Theory as a logical form: complexity and systematicity. Structural elements of the theory and their relationship

A theory is an internally consistent system of knowledge about a part of reality; it is the highest form of scientific knowledge. According to K. Popper, “theories are networks designed to capture what we call the “world” in order to understand, explain and master it. We strive to make the cells of these networks ever smaller.

Each theory includes the following components:

Initial empirical basis;

Many assumptions (postulates, hypotheses);

Logic - rules of logical inference;

Theoretical statements, which are basic theoretical knowledge.

There are qualitative theories that are constructed without a mathematical apparatus (psychoanalysis by S. Freud, theory of self-actualization by A. Maslow) and formalized theories in which the main conclusions are based on mathematical analysis of data (field theory by K. Lewin, theory of cognitive development by J. Piaget).
A theory is created not only to describe, but also to explain and predict reality. It is considered scientific if there is a possibility of rejecting it (recognizing it as false) in the process of empirical testing. Such verification is carried out not on the entire volume of objects under study - the general population, but on a part or subset of this population, which has all its properties. This part of the population is called a sample.

The basic rules for sampling are:

2) the criterion of equivalence (criterion of internal validity), according to which the subjects must be equalized according to other (as opposed to the independent variable) characteristics;

3) the criterion of representativeness (criterion of external validity), which determines the compliance of the subjects with that part of the population to which the results of the study will then be transferred.

The theory, according to S.L. Rubinstein, “this is a circle of phenomena that develop and function according to their internal laws. Each discipline that rises to the level of science must reveal the specific laws of determination of the phenomena being studied.” The main task of any science, including psychological science, is to reveal the basic specific patterns of the phenomena being studied.
The theoretical foundation of psychological theory is the principle of determinism, i.e. the principle of causality of mental phenomena, aimed at explaining and revealing these causes. The functions of psychological theory are:

1) an explanation of the occurrence of certain phenomena (for example, anxiety), or a retro-story;

2) prediction of their occurrence;

3) detection and proof of connections between several determinants and a mental phenomenon.

The features of psychological theory are: explanation of the causality of mental phenomena, justification of the variety of factors influencing a mental phenomenon, differentiation of everyday and scientific concepts.

Implicit and Explicit Concepts

In a certain sense of the word, all people are researchers, and like true researchers, they strive to construct their own system of ideas about a part of reality, to create their own theory. This concept is called ordinary or implicit. In comparison, a scientific theory is called explicit. What distinguishes a scientific theory from an implicit one is that it can be explicated, verified, and made explicit. Implicit theories are considered not explicit, not articulated, and not tested in experiment.

The concept of “implicit personality theory” was proposed by J. Bruner and R. Tagiuri in 1954 and is still used to designate an unconscious hierarchical system of ideas about the mental organization of other people. Its content consists of ideas about personality qualities. In the study of implicit theories of personality, there are two main approaches - traditional and alternative (psychosemantic). The traditional direction is represented by the works of J. Bruner and R. Tagiuri, as well as the psychology of “common sense” by L. Ross, the theory of causal attribution by G. Kelly, D. Scheider, etc. An alternative approach, thus named by its founder J. Kelly, arose in in line with the theory of personal constructs and was developed in the psychosemantic direction (P. Vernon, V.F. Petrenko, A.G. Shmelev, etc.). Representatives of the latter approach, in addition to identifying the substantive components of the implicit theory of personality, carry out factor analysis, which allows you to evaluate and combine the qualities and connections between individual components into a personal semantic space.

A theory is considered explicit if it is articulated, understood and tested empirically, or, more strictly, experimentally. The criteria for an explicit theory are breadth of scope, parsimony, and relevance to empirical research. Let's consider the most famous explicit theories of personality.

Any theory is an integral developing system of true knowledge (including elements of error), which has a complex structure and performs a number of functions. In modern scientific methodology, the following are distinguished: main components, elements theories: 1. Initial foundations - fundamental concepts, principles, laws, equations, axioms, etc. 2. Idealized objects - abstract models of essential properties and connections of the objects being studied (for example, “absolutely black body”, “ideal gas” and etc.). 3. Logic of theory - totality certain rules and methods of proof - aimed at clarifying the structure and changing knowledge. 4. Philosophical attitudes and value factors. 5. A set of laws and statements derived as consequences from the principles of a given theory in accordance with specific principles.

For example, in physical theories two main parts can be distinguished: formal calculus (mathematical equations, logical symbols, rules, etc.) and meaningful interpretation (categories, laws, principles). The unity of the substantive and formal aspects of the theory is one of the sources of its improvement and development.

Methodologically important role plays in the formation of theory abstract, idealized object(“ideal type”), the construction of which is a necessary stage in the creation of any theory, carried out in forms specific to different fields of knowledge. This object acts not only as a mental model of a certain fragment of reality, but also contains a specific research program that is implemented in the construction of a theory.

B.C. Stepin considers it necessary to highlight in the structure of the theory as its basis a special organization of abstract objects - a fundamental theoretical scheme associated with the corresponding mathematical formalism. In the content of the developed theory, in addition to its fundamental scheme, the author identifies another layer of organization of abstract objects - the level of particular theoretical schemes. The fundamental theoretical scheme, together with its derivatives, is presented as the “internal skeleton of theoretical knowledge.” The problem of the genesis of theoretical schemes is called the fundamental problem of the methodology of science. It is noted that in the theory there is no linear chain of abstract objects, but there is a complex multi-level hierarchical system of them.

Speaking about the goals and paths of theoretical research in general, A. Einstein noted that “theory pursues two goals: 1. To cover, if possible, all phenomena in their interrelation (completeness). 2. To achieve this by taking as a basis as few logically mutually related logical concepts and arbitrarily established relationships between them (basic laws and axioms). I will call this goal “logical uniqueness.”

The variety of forms of idealization and, accordingly, types of idealized objects corresponds to I am the variety of types (types) of theories, which can be classified on different grounds (criteria). Depending on this, theories can be distinguished: descriptive, mathematical, deductive and inductive, fundamental and applied, formal and substantive, “open” and “closed”, explanatory and descriptive (phenomenological), physical, chemical, sociological, psychological, etc. d.

So, mathematical theories characterized by a high degree of abstraction. Deduction is of decisive importance in all constructions of mathematics. The dominant role in the construction of mathematical theories is played by axiomatic and hypothetico-deductive methods, as well as formalization. Many mathematical theories arise through the combination, the synthesis, of several basic or generative abstract structures.

Theories of experimental (empirical) sciences- physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, history, etc. - according to the depth of penetration into the essence of the phenomena being studied, they can be divided into two large classes: phenomenological and non-phenomenological.

Phenomenological (them. also called empirical) describe the experimentally observed properties and quantities of objects and processes, but do not delve deeply into their internal mechanisms (for example, geometric optics, thermodynamics, many pedagogical, psychological and sociological theories, etc.). Such theories do not analyze the nature of the phenomena under study and therefore do not use any complex abstract objects, although, of course, to a certain extent they schematize and construct some idealizations of the studied area of phenomena.

Phenomenological theories solve, first of all, the problem of ordering and primary generalization of the facts related to them. They are formulated in ordinary natural languages using special terminology of the relevant field of knowledge and are predominantly qualitative in nature. Researchers encounter phenomenological theories, as a rule, at the first stages of the development of any science, when the accumulation, systematization and generalization of factual empirical material occurs. Such theories are a completely natural phenomenon in the process of scientific knowledge.

With the development of scientific knowledge, theories of the phenomenological type give way to non-phenomenological ones.(they are also called explanatory). They not only reflect the essential connections between phenomena and their properties, but also reveal the deep internal mechanism of the phenomena and processes being studied, their necessary interrelations, essential relationships, i.e. their laws.

But these are no longer empirical, but theoretical laws, which are formulated not directly on the basis of the study of experimental data, but through certain mental actions with abstract, idealized objects. “At the basis of an established theory one can always find a mutually consistent network of abstract objects that determines the specificity of this theory.”

One of the important criteria by which theories can be classified is the accuracy of predictions. Based on this criterion, two large classes of theories can be distinguished. The first of these includes theories in which the prediction is reliable (for example, many theories of classical mechanics, classical physics and chemistry). In theories of the second class, prediction has a probabilistic character, which is determined by the cumulative action large number random factors. This kind of stochastic (from the Greek - guess) theories are found not only in modern physics, but also in large numbers in biology and the social and human sciences due to the specificity and complexity of the very objects of their research.

A. Einstein distinguished two main types of theories in physics - constructive and fundamental. Most physical theories, in his opinion, are constructive, that is, their task is to construct a picture of complex phenomena based on some relatively simple assumptions (such as, for example, the kinetic theory of gases). The starting point and basis of fundamental theories are not hypothetical propositions, but empirically found ones. general properties phenomena, principles from which mathematically formulated criteria that have universal applicability follow (this is the theory of relativity). Fundamental theories use not synthetic, but analytical method. Einstein considered the advantages of constructive theories to be their completeness, flexibility and clarity. He considered the advantages of fundamental theories to be their logical perfection and the reliability of their starting points 1 .

Despite the fact that no matter what type of theory it is, no matter what methods it is constructed, “the most essential requirement for any scientific theory always remains unchanged - the theory must correspond to the facts... Ultimately, only experience will make a decisive verdict” 2, - sums up the great thinker.

In this conclusion, it is not at all accidental that Einstein uses the expression “ultimately.” The fact is that, as he himself explained, in the process of the development of science, our theories become more and more abstract, their connection with experience (facts, observations, experiments) becomes more and more complex and indirect, and the path from theory to observations becomes longer , thinner and more complex. In order to realize our constant ultimate goal - “a better and better understanding of reality”, we must clearly understand the following objective circumstance. Namely, that “new links are added to the logical chain connecting theory and observation. In order to clear the path leading from theory to experiment from unnecessary and artificial assumptions, in order to cover an increasingly vast area of facts, we must make the chain ever longer and longer. longer." At the same time, Einstein adds, the simpler and more fundamental our assumptions become, the more complex the mathematical tool of our reasoning.

V. Heisenberg believed that a scientific theory should be consistent (in the formal mathematical sense), have simplicity, beauty, compactness, a specific (always limited) scope of its application, integrity and “final completeness.” But the strongest argument in favor of the correctness of the theory is its “multiple experimental confirmation.” “The decision about the correctness of a theory thus turns out to be a long historical process, behind which lies not the proof of a chain of mathematical conclusions, but the convincingness of a historical fact. A complete theory, one way or another, is never an exact reflection of nature in the corresponding area; it is a kind of idealization of experience, carried out with the help of the conceptual foundations of the theory and ensuring a certain success.”

They have a specific and complex structure theories of social and human sciences. Thus, based on the ideas of the American sociologist R. Merton, in modern sociology it is customary to distinguish the following levels of sociological knowledge and, accordingly, types of theories:

General sociological theory(“theoretical sociology”), which provides an abstract and generalized analysis of social reality in its integrity, essence and history of development; at this level of cognition the structure and general patterns of functioning and development of social reality are fixed. At the same time, the theoretical and methodological basis of the general sociological theory is social philosophy.

Level of substantive consideration - private (“mid-rank”) sociological theories, having general sociology as their theoretical and methodological basis and providing a description and analysis of the socially special. Depending on the uniqueness of their objects of study, private theories are represented by two relatively independent classes of private theories - special and sectoral theories:

A) Special theories explore the essence, structure, general patterns functioning and development of objects (processes, communities, institutions) actually social sphere social life, understanding the latter as relatively independent region social activities responsible for the direct reproduction of man and personality. These are the sociologies of gender, age, ethnicity, family, city, education, etc. Each of them, exploring a special class of social phenomena, acts primarily as a general theory of this class of phenomena. In essence, noted P. A. Sorokin, these theories do the same thing as general sociology, “but in relation to a special class of sociocultural phenomena.”

b) Industry theories explore the social (in the above sense of the term) aspects of classes of phenomena belonging to other spheres of social life - economic, political, cultural. These are the sociologies of labor, politics, culture, organization, management, etc. Unlike special theories, sectoral theories are not general theories of these classes of phenomena, because they study only one aspect of their manifestation - social.

However, some sociologists believe that “the building of sociological science consists of five floors.” Others believe that Merton's scheme (general theory - middle-range theory - empirical research), having played a certain role in the development of sociology, has "exhausted its possibilities." Therefore, this scheme should not be improved, but “we must abandon it.”

Thus, a theory (regardless of its type) has the following main features: 1. Theory is not individual reliable scientific propositions, but their totality, an integral organic developing system. The unification of knowledge into a theory is carried out primarily by the subject of research itself, by its laws.

Not every set of provisions about the subject being studied is a theory. To turn into a theory, knowledge must reach a certain degree of maturity in its development. Namely, when it not only describes a certain set of facts, but also explains them, that is, when knowledge reveals the causes and patterns of phenomena.

For a theory, justification and proof of the provisions included in it are mandatory: if there is no justification, there is no theory.

Theoretical knowledge should strive to explain the widest possible range of phenomena and to continuously deepen knowledge about them.

The nature of a theory is determined by the degree of validity of its defining principle, reflecting the fundamental regularity of a given subject.

The structure of scientific theories is meaningfully “determined by the systemic organization of idealized (abstract) objects (theoretical constructs). Statements of theoretical language are directly formulated in relation to theoretical constructs and only indirectly, thanks to their relationship to extra-linguistic reality, describe this reality.”

Theory is not only ready-made, established knowledge, but also the process of obtaining it; therefore, it is not a “bare result”, but must be considered together with its emergence and development.

In modern philosophy of science (both Western and domestic), theory is no longer considered as an unchanging, “closed” static system with a rigid structure, but various models of the dynamics (growth, change, development) of knowledge are built (see Chapter IV, §1 ). In this regard, it is emphasized that with all the fruitfulness of formalization and axiomatization of theoretical knowledge, one cannot fail to take into account that the real process of constructive development of theory, oriented by the tasks of covering new empirical material, does not fit into the framework of the formal-deductive idea of the development of theories.

However, the development of a theory is not only “the movement of thought within itself” (“ideas”), but the active processing by thought of diverse empirical material into its own internal content of theories, the concretization and enrichment of its conceptual apparatus. The image of the actual deployment (development) of theory given by Hegel - the “snowball” - has not lost its relevance to this day. That is why the most important method of constructing, developing and presenting theories is the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete.

To the number basic functions - theory The following can be included:

Synthetic function is the combination of individual reliable knowledge into a single, holistic system.

The explanatory function is the identification of causal and other dependencies, the variety of connections of a given phenomenon, its essential characteristics, the laws of its origin and development, etc.

Methodological function- on the basis of theory, various methods, methods and techniques of research activity are formulated.

Predictive - the function of foresight. Based on theoretical ideas about the “present” state of known phenomena, conclusions are drawn about the existence of previously unknown facts, objects or their properties, connections between phenomena, etc. Prediction about the future state of phenomena (as opposed to those that exist but have not yet been identified ) is called scientific foresight.

Practical function. The ultimate purpose of any theory is to be translated into practice, to be a “guide to action” for changing reality. Therefore, it is quite fair to say that there is nothing more practical than a good theory. But how do you choose a good one from many competing theories? According to K. Popper, an important role in choosing theories is played by the degree of their testability: the higher it is, the greater the chances of choosing a good and reliable theory. The so-called “relative acceptability criterion,” according to Popper, gives preference to the theory that: a) communicates the greatest amount of information, that is, has a deeper content; b) is logically more strict; h) has greater explanatory and predictive power; D) can be more accurately verified by comparing predicted facts with observations. In other words, Popper summarizes, we choose the theory that the best way withstands competition with other theories and in the course of natural selection turns out to be the most suitable for survival. In the course of the development of the science of communication with new fundamental discoveries (especially during periods of scientific revolutions), fundamental changes in the understanding of the mechanism of the emergence of scientific theories occur. As A. Einstein noted, the most important methodological lesson that quantum physics taught is the rejection of a simplified understanding of the emergence theory as a simple inductive generalization of experience. A theory, he emphasized, can be inspired by experience, but is created as if from above in relation to it, and only then verified by experience. What Einstein said does not mean that he rejected the role of experience as a source of knowledge. In this regard he wrote that "purely logical thinking in itself cannot provide any knowledge about the world of facts; all knowledge of the real world comes from experience and is completed by it. Positions obtained by purely logical means do not say anything about reality" 1. However, Einstein believed that " “It is not always harmful” in science to use concepts in which they are considered independently of the empirical basis to which they owe their existence. The human mind must, in his opinion, “freely construct forms” before their actual existence is confirmed: “knowledge cannot blossom from bare empiricism.” Einstein compared the evolution of experimental science “as a continuous process of induction” with the compilation of a catalog and considered such development of science a purely empirical matter, since such an approach, from his point of view, does not cover the entire actual process of cognition as a whole. Namely, “it is silent about the important role of intuition and deductive thinking in the development of exact science. As soon as any science leaves the initial stage of its development, the progress of theory is no longer achieved simply through the process of ordering. The researcher, starting from experimental facts, tries to develop a system of concepts that, generally speaking, would be logically based on a small number of basic assumptions, the so-called axioms. We call such a system of concepts theory... For the same set of experimental facts, there may be several theories that differ significantly from each other.”

In other words, theories of modern science are created not simply through inductive generalization of experience (although such a path is not excluded), but through the initial movement in the field of previously created idealized objects, which are used as a means of constructing hypothetical models of a new area of interactions. The substantiation of such models by experience turns them into the core of a future theory. “It is theoretical research, based on relatively independent operation of idealized objects, that is capable of discovering new subject areas before they begin to be mastered by practice. Theorization acts as a kind of indicator of the development of science.”

The idealized object thus acts not only as a theoretical model of reality, but it implicitly contains a certain research program, which is implemented in the construction of a theory. The relationships between the elements of an idealized object, both initial and inferred, are theoretical laws, which (unlike empirical laws) are formulated not directly on the basis of the study of experimental data, but through certain mental actions with the idealized object.

It follows from this, in particular, that the laws formulated within the framework of theory and essentially relating not to empirically given reality, but to reality as it is represented by an idealized object, must be appropriately specified when applied to the study of real reality. With this circumstance in mind, A. Einstein introduced the term “physical reality” and identified two aspects of this term. Its first meaning was used by him to characterize the objective world that exists outside and independently of consciousness. “The belief in the existence of an external world,” Einstein noted, “independent of the perceiving subject, lies at the basis of all natural science.”

In its second meaning, the term “physical reality” is used to consider the theorized world as a set of idealized objects that represent the properties of the real world within a given physical theory. “The reality studied by science is nothing more than a construction of our mind, and not just a given” 2. In this regard, physical reality is defined through the language of science, and the same reality can be described using different languages.

When characterizing science, scientific knowledge as a whole, it is necessary to highlight its main task, its main function - the discovery of the laws of the area of reality being studied. Without establishing the laws of reality, without expressing them in a system of concepts, there is no science, there can be no scientific theory. To paraphrase the words of a famous poet, we can say: we say science - we mean law, we say law - we mean science.

The very concept of scientificity (which was already discussed above) presupposes the discovery of laws, delving into the essence of the phenomena being studied, and determining the diverse conditions for the practical applicability of laws.

The study of the laws of reality finds its expression in the creation of a scientific theory that adequately reflects the subject area under study in the integrity of its laws and patterns. Therefore the law is key element of the theory, which is nothing more than a system of laws expressing the essence, deep connections of the object under study (and not just empirical dependencies) in all its integrity and concreteness, as a unity of the diverse.

In its most general form, a law can be defined as a connection (relationship) between phenomena and processes, which is:

a) objective, since it is inherent primarily in the real world, the sensory-objective activity of people, expresses the real relationships of things;

b) essential, concrete-universal. Being a reflection of what is essential in the movement of the universe, any law is inherent in all processes of a given class, of a certain type (type) without exception, and operates always and wherever the corresponding processes and conditions unfold;

c) necessary, because, being closely connected with the essence, the law acts and is implemented with “iron necessity” in appropriate conditions;

d) internal, since it reflects the deepest connections and dependencies of a given subject area in the unity of all its moments and relationships within the framework of some integral system;

e) repeating, stable, since “the law is solid (remaining) in the phenomenon”, “identical in the phenomenon”, their “calm reflection” (Hegel). It is an expression of a certain constancy of a certain process, the regularity of its occurrence, the uniformity of its action in similar conditions.

The stability and invariance of laws is always correlated with the specific conditions of their action, the change of which removes this invariance and gives rise to a new one, which means a change in the laws, their deepening, expansion or narrowing of the scope of their action, their modifications, etc. Any law is not something immutable , but is a concrete historical phenomenon. With changes in relevant conditions, with the development of practice and knowledge, some laws disappear from the scene, others reappear, the forms of action of laws, methods of their use, etc. change.

The most important, key task of scientific research is to “raise experience to the universal”, to find the laws of a given subject area, a certain sphere (fragment) of real reality, to express them in relevant concepts, abstractions, theories, ideas, principles, etc. The solution to this problem can to be successful if the scientist proceeds from two main premises: the reality of the world in its integrity and development and the conformity of this world with laws, i.e., the fact that it is “permeated” by a set of objective laws. The latter regulate the entire world process, provide it with a certain order, necessity, and the principle of self-propulsion and are completely knowable. The outstanding mathematician A. Poincaré rightly argued that laws, as the “best expression” of the internal harmony of the world, are the basic principles, regulations, reflecting the relationships between things. “However, are these regulations arbitrary? No; otherwise they would be sterile. Experience gives us free choice, but at the same time it guides us.”

It must be borne in mind that the thinking of people and the objective world are subject to the same laws and that therefore they must be consistent in their results with each other. The necessary correspondence between the laws of objective reality and the laws of thinking is achieved when they are properly cognized.

Understanding laws is a complex, difficult and deeply contradictory process of reflecting reality. But the cognizing subject cannot reflect the entire real world, especially at once, completely and entirely. He can only forever approach this, creating various concepts and other abstractions, formulating certain laws, applying a whole range of techniques and methods in their entirety (experiment, observation, idealization, modeling, etc.). Describing the features of the laws of science, the famous American physicist R. Feynman wrote that, in particular, “the laws of physics often do not have an obvious direct relationship to our experience, but represent its more or less abstract expression... Very often, between elementary laws and fundamental aspects of real phenomena, a distance of enormous size.”

V. Heisenberg, believing that the discovery of laws is the most important task of science, noted that, firstly, when the great comprehensive laws of nature are formulated - and this became possible for the first time in Newtonian mechanics - “we are talking about the idealization of reality, and not about it itself " Idealization arises because we explore reality with the help of concepts. Secondly, each law has a limited scope of application, outside of which it is unable to reflect phenomena, because its conceptual apparatus does not cover new phenomena (for example, all natural phenomena cannot be described in the concepts of Newtonian mechanics). Third, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are "very general idealizations of a very wide sphere of experience and their laws will be valid in any place and at any time - but only relative to that sphere of experience in which the concepts of these theories are applicable."

Laws are first discovered in the form of assumptions and hypotheses. Further experimental material, new facts lead to the “purification of these hypotheses”, eliminating some of them, correcting others, until, finally, the law is established in its pure form. One of the most important requirements that a scientific hypothesis must satisfy is, as noted earlier, its fundamental verifiability in practice (in experience, experiment, etc.), which distinguishes a hypothesis from all kinds of speculative constructions, groundless inventions, unfounded fantasies, etc.

Since laws belong to the sphere of essence, the deepest knowledge about them is achieved not at the level of direct perception, but at the stage of theoretical research. It is here that the reduction of the random, visible only in phenomena, to actual internal movement ultimately occurs. The result of this process is the discovery of a law, or more precisely, a set of laws inherent in a given area, which in their interconnection form the “core” of a certain scientific theory.

Revealing the mechanism for discovering new laws, R. Feynman noted that “... the search for a new law is carried out as follows. First of all, they guess about him. Then they calculate the consequences of this guess and find out what this law would entail if it turns out to be true. Then the results of calculations are compared with what is observed in nature, with the results of special experiments or with our experience, and based on the results of such observations it is determined whether this is true or not. If the calculations disagree with the experimental data, then the law is incorrect.”

At the same time, Feynman draws attention to the fact that at all stages of the movement of knowledge, an important role is played by the philosophical guidelines that guide the researcher. Already at the beginning of the path to the law, it is philosophy that helps to make guesses; here it is difficult to make a final choice.

The discovery and formulation of a law is the most important, but not the last task of science, which must still show how the law it discovers makes its way. To do this, it is necessary, with the help of the law, relying on it, to explain all the phenomena of a given subject area (even those that seem to contradict it), to derive them all from the corresponding law through a number of intermediary links.

It should be borne in mind that each specific law almost never appears in its “pure form”, but always in conjunction with other laws of different levels and orders. In addition, we must not forget that although objective laws act with “iron necessity”, they themselves are by no means “iron”, but very “soft”, elastic in the sense that, depending on specific conditions, the one who wins the advantage is the one who that's a different law. The elasticity of laws (especially social ones) is also manifested in the fact that they often act as laws of tendencies, implemented in a very confusing and approximate manner, like some never firmly established average of constant fluctuations.

The conditions under which each given law is implemented can stimulate and deepen, or vice versa - “suppress” and remove its effect. Thus, any law in its implementation is always modified by specific historical circumstances, which either allow the law to gain full force, or slow down, weaken its action, expressing the law in the form of a breaking through trend. In addition, the effect of a particular law is inevitably modified by the concomitant effect of other laws.

Each law is “narrow, incomplete, approximate” (Hegel), since it has boundaries of its action, a certain sphere of its implementation (for example, the framework of a given form of movement of matter, a specific stage of development, etc.). As if echoing Hegel, R. Feynman noted that even the law of universal gravitation is not exact - “the same applies to our other laws - they are inaccurate. Somewhere on the edge there is always a mystery, there is always something to puzzle over.”

On the basis of laws, not only the explanation of phenomena of a given class (group) is carried out, but also prediction, foresight of new phenomena, events, processes, etc., possible paths, forms and trends in the cognitive and practical activities of people.

Open laws, known patterns can - if they are skillfully and correctly applied - be used by people so that they can change nature and their own social relations. Since the laws of the external world are the basis for purposeful human activity, people must consciously be guided by the requirements arising from objective laws, as regulators of their activities. Otherwise, the latter will not become effective and efficient, but will be carried out in best case scenario by trial and error. Based on the known laws, people can truly scientifically control both natural and social processes and regulate them optimally.

Relying in his activities on the “kingdom of laws,” a person can at the same time, to a certain extent, influence the mechanism for implementing a particular law. It can promote its action in a purer form, create conditions for the development of the law to its qualitative completeness, or, on the contrary, restrain this action, localize it or even transform it.

Let us emphasize two important methods that cannot be missed when “working” with scientific laws. Firstly, the formulations of the latter directly relate to the system of theoretical constructs (abstract objects), i.e., they are associated with the introduction of idealized objects that simplify and schematize empirically necessary situations.

Secondly, in every science (if it is such) “ideal theoretical models (schemes) are an essential characteristic of the structure of any scientific theory”, key element which is the law.

The variety of types of relationships and interactions in reality serves as the objective basis of existence many forms (types) of laws, which are classified according to one or another criterion (basis). According to the forms of movement of matter, laws can be distinguished: mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, social (public); in the main spheres of reality - the laws of nature, the laws of society, the laws of thinking; according to the degree of their generality, more precisely - according to the breadth of the scope of their action - universal (dialectical), general (special), particular (specific); according to the mechanism of determination - dynamic and statistical, causal and non-causal; according to their significance and role - basic and non-basic; in terms of fundamentality - empirical (formulated directly on the basis of experimental data) and theoretical (formed through certain mental actions with idealized objects), etc.

One-sided (and therefore erroneous) interpretations of the law can be expressed as follows.

The concept of law is absolutized, simplified, fetishized. What is overlooked here is the fact (noted by Hegel) that this concept- which is certainly important in itself - is only one of the stages of human knowledge of the unity of interdependence and integrity of the world process. The law is only one of the forms of reflection of real reality in knowledge, one of the facets, moments of the scientific picture of the world in connection with others (reason, contradiction, etc.).

The objective nature of laws and their material source are ignored. It is not real reality that must be consistent with principles and laws, but on the contrary - the latter are true only insofar as they correspond to the objective world.

The possibility of people using a system of objective laws as the basis of their activity in its diverse forms is denied - primarily in the sensory-objective one. However, ignoring the requirements of objective laws still makes itself felt sooner or later, “revenges itself” (for example, pre-crisis and crisis phenomena in society).

Theory as the highest form of organization of scientific knowledge is understood as a holistic idea, structured in diagrams, about the universal and necessary laws of a certain area of reality - the object of the theory, existing in the form of a system of logically interconnected and deducible propositions.

The basis of the existing theory is a mutually agreed upon network of abstract objects that determines the specifics of this theory, called the fundamental theoretical scheme and the particular schemes associated with it. Based on them and the corresponding mathematical apparatus, the researcher can obtain new characteristics of reality, without always turning directly to empirical research.

The following main elements of the theory structure are identified:

1) Initial foundations - fundamental concepts, principles, laws, equations, axioms, etc.

2) An idealized object is an abstract model of the essential properties and connections of the objects being studied (for example, “absolutely black body”, “ideal gas”, etc.).

3) The logic of the theory is a set of certain rules and methods of proof aimed at clarifying the structure and changing knowledge.

4) Philosophical attitudes, sociocultural and value factors.

5) A set of laws and statements derived as consequences from the fundamentals of the theory in accordance with specific principles.

A. Einstein noted that “the theory has two goals:

1. To cover, if possible, all phenomena in their interrelation (completeness).

2. To achieve this by taking as a basis as few logically mutually related logical concepts and arbitrarily established relationships between them (basic laws and axioms). I will call this goal "logical uniqueness"

Types of theories

mathematical and empirical,

deductive and inductive,

fundamental and applied,

formal and substantive,

"open" and "closed"

explaining and describing (phenomenological),

physical, chemical, sociological, psychological, etc.

1. Modern (post-non-classical) science is characterized by the increasing mathematization of its theories (especially natural science) and the increasing level of their abstraction and complexity. The importance of computational mathematics (which has become an independent branch of mathematics) has sharply increased, since the answer to a given problem often needs to be given in numerical form, and math modeling.

Most mathematical theories rely on set theory as their foundation. But in recent years, people are increasingly turning to the relatively recently emerged algebraic theory of categories, considering it as a new foundation for all mathematics.

The theories of experimental (empirical) sciences - physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, history - according to the depth of penetration into the essence of the phenomena being studied can be divided into two large classes: phenomenological and non-phenomenological.

Phenomenological (they are also called descriptive, empirical) describe the experimentally observed properties and quantities of objects and processes, but do not delve deeply into their internal mechanisms (for example, geometric optics, thermodynamics, many pedagogical, psychological and sociological theories, etc.). Such theories solve, first of all, the problem of ordering and primary generalization of the facts related to them. They are formulated in ordinary natural languages using special terminology of the relevant field of knowledge and are predominantly qualitative in nature.

With the development of scientific knowledge, theories of the phenomenological type give way to non-phenomenological ones (they are also called explanatory). Along with observable empirical facts, concepts and quantities, very complex and unobservable, including very abstract concepts, are introduced here.

One of the important criteria by which theories can be classified is the accuracy of predictions. Based on this criterion, two large classes of theories can be distinguished. The first of these includes theories in which the prediction is reliable (for example, many theories of classical mechanics, classical physics and chemistry). In theories of the second class, prediction is probabilistic in nature, which is determined by the combined action of a large number of random factors. This kind of stochastic (from the Greek - guess) theories are found in modern physics, biology and social sciences and humanities due to the specificity and complexity of the very object of their research.

A. Einstein distinguished two main types of theories in physics - constructive and fundamental:

Most physical theories are constructive, i.e. their task is to construct a picture of complex phenomena on the basis of some relatively simple assumptions (such as, for example, the kinetic theory of gases).

The basis of fundamental theories is not hypothetical provisions, but empirically found general properties of phenomena, principles from which mathematically formulated criteria that have universal applicability follow (this is the theory of relativity).

V. Heisenberg believed that a scientific theory should be consistent (in the formal logical sense), have simplicity, beauty, compactness, a defined (always limited) scope of its application, integrity and “final completeness.” But the strongest argument in favor of the correctness of the theory is its “multiple experimental confirmation.”

The theories of social sciences and humanities have a specific structure. Thus, in modern sociology, since the work of the great American sociologist Robert Merton (i.e., since the beginning of the 20th century), it has been customary to distinguish three levels of substantive study of social phenomena and, accordingly, three types of theories.

general sociological theory ("general sociology"),

· private ("middle rank") sociological theories - special theories (sociology of gender, age, ethnicity, family, city, education, etc.)

· sectoral theories (sociology of labor, politics, culture, organization, management, etc.)

Ontologically, all sociological theories are divided into three main types:

1) theories of social dynamics (or theories of social evolution, development);

2) theories of social action;

3) theories of social interaction.

The theory (regardless of its type) has the main features:

1. Theory is not individual, reliable scientific propositions, but their totality, an integral organic developing system. The unification of knowledge into a theory is carried out primarily by the subject of research itself, by its laws.

2. Not every set of provisions about the subject being studied is a theory. To turn into a theory, knowledge must reach a certain degree of maturity in its development. Namely, when it not only describes a certain set of facts, but also explains them, i.e. when knowledge reveals the causes and patterns of phenomena.

3. For a theory, justification and proof of the provisions included in it are mandatory: if there is no justification, there is no theory.

4. Theoretical knowledge should strive to explain the widest possible range of phenomena, to continuously deepen knowledge about them.

5. The nature of the theory determines the degree of validity of its defining principle, reflecting the fundamental regularity of a given subject.

6. The structure of scientific theories is meaningfully “determined by the systemic organization of idealized (abstract) objects (theoretical constructs). Statements of theoretical language are directly formulated in relation to theoretical constructs and only indirectly, thanks to their relationship to extralinguistic reality, describe this reality.”

7. Theory is not only ready-made, established knowledge, but also the process of obtaining it, therefore it is not a “bare result”, but must be considered together with its emergence and development.

The main functions of the theory include the following:

1. Synthetic function - combining individual reliable knowledge into a single, holistic system.

2. Explanatory function - identifying causal and other dependencies, the variety of connections of a given phenomenon, its essential characteristics, the laws of its origin and development, etc.

3. Methodological function - on the basis of theory, various methods, methods and techniques of research activity are formulated.

4. Predictive - the function of foresight. Based on theoretical ideas about the “present” state of known phenomena, conclusions are drawn about the existence of previously unknown facts, objects or their properties, connections between phenomena, etc. Prediction about the future state of phenomena (as opposed to those that exist but have not yet been identified) is called scientific foresight.

5. Practical function. The ultimate purpose of any theory is to be translated into practice, to be a “guide to action” for changing reality. Therefore, it is quite fair to say that there is nothing more practical than a good theory.

How to choose a good one from many competing theories?

K. Popper introduced the "criterion of relative acceptability." The best theory is the one that:

a) communicates the greatest amount of information, i.e. has deeper content;

b) is logically more strict;

c) has greater explanatory and predictive power;

D) can be more accurately verified by comparing predicted facts with observations.

Any theory is an integral developing system of true knowledge (including elements of error), which has a complex structure and performs a number of functions. In modern scientific methodology, the following main elements of the theory structure are distinguished: 1) Initial grounds- fundamental concepts, principles, laws, equations, axioms, etc. 2) Idealized object- an abstract model of the essential properties and connections of the objects being studied (for example, “absolutely black body”, “ideal gas”, etc.). 3) Logic theory- a set of certain rules and methods of proof aimed at clarifying the structure and changing knowledge. 4) Philosophical attitudes, sociocultural and value factors. 5) Set of laws and statements, derived as consequences from the principles of this theory in accordance with specific principles.

An idealized object (“ideal type”) plays a methodologically important role in the formation of a theory, the construction of which is a necessary stage in the creation of any theory, carried out in forms specific to different fields of knowledge. This object acts not only as a mental model of a certain fragment of reality, but also contains a specific research program that is implemented in the construction of a theory.

Speaking about the goals and ways of theoretical research in general, A. Einstein noted that “theory pursues two goals: 1. To cover, as far as possible, all phenomena in their interrelation (completeness). 2. To achieve this, taking as a basis as few logically mutually related logical concepts and arbitrarily established relationships between them (basic laws and axioms). I will call this goal “logical uniqueness.”

1 Einstein A. Physics and reality. - M., 1965. P. 264.

The variety of forms of idealization and, accordingly, types of idealized objects corresponds to the variety of types (types) of theories that can be classified on different grounds (criteria). Depending on this, theories can be distinguished: descriptive, mathematical, deductive and inductive, fundamental and applied, formal and substantive, “open” and “closed”, explanatory and describing (phenomenological), physical, chemical, sociological, psychological, etc. d.

Modern (post-non-classical) science is characterized by the increasing mathematization of its theories (especially natural science) and the increasing level of their abstraction and complexity. This feature modern natural science led to the fact that work with his new theories due to high level the abstractness of the concepts introduced into them turned into a new and unique type of activity. In this regard, some scientists speak, in particular, about the threat of the transformation of theoretical physics into a mathematical theory.

In modern science, the importance of computational mathematics (which has become an independent branch of mathematics) has sharply increased, since the answer to a given problem often needs to be given in numerical form. Currently, mathematical modeling is becoming the most important tool of scientific and technological progress. Its essence is the replacement of the original object with the corresponding mathematical model and further studying it, experimenting with it on a computer and using computational algorithms.

The general structure of a theory is specifically expressed in different types (species) of theories. Thus, mathematical theories are characterized by a high degree of abstraction. They rely on set theory as their foundation. Deduction is of decisive importance in all constructions of mathematics. The dominant role in the construction of mathematical theories is played by axiomatic and hypothetico-deductive methods, as well as formalization.

Many mathematical theories arise through the combination, the synthesis, of several basic, or generative, structures. The needs of science (including mathematics itself) have recently led to the emergence of a number of new mathematical disciplines: graph theory, game theory, information theory, discrete mathematics, optimal control theory, etc. In recent years, people have increasingly turned to the relatively recently emerged algebraic category theory, considering it as a new foundation for all mathematics.

Phenomenological (they are also called descriptive, empirical) describe the experimentally observed properties and quantities of objects and processes, but do not delve deeply into their internal mechanisms (for example, geometric optics, thermodynamics, many pedagogical, psychological and sociological theories, etc.). Such theories do not analyze the nature of the phenomena under study and therefore do not use any complex abstract objects, although, of course, to a certain extent they schematize and construct some idealizations of the studied area of phenomena.

With the development of scientific knowledge, theories of the phenomenological type give way to non-phenomenological ones (they are also called explanatory). They not only display the connections between phenomena and their properties, but also reveal the deep internal mechanism of the phenomena and processes being studied, their necessary interrelations, essential relationships, i.e. their laws (such as, for example, physical optics and a number of other theories). Along with observable empirical facts, concepts and quantities, very complex and unobservable, including very abstract concepts, are introduced here. There is no doubt that phenomenological theories, due to their simplicity, are more easily amenable to logical analysis, formalization and mathematical processing than non-phenomenological ones. It is no coincidence that in physics such sections as classical mechanics, geometric optics and thermodynamics were among the first to be axiomatized.

One of the important criteria by which theories can be classified is the accuracy of predictions. Based on this criterion, two large classes of theories can be distinguished. The first of these includes theories in which the prediction is reliable (for example, many theories of classical mechanics, classical physics and chemistry). In theories of the second class, prediction is probabilistic in nature, which is determined by the combined action of a large number of random factors. This kind of stochastic (from the Greek - guess) theories are found not only in modern physics but also in large quantities in biology and social sciences and humanities due to the specificity and complexity of the very object of their research. The most important method the construction and development of theories (especially non-phenomenological ones) is a method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete.

Thus, a theory (regardless of its type) has the following main features:

3. For a theory, justification and proof of the provisions included in it are mandatory: if there is no justification, there is no theory.

4. Theoretical knowledge should strive to explain the widest possible range of phenomena, to continuously deepen knowledge about them.

5. The nature of the theory determines the degree of validity of its defining principle, reflecting the fundamental regularity of a given subject.

1 Stepin V. S. Theoretical knowledge. - M., 2000. P. 707.

The main functions of the theory include the following:

1. Synthetic function- combining individual reliable knowledge into a single, holistic system.

2. Explanatory function- identification of causal and other dependencies, the variety of connections of a given phenomenon, its essential characteristics, the laws of its origin and development, etc.

3. Methodological function- on the basis of theory, various methods, methods and techniques of research activity are formulated.

4. Predictive- function of foresight. Based on theoretical ideas about the “present” state of known phenomena, conclusions are drawn about the existence of previously unknown facts, objects or their properties, connections between phenomena, etc. Prediction about the future state of phenomena (as opposed to those that exist but have not yet been identified) is called scientific foresight.

5. Practical function. The ultimate purpose of any theory is to be translated into practice, to be a “guide to action” for changing reality. Therefore, it is quite fair to say that there is nothing more practical than a good theory. But how do you choose a good one from many competing theories?

In psychology, generally the same forms of scientific knowledge as in other sciences: concepts, judgments, conclusions, problems, hypotheses, theories. Each of them represents a relatively independent way of reflection by a subject of an object, a way of recording knowledge that has developed in the course of the development of universal human spiritual activity.

Among all forms of knowledge, the highest, most perfect and complex in the methodology of science is recognized theory. Indeed, if concepts or conclusions, problems or hypotheses are often formulated in one sentence, then an interconnected, ordered system of statements is necessary to express the theory. Entire volumes are often written to present and substantiate theories: for example, Newton substantiated the theory of universal gravitation in the voluminous work “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy” (1687), which he spent more than 20 years writing; S. Freud outlined the theory of psychoanalysis not in one, but in many works, and over the last 40 years of his life he constantly made changes and clarifications to it, trying to adapt it to changing social conditions, assimilate new facts from the field of psychotherapy, and reflect the criticism of opponents.

However, this does not mean that the theories are super complex and therefore beyond the understanding of the “man on the street.” Firstly, any theory can be presented in a concise, somewhat schematized version, removing the secondary, insignificant, and bracketing out the supporting arguments and supporting facts. Secondly, ordinary people (i.e., those who are not professional scientists) master many theories along with their implicit logic from school, and therefore in adulthood they often build their own theories based on generalization and analysis of everyday experience, different from scientific degree of complexity, lack of mathematization and formalization, insufficient validity, less systematic and logical harmony, in particular, insensitivity to contradictions. Thus, a scientific theory is a somewhat refined and complicated version of everyday theories.

Theories act as methodological units, a kind of “cells,” of scientific knowledge: they represent all levels of scientific knowledge along with methodological procedures for obtaining and substantiating knowledge. Scientific theory includes and combines all other forms of scientific knowledge: its main “building material” is concepts, they are connected with each other by judgments, from which inferences are made according to the rules of logic; Any theory is based on one or more hypotheses (ideas) that are the answer to a significant problem (or set of problems). If a particular science consisted of only one theory, it would nevertheless possess all the basic properties of science. For example, geometry for many centuries was identified with the theory of Euclid and was considered at the same time an “exemplary” science in the sense of accuracy and rigor. In a word, theory is science in miniature. Therefore, if we understand how the theory is structured, what functions it performs, then we will comprehend the internal structure and “working mechanisms” of scientific knowledge as a whole.

In the methodology of science, the term “theory” (from the Greek theoria - consideration, research) is understood in two main senses: broad and narrow. In a broad sense, a theory is a complex of views (ideas, concepts) aimed at interpreting a phenomenon (or a group of similar phenomena). In this sense, almost every person has his own theories, many of which relate to the field of everyday psychology. With their help, a person can organize his ideas about goodness, justice, gender relations, love, the meaning of life, posthumous existence, etc. In a narrow, special meaning, theory is understood as the highest form of organization of scientific knowledge, giving a holistic idea of the patterns and essential connections of a certain area of reality. A scientific theory is characterized by systemic harmony, the logical dependence of some of its elements on others, and the deducibility of its content according to certain logical and methodological rules from a certain set of statements and concepts that form the initial basis of the theory.

In the process of developing knowledge, the emergence of theories is preceded by the stage of accumulation, generalization and classification of experimental data. For example, before the emergence of the theory of universal gravitation, a lot of information had already been collected both in astronomy (from individual astronomical observations to Kepler’s laws, which are empirical generalizations of the observed motion of planets) and in the field of mechanics (Galileo’s experiments on studying free fall tel); In biology, the evolutionary theories of Lamarck and Darwin were preceded by extensive classifications of organisms. The emergence of a theory resembles an insight, during which an array of information is suddenly clearly organized in the theorist’s head thanks to a suddenly emerging heuristic idea. However, this is not entirely true: an innovative hypothesis is one thing, and its justification and development is quite another. Only after the completion of the second process can we talk about the emergence of a theory. Moreover, as the history of science shows, the development of a theory associated with its modifications, refinements, and extrapolation to new areas can last tens and even hundreds of years.

There are several positions on the question of the structure of theories. Let's highlight the most influential of them.

According to V.S. Shvyrev, scientific theory includes the following main components:

1) original empirical basis, which includes many facts recorded in this field of knowledge, achieved through experiments and requiring theoretical explanation;

2) the original theoretical basis -- a set of primary assumptions, postulates, axioms, general laws that collectively describe idealized object of theory;

3) logic of theory - a set of rules of logical inference and proof acceptable within the framework of the theory;

4) a set of statements derived in theory with their evidence, constituting the main body of theoretical knowledge .

The central role in the formation of a theory, according to Shvyrev, is played by the underlying idealized object - a theoretical model of the essential connections of reality, presented with the help of certain hypothetical assumptions and idealizations. In classical mechanics, such an object is a system of material points; in molecular kinetic theory, it is a set of chaotically colliding molecules closed in a certain volume, represented as absolutely elastic material points.

It is not difficult to demonstrate the presence of these components in developed subject-centric psychological theories of personality. In psychoanalysis, the role of the empirical basis is played by psychoanalytic facts (data from clinical observations, descriptions of dreams, erroneous actions, etc.), theoretical basis consists of the postulates of metapsychology and clinical theory, the logic used can be characterized as “dialectical” or as the logic of “natural language”, the “multidimensional” model of the psyche (topological, energetic, economic) acts as an idealized object. From here it is clear that psychoanalytic theory is more complex than any physical theory, since it includes more basic theoretical postulates, operates with several idealized models at once, and uses more “subtle” logical means. Coordination of these components and elimination of contradictions between them represents an important epistemological task, which is still far from being resolved.

A different approach to explicating the structure of the theory is proposed by M.S. Burgin and V.I. Kuznetsov, identifying four subsystems in it: logical-linguistic(language and logical means), model-representative(models and images describing the object), pragmatic-procedural(methods of cognition and transformation of an object) and problem-heuristic(description of the essence and ways to solve problems). The identification of these subsystems, as the authors emphasize, has certain ontological grounds. “The logical-linguistic subsystem corresponds to the existing orderliness of the real world or some part of it, the presence of certain patterns. The pragmatic-procedural subsystem expresses the dynamic nature of the real world and the presence of interaction with it by the cognizing subject. The problem-heuristic subsystem appears due to the complexity of the cognizable reality, which leads to the emergence of various contradictions, problems and the need to solve them. And, finally, the model-representative subsystem primarily reflects the unity of thinking and being in relation to the process of scientific knowledge.”

The comparison of the theory with the organism made by the above-mentioned researchers is worthy of attention. Like Living being, theories are born, develop, reach maturity, and then grow old and often die, as happened with the theories of caloric and ether in the 19th century. As in a living body, the subsystems of the theory are closely interconnected and are in coordinated interaction.

The question of the structure of scientific knowledge is addressed somewhat differently by V.S. Stepin. Based on the fact that the methodological unit of knowledge analysis should not be a theory, but a scientific discipline, he identifies three levels in the structure of the latter: empirical, theoretical and philosophical, each of which has a complex organization.

Empirical level includes, firstly, direct observations and experiments, the result of which are observational data; secondly, cognitive procedures through which the transition from observational data to empirical dependencies and facts is carried out. Observation data are recorded in observation protocols, which indicate who observed, the time of observation, and describe the devices, if they were used. If, for example, a sociological survey was conducted, then the observation protocol is a questionnaire with the answer of the respondent. For a psychologist, these are also questionnaires, drawings (for example, in projective drawing tests), tape recordings of conversations, etc. The transition from observational data to empirical dependencies (generalizations) and scientific facts presupposes the elimination of the observations contained in them subjective moments(related to possible errors observer, random interference distorting the behavior of the phenomena under study, instrument errors) in order to obtain reliable intersubjective knowledge about the phenomena. Such a transition involves rational processing of observation data, searching for stable invariant content in them, and comparing multiple observations with each other. For example, a historian establishing the chronology of past events always strives to identify and compare a multitude of independent historical evidence, which for him serves as observational data. Then the invariant content identified in the observations is interpreted (interpreted), using known theoretical knowledge. Thus, empirical facts, constituting the bulk of the corresponding level of scientific knowledge, constituted as a result of the interpretation of observational data in the light of a particular theory.

Theoretical level is also formed by two sublevels. The first consists of particular theoretical models and laws, which act as theories relating to a fairly limited area of phenomena. The second consists of developed scientific theories that include particular theoretical laws as consequences derived from the fundamental laws of the theory. Examples of knowledge of the first sublevel can be theoretical models and laws that characterize individual species mechanical motion: model and law of pendulum oscillation (Huygens’s laws), planetary motion around the Sun (Kepler’s laws), free fall of bodies (Galileo’s laws), etc. In Newtonian mechanics, which is a typical example of a developed theory, these particular laws, on the one hand, are generalized and, on the other hand, derived as consequences.

A unique cell for organizing theoretical knowledge at each of its sublevels is double layer construction, consisting of theoretical model and formulated regarding it law. The model is built from abstract objects (such as a material point, a reference system, an absolutely solid surface, an elastic force, etc.), which are in strictly defined connections and relationships with each other. Laws express the relationship between these objects (for example, the law of universal gravitation expresses the relationship between the mass of bodies, understood as material points, the distance between them and the force of attraction: F = Gm1m2/ r2).

The explanation and prediction of experimental facts by theories is connected, firstly, with the derivation of consequences from them that are comparable with the results of experience, and, secondly, with the empirical interpretation of theoretical models achieved through establishing a correspondence between them and the real objects that they reflect. Thus, not only are facts interpreted in the light of theory, but also the elements of the theory (models and laws) are interpreted so as to be subject to experimental verification.

Level foundations of science is the most fundamental in the structure of scientific knowledge. However, until the mid-20th century, it did not stand out: methodologists and scientists simply did not notice it. But it is precisely this level that “acts as a system-forming block that determines the strategy of scientific research, the systematization of acquired knowledge and ensures its inclusion in the culture of the corresponding era.” According to V.S. Stepin, we can distinguish at least three main components of the foundations of scientific activity: ideals and norms of research, the scientific picture of the world and the philosophical foundations of science.

In paragraph 2 of Chapter 1, we already looked at the first two components of this level, so we will focus on the third. According to V.S. Stepin, philosophical foundations– these are the ideas and principles that substantiate the ontological postulates of science, as well as its ideals and norms. For example, Faraday's justification for the material status of electric and magnetic fields was carried out by reference to the metaphysical principle of the unity of matter and force. Philosophical foundations also ensure the “docking” of scientific knowledge, ideals and norms, the scientific picture of the world with the dominant worldview of a particular historical era, with the categories of its culture.

The formation of philosophical foundations is carried out by sampling and subsequent adaptation of ideas developed in philosophical analysis to the needs of a specific area of scientific knowledge. In their structure, V.S. Stepin identifies two subsystems: ontological, represented by a grid of categories that serve as a matrix of understanding and cognition of the objects under study (for example, the categories “thing”, “property”, “relationship”, “process”, “state”, “causality”, “necessity”, “accident”, “ space", "time", etc.), and epistemological, expressed by categorical schemes that characterize cognitive procedures and their results (understanding of truth, method, knowledge, explanation, evidence, theory, fact).

Noting the validity and heuristic nature of the positions we have outlined on the issue of the structure of scientific theory, in particular, and scientific knowledge in general, we will try to identify them weak sides and determine your own vision of the problem. The first, naturally arising question is related to whether to include empirical level science to the content of the theory or not: according to Shvyrev, the empirical level is included in the theory, according to Stepin - not (but is part of scientific discipline), Burgin and Kuznetsov implicitly include the empirical level as part of the pragmatic-procedural subsystem. Indeed, on the one hand, theory is very closely interconnected with facts; it is created to describe and explain them, therefore the elimination of facts from theory clearly impoverishes it. But, on the other hand, facts are able to “lead their own life”, independent of a specific theory, for example, “migrate” from one theory to another. The last circumstance, it seems to us, is more significant: the theory precisely describes and explains the facts, is imposed on them, and therefore they should be taken beyond the limits of the theory. This is also supported by the established division of levels of scientific knowledge into theoretical and empirical (fact-fixing).

Therefore, Stepin’s point of view seems to us the most justified, but adjustments must also be made to it related to the understanding of the structure and role of the philosophical foundations of science. Firstly, they cannot be considered as being on the same level with ideals and norms, with the scientific picture of the world, precisely because of their fundamental nature, primacy, as the author himself notes. Secondly, they are not reduced to ontological and epistemological, but also include value (axiological) and practical (praxeological) dimensions. In general, their structure is homologous to the structure of philosophical knowledge, which includes not only ontology and epistemology, but also ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, and philosophical anthropology. Thirdly, the interpretation of the genesis of philosophical foundations as the “flow” of ideas from philosophy into science seems to us too narrow; we cannot underestimate the role of the personal life experience of a scientist, in which philosophical views, although developed to a large extent spontaneously, are most deeply rooted due to “ emotional, value-semantic charge”, direct connection with what was seen and experienced.

Thus, the theory is higher form scientific knowledge, a systematically organized and logically connected multi-level set of abstract objects of varying degrees of generality: philosophical ideas and principles, fundamental and particular models and laws, built from concepts, judgments and images.

Further specification of ideas about the nature of scientific theories is associated with the identification of their functions and types.

The question about the functions of theory is, in essence, a question about the purpose of theory, about its role both in science and in culture as a whole. Coming up with an exhaustive list of features is quite difficult. Firstly, in various sciences theories do not always play the same roles: mathematical knowledge, which deals with the world of “frozen”, ideal entities equal to themselves, is one thing, and humanitarian knowledge, focused on understanding the constantly changing, fluid existence of a person in the same unstable world, is another thing . This substantive difference determines the insignificance (often the complete absence) of the predictive function in the theories of mathematics, and, on the contrary, its importance for the sciences that study man and society. Secondly, scientific knowledge itself is constantly changing, and along with it, ideas about the role of scientific theories are being transformed: in general, with the development of science, more and more new functions are assigned to theories. Therefore, we will note only the most important, basic functions of scientific theory.

1. Reflective. The idealized object of the theory is a kind of simplified, schematized copy of real objects, therefore the theory reflects reality, but not in its entirety, but only in the most significant moments. First of all, the theory reflects the basic properties of objects, important connections and relationships between objects, patterns of their existence, functioning and development. Since the idealized object is a model real object, then this function can also be called modeling (model-representative). In our opinion, we can talk about three types of models(idealized objects): structural, reflecting the structure, composition of the object (subsystems, elements and their relationships); functional, describing its functioning over time (i.e. those single-quality processes that occur regularly); evolutionary, reconstructing the course, stages, reasons, factors, trends in the development of an object. Psychology uses many models: psyche, consciousness, personality, communication, small social group, family, creativity, memory, attention, etc.

2. Descriptive the function is derived from the reflective function, acts as its private analogue and is expressed in the theory’s fixation of the properties and qualities of objects, connections and relationships between them. Description, apparently, is the oldest, simplest function of science, therefore any theory always describes something, but not every description is scientific. The main thing in a scientific description is accuracy, rigor, and unambiguity. The most important means of description is language: both natural and scientific, the latter being created precisely to increase accuracy and rigor in recording the properties and qualities of objects. Likewise, the psychologist begins the examination of the client by searching and recording significant facts. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that, for example, Freud built a psychoanalytic theory without relying on his own and other people’s previous clinical experience, in which descriptions of case histories were abundantly presented with detailed indications of their etiology, symptoms, stages of development, and methods of treatment.

3. Explanatory also derived from the reflective function. An explanation already presupposes a search for consistent connections, clarification of the reasons for the appearance and occurrence of certain phenomena. In other words, to explain means, firstly, to bring a single phenomenon under common law(for example, a single case of a brick falling to the ground can be brought under the general law of gravitation, which will show us why the brick flew down (and not up or did not remain hanging in the air) and at exactly such a speed (or acceleration) and, secondly , find the reason that gave rise to this phenomenon (in our example, such a reason that caused the fall of a brick would be the force of gravity, the gravitational field of the Earth.) A psychologist, however, like any person, cannot do without searching for consistent connections, without finding out the causes of events and taking into account the influence of various factors on what is happening to him and around him.

4. Prognostic the function stems from the explanatory one: knowing the laws of the world, we can extrapolate them to future events and, accordingly, predict their course. For example, I can reliably assume (and with one hundred percent probability!) that the brick I threw out the window will fall to the ground. The basis for such a forecast, on the one hand, is everyday experience, and on the other hand, the theory of universal gravitation. Involving the latter can make the forecast more accurate. IN modern sciences dealing with complex self-organizing and “human-sized” objects are absolutely accurate forecasts are rare: and the point here is not only in the complexity of the objects under study, which have many independent parameters, but also in the very dynamics of self-organization processes, in which randomness, a small force impact at bifurcation points can radically change the direction of development of the system. Also in psychology, the vast majority of forecasts are of a probabilistic-statistical nature, since, as a rule, they cannot take into account the role of numerous random factors that take place in social life.

5. Restrictive (prohibiting) function is rooted in the principle of falsifiability, according to which a theory should not be omnivorous, capable of explaining any, primarily previously unknown, phenomena from its subject area; on the contrary, a “good” theory should prohibit certain events (for example, the theory of universal gravity prohibits the upward flight of a brick thrown from a window; the theory of relativity limits the maximum speed of transmission of material interactions to the speed of light; modern genetics prohibits the inheritance of acquired traits). In psychology (especially in such sections as personality psychology and social psychology), apparently, we should talk not so much about categorical prohibitions as about the improbability of certain events. For example, from E. Fromm’s concept of love it follows that a person who does not love himself cannot truly love another. This is, of course, a ban, but not an absolute one. It is also very unlikely that a child who missed a sensitive period for language acquisition (for example, due to social isolation) will be able to fully master it in adulthood; in the psychology of creativity, it is recognized that there is a low probability of an opportunity for a complete amateur to do something important scientific discovery in fundamental areas of science. And it is almost impossible to imagine that a child with an objectively confirmed diagnosis of imbecility or idiocy could become an outstanding scientist.

6. Systematizing the function is determined by man’s desire to order the world, as well as by the properties of our thinking, which spontaneously strives for order. Theories act as an important means of systematization and condensation of information simply due to their inherent organization, the logical relationship (deducibility) of some elements with others. The simplest form of systematization is the processes of classification. For example, in biology, classifications of plant and animal species necessarily preceded evolutionary theories: only on the basis of extensive empirical material of the former was it possible to advance the latter. In psychology, perhaps the most famous classifications relate to personality typology: Freud, Jung, Fromm, Eysenck, Leonhard and others made significant contributions to this area of science. Other examples are the identification of types of pathopsychological disorders, forms of love, psychological influence, types of intelligence, memory, attention, abilities and other mental functions.

7. Heuristic the function emphasizes the role of theory as “the most powerful means of solving fundamental problems of understanding reality.” In other words, a theory not only answers questions, but also poses new problems, opens up new areas of research, which it then tries to explore in the process of its development. Often, questions posed by one theory are solved by another. For example, Newton, having discovered the gravitational force, could not answer the question about the nature of gravity; this problem was already solved by Einstein in general theory relativity. In psychology, the most heuristic theory still remains, apparently, psychoanalysis. On this subject, Kjell and Ziegler write: “Although research concerning Freud's psychodynamic theory cannot prove his concepts beyond doubt (since the verifiability of the theory is low), he has inspired many scientists by showing them in which direction research can be carried out to improve our knowledge about behavior. Literally thousands of studies have been prompted by Freud's theoretical claims." In terms of the heuristic function, the vagueness and incompleteness of the theory are more advantages than disadvantages. This is Maslow's theory of personality, which is more a collection of delightful guesses and assumptions than a clearly defined structure. Largely because of its incompleteness, coupled with the boldness of the hypotheses put forward, it “served as a stimulus for the study of self-esteem, peak experience and self-actualization, ... influenced not only researchers in the field of personology, but also in the field of education, management and health care.”

8. Practical the function is epitomized by the famous aphorism of the 19th-century German physicist Robert Kirchhoff: “There is nothing more practical than a good theory.” Indeed, we build theories not only to satisfy curiosity, but, above all, to understand the world around us. In a clear, orderly world, we not only feel safer, but we can also function successfully in it. Thus, theories act as a means of solving personal and social problems and increase the efficiency of our activities. In the era of post-non-classics, the practical significance of scientific knowledge comes to the fore, which is not surprising, because modern humanity faces global problems, which most scientists see as possible to overcome only through the development of science. The theories of psychology today claim not only to solve the problems of individuals and small groups, but also strive to contribute to the optimization of social life as a whole. According to Kjell and Ziegler, psychology has an important contribution to make in solving problems associated with poverty, racial and sexual discrimination, alienation, suicide, divorce, child abuse, drug and alcohol addiction, crime, etc.

Kinds theories are distinguished on the basis of their structure, determined, in turn, by the methods of constructing theoretical knowledge. There are three main, “classical” types of theories: axiomatic (deductive), inductive and hypothetico-deductive. Each of them has its own “construction base” represented by three similar methods.

Axiomatic theories, established in science since antiquity, personify the accuracy and rigor of scientific knowledge. Today they are most common in mathematics (formalized arithmetic, axiomatic set theory), formal logic (propositional logic, predicate logic) and some branches of physics (mechanics, thermodynamics, electrodynamics). Classic example Such a theory is Euclid’s geometry, which for many centuries was considered a model of scientific rigor. As part of an ordinary axiomatic theory, there are three components: axioms (postulates), theorems (derived knowledge), and rules of inference (proofs).

Axioms(from the Greek axioma “honored, accepted position”) - provisions accepted as true (as a rule, due to self-evidence) that together constitute axiomatics as the fundamental basis of a specific theory. To introduce them, pre-formulated basic concepts (definitions of terms) are used. For example, before formulating the main postulates, Euclid gives definitions of “point”, “straight line”, “plane”, etc. Following Euclid (however, the creation of the axiomatic method is attributed not to him, but to Pythagoras), many tried to build knowledge on the basis of axioms: not only mathematicians, but also philosophers (B. Spinoza), sociologists (G. Vico), biologists (J. Woodger). The view of axioms as eternal and unshakable principles of knowledge was seriously shaken with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries; in 1931, K. Gödel proved that even the simplest mathematical theories cannot be completely constructed as axiomatic formal theories (the incompleteness theorem). Today it is clear that the acceptance of axioms is determined by the specific experience of the era; with the expansion of the latter, even the most seemingly unshakable truths may turn out to be erroneous.

From the axioms, according to certain rules, the remaining provisions of the theory (theorems) are derived (deduced), the latter forming the main body of the axiomatic theory. Rules are studied by logic - the science of the forms of correct thinking. In most cases they represent the laws of classical logic: such as law of identity(“every essence coincides with itself”), law of contradiction(“no proposition can be both true and false”), law of the excluded middle(“every judgment is either true or false, there is no third choice”), law of sufficient reason(“every judgment made must be properly justified”). Often these rules are applied by scientists half-consciously, and sometimes completely unconsciously. As noted above, researchers often make logical mistakes, relying more on their own intuition than on the laws of thinking, preferring to use the “softer” logic of common sense. Since the beginning of the 20th century, non-classical logics began to develop (modal, multivalued, paraconsistent, probabilistic, etc.), moving away from classical laws, trying to grasp the dialectics of life with its fluidity, inconsistency, not subject to classical logic.

If axiomatic theories are relevant to mathematical and formal logical knowledge, then hypothetico-deductive theories specific to the natural sciences. G. Galileo is considered the creator of the hypothetico-deductive method, who also laid the foundations of experimental natural science. After Galileo, this method was used (though mostly implicitly) by many physicists, from Newton to Einstein, and therefore until recently it was considered fundamental in natural science.

The essence of the method is to put forward bold assumptions (hypotheses), the truth value of which is uncertain. Then, consequences are deductively derived from the hypotheses until we arrive at statements that can be compared with experience. If empirical testing confirms their adequacy, then the conclusion (due to their logical relationship) about the correctness of the initial hypotheses is legitimate. Thus, the hypothetico-deductive theory is a system of hypotheses of varying degrees of generality: at the very top are the most abstract hypotheses, and at the top lowest level– the most specific, but subject to direct experimental verification. It should be noted that such a system is always incomplete, and therefore can be expanded with additional hypotheses and models.

The more innovative consequences that can be verified by subsequent experience can be derived from a theory, the more authority it enjoys in science. In 1922, Russian astronomer A. Friedman derived equations from Einstein’s theory of relativity that proved its nonstationarity, and in 1929, American astronomer E. Hubble discovered a “red shift” in the spectrum of distant galaxies, confirming the correctness of both the theory of relativity and Friedman’s equations. In 1946, an American physicist of Russian origin G. Gamow, from his theory of the hot Universe, deduced the necessity of the presence in space of microwave isotropic radiation with a temperature of about 3 K, and in 1965 this radiation, called relict radiation, was discovered by astrophysicists A. Penzias and R. Wilson. It is quite natural that both the theory of relativity and the concept of a hot Universe have entered the “solid core” of the modern scientific picture of the world.

Inductive theories in their pure form in science, apparently, are absent, since they do not provide logically based, apodictic knowledge. Therefore, we should rather talk about inductive method, which is also characteristic, first of all, of natural science, since it allows us to move from experimental facts first to empirical and then theoretical generalizations. In other words, if deductive theories are built “from the top down” (from axioms and hypotheses to facts, from the abstract to the concrete), then inductive theories are built “from the bottom up” (from individual phenomena to universal conclusions).

F. Bacon is usually recognized as the founder of inductive methodology, although the definition of induction was given by Aristotle, and the Epicureans considered it the only authoritative method of proving the laws of nature. It is interesting that, perhaps under the influence of the authority of Bacon, Newton, who in fact relied mainly on the hypothetico-deductive methodology, declared himself a supporter of the inductive method. A prominent defender of the inductive methodology was our compatriot V.I. Vernadsky, who believed that it is on the basis of empirical generalizations that scientific knowledge should be built: until at least one fact is discovered that contradicts a previously obtained empirical generalization (law), the latter should be considered true.

Inductive inference usually begins with the analysis and comparison of observational or experimental data. If at the same time something common and similar is seen in them (for example, the regular repetition of a property) in the absence of exceptions (conflicting information), then the data are generalized in the form of a universal proposition (empirical law).

Distinguish complete (perfect) induction, when the generalization refers to a finitely observable area of facts, and incomplete induction, when it relates to an infinitely or finitely observable area of facts. For scientific knowledge, the second form of induction is most important, since it is it that gives an increase in new knowledge and allows us to move on to law-like connections. However, incomplete induction is not a logical reasoning, since no law corresponds to the transition from the particular to the general. Therefore, incomplete induction is probabilistic in nature: there is always a chance that new facts will appear that contradict those previously observed.

The “trouble” of induction is that a single disproving fact makes the empirical generalization as a whole untenable. This cannot be said about theoretically based statements, which can be considered adequate even when faced with many contradictory facts. Therefore, in order to “strengthen” the significance of inductive generalizations, scientists strive to substantiate them not only with facts, but also with logical arguments, for example, to derive empirical laws as consequences from theoretical premises or to find the reason that determines the presence of similar characteristics in objects. However, inductive hypotheses and theories in general are of a descriptive, ascertaining nature and have less explanatory potential than deductive ones. However, in the future, inductive generalizations often receive theoretical support, and descriptive theories are transformed into explanatory ones.

The considered basic models of theories act primarily as ideal-typical constructions. In the actual scientific practice of natural science, when constructing theories, scientists, as a rule, use both inductive and hypothetico-deductive methodology simultaneously (and often intuitively): the movement from facts to theory is combined with a reverse transition from theory to verifiable consequences. More specifically, the mechanism for constructing, justifying and testing a theory can be represented by the following diagram: observational data → facts → empirical generalization → universal hypothesis → particular hypotheses → testable consequences → setting up an experiment or organizing an observation → interpretation of experimental results → conclusion about the consistency (failure) of hypotheses → putting forward new ones hypotheses The transition from one stage to another is far from trivial; it requires the use of intuition and a certain amount of ingenuity. At each stage, the scientist also reflects on the results obtained, aimed at understanding their meaning, compliance with the standards of rationality, and eliminating possible errors.

Of course, not every hypothesis verified by experience is subsequently transformed into a theory. In order to form a theory around itself, a hypothesis (or several hypotheses) must not only be adequate and new, but also have a powerful heuristic potential and relate to a wide range of phenomena.

The development of psychological knowledge as a whole follows a similar scenario. Let's take, for example, the theory of personality (more precisely, the psychotherapeutic concept as one of its parts) by K.R. Rogers, recognized throughout the world, meeting to a fairly high degree the criteria of heuristics, experimental approbability, and functional significance. Before moving on to building a theory, Rogers received a psychological education, acquired rich and varied experience working with people: first helping difficult children, then teaching at universities and counseling adults, conducting Scientific research. At the same time, he studied in depth the theory of psychology, mastered methods of psychological, psychiatric and social assistance. As a result of analyzing and summarizing his experience, Rogers came to understand the futility of “intellectual approaches,” psychoanalytic and behaviorist therapy, and the realization that “change occurs through experience in relationships.” Rogers was also dissatisfied with the inconsistency of Freudian views with the “scientific, purely objective statistical approach to science.”

Rogers bases his own psychotherapeutic concept on the “basic hypothesis”: “if I can create a certain type of relationship with another person, he will discover the ability to use this relationship for his development, which will cause a change and development of his personality.” Apparently, this assumption is based not only on the therapeutic and life experience of the author, but also owes its birth to philosophical ideas Rogers, intuitive conviction of its correctness. Particular consequences follow from the main hypothesis, for example, the position of three “necessary and sufficient conditions” for successful therapy: non-judgmental acceptance, congruence (sincerity), empathic understanding. The conclusion of particular hypotheses in this case cannot be considered purely logical or formal; on the contrary, it is substantive, creative in nature, and is associated, again, with the generalization and analysis of the experience of relationships with people. As for the main hypothesis, it fully complies with the above-mentioned requirements of heuristics and fundamentality, and therefore may well serve as the “ideological center” for building a developed theory. The heuristic nature of the main hypothesis was manifested, in particular, in the fact that it guided many researchers to study the quality of the relationship between the consultant and the client. Its fundamental nature is associated with the possibility of extrapolation to any (not just psychotherapeutic) relationships between people, which was done by Rogers himself.

The hypotheses put forward formed the theoretical basis of client-centered therapy, which then became the subject of objective, rigorous, measurement-based, empirical study. Rogers not only formulated a number of testable consequences due, first of all, to the operationalization of basic concepts, but also defined a program and methods for their verification. The implementation of this program has convincingly proven the effectiveness of client-centered therapy.

From Rogers' theory it follows that the success of therapy depends not so much on the knowledge, experience, and theoretical position of the consultant, but on the quality of the relationship. This assumption can also be tested if we can operationalize the concept of “relationship quality”, consisting of “sincerity”, “empathy”, “goodwill”, “love” for the client. For this purpose, one of Rogers' employees, based on scaling and ranking procedures, developed the Attitude List questionnaire for clients. For example, agreeableness was measured using sentences of different ranks: from “He likes me”, “He is interested in me” (high and medium levels of agreeableness) to “He is indifferent to me”, “He disapproves of me” (zero and negative levels, respectively). goodwill). The client rated these statements on a scale from “very true” to “not at all true.” As a result of the survey, a high positive correlation was discovered between the empathy, sincerity, and friendliness of the consultant, on the one hand, and the success of therapy, on the other. A number of other studies have shown that the success of therapy does not depend on the theoretical position of the consultant. In particular, a comparison of psychoanalytic, Adlerian and client-centered psychotherapy showed that success depends precisely on the quality of the relationship between the participants in the therapeutic process, and not on the basis of what theoretical concepts it unfolds. Thus, particular, and, consequently, Rogers’ main hypotheses received experimental confirmation.

Using the example of Rogers' concept of interhuman relations, we see that the development of the theory is cyclical, spiral-shaped: therapeutic and life experience → its generalization and analysis → putting forward universal and particular hypotheses → drawing testable consequences → testing them → clarifying hypotheses → modification based on refined knowledge of the therapeutic experience. Such a cycle can be repeated many times, with some hypotheses remaining unchanged, others being refined and modified, others being discarded, and others being generated for the first time. In such a “circulation” the theory develops, refines, enriches, assimilating new experience, putting forward counterarguments to criticism from competing concepts.

Most others psychological theories functions and develops according to the same scenario, so it is legitimate to conclude that the “average psychological theory” combines the features of both hypothetico-deductive and inductive theories. Are there “pure” inductive and hypothetico-deductive theories in psychology? In our opinion, it is more correct to talk about the gravitation of a particular concept towards the pole of induction or deduction. For example, most concepts of personality development are predominantly inductive in nature (in particular, Freud’s doctrine of psychosexual stages, E. Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development, J. Piaget’s theory of stages of intellectual development) since they, firstly, rely on a generalization of observations and experiments, - secondly, they are predominantly descriptive in nature, characterized by “poverty” and weakness of explanatory principles (for example, Piaget’s theory cannot explain, except by reference to observational data, why there should be exactly four (and not three or five) stages of intelligence formation, why only children develop faster than others, why the order of stages is this way, etc.). With regard to other theories, it is often impossible to say exactly which type they are closer to, since the development of universal hypotheses in most cases is equally based on both the experience and intuition of the researcher, as a result of which many provisions of the theories combine the qualities of empirical generalizations and universal hypotheses-guesses .

But why are there so many theories in psychology, what determines their diversity, since we live in the same world, have similar life experiences: we are born, learn language and etiquette, go to school, fall in love, get sick and suffer, hope and dream? Why do theorists interpret this experience differently, each emphasizing their own, paying attention to some aspects of it and losing sight of others, and accordingly they put forward different hypotheses and build theories that are completely different in content from each other? In our opinion, the key to answering these questions lies through the study of the philosophical foundations of psychological theories, to which we now turn.

Theory as a logical form: complexity and systematicity. Structural elements of the theory and their relationship

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