative. Enormous resources were consumed by the arms race, primarily strategic, in which the USSR, as a rule, had to catch up with the United States. The USSR achieved short-term priority for the first time by being the first to create a ballistic intercontinental missile.

One of the consequences of the worsening financial situation of the country during this period was increased inflation, although it was officially believed that there could be no inflation under socialism. An attempt was made to improve the situation by implementing a number of measures. The first step in this direction was monetary reform. On January 1, 1961, new banknotes were introduced into circulation. The exchange of old money was carried out in a ratio of 10:1, and prices and wages changed in the same proportion. In fact, a denomination was carried out, i.e. enlargement monetary unit countries. But the purchasing power of the new money continued to decline.

The next step can be considered the government's decision to universally reduce production costs. It was caused by the fact that the dynamics of labor productivity growth in the country turned out to be lower than planned. It was decided to organize a company to reduce production costs, which meant a hidden reduction wages workers.

The period of Khrushchev's transformations of the 50s and early 60s. contributed a lot of positive things to the development of the social sphere. The economic history of the USSR would be incomplete without studying the great changes that occurred during this period in the social sphere and which affected primarily the urban population. The above measures were inextricably intertwined with various kinds of relaxations in socio-political life, which constituted the content of the first Khrushchev “thaw”. In 1956, the 1940 Law on criminal liability for being late for work and prohibitions on changing jobs was repealed. The minimum wage was clearly defined, below which enterprises could not pay for work. In the same year, a decision was made to reduce the working week to 46 hours.

The most historically significant of all the social measures of the Khrushchev period was the Pension Law of 1965, which affected the interests of millions of people. The size of the pension was set depending on length of service, age and the amount of wages received. If before 1956 all workers received a pension of 210 rubles, then the new Law provided for a range of pension fluctuations from 300 to 1200 rubles. The significance of this Law extended far into the future, because in today's Russia pension provision clearly lags behind the level of 1956. Men could retire at the age of 60 with 25 years of work experience, women - at 55 with 20 years of work experience (this was much lower age limit in most Western countries). However, this Law bypassed the issue of automatic retirement upon reaching the age limit. In addition, the system of personal pensions assigned “for special services to the state” was significantly expanded. Their size was significantly higher than national pensions; they were associated with various privileges for paying for housing, receiving free vouchers to sanatoriums, etc.

The issue of pension provision for collective farmers was resolved only in 1965. Men began to receive old-age pensions at the age of 65, women at the age of 60, and only if they continued to live on their collective farm. For those who, in their old age, moved to the city to live with their children before reaching retirement age (even if they had the necessary work experience), the question of a pension did not arise at all; they seemed to fall out of the scope of social security. And the size of pensions for rural residents was set at 8 rubles, later it was raised to 12-15 rubles. It was believed that they could get the rest of their livelihood from their subsidiary plots.

It was already mentioned above about reducing the working week from 48 to 46 hours. During the Seven Year Plan, the working week was reduced to an average of 40 hours. This meant that workers and employees worked five days a week for 7 hours, and on Saturday – 5 hours. Later, in the late 1960s, these five Saturday hours were distributed to other days of the week, and Saturday became the second day off. Paid maternity leave has increased from 70 to 112 days.

During those same years, dramatic changes occurred in housing construction. In 1955, a resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On the elimination of excesses in design and construction,” which meant the transition to mass cheap housing construction, transferred to an industrial basis (the production of house parts was carried out at previously built house-building plants). Houses began to be built from reinforced concrete panels, which significantly reduced construction time.

And although new microdistricts in cities began to be built up with monotonous five-story buildings, people moving from barracks, basements and dormitories to new separate apartments, perceived it as happiness. City housing stock in 1955-1964. increased by 1.8 times. In the 50s, preferential loans began to be provided to developers individual houses. This has improved the housing situation in small and medium-sized towns and rural areas. For 1956-1960 Almost 54 million people moved to new apartments, accounting for a quarter of the country’s total population. Housing cooperatives have become widespread on fairly favorable terms with payment of the entire cost of the apartment in installments over 15 years. All this was achieved by the end of the 70s. 80% of families in cities have separate apartments. However, due to the massive influx of migrants from the countryside to the cities, it was not possible to overcome the housing crisis.

In 1958, it was decided to suspend the payment of money on government loans for 20 years, since the state did not have the funds for this. At the same time, the mandatory subscription to government loans was abolished. This decision was received ambiguously. On the one hand, millions of people have accumulated a certain amount of bonds over many years, and their payment served as an additional source of income.

On the other hand, stopping the annual subscription to the loan meant some savings for the family. In 1957, taxes on wages for low-paid categories of workers were reduced, benefits for large families, and payments for temporary disability increased. The minimum wage was increased from 30 to 40-45 rubles. per month In the mid-1960s. it reached 60 rubles. per month The average monthly salary increased from 78 rubles. in 1958 up to 95 rubles. in 1965, but the gap between the lowest and highest levels of wages remained quite large. The category of low-paid workers included teachers, doctors, junior medical staff, workers in museums, libraries, etc. Family incomes also increased with the abolition of all types of payments for school and higher education in 1956.

As before, utility bills occupied an insignificant place in the family budget. The main place among family expenses was food costs - more than 50% of wages. It is impossible not to cancel the broad movement that began for the liberalization of spiritual life, which embraced the intelligentsia: representatives of academic science, university teachers, writers, etc., who later received the name “sixties.” Art publication magazines began to appear, which published works that critically assessed the Stalinist era and the general vices of the social system from the position of romantic faith in a bright future. This short period was called the “thaw”.

These and other social measures had a positive impact on progress in people's well-being and can undoubtedly be credited to N. Khrushchev. In general, the consequences of socio-economic transformations of the mid-50s - early 60s. can be assessed as positive. They tore the country out of the stupor of the Stalin era. But these measures did not reach their logical conclusion. And the leader’s days in high positions were numbered. However, the years of N. Khrushchev’s reign should be noted as a period of searches and hopes for a better future. Compared to the years of Stalin’s rule, many attempts were made to change the country, to make people feel that they were not “cogs” of a huge state machine, but members of society.

For 1953 – 1964 serious changes have occurred in the country's economy. For the first time they began to talk about the efficiency of management, and people began to think about the standard of living. Not everything that Khrushchev conceived actually came to fruition. A number of Khrushchev's projects were characterized by vagueness, and even outright projection. But in all this, from the point of view of history, the main thing was visible - not to calm down, to move forward, to improve the forms and methods of governing the country

N. Khrushchev's course had well-known socio-psychological and methodological basis. In any case, he organically fit into the social atmosphere of the post-Stalin “thaw”, with awakening, albeit very vague hopes, optimism, faith in own strength, reflected the traditional psychology of the Soviet leadership of maximalism, communist assault and the conviction that “there are no fortresses that the Bolsheviks cannot take.” These sentiments were also fueled by changes in the international arena, where the community of socialist countries strengthened, the colonial system collapsed, and tens of millions of people in the “Third World” turned their attention to the USSR.

In this situation, in 1957, N. Khrushchev put forward the slogan “Catch up and overtake America.” Although at first it was only about the production of meat and dairy products, this slogan marked Khrushchev’s “leap”, under which an ideological basis was soon laid down. In 1959, the XXII Congress of the CPSU stated that in the USSR socialism had won a complete and final victory, and the country had entered a period of extensive construction of communism. This thesis was enshrined in the Third Program of the CPSU, adopted at the XXII Party Congress (October 1961). The program stated that by 1980 a communist society would be built in the USSR as a whole. It was planned to achieve by this time first place in the world in terms of labor productivity and output per capita in terms of living standards. After 20 years, it was necessary to minimize or completely abolish all commodity-money relations in the economy, transform “socialist statehood into public communist self-government,” and educate a “new man” in accordance with high moral ideals.

It was assumed that all manifestations of private property at the everyday level would quickly die out, and therefore people should travel by public transport or rent cars, and not purchase them for personal use, relax in holiday homes, and not on personal summer cottages, etc. d. All this was supposed to instill in people a desire for universal equality and collectivism. It was expected that by 1980 a number of food products would be distributed free of charge, travel on public transport, accommodation in municipal housing, etc. would be free. These and other ideas of economic primitivism, embedded in the program, were supposed to strengthen people's faith in bright ideals and cause a rise in the enthusiasm of broad sections of the population.

Great changes occurred during the Khrushchev decade in foreign policy. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, new principles were formulated in international economic relations, in particular, the possibility of a multivariate path to building socialism in various countries. This confirmed the special path of development of Yugoslavia and other countries. But, despite this, the USSR continued to impose its stereotypes on Eastern European countries, as a result of which anti-socialist sentiments sharply worsened in Hungary, Germany, and Poland.

It took the military intervention of the USSR to change the situation in Hungary (in the fall of 1956), and in Germany to build the “Berlin Wall” (1961), which divided the German people. Relations with China and Albania worsened, whose leadership was dissatisfied with criticism of the “cult of personality” in the twentieth Congress of the CPSU At this congress the need for the peaceful existence of countries with different social systems was also confirmed.

Based on this principle, the USSR sought to reach an agreement with leading Western countries on mutual disarmament and a reduction in the number of armed forces. The size of the armed forces was unilaterally reduced from 5.8 million people. (1955) up to 2.5 million people. (1960). The issue of limiting nuclear weapons testing in three areas was especially acute: the atmosphere, in space, and under water. This agreement was signed by representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain. Is it true, Western countries did not really trust the Soviet Union, and the USSR was at that time developing its military programs for the construction of nuclear power plants submarines, equipping the army and navy with intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads, placed its military bases in third world countries. Particular tension arose after the import of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba, which resulted in the “Cubicle crisis” in the fall of 1962, which brought the world to the brink of a nuclear conflict, which was resolved through negotiations between the leaders of the United States and the USSR. Such a difficult foreign policy situation did not allow the USSR to reduce military spending, as well as the costs of maintaining the military-political bloc of socialist countries - the Warsaw Pact Organization.

By the mid-1960s, the limit on the partial improvement of the planned system had been reached. Next, it was necessary to decide on more radical changes in all spheres of life, but the country’s political leadership was no longer able to do this. The “time limit” allotted to N. Khrushchev was exhausted, as was his own political and intellectual potential. It is significant that N. Khrushchev, like many political figures of our time, was much more popular in the international arena than in his own country. This was due, first of all, to the firm course that the USSR followed in international politics, to the turn from confrontation to détente, to establishing dialogue. It was with the personality of Khrushchev that the West associated the growing opinion that it was possible to come to an agreement with the Russians on many issues.

But within the country, N. Khrushchev became an increasingly unpopular figure, both among his associates and among the people. The party-state apparatus was dissatisfied with the constant and unpredictable reorganizations, which caused a lot of anxiety. In addition, broad sections of the public proposed abolishing or reducing the privileges of the nomenklatura in order to prevent further social differentiation of society, but this prospect did not suit the ruling circles of the country. The most orthodox party leaders believed that the process of de-Stalinization, begun at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, had gone too far and threatened the role of the party in all areas of the economic, political and especially spiritual life of the country. Among the dissatisfied were many military personnel due to the reduction of the armed forces. After all, in the late 50s and early 60s. Many highly paid general positions were eliminated, and hundreds of thousands of officers were left to fend for themselves. Dissatisfaction also grew due to the gradual ban on the liberalization of spiritual life and the interference of party bodies in the creative sphere. All this helped part of the party apparatus to get rid of N. Khrushchev without much effort. At the October (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he was accused of voluntarism and subjectivism and dismissed.

1. In April 1956, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued, abolishing criminal liability for absenteeism and unauthorized departure from the enterprise; it was replaced by disciplinary liability.

2. In January 1957, a new Regulation on the procedure for resolving labor disputes was adopted, on the basis of which commissions for labor disputes were created at enterprises (on issues of dismissal, transfer, payment, etc.). The commission's decisions could be appealed to the factory committee and then to the court.

3. The Committee on Labor and Wages, created under the Government of the USSR, implemented in 1955 – 1960s a number of measures to streamline wages.

4. Since 1956, the length of the working day on Saturdays and pre-holidays has been reduced by 2 hours; a 6-hour working day was established for working teenagers; The duration of maternity leave has increased.

5. In July 1958, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Regulations on the rights of the factory, factory, and local trade union committees. Trade union committees were entrusted with control over the implementation by the enterprise administration of labor legislation and safety regulations, over the work of trade and public catering enterprises, over correct remuneration, etc. Dismissal of workers on the initiative of the administration could only be carried out with the consent of trade unions.

6. In July 1956, the law on state pensions was adopted, establishing uniform criteria for the assignment of pensions. The retirement age for men was set at 60 years, for women – at 55 years old. The total length of service of a citizen began to play an important role in assigning a labor pension. For men it was set at 25 years old, for women – at 20 years old. When assigning pensions for disability, due to work injury or occupational disease, age and length of service were not taken into account. The law established minimum and maximum pension payments. For categories of low-paid workers, pension rates increased by 2 times or more.

7. Tuition fees in schools and universities were abolished.

8. The scale of housing construction has increased. Industrialization contributed to the acceleration of its pace construction work, the use of prefabricated reinforced concrete, panel houses with small apartments. At the same time, new principles were developed for the development of residential microdistricts like the famous Cheryomushki microdistrict in Moscow, where residential buildings were combined with institutions and cultural institutions - domestic use: schools, hospitals, kindergartens, shops, hairdressers, etc.

The results of the reign of N.S. Khrushchev. A housing program developed and implemented in the Soviet Union with the active participation of N.S. Khrushchev, allowed in just a few years, already in the second half of 50 - 90s, to move almost a quarter of the country's population into new comfortable apartments. The famous “Khrushchev buildings” reduced the severity of the housing problem. Moreover, warrants for moving into panel “Khrushchev” buildings were issued to needy citizens of the USSR for free.And this is just one decade after the end of the destructive Great Patriotic War, which destroyed almost a third of the entire economic potential of the huge country, when almost 2 thousand cities and 70 thousand villages lay in ruins.

During the era of Khrushchev's reforms, high-tech industries developed rapidly: electronics, aircraft manufacturing, astronautics and others. Under Khrushchev, the world's first artificial Earth satellite was launched (October 4, 1957) and world's first manned space flight. Moreover, the flight of Yu.A. Gagarin into space on April 12, 1961 became a triumph not only of Soviet science and technology, but for some time of the entire Soviet country, led by N.S. Khrushchev, the author of many reforms of that period.

Thus, Khrushchev’s implementation of state and legal reforms, progressive initiatives in industry, agriculture, development of virgin and fallow lands, a new successful social politics, his elimination of the repressive regime of Stalin, debunking the cult of personality of the leader of all nations – all this became manifestations of a new approach to public administration. The Khrushchev period of governing the country turned out to be a major step in the development of our state.

Certain successes in government - legal reforms, economics, social sphere, promises of N.S. Khrushchev, made at the XXII Party Congress, that “the current generation of Soviet people will live under communism,” gave rise to too many illusions in society about the possibilities of the socialist economic system. The reformer’s plans were not destined to come true: the construction took two decades to materially - The technical basis of communism, which would make it possible to implement the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need,” was a clear utopia of another Kremlin dreamer.

Removal of N.S. Khrushchev from power. Khrushchev's voluntarism, his gradual departure from the principles of collective leadership, the concentration of party and state power in one hand and other mistakes led to the fact that his inner circle was dissatisfied with his rule and took measures to remove the leader from power.

On the initiative of L.I. Brezhnev and his supporters on October 13, 1964, an extraordinary meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee was convened, ostensibly to discuss issues on agriculture. N.S. Khrushchev was in the south at that time, on vacation, but met with the French Minister of Agriculture. Therefore, he did not immediately accept Brezhnev’s insistent offer to urgently arrive in Moscow. For Khrushchev and his companion A.I. Mikoyan, who arrived in Moscow, already at the airfield, where they were met only by a KGB officer, it became clear that at the Plenum of the Central Committee it would not be about agriculture. At the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, 22 people gathered, ministers of the USSR and several secretaries of regional committees were present. The discussion was stormy, sharp and frank. Khrushchev resolutely rejected almost all the accusations against himself and himself made several accusations against the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee present. One A.I. spoke in defense of Khrushchev. Mikoyan, who stated that Khrushchev’s activities – the party’s great political capital, which it does not have the right to squander so easily. But none of those present supported Mikoyan. It was obvious that the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee this time would not be on the side of the First Secretary. However, it was not possible to convince Khrushchev to resign voluntarily, and the meeting, which began in the afternoon of October 13, had to be interrupted late at night for rest. Everyone went home, agreeing to gather on the morning of October 14th. However, at night Khrushchev decided: “If they don’t want me, then so be it,” and the next day the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee lasted no more than an hour and a half. L.I. was elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Brezhnev, and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - A.N. Kosygin. On October 14, the next Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee opened in the Kremlin, whose members had already arrived in Moscow from all over the country in advance. The meeting was opened by L.I. Brezhnev, chaired by A.I. Mikoyan. N.S. was also present at the meeting of the plenum. Khrushchev, who did not utter a word. M.S. Suslov read a report at the Plenum in which there was no objective analysis of Khrushchev’s activities for 11 years, but there were remarks mainly of a personal nature related to his voluntarism in Lately. Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee released N.S. Khrushchev from all positions held. Was confirmed as the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev. This plenum of the Central Committee is reminiscent of - then a palace coup of the 18th century: a conspiracy – bias – appointment of a new monarch.

13.3. Socio-economic development of the country in the “Brezhnev era”

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who came to power as a result of a party “palace coup,” was a typical representative of the nomenklatura. During the Great Patriotic War, he was a colonel and head of the political department of a division that fought on Malaya Zemlya near Novorossiysk. After the war, he headed the Zaporozhye, then the Dnepropetrovsk regional committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine. During the period of virgin lands development he led Kazakhstan, in 1950 – 1952 – Moldova. In a conspiracy against N.S. Khrushcheva L.I. Brezhnev served as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Public administration in the Brezhnev era. After eliminating N.S. Khrushchev from the authorities of L.I. Brezhnev, then still full of strength and energy, carried out a whole range of state, legal, economic and social reforms that significantly changed the face of our country. L.I. Brezhnev carried out some counter-reforms of public administration. Instead of Khrushchev's economic councils, he revived everything line ministries. Together with them, a return to the sectoral principle of industrial planning and management was carried out. However, some independence of the union republics was preserved. Planning was carried out by the USSR State Planning Committee through the Union and Union-Republican ministries.

L.I. At first, Brezhnev did not have a clear program for managing the Soviet state or carrying out urgent reforms. He didn’t have his own team of professionals either. - like-minded people to implement planned changes. But he, as an experienced apparatchik, strengthened the position of the party nomenklatura, expanded its powers in managing the regions and the country as a whole. A little later, a team appeared to carry out reforms. Of course, its basis was the party elite, members and candidate members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party.

Without the sanction (resolution, approval) of the relevant sector or department of the CPSU Central Committee, and in some cases – The Secretariat or the Politburo, not a single government body could make a single decision of any importance at that time. Through the Central Committee of the CPSU the so-called political, often direct guidance sectors of the national economy.

A similar situation arose in the localities, where the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional committees and regional committees monopolized all political decisions and controlled the activities of Soviet and Komsomol organizations, local courts, industrial and agricultural enterprises.

At the XXIII Congress of the CPSU (1966), the title “General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee” was restored. Later, Brezhnev combined the main party position with the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and chairman of the Defense Council.

Initially, Brezhnev showed himself to be an energetic and fairly competent leader, although he gravitated towards conservatism, but exercised competent leadership in the interests of the country. L.I. Brezhnev in the mid-60s. was an ardent supporter of economic reforms and supported the head of government Alexey Nikolaevich Kosygin - author of reforms in industry and agriculture. However, later, by the mid-70s, disagreements began between Brezhnev and Kosygin on issues of further economic reform. Unfortunately, this confrontation ended in Kosygin's defeat, and Brezhnev took political actions that cemented the Soviet state's abandonment of market reforms. And yet some of their results joint activities gave positive impetus to the socio-economic development of the country.

Agrarian reform was proclaimed at the March (1965) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It included measures to solve social problems in the countryside, the use of economic incentives in agriculture, and increased financing for agricultural production. During the implementation of agrarian reform, the following changes were made.

1. The peasants received additional land for personal use for the development of household farming, and the “extra” land was no longer cut off.

2. Peasants received the right to a pension.

3. On collective farms, a minimum wage was guaranteed in cash, and the rest was payment in kind (grain, vegetables, etc.).

4. The purchase price for agricultural products increased again while the norms for mandatory deliveries to the “bins of the Motherland” were reduced. For their above-plan sales, an additional price premium of 50% was introduced.

5. A firm plan for government purchases of grain and other agricultural products was established for a period of 6 years. This increased the stability and interest of peasants in the results of their labor.

6. The corn epic was put to an end: they were no longer forced to sow the “queen of the fields” and sunflowers on lands close to the North Pole.

All this led to an increase in labor productivity in agriculture. By the end of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1965-1970), the total profitability of state farm production was 22%, and collective farm production was even higher – 34%. Thanks to agricultural reform, the country's supply of agricultural products has improved significantly.

The course to increase agricultural production was continued with the approval of the ninth and tenth five-year plans for the development of the national economy of the USSR. In just three five-year plans from 1966 to 1980, almost 400 billion rubles. If we take into account the fact that the ruble at that time at the exchange rate was higher than the US dollar, it becomes clear what gigantic sums were allocated under L.I. Brezhnev for the implementation of agrarian reforms. However, these funds were used extremely ineffectively. They invested in the construction of gigantic expensive complexes, ill-conceived reclamation and chemicalization of fields that did not bring real returns.

Reforms in industry. In November 1965 A.N. Kosygin made a report at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in which he substantiated the need for economic reform in industry. The head of the government proposed introducing market categories and concepts into the economic activities of enterprises: profit, profitability, cost accounting, cost of production, etc. The reform significantly reduced the list of planned indicators previously introduced by the state. One of the main performance indicators industrial enterprises The volume of products sold was determined, rather than the volume of all products produced. This was a step forward to the modern concept of "market conditions", that is, producing what the consumer requires.

To economically stimulate labor and produce goods, it was decided to leave part of the profits at the disposal of enterprises. Due to deductions from profits at plants and factories, special funds were formed: 1) material incentives; 2) development of production (self-financing) and 3) socio-cultural and everyday development (money was allocated for the construction of housing, sanatoriums, cultural centers, etc.). This was a significant step towards the independence of enterprises and stimulation of labor productivity.

Kosygin economic reform gave a noticeable impetus to the stalled national economy. Already in 1966, over 700 production teams began working under the new business conditions. In accordance with the reform, production associations began to be created for the purpose of cooperation in the production of complex products. An example of such cooperation is the merger of the Moscow Automobile Plant named after I.A. Likhachev with specialized enterprises in Roslavl and Mtsensk, which produced components and spare parts for cars. This contributed to strengthening economic ties, eliminated duplicate production facilities.

In the Soviet Union during this period, in order to develop science and technology, new knowledge-intensive industries were created: microelectronics, nuclear engineering, etc., arose scientifically - production associations that met the requirements of the time.

The progressive significance of economic reforms in the Brezhnev era, especially at the initial stage, is evidenced by the following figures and facts. Only for the eighth five-year plan industrial production increased by one and a half times, labor productivity – by 33%. The Eighth Five-Year Plan became one of the most successful for the country's economy. Was built 1900 new industrial enterprises, construction of the first stage of the Volzhsky Automobile Plant in Tolyatti was completed, Western - Siberian Metallurgical Plant, thermal power plants in Konakovo and Krivoy Rog, construction of the Central Asia gas pipeline was completed – Center" with a length of 2750 km. Construction of the first stage of the famous oil pipeline "Druzhba", length 8,900 km. Total length of petroleum built in the USSR - and gas pipelines exceeded 35 thousand km.

Economic growth rates under L.I. Brezhnev at 60 – 70- x years were significantly higher than in developed European countries. The average annual growth rate of national income during the Eighth Five-Year Plan reached 7.7%. This figure significantly exceeds the current rate of development of the Russian economy.

Since mid 70s - x years real control in the party was concentrated in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Within the framework of this body, a narrow group of the party super-elite was formed consisting of Yu.V. Andropova, A.N. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinova, M.I. Suslova, K.U. Chernenko, who together with Brezhnev actually resolved all the most fundamental issues.

Party leaders, understanding the importance of the development of science and technology, called on the Soviet people to “combine the achievements scientifically - technical progress with the advantages of socialism." However, it was precisely these “advantages” that hampered the development of science and technology, the introduction of their achievements into production, since the problem was not solved incentives. Economic incentives were replaced by socialist competition in scientific - research institutes and scientific - production associations. From time to time, however, there were reports of new major discoveries and developments, but if they were not of military significance, then most often were not introduced into mass production then from - for “lack of funds”, then from - for the lack of strong support among developers in those instances where the fate of discoveries was decided.

At the same time, relations were established in the country personal loyalty, nepotism in the selection and placement of personnel. For example, those people who had previously worked with Brezhnev in Ukraine, Moldova or Kazakhstan and were endlessly devoted to him found themselves in high leadership positions, and Brezhnev’s son and son-in-law were introduced to the CPSU Central Committee.

The isolation of the power elite, its practical irremovability and lack of control, the “unsinkability” of the party nomenklatura and senior officials, no matter what mistakes they made in leadership, – all this caused discontent in society and social apathy of citizens. Thus, on December 12, 1979, a narrow circle of Politburo members at Brezhnev’s dacha decided to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. As it turned out later, this was a serious political mistake.

Social differentiation grew, based not on labor contribution, but on the degree of access to scarcity. It was aggravated by an increase in undeserved and illegal privileges for certain categories of citizens, mainly party and Soviet workers and other nomenklatura.

By mid 70s - x years reforms in the economy were practically curtailed. As a result, the growth rate of labor productivity in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975) compared to the Eighth Five-Year Plan decreased from 6.8 to 3%, that is, more than doubled.

The country's leadership explained this by objective reasons: an unfavorable demographic situation and a decline in specific gravity working-age population, depletion of the traditional raw material base and a sharp rise in the cost of mining; physical wear and tear and obsolescence of equipment; significant increase in military spending, etc. All these factors really took place and had a negative impact on economic development. However, the main circumstance explaining the failure of the reforms was that the directive model of the economy itself had exhausted its resources. She could do something else - At that time it developed by inertia, but in historical terms it was doomed.

Existing methods of public administration could no longer provide solutions to the problems facing the economy. Extensive methods of developing the national economy have exhausted themselves. Factors such as the need for direct and indirect subsidies to unprofitable enterprises and ineffective territories, exorbitant military spending and multi-billion dollar loans from the USSR to third world countries.

The situation was saved only by oil, gas and other energy resources, the reserves of which were discovered with the help of space satellites. The export of “black gold” abroad has become a powerful source of obtaining additional currency, with a magic wand to solve acute social problems - economic problems. Using petrodollars, the state began to purchase Western equipment and technology and, on this basis, solve pressing problems.

Instead of trying to improve product quality, intensification of production, To make a profit by introducing the achievements of scientific and technological progress into production, the bureaucracy relied on imported pumping. The main task was to maintain the achieved production rates. As a result, the USSR actually “slept through” the information revolution – computerization and IT technologies. While the United States, Western Europe and Japan developed along post-industrial lines of modernization, the Soviet economy traditionally and inertly developed within the framework of the industrial stage. The backwardness of the Soviet Union is evidenced by the fact that by 1985 it had a thousand times fewer personal computers and computers than, for example, the USA. The situation has escalated from - for the sanctions imposed by the West against the USSR after the outbreak of the Afghan war, when access to the country of the best foreign models of equipment and high-tech technologies virtually ceased.

In the USSR by the beginning of the 80s. There were signs of a slowdown in economic growth, stagnation and stagnation. But the label of “stagnation and stagnation”, hung by biased politicians and economists, is not entirely correct in relation to to all Brezhnev era. If we take as a whole the Brezhnev period of development of a huge country that occupied an area of ​​22.4 million square meters. km, where almost 280 million people lived, then the overall picture will be strikingly different from the one that is being imposed on inexperienced Russians by the dependent media and, first of all, by federal television channels.

Facts show: by the beginning of perestroika 80 - x years A powerful industrial potential was created in the Soviet Union. Over the 18 years from 1970 to 1988, industrial production in the USSR increased 2.38 times. Over the same 18 years, the developed countries of Europe showed a significantly smaller increase in industrial production. In England it increased by only 1.32 times, or almost 2 times less than in the Soviet Union; in Germany – at 1.33; in France – 1.48 times, that is, significantly less than in the USSR during the “period of stagnation and stagnation.” Even the USA lagged behind the USSR, giving an increase in industrial production of only 1.68 times.

The volume of gross domestic product in the period from 1960 to 1988 in the USSR increased almost 5 times! Moreover, the growth rate of the finished social product was maintained throughout almost the entire Brezhnev period. Compared to 1960, its volume in 1970 was exceeded by 2.1 times, in 1980. – 3.5 times, and in 1988 – 4.7 times. Therefore, it is at least unscientific to hang the label “Brezhnev’s stagnation” on an economy that was ahead of not only developed countries in its main economic indicators Western Europe, but also the USA. The economic indicators of the USSR would have been much higher if Brezhnev had not been so ill in last years leadership of the country or gave way in time to a more energetic leader of the state.

The foundation of the economy, laid in the Brezhnev era, proven oil and gas reserves made it possible to survive the failure of Gorbachev’s perestroika, almost a decade and a half of Yeltsin’s systemic crisis and failures in the governance of Putin and Medvedev. Thus, the Brezhnev-Kosygin reforms in industry and agriculture, which yielded positive results, have important historical significance.

With all the shortcomings and vices political system, the slowness of the bureaucratic apparatus for managing the economy under L.I. Brezhnev ensured a relatively high level of well-being of the population.

Success in the social sphere. Successes in the economic field allowed the socialist state to solve many social problems. The Constitution of the USSR, adopted in 1977, and special laws regulating the social policy of the state were aimed at this. Public consumption funds increased, serious financial investments were made in public medicine, education, sports, and recreation.

Education in higher and other educational institutions under L.I. Brezhnev was free. (For comparison: the cost of annual training at prestigious state Russian universities in 2010 was: at the Higher School of Economics in the Faculty of State and Municipal Administration - 250 thousand rubles per year, at M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University at the Faculty of Political Science master's programs - 261.6 thousand, at MGIMO for bachelor's programs - from 280 thousand rubles).

During the Brezhnev period, close attention was paid to the quality of education and the high level of training of specialists. The degree of professional training of that time can be judged by the fact that the current leaders Russian state, regional authorities and management, rectors of leading universities (the list goes on) received their education under L.I. Brezhnev.

Healthcare made it possible to successfully combat child mortality, epidemics and other diseases. Operations, even the most complex ones, were free for people.

Pension provision generally met the needs of people who had retired. Pensions were increased for ferrous metallurgy workers, miners, and other categories with difficult conditions labor activity. Bonuses were introduced for continuous work experience at one enterprise, institution or organization. Pensions for disabled people and participants of the Great Patriotic War, and families of military personnel who died at the front were noticeably increased.

The maximum pension for ordinary citizens (teachers, doctors, engineers, etc.) was 132 rubles and allowed them to live almost comfortably. A loaf of bread cost a little more than 10 kopecks, sausage – 2 rubles 20 kopecks per 1 kg, meat – no more than 2 rubles per kg, 1 kWh of electricity – 4 kopecks, gasoline – 7 kopecks per 1 liter, rent was charged no more than 10–15 rubles per month, etc. At these prices, the cost of living was low, and pensioners could afford some - what to save for a rainy day.

There were no traces of any delays in the payment of pensions or salaries. “Indeed, this was the case before, 132 rubles of the Soviet labor pension translated into natural products, such as bread, milk, meat, etc. – were undoubtedly more significant than my pension today. What could you buy then by paying 16 rubles 39 kopecks for an apartment and electricity: 730 loaves of bread, 60 kg of boiled sausage, 32 kg of Swiss cheese. Today my 3,500 rubles of pension remaining from paying utility bills, – wrote pensioner Lidia Kulikova in 2007 to the Russian Federation magazine, – allow you to buy 290 loaves of bread, 17 kg of sausage, 23 kg of Russian cheese, that is, in all respects, three times less.” Thus, the social security of pensioners during the Brezhnev period of government was significantly higher than in modern Russia.

Soviet people during the Brezhnev period of leadership of the state had other social guarantees, including housing. The housing legislation in force at that time determined the order free providing citizens with living space. It should be emphasized that the housing legislation of that period also provided for the improvement of living conditions for citizens at the expense of the state.

The law established categories of citizens who had benefits in providing housing. These categories included disabled people and participants in the Great Patriotic War, Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor, holders of the Order of Glory of three degrees, etc. If there were less than 12 square meters per person. m of living space, then citizens living in such cramped conditions also had the right to improve their living conditions at the expense of the state.

No one could evict a citizen from an apartment or residential building occupied by law. His home was his real fortress. Entering a home was punishable by law.

Under L.I. Brezhnev built over 1.5 billion square meters. m of housing, which allowed More than 40% of Soviet people received comfortable apartments for free. According to official statistics, by the beginning of 80 - x years XX century Almost 80% of families had separate apartments, including families of citizens of Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Baltic republics, Central Asia and Transcaucasia. In these republics, which left the USSR in December 1991, the lion's share of the housing stock is still made up of apartments from the Brezhnev period of “stagnation and stagnation.”

In 1966 – 1967 not without the participation of L.I. Brezhnev was introduced five-day work week with two days off. Wages for the main categories of workers increased, and the minimum wage was significantly increased. In 1970, the Fundamentals of Labor Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics were adopted. On their basis, new codes of labor laws of the union republics were developed and put into effect. In the RSFSR, a new Labor Code was adopted in 1971. The new labor legislation attached great importance to the protection labor rights women and youth. Women received the right to partially paid leave to care for children up to one year of age. The rights of pregnant women were protected: no one could deprive them of work and earnings, deny them maternity leave, etc.

During the Brezhnev reform period supply of food to the population and consumer goods reached the highest level compared to other periods of the country's socialist development. Moreover, prices for goods and services were relatively low, affordable to the average consumer. For example, with a salary of 200 rubles, one could buy four vouchers to a sanatorium on the Black Sea (with treatment, food and accommodation in equipped rooms) for a period of 24 days.

Recent 100 - anniversary of the birth of L.I. Brezhnev in Russia “passed under a friendly sigh of nostalgia: many remembered the stagnation as a “golden age”, historical happiness – bright, carefree" – published in January 2007 by Komsomolskaya Pravda. Reflecting on this phenomenon, the most influential Russian newspaper in the article “Is the USSR returning?” writes: “It’s a strange thing, sometimes ironizing our funny and sad past, we suddenly discover in today’s life where there is everything we dreamed of – from sausages and foreign cars to free trips abroad... – our fellow citizens suddenly began to feel nostalgic for the viscous Brezhnev “stagnation”. The newspaper quotes the words of Arkady Inin, which contains the answer to the question why former Soviet citizens liked the Brezhnev era so much. “I dream of nothing more than waking up in a “golden stagnation” – famous writer stated - satirist. – When there was stability, confidence in the future, security, care for people, respect for veterans, pensions on which you could not only live, but also relax in Crimea, the absence of the cult of money, wild class inequality, scoundrels in Courchevel, homeless people and street children on Russian streets. And most importantly – there was respect for human dignity.” These are the memories of today's Russians who lived in the Brezhnev era, which was often not entirely fair called the era of “stagnation and stagnation.”

To maintain objectivity, it should be noted that at the end of the article, A. Inin lists what he did not like about that era. He, like most former Soviet citizens, would not like to see the Iron Curtain, the power of the CPSU and political censorship again.

The end of the Brezhnev era. It should be borne in mind that the beginning and end of the Brezhnev era are strikingly different from each other. This is due primarily to the leader of the state himself, his attitude towards the state - legal reforms and changes in social - economic sphere. At the end of his reign, Brezhnev lost the opportunity critical thinking and even tried, with the support of his circle, to organize a semblance of a cult of his personality. Some historians are inclined to explain the dramatic changes by serious health problems of the reformer, a negative attitude towards the transformations of his immediate circle, especially the elderly members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

All these assumptions are based on real facts. Be that as it may, at the end of the Brezhnev era changes occurred that became a milestone in the development of society. The country began counter-reforms, affecting many areas of Soviet society. In politics, the concept of building communism was replaced by the concept of developed socialism. In the state apparatus, the principles of collegial leadership were replaced by unity of command. The party has forgotten the principle of personnel rotation. In civil society there was increasing persecution of dissidents.

At the end of 70 - X – early 80s - x years In connection with the beginning of the fall in oil export prices, investment in the social sphere sharply decreased. Its financing on the “residual principle” had a particularly difficult impact on the living conditions of the rural population. The provision of villagers with medical and children's services lagged significantly behind the city. preschool institutions, consumer service and catering enterprises.

A special contrast in the social security of rural workers was noticeable in comparison with the standard of living of the leaders of party and Soviet bodies, who occupied a special, privileged position in the system of distribution of material goods. There was a special supply of food and industrial goods for them; they were served by special clinics, hospitals, and sanatoriums. At the end of Brezhnev’s rule in the USSR, the facts became increasingly obvious how the servants of the people turned into masters. They acquired various privileges, benefits, and many of the party and Soviet functionaries – and wealth.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev is the Soviet leader who in the mass consciousness is associated with the “thaw” and the “Khrushchevs.” However, not everyone knows that the social and political reforms of this Soviet leader, in fact, planted a “bomb” under the entire Soviet system and statehood.
The inability of our state and society to cope with the coup d'etat of 1991, Gorbachev's mistakes during the “rebuilt reforms” and the extremely weak capacity of the late Soviet government in principle are the legacy of Nikita Khrushchev.

Even the fact that rather quickly, ten years after coming to power, Khrushchev was overthrown by the method of a “quiet coup” did not help the USSR recover from the “reforms”. They laid such profound changes in society and the system of power.

Khrushchev's team

Having come to power in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev began to form his “team” in a very unique way. No, personnel renewal was necessary from a political point of view. Many in the then nomenklatura had a very negative attitude towards the new Secretary General.

But when selecting “new and loyal personnel,” Nikita Sergeevich, first of all, looked at loyalty, often ignoring such a criterion as professionalism.

This system was once very accurately characterized by the Soviet economist Dmitry Shepilov: “Why was Minister X replaced by Y? Why was such a completely unsuitable person as Z put in this important post?” - followed the answers: “Nikita Sergeevich worked with the YG in Ukraine... Zeta Nikita Sergeevich knows from working together in the MK party.”

These relationships and the emphasis on loyalty immediately became a characteristic feature of the entire political system down to the lowest party and political levels. Moreover, official reforms followed, which essentially neutralized the concept of “political professionalism.”

School reform

We are talking, for example, about the so-called school reform and the law of December 24, 1958 “On strengthening the connection between school and life and on the further development of the public education system in the USSR.”

This law assumed an emphasis on labor education, and after school, graduates were required to work in production for two years and only then could continue their studies. The only problem was that the salary of even an unskilled worker was higher than a student scholarship.

Therefore, the newly minted workers were not eager to continue their education. True, it was from these personnel that, as a result of another reform, they began to form political elites Khrushchev period.

Record-breaking milkmaids

On the initiative of Nikita Sergeevich, now the main contenders for social elevators have become people from working-class youth. Roughly speaking, a record-breaking milkmaid who exceeded the milk production norm could easily become the deputy chairman of a collective farm and advance along the party line. And there were millions of such milkmaids, tractor drivers, miners and other young workers in the Land of the Soviets. In general, there was someone to replace the “outdated” party elite, which, in the words of Khrushchev himself, “stayed late at the fair.”

To increase their political knowledge, they, this new elite, were offered party courses, but not systematic education. And these same “milkmaids” eventually came to power in the USSR. Yes, they were practitioners, but these people had minimal theoretical knowledge and knowledge about politics.

From combine operators to politicians

The most famous and sad example of such career growth was Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, who was an excellent combine operator and fell under Khrushchev’s personnel and social reforms. And who would argue that he did an excellent job with the combine.

And since it worked out perfectly, both party and career growth began. Just not in the specialty, namely in political sphere, which ultimately brought Mikhail Sergeevich to power in the USSR, in the country about political structure which he understood very little. Therefore, things somehow didn’t work out for him with her.

Uneducated elites

During the same period, a unique system of “moral priorities” arose in the USSR. Now those same “working, working youth” had an extremely negative attitude towards educated specialists and professionals. Because they were just “theorists,” while the new “elites” became pure practitioners of socialism and communism. They literally built it with their own hands. This, however, had nothing to do with political literacy. However, Nikita Sergeevich was interested in this to a minimal extent.

In fact, it was under Khrushchev that a mechanism was formed for promoting the most arrogant, assertive, but loyal and uneducated to power, which in historiography is usually called “negative selection.”

After Khrushchev's removal from power, the new Secretary General, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, faced an acute personnel problem. There were a minority of political professionals, truly educated specialists. Moreover, Khrushchev's favoritism continued to prevail in the Soviet system. And therefore, these very rare specialists formed the Brezhnev gerontocracy, and then the “stagnation”. There simply wasn’t an adequate replacement, and I didn’t really want to let her into power.

But in the end, these same “Khrushchev cadres” got involved in their revenge after the death of Brezhnev, and then Andropov and Chernenko. And we all remember very well how this revenge ended. It was a monumental collapse of the greatest country.

It is worth noting that it was Khrushchev’s generation of “promising cadres” who caused this collapse. After all, both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin are people who were fully formed in the USSR. They were born, raised, trained and raised only according to Soviet patterns.

Even Brezhnev had three gymnasium classes in Tsarist Russia. And, it must be said, he did not destroy the Soviet Union. It was completely destroyed by Soviet people. And first of all, we can say “thank you” to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev for this.

Solving economic problems remained the most important task for Soviet society. In the organization of economic development of this period, two periods are clearly distinguished, seriously differing from each other in methods, goals and final results.

1953-1957 Economic course G.M. Malenkova After Stalin's death the new economic course of the USSR was associated with the name of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G.M. Malenkova(1953-1955). It consisted of a social reorientation of the economy, which meant shifting the center of gravity to the development of the light and food industries, as well as agriculture.

An attempt was made to solve the food problem and bring agriculture out of the crisis by increasing productivity (i.e. intensifying production) and using the factor of personal interest of the collective farmer. For this purpose, it was planned: a reduction in taxes on personal subsidiary plots, an increase in procurement prices for agricultural products, a write-off of agricultural tax arrears for collective farms (1.5 billion poods of grain), and an increase in household plots. This was one of the options for the new agricultural course.

Agricultural Transformation Program carried out N.S. Khrushchev, was somewhat different from the strategic plan of G.M. Malenkov. In addition to these measures, Khrushchev intended to ensure the rise of agriculture through the rapid expansion of sown areas through the development of virgin lands (an extensive way of agricultural development). Special attention He also paid attention to the processes of mechanization of agriculture, for which it was planned in the future to transform collective farms into large industrial-type farms.

In 1954, the development of virgin lands in the Volga region, Siberia and Kazakhstan began. With the participation of 300 thousand volunteers, mostly young people, 42 million hectares of new land were developed.

Purchasing prices for agricultural products were doubled, collective farm debts on agricultural taxes from previous years were written off (1.5 billion poods of grain), and expenses for social development of the village were increased several times. Taxes on personal subsidiary plots were abolished, which were allowed to be increased fivefold. In 1958, mandatory supplies of agricultural products from household plots were abolished, and taxes on them were reduced.

On the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev, the criteria for planning in agriculture were changed, collective farms received the right to make changes to their charters.

For 1953-1958 the increase in agricultural production was 34% compared to the previous five years. In order to solve the food problem, the area under corn was increased: from 1955 to 1962. from 18 to 37 million. ha.

Administrative and economic reform. In 1957 N.S. Khrushchev tried to decentralize the management of industry, to create a new organizational and economic structure, built on the management of industry not on a sectoral basis (through ministries), but on a territorial principle.

In order to limit the possibility of interference of local party apparatuses in economic activities, they were created economic councils, which were directly subordinate to the Union Ministry. 141 all-Union and republican ministries were abolished and 105 economic councils were created in their place.

The reorganization of the management system yielded certain results: production specialization and intersectoral cooperation increased, and a process of technical reconstruction of the economy took place. The rights and economic powers of the union republics expanded. However, the reform as a whole not only did not introduce qualitative changes in economic conditions, but also gave rise to a certain disunity in the sectoral mechanism of the Soviet economy.

Social politics. The economic policy of the post-Stalin leadership, despite the contradictions, had a pronounced social orientation. In the mid-50s. A program of measures was developed aimed at raising the living standards of the population.

Salaries of workers in industry were regularly increased. The real incomes of workers and employees increased by 60%, collective farmers - by 90% (since 1956, collective farmers were transferred to monthly advance payment). The law on old-age pensions for workers and employees doubled their size and lowered the retirement age. The working week was reduced from 48 to 46 hours, and compulsory government loans were abolished. Trade unions received greater rights in production.

One of the important achievements of social policy was housing construction. From 1955 to 1964 The city's housing stock increased by 80%, 54 million people received new apartments. The material base of education, health care, and culture was strengthened.

1958-1964 At the end of the 50s. a transition was made from five-year to seven-year planning (1959-1965). From that time on, the process of replacing economic incentives in economic development with administrative coercion began. IN agriculture this tendency was most clearly evident.

Collective farm policy. Among the imbalances in the seven-year plan, the most severe was the agricultural crisis. Farms experienced a constant lack of electricity, chemical fertilizers, and seeds of valuable crops.

In order to industrialize agriculture, collective farms were consolidated (as a result, their number decreased from 91 thousand to 39 thousand). In the course of extensive communist construction, with the goal of transforming all property into public property, a massive transformation of collective farms into state farms took place. Characteristic feature There was also a consolidation of collective farms at the expense of the so-called unpromising villages. In 1959, a forced purchase of all equipment from liquidated machine and tractor stations (MTS) by collective farms was carried out, which undermined the financial position of rural producers, given that they also did not have a sufficient number of technical personnel.

The corn epic did not produce positive results in 1962-1963. The crisis in the development of virgin lands worsened.

In order to quickly achieve the tasks of communist construction, the authorities took attack on private farms. Collective farmers' land plots were again cut (from 1.5 acres per collective farm yard in 1955-1956 to one hundred square meters in 1959-1960; in 1950-1952 there were 32 acres), livestock was forcibly bought out. Against this background, a campaign of public condemnation of traders and money-grubbers and a struggle against the invaders of collective farm lands unfolded. As a result, there was a decline in private farming. Collective farm workers turned into hired workers.

As a result of the difficulties that arose, the seven-year plan for agricultural development was not fulfilled: instead of the planned 70%, the increase in agriculture was only 15%. The food problem in the country has worsened. The resulting food shortage caused prices to rise, in particular for meat by 25-30%. Economic difficulties coincided with a bad harvest in 1963, which had catastrophic consequences. As a result, the agricultural crisis led to the first massive purchases of grain abroad (12 million tons).

Industry. In general, during the period under review, the average annual growth rate of industrial production in the USSR exceeded 10%, which was ensured solely thanks to the harsh methods of the command economy. Scientific and technological progress was considered one of the levers for industrial development.

Further development of the administrative system. A process has emerged development of vertical centralization economic councils (SNH). In June 1960, republican Council of National Economy was created, in March 1963 - Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh). The system of national economic planning has consistently become more complex.

The system of management bodies in the agricultural sector has changed. Since March 1962 were created collective farm and state farm administrations (KSU)).

The administrative reform also affected structures of party organizations. In order to strengthen the role of the party in the development of agriculture in rural areas, district committees were abolished (their functions were transferred to party organizations of the Communist Party of Ukraine and party organizers in production); regional committees were divided according to production principle - into industrial and agricultural. In general, the reform to restructure management retained the essence of the administrative and economic mechanism; the territorial management system led to sectoral imbalance and the growth of parochial tendencies of economic councils.

Reorganization of the administrative system has become a regular occurrence. The continuous shake-ups of the apparatus and personal movements seriously worried party and government officials who were striving for stability in their personal position. N.S. Khrushchev declared his readiness to scatter everyone like kittens. It seemed to the apparatchiks that de-Stalinization did not bring the desired confidence in the future. In bureaucratic circles, dissatisfaction with N.S. Khrushchev and a desire to subordinate him to the apparatus grew. A major step on this path was the campaign against the creative intelligentsia, as a result of which Khrushchev the reformer lost his strong support among them.

Representatives of all levels of the party apparatus also expressed dissatisfaction with Khrushchev (after its division into two independent systems and the formation of a kind of dual power). Therefore, a conspiracy against N.S. Khrushchev became inevitable.

Social politics. At first, in the social sphere they continued positive developments. The financial situation of the population improved, and public consumption funds grew. By 1960, the transfer of workers and employees to a 7-hour working day was completed. The introduction of pensions for collective farmers was being prepared. The housing stock has grown (by 40% between 1959 and 1965).

In the context of a reduction in the pace of development and increasing crisis economic phenomena social policy was not consistent. The government froze for twenty years payments on domestic loans issued before 1957 (in order to reduce the budget deficit). By the end of the 50s, the food problem worsened, the population was hit hard by a reduction in production tariffs and a simultaneous rise in prices (an average of 28% ).

This caused spontaneous protests by workers. In 1959, with the help of troops, a protest of one and a half thousand workers - construction workers of the Kazakhstan Magnitogorsk (Temirtau) was suppressed. In 1962, a 7,000-strong labor demonstration took place in Novocherkassk, which was also dispersed by troops using tanks (24 people died, 105 riot participants were convicted). Work demonstrations took place in many industrial areas - Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, Kemerovo, Ivanovo.

RESULTS. During the Khrushchev Thaw, serious efforts were made attempt at modernization. N.S. Khrushchev set the impetus for development political processes, taking the path of liberalization.

However use of the old political and economic mechanism during the reforms predetermined their failure. Course N.S. Khrushchev was characterized by the absolutization of organizational factors, the solution of economic problems by administrative and political methods. The situation was aggravated by the absence of any scientific and managerial foundations for administrative reforms, the randomness and subjectivity of the transformations carried out in the administrative and economic system.

N.S. Khrushchev and the leadership of the party, remaining in the positions of communist ideology and preserving many traditions of the Stalinist leadership, were not only unprepared, but also did not strive for radical changes.

After the failures of N.S. Khrushchev’s controversial transformative activities, fatigue syndrome arose in society, the desire for sustainable forms of social and personal life . During this period, the party-state bureaucracy, thirsting for stability, came to first place in the hierarchy of power, or nomenclature, which played a decisive role in the removal of N.S. Khrushchev in October 1964.