War between France and Prussia 1870 1871. Franco-Prussian War

Chapter 30. Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871

The war between France and Germany in 1870 marked the first time that improved rifled weapons were used by professional armies on both sides. Therefore, this war represents the only source from which one can understand what influence new weapons have on the actions of various branches of the military and changes relative value branches of troops during combat operations.

Both armies fought had numerous, well-armed and trained cavalry, although their ratio to infantry in both armies was smaller than in other wars. This happened due to an increase in the size of the armies themselves, rather than due to a reduction in cavalry forces.

The French cavalry consisted of 11 cuirassier and 1 carabinieri regiments, heavy or reserve cavalry, 13 dragoon and 9 uhlan regiments of line cavalry, 17 cavalry, 9 hussars and 3 spagis (local African cavalry) light cavalry. The guards and light cavalry regiments each had 6 squadrons, including 1 reserve. Other cavalry regiments had 4 field and 1 reserve squadron each. Two regiments were united into brigades, and 2 or 3 brigades made up a cavalry division. IN war time the total number of cavalry was 40 thousand people.

Each corps, consisting of three or four infantry divisions, had a cavalry division attached to it, which was under the direct command of the corps commander, so that the commanders of the infantry divisions could not directly dispose of the cavalry. In the German army, one cavalry regiment was assigned to each infantry division.

French division commanders more than once felt the need for special and maneuverable cavalry units. This happened, for example, near Weissenburg, where General Abel Douhet, together with the 2nd Infantry Division of the 1st Corps, did not have a single platoon of cavalry to organize reconnaissance on his front. He occupied an advanced position, and the Prussian attack on him was unexpected and ended in heavy losses and withdrawal.

In addition to the cavalry divisions attached to the French corps, there was also a reserve cavalry corps of three divisions, totaling 48 squadrons, 30 cannons and 6 mitrailleuses (the French name for canister).

The cavalry's armament was as follows. Cuirassiers had broadswords and pistols, lancers had pikes, sabers and pistols, dragoons, rangers and hussars were equally armed with Chassepo carbines, which fired at 800 steps, and sabers. These units consisted of mounted riflemen, although they usually acted similarly to other mounted units, but if necessary they dismounted and fought on foot.

The cavalry of the North German Confederation (created in 1867 under the auspices of Prussia) consisted of 10 cuirassiers, 21 lancers, 21 dragoons, 18 hussars and 6 light regiments, a total of 76 regiments of 4 active squadrons and 1 reserve.

There were about 600 cavalry in the regiment. Each infantry division consisted of a cavalry regiment, the remaining regiments were consolidated into divisions and assigned to different armies; divisions, consisting of 2 brigades of 2 regiments, each had a horse battery. Cuirassiers and dragoons were considered heavy cavalry, all others were considered light cavalry. Total The cavalry of the German army, including the South German troops, amounted to 369 squadrons, or approximately 56 thousand people.

From the very beginning of the war of 1870, the superiority of the Germans in organization and in the art of warfare became obvious. The wars of the great Napoleon, followed by successes in Crimean War, and even more clear achievements in Italy in 1859 (under Magenta and others) instilled in the French a belief in their invincibility, they rested on their laurels, not paying due attention to improvements in military affairs. The experience of the American Civil War did not teach the French anything; they believed that the armies in the United States, recruited from ordinary people, and not professional soldiers, can teach nothing to an army like the French, so the lessons of the American war have no value.

It seems that the French lost sight of the fact that four years of constant combat with varying degrees of success can train soldiers high level, whose practical knowledge of military affairs will be greater than if all their service and training in military affairs took place in peacetime.

Consequently, the French did not take advantage of the cavalry experience developed in America. Therefore, the guard and reconnaissance service of their cavalry turned out to be below any criticism, and their actions in battle, in highest degree brave and courageous, but equally thoughtless, led only to fruitless victims at Werth and Sedan.

Nothing stands out more clearly in descriptions of the 1870 campaign than the ineptitude of the French in the performance of guard and reconnaissance services. It was completely neglected, as happened, for example, at Beaumont, or, as in other places, it was executed so carelessly that the French troops were repeatedly attacked by the enemy in their bivouacs in broad daylight and were taken by surprise.

Four years before the start of the Franco-Prussian War, the German cavalry was already dealing with Austrian cavalry, whose reconnaissance and guard service was carried out equally ineffectively. Accordingly, the Germans became more bold in conducting reconnaissance, which was greatly facilitated by the inactivity of the French cavalry in such operations. From the very beginning of the campaign, the German cavalry brought much benefit to their army, both by reconnaissance and by tirelessly conducting long-range surveillance and reconnaissance of the enemy in all directions.

Thanks to constant impunity, German patrols walked behind the French lines and made bold and risky searches in small groups of cavalrymen, collecting and bringing back very important information regarding enemy positions and movements.

The careful training of German soldiers in peacetime and well-written instructions for the performance of basic duties now proved to be of extraordinary value to them, enabling them to perform admirably the service which had been entrusted to them in war.

On the night of June 23-24, a patrol of Prussian lancers penetrated the French lines and blew up the French railway viaduct at Saargemund. From that day on, the Prussian cavalry began to constantly demonstrate its superiority. On July 26, the Württemberg General Staff officer Count Zeppelin, together with 4 officers and 4 lower ranks, passed through the French forward posts located near Lauterburg and acted for 36 hours in the French rear, conducting reconnaissance. However, while resting at a small inn in Schirlenhof, south of Werth, 10 miles in rear of the French outposts, the group was unexpectedly attacked. Only Count Zeppelin managed to gallop away and bring a large number of information of extraordinary significance, on the basis of which the plan for the advance of the crown prince's army was built a few days later.

Meanwhile, the French cavalry was inactive. General Abel Douai, along with his 2nd Infantry Division, did not have any cavalry. When he was pushed forward into an exposed position at Weissenburg, he was suddenly attacked by the enemy and Douai was completely defeated during the advance of the German 3rd Army. This was the first Prussian success, and was followed two days later by a second, at Werth, where the French right wing also suffered seriously from the advancing Prussians. During these battles, the French fought bravely and courageously, but were attacked unexpectedly and by superior forces.

At the Battle of Werth, Michel's French cuirassier brigade, from the French right flank, attacked the Prussian left flank, which was advancing towards Morsbronn and threatened to bypass the French right flank. This brigade, numbering a thousand men, advanced on Morsbronn in three lines over difficult terrain.

Despite rifle fire, they bravely rushed forward to strike the Prussian infantry, preventing them from forming into battle formation. The Germans met the attack in the formation they were in, without having time to form a cohesive square that would have given them the opportunity to fire with enormous advantage.

Nevertheless, within a few minutes, as a result of heavy rifle fire, the cuirassiers suffered huge losses. Those who remained tried to continue the attack, but were captured, and only a few managed to break through and escape by roundabout routes. But these remnants of the brigade were also attacked by the Prussian hussar regiment.

As a result of this battle, Michel's brigade and the 6th Lancers regiment, which attacked along with it, were almost completely destroyed, only a few managed to break through to their own. The Prussian hussars lost 1 man killed, 23 were wounded, and 35 horses were damaged. Infantry losses were very insignificant.

Thanks to the sacrifice of a cavalry brigade, the French managed to gain time for the retreat of their right wing. The attack was carried out brilliantly and in in perfect order: The cavalry rushed towards the enemy without hesitation or stop, and yet the fire of the infantry, which was fired from needle guns, was sufficient to defeat them and almost completely destroy them, so that the infantry did not even need to form a square. In this war we will see other examples of how cavalry had little chance of success if it operated in the old way.

After the battles of Werth and Spichern, the French, discouraged by their defeats, were forced to quickly retreat in different directions, the right flank under the command of MacMahon retreated first to the south and then in a roundabout way to Chalons, and the rest of the army (Bazaine) retreated to Metz.

At the same time, the German cavalry performed so magnificently that it proved its enormous capabilities and the usefulness it could bring in combat, despite the very significant improvement in the quality of firearms. Although the chances of success for cavalry on the battlefield were largely reduced, they still remained ample opportunities for its use, which the Germans did, and very skillfully.

The German cavalry hurried to get one or two marches ahead of the main infantry corps, constantly keeping the enemy in sight, and, spreading far and wide over a long distance, formed an impenetrable curtain or veil that hid the movements of the main army, allowing the latter to be at peace with respect to possible attacks by the enemy . She was sure that she was securely covered in this way. All these duties were carried out in the most remarkable manner, with courage, energy and skill, showing the enormous advantages afforded by superior numbers and well-organized mounted troops.

At a time when the armies of most countries began to reduce the number of cavalry, having come to the conclusion that it had become less necessary, in the Prussian (and North German) army, on the contrary, it was strengthened rather than reduced, constantly remembering the enormous value of cavalry.

The units and cavalry units moved far forward practically concealed for the French generals all information about the positions and intentions of the Prussians. The patrols of lancers and hussars appeared everywhere, and under their curtain it was impossible to detect from which part of the moving curtain of horsemen the main forces would appear.

The German corps walked 20–30 miles (32–48 km) behind their cavalry units in safety, both while moving and during halts and bivouacs. Meanwhile, the German cavalry advanced, drove MacMahon south of Metz, overran the entire territory between the troops of MacMahon and Bazaine, and soon reached the Moselle.

They reached Nancy, the main city of Lorraine, and on August 12 the city was surrendered to 6 Uhlan regiments, which were soon joined by a larger number of other mounted units. Soon the Prussian cavalry occupied the entire Moselle line, spreading all the way to the fortifications of Metz. It was thanks to the daring and dashing actions of the German cavalry that McMahon's reinforcements were unable to join the main forces of the French army.

The Germans then crossed the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, and the whole great mass of cavalry advanced north to envelop the right flank of the French army at Metz. By this time it was clear that the French intended to retreat towards Verdun, and it was important to prevent, if possible, their advance.

The main forces of the Germans were still far behind, although they were marching at a forced pace. The advanced cavalry was supposed to hold the enemy until the infantry corps arrived. On the morning of August 15, the German advanced cavalry units attacked the Metz-Verdun road and were able to delay the French retreat for almost 24 hours.

General Forton's cavalry division, which formed the vanguard of the French army, in this transition encountered Redern's brigade from the 5th Prussian cavalry division, which had a battery of horse artillery. This small detachment of Prussian cavalry fought bravely and delayed the movement of the entire southern column of the French army with artillery fire.

It is necessary to note the ineffectiveness and lack of initiative in the response by the French cavalry, since General Forton had a significant number of cavalrymen and could easily throw Redern’s small Prussian brigade out of the way, thereby ensuring the continuation of the movement. However, instead of advancing, he retreated to Vionville, and with this the fate of Bazaine's army was practically sealed.

The next day, after a difficult march, German infantry divisions began to approach one after another, the French attempts to resume the movement towards Verdun led to the battle of Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, which ended unsuccessfully for the French. The French retreated to Gravelotte, where the decisive battle took place. It led to Bazin being surrounded at Metz, where he finally surrendered.

In the midst of the battle on August 16 at Vionville there was a critical moment when the 6th French Corps under the command of Marshal Canrobert, initially outnumbering the Prussians, pressed with enormous force and threatened a decisive attack on the weary troops of Elfensleben and Flavigny.

Having neither infantry nor artillery in reserve, Elfensleben decided that his only hope was to mount a decisive attack with his entire cavalry, which was done. Admittedly, it seemed to be something of a last resort, since it was clear that all the soldiers would be sacrificed.

The brigade, consisting of 3 squadrons of the 7th Cuirassier Regiment and three from the 16th Uhlan Regiment, was commanded by General Bredov. He formed them in a single line, but due to a delay in the deployment of the 16th Lancers, the attack began in ledges. Under heavy artillery fire, they rushed forward, soon reached the guns, cut down the artillerymen with broadswords and sabers, and rushed at full speed further towards the infantry lines located in the rear. She met the attacking squadron with volleys of gunfire.

Nevertheless, the infantry lines were broken through, broadswords, sabers and pikes had a deadly effect, and several mitrailleuses were captured. Excited by success, carried away by the hot fury of the attack, the Germans could no longer unite or reorganize. And then the French cuirassiers of the 7th Cuirassier Regiment, along with lancers and spagis, suddenly attacked these cavalry, who were in disarray. In their hasty retreat they were poorly organized and suffered huge losses, but the sacrifice was duly made as they were able to delay a French attack that would otherwise have been fatal. It was the bravest attack of the war, the only one of its kind and to a certain extent successful.

Made later in the day to assist Wedel's infantry brigade, the attack by the 1st Prussian Dragoon Guards was not successful, and fire from the undisturbed French infantry drove them back with heavy casualties. Shortly after this, General von Barbie, with 6 regiments of cavalry on the Prussian left flank, attacked 10 regiments of French cavalry under the leadership of General Clerambault, who, strange as it may seem, met the attack by opening fire with carbines on the open plain. The Prussians, despising this fire, attacked with cold steel, and a short hand-to-hand battle soon began, ending in favor of the Germans, whose superiority and skill clearly dominated their enemy.

At the end of the battle, when it was already dark, an attack was made by the 6th Prussian Cavalry Division, when a brigade of hussars under the leadership of Rauch broke through several squares of French infantry. This happened thanks to the darkness, which hid the approach of the horsemen, and they were able to approach at close range. The fierce fire rained down on them from all the squares led to the rapid retreat of the division.

Almost only infantry and artillery took part in the battle of Gravelot - Saint-Privat, so we do not dwell on it.

In subsequent operations between 18 August and the Battle of Sedan, the contrast between the actions of the cavalry of the two armies became very clear. At the request of the French government, MacMahon was forced to begin an outflanking maneuver to try to rescue Bazin and link up with him.

This plan could only be carried out if it was carried out quickly, skillfully and secretly. The French cavalry had a real opportunity not only to regain their well-deserved reputation, but also to significantly help their army. However, they surprisingly consistently managed to fail on all counts, which is largely the fault of the commander-in-chief.

The most the right decision there would be a concentration of all the cavalry on the right flank, so that, having set up a line of posts with supports, they would make a curtain out of it, behind which the army would secretly carry out its movements. Failure to detect French movements for one or two days would undoubtedly increase their chances of success. Instead, part of the cavalry marched at the head of the columns, part equally on both flanks, and part was distributed among the corps. At first, at least half of the reserve cavalry was placed on the right flank, but on August 25 it was drawn towards Le Chene, and thus the right flank was left without cover precisely in the direction from which the greatest danger threatened; Bonnemann's reserve division was constantly moving on the extreme left flank, where it was impossible to expect an attack. Thus, during the entire further movement, the French army was covered only by cavalry units attached to the corps.

The result was as could be expected: the Germans soon discovered the movements and understood the French plan, after which their entire army turned to the right and rushed towards them. An impenetrable curtain of cavalry, spreading far and wide around, hid the movements of the Germans. And soon huge masses of German infantry came close to the flank and rear of the French columns, moving blindly, neglecting simple precautions.

First, on August 30, the Germans attacked the 5th French corps of General Falla, who was bivouacked north of Beaumont. For some unknown reason, the French completely neglected precautions and did not send cavalry to reconnoiter the forests south of Beaumont. There was an inexplicable miss, since the French had every reason to believe that the attack was most likely to come from this direction.

The Prussians, moving under the cover of the forests, came close to the camp and were able to clearly see how the French troops were preparing food and calmly resting, completely unaware of the danger that threatened them. German artillery shells burst unexpectedly among the French, the first sign of an attack that was boldly launched and proved completely successful. The French artillery did not even have time to harness their horses, so their guns were captured along with all their tents, baggage and supplies.

What happened became a prologue to the final defeat at Sedan. In this last battle of the Empire, the cavalry again proved that it had not lost the courage that had always distinguished the French soldier. At the end of the battle, General Ducrot decided to make a desperate attempt to delay the enemy large mass cavalry, and then fight through with the infantry coming behind.

General Marguerite, together with the reserve cavalry division, was to attack and break through the enemy position, then turn right and crush the enemy in that direction. Bonnemann's 2nd Reserve Cavalry Division was to support this attack, with several mounted regiments of the 12th Corps acting as reserves.

The cavalry moved forward to attack, it rolled like a tornado and seemed to crush the Prussian infantry. The charging cavalry soon broke through the line of skirmishers and rushed forward towards the German battalions, who deployed in closed lines and met them with a deadly hail of bullets from needle rifles.

The attacks were repeated with brilliant courage. The cavalry bravely rushed forward, but they were mowed down in such numbers that along the entire front of the Prussian lines there were piles of dead and dying men and horses. This entire operation was a futile and terrible sacrifice of brave men.

“In this campaign, I believe, the question of cavalry attacking infantry armed with breech-loading rifles was finally settled. Under whatever circumstances such an attack was carried out - by the 8th and 9th French cuirassier regiments at Werth, the 7th Prussian at Vionville on August 16, or by the two French light cavalry brigades on the left flank at Sedan - the result was the same, the attacks resulted in horrific casualties, without any clear result.

General Sheridan was an attentive witness to the four charges of the French light horse at Sedan, and gave me the most detailed account of them. I examined the scene of the attack most carefully only 30 hours later, when the dead soldiers and horses lying everywhere had not yet been removed, so I was able to form an accurate picture, as if I myself had witnessed the attack.

The first attack, carried out by the 1st French Hussars, took place at the very favorable conditions of the possible and, moreover, was organized very skillfully. As soon as the Prussian riflemen, walking in front of the main infantry corps, entered the hill behind which the hussars were waiting, they immediately walked around the hill until they found themselves in the rear and on the right flank of the riflemen. In this way they passed before they were noticed, and then they attacked in the most valiant manner, attacking the whole line.

However, even under such favorable circumstances, the attack did not achieve the result that should have been discussed. The Germans immediately formed groups and opened fire; the few who fled to the rear, about 25 or 30 people, were cut down.

The fire from these clumsy little Prussian squares inflicted heavy losses on the hussars. The two squadrons attacking from behind wisely deviated and returned under the cover of the hill. Those who broke through the Prussian lines were killed, wounded or captured. Everything that happened did not delay the advance of the Prussian infantry even for 5 minutes.

Subsequent attacks by the 1st, 3rd and 4th African Regiments and the 6th Cavalry Regiment ended in nothing, although they were carried out in the most valiant and persistent manner. The Prussians simply waited for them, forming a line until the horsemen approached to within 140 meters. There was a pointless massacre without any success. The hillside was literally covered with the dead bodies of the horsemen and their small gray Arabian horses. These two brigades, consisting of five regiments, probably lost about 350 men killed, not counting the wounded and prisoners. It is impossible to imagine a greater shame.

General Sheridan assured me that the horsemen behaved in the most gallant manner, charging again and again after the signals to charge.

Until the last minute they were sheltered from enemy fire, carefully equipped, skillfully and bravely directed. The length of the attack did not exceed 350–370 meters, and yet the result was the complete destruction of the cavalry without any success.

It is with great pain that I have to talk about this. A friend of mine, whom I knew in Africa ten years ago, with the rank of major, commanded two squadrons of one of the regiments. He showed me a list of his two squadrons with marks on it next to the names of the soldiers. It turned out that out of 216 people who went into battle, fifty-eight returned. Moreover, they were under gunfire for no more than a quarter of an hour.”

After the Battle of Sedan, the war mainly focused on two sieges - Paris and Metz. At the same time, the cavalry provided excellent service in maintaining lines of communication and covering operations. During the action in some French provinces several cases involving cavalry occurred, but all of them were of a local scale.

So, during the battle of Amiens, several German squadrons attacked a naval battalion and captured several cannons. At Orleans the 4th Hussars and at Soigny the 11th Lancers also captured French guns. These minor successes achieved on the battlefield are not at all comparable to the enormous mass of cavalry, numbering almost 70 thousand, that the Germans fielded in this war.

At the beginning of the Siege of Paris, the French organized small guerrilla corps called Frantirieres (French Free Rifles). When they became numerous, the Prussian lancers could no longer move freely over considerable distances, but were almost always accompanied by battalions of infantry, moving with them to clear villages, forests and generally closed places, preventing the popular movement of these voluntary skirmishers, who fought with extraordinary bravery.

All of the above indisputably proves that the significant successes achieved by the Prussian cavalry at the beginning of the war should be attributed rather to the inaction of the French cavalry or its improper use, but not at all to the superiority in armament or organization of the famous lancers.

The system of attaching cavalry to infantry naturally deprived the cavalry of mobility. As a result, the cavalry lost its inherent qualities, which disappeared the moment the cavalry was attached to the infantry.

A careful study of the use of cavalry during the American Civil War would have shown the Germans that if their cavalry had been armed with rifles or carbines, they would have been able to do equally well or better what they did in the early period of the war, and later fight successfully. against the French free shooters.

In America, mounted riflemen constantly captured cities and villages, even occupied by infantry and artillery. The "house guards" (local militias), the same type of troops as the French Free Fusiliers, could never prevent the rapid advance of the Southern cavalry, who would probably laugh at the idea that they could be delayed and stopped, and that they need to be given infantry for the duration of their raids.

From this point of view, the experience of the Franco-German war is noteworthy, since the brilliant successes of the Prussian cavalry at the beginning of the campaign may have led to the expectation that they might be embarrassed by such undisciplined and irregular troops as the free skirmishers. What happened was the most striking lesson that the war since Sedan gave to a cavalry officer, and requires little thought as to how to identify weakness and try to find an antidote.

This turned out to be the last one big war, from which we can derive directions for future cavalry actions. At the time I wrote this book there was a war going on between Turkey and Serbia, of which only vague and inaccurate descriptions can be gathered from the public press. So it is impossible at present to say whether any positive experience can really be drawn from the fighting that took place there. As far as we have been able to discover, the horsemen did not have a significant influence. The following passage, quoted from a newspaper, if true, clearly shows the value of the revolver and is therefore worthy of attention:

“During the Battle of Zaichar, the Serbian officer, Captain Frasanovic, showed himself in an extraordinary way. He took his saber in his teeth and his revolver in his hand, rushed through the Turkish half-battalion, grabbed the banner and carried it away, leaving behind a dead or wounded Turk with each shot.”

Here we will finish the historical essay dedicated to the cavalry and its service. We have traced its formation from the foggy period of the most distant Antiquity through all the changes and vicissitudes of the intervening centuries down to the present time. We hope that we have been able to clarify for the reader the gradual development of cavalry to its modern state. Now let us try to complete our work worthily in order to decide, in the light of the experience of the past and the knowledge of the present, what can be considered the best system organization, equipment and use of cavalry in a future war.

author Potemkin Vladimir Petrovich

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The defeat of France with the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 occurred unusually quickly. Three German armies, led by himself William I, constantly having Bismarck, Moltke and War Minister Roon with them, they moved towards France, preventing its army, led by Napoleon III, from invading Germany. Already in the first days of August, the Germans victoriously entered Alsace and Lorraine, after which revolutionary ferment began in Paris.

Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871: Battle of Mars-la-Tour on August 16, 1870. Artist P. J. Janniot, 1886

Under the influence of dissatisfaction - both among the people and among the army - with the defeats to which certain parts of the French army were subjected, Napoleon III resigned from his main command in the Franco-Prussian War and handed it over to Marshal Bazin. It was necessary to retreat, but nothing was prepared for the retreat, and Bazaine had only one thing left - to lock himself in Metz, which was immediately surrounded by the enemy. Another French army under the command of a marshal McMahon was heading towards Metz, but the Germans blocked her road, pushed her to the north and surrounded her on all sides near Sedan. Here, on September 2, the main catastrophe of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 occurred - the surrender of the French army of more than 80 thousand people and the surrender of Napoleon III himself. Bazin's attempt, around this time, to break through to join MacMahon was repulsed, and Bazin was finally locked in Metz.

Franco-Prussian War. Battle of Sedan. 1870

Battle of Sedan decided the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and became a fatal blow to the second French empire. Napoleon III did not feel safe in his own army, he left in a carriage to look for the Prussian king, but met with Bismarck and Moltke, and then with Wilhelm I. At their meeting, they talked about the causes of the Franco-Prussian War, and the captive emperor justified himself by saying that It was the public opinion of France that forced him to start a war that he himself did not want. “But this public opinion,” the Prussian king objected to him, “was created by your Majesty’s ministers.”

Captured Napoleon III talks with Bismarck after the Battle of Sedan

The news of the Sedan disaster came to Paris the next day, and on the 4th it happened revolution. In the morning, crowds of people walked through the streets of Paris, shouting about the deposition of Napoleon, and in the middle of the day people filled the legislative building. The meeting was interrupted, and the Parisian deputies, having gathered in the town hall, proclaimed a republic ( Third Republic) and organized under the chairmanship of General Trochu a “government national defense" It included well-known opponents of Napoleon III: a Jew who took over internal affairs, and the journalist Rochefort, who had just been released from prison. This government was not averse to ending the Franco-Prussian War and making peace, but Bismarck demanded the concession of Alsace and the German part of Lorraine. “Not a single inch of our land, not a single stone of our fortresses,” Jules Favre, a member of the French government who was in charge of external affairs, decisively declared in response to this demand.

The “Government of National Defense” sent Thiers to the foreign courts on September 12 for help, but his mission was not successful, and on September 19, 1870, exactly two months after the declaration of war, the Germans had already besieged Paris. At the end of September 1870, the capitulation of Strasbourg, besieged at the beginning of hostilities, followed; at the end of October, Bazaine was forced to starve to surrender Metz to the Germans with an army of 173 thousand. (Public opinion biasedly accused the marshal of treason). Now in German captivity there were two French armies, which numbered about 250 thousand people - something unheard of in the whole military history, – and German troops from near Strasbourg and Metz could move further into France. Sedan, Strasbourg and Metz reserves during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 went to the Germans, as well as everything that was still found by the Germans in other fortresses, which then surrendered one after another.

Franco-Prussian War. Map. The dotted line marks the border of the territory ceded to Germany by the Frankfurt Peace

On September 19, as was said, the siege of Paris began. Back in the forties, in view of the expected war with the Germans, the city was, on the initiative Thiera, fortified with a rampart and a ditch 34 versts long and a number of forts at some distance from Paris, the line of which was 66 versts. When the enemy attacked Paris during the Franco-Prussian War, 60-70 thousand regular troops were collected, a large amount of food supplies, as well as military supplies, etc. were brought in. It was a difficult task for the Germans to surround Paris with its population exceeding 2 million. shower to cut him and his forts off from all communication with the rest of the world. The main headquarters of the German army was located at Versailles, the famous residence of the last three French kings of the old monarchy.

Siege of Paris, which lasted during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 for 19 weeks without one day (4 and a half months), in terms of the mass of residents of the besieged city and the mass of the besieging troops, was something unprecedented in world history. In the end, there was not enough food supplies, and they had to eat dogs, rats, etc. In addition to hunger, the Parisians also suffered from the winter cold. To top it all off, in January 1871, when the Prussians brought heavy siege artillery to Paris, the city was bombarded for three weeks. Communication with the outside world was maintained only by carrier pigeons. Three members of the government of national defense, even before the start of the siege, retired to Tours in order to organize the defense of the country from there, and after the start of the siege they were joined by Gambetta, who flew from Paris in a hot air balloon.

All attempts by the besieged to repel the Germans ended extremely unsuccessfully; Discontent with General Trochu reigned in the city, and attempts were even made to overthrow the government. Finally, on January 23, 1871, after a series of failed armistice negotiations in the Franco-Prussian War, Jules Favre went to Versailles to ask for peace. On January 28, 1971, he and Bismarck signed an act of surrender of Paris and a truce for three weeks with the transfer of all external forts to the Germans, the issuance of weapons, leaving the Parisian troops in the city as prisoners of war, the payment of 200 million francs indemnity and the obligation to assemble in Bordeaux in two weeks national assembly for peace.

Ten days before the capitulation of Paris, on January 18, 1871, in one of the Versailles halls, the allied German sovereigns, on the formal initiative of the Bavarian king, proclaimed the Prussian king German Emperor. This was preceded a month before Wilhelm I received a deputation from the North German Reichstag, asking him to accept a new title. It is curious that the deputation was headed by the same person (Simsov), who in 1849 offered the imperial crown to the late brother of Wilhelm I on behalf of the Frankfurt parliament. Thus the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership was completed.

Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles, 1871. Painting by A. von Werner, 1885. In the center, at the steps of the throne, is Bismarck in a white uniform. To his right, half-turned, is Helmuth von Moltke

During the siege of Paris, the “Dictator of Tours,” as Gambetta was nicknamed for the energy and authority he displayed, as now Minister of War, organized a massive militia from the remnants of the regular army and recruits (all men from 21 to 40 years old) and obtained weapons for it, secretly bought in England. Four armies were created, which numbered almost 600 thousand people, but the Germans defeated these untrained crowds thrown into battle by the French Republicans one after another. As the Franco-Prussian War continued, they continued to capture thousands of soldiers and took cities on the other side of Paris, incidentally, capturing Tours itself. The north-eastern corner of France between Belgium and the Channel, and a large territory south-west of Paris fell into the hands of the Prussians, and one of Gambetta’s hastily recruited armies, defeated and losing up to 15 thousand prisoners, was forced to move to Switzerland, where it was disarmed . Despite all this, Gambetta resisted the conclusion of peace and, with a proclamation to the people on January 31, appealed to the patriotism of the French to wage the Franco-Prussian war to the last extreme.

Leon Michel Gambetta. Painting by L. Bonn, 1875

In essence, however, the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 was decided by the capitulation of Paris. Military operations in 1870-71. lasted 180 days, during which 800 thousand people were killed, wounded, taken prisoner, disarmed in Paris and crossed into Swiss territory - again, something that could not be imagined before.

At the beginning of February, elections to the National Assembly took place throughout France, without any interference from the Germans, which then opened its meetings on February 12 in Bordeaux. The Government of National Defense resigned, and Thiers became the head of the executive branch, who was entrusted with negotiating peace. The preliminary treaty ending the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 took place at Versailles on February 26. On March 1, 1871, it was adopted by the national assembly (546 votes to 107), and on May 20 it was finally signed in Frankfurt am Main. By Treaty of Frankfurt 1871 France lost Alsace and significant part Lorraine, with a population of one and a half million, two-thirds German, one-third French, was obliged to pay 5 billion francs and was subject to German occupation east of Paris until the indemnity was paid. Germany released French prisoners of war immediately, and at that moment there were more than 400 thousand of them.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the war between France, on the one hand, and Prussia and other states of the North German Union and Southern Germany, on the other.

Caused by deep contradictions between Prussia and France. Prussia sought to complete the unification of Germany under its auspices and weaken France and its influence in Europe. France - to inflict a decisive defeat on Prussia, eliminate the possibility of creating a united and strong Germany, and maintain its predominant influence on Europe. continent, stop the growth of the revolutionary movement and prevent the political crisis of the Second Empire. (For the map, see the inset to page 320.) On the eve of F.-p. V. Prussian army, recruited on the basis of universal conscription, was the strongest and most combat-ready in the West. Europe. Number troops of North Germany, the union (including contingents of the South German state) in the military. time could be over 1 million people. (including over 690 thousand in the active army). In the military At that time, the corps united into an army. German art-I was armed with steel rifled guns from the Krupna plant, valid. the fire reached 3.5 km. Prus, a plan developed back in the winter of 1868/69 by the chief general. General headquarters X. Moltke (senior), envisaged an offensive against Alsace and Lorraine, the defeat of the main. strength in the gene. battle, then push their remnants to the white border and capture Paris. The plan took into account the possibility of military operations against Austria-Hungary if it entered the war on the side of France.

The total number of French army military time could not exceed 570 thousand people, including 330-340 thousand in the active army. In service with the French. The infantry had a needle gun of the A. Chaspo system, which had an effective range. fire 1500 m (1.5 times more than the German needle gun I. Dreyse), as well as 25-barrel mitrailleuses (rate of fire up to 250 rounds per minute, fire range up to 1500 m). However, the French bronze rifled guns were loaded from the muzzle and were significantly inferior to German ones in firing range. A major miscalculation by the French. military There was a lack of leadership in the organization. structure of the peacetime army of divisions and corps (with the exception of the Guards), their formation immediately on the eve of the war could not ensure proper coherence of units and subunits. France did not have a carefully developed war plan. Hastily compiled, it contained a number of errors (the timing of the mobilization and concentration of troops, calculations for the split of the German coalition, etc. were unrealistic). Due to the superiority of the Prussian troops in numbers, art. Armament and combat training, the French sought to launch the offensive first, forestalling the enemy in the mobilization and deployment of forces. Franz. the command planned to inflict ch. blow in the Bavarian Palatinate, to separate the troops of North Germany. Union and South Germany. state, etc. to keep the latter from entering the war on the side of Prussia.

The reason for the war for both sides was diplomatic. conflict between Prussia and France over the candidacy for Spanish. throne. On July 2, 1870, the government of Spain invited a relative of Prussia, King William I, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, to occupy the vacant royal throne. Napoleon III, provoked by Bismarck, declared war on Prussia on July 19, 1870. From the Prussian side, it began as history, progressive, because its chapter. the goal was to remove obstacles to the final unification of Germany posed by France. At the same time, aggression. Prussia's plans created the preconditions for the subsequent transformation of the war on its part into an aggressive one.

Franz. The troops were consolidated into one Army of the Rhine (commander-in-chief Napoleon III), concentrated in Alsace and Lorraine. German the army (commander-in-chief Wilhelm I, in fact Moltke) was concentrated by August 1. on the Middle Rhine between Metz and Strasbourg and by 6 August. totaled approx. 500 thousand people at 1584 or. Franz. The troops did not take decisive action, limiting themselves to minor skirmishes with the vanguards of the pr-ka. Aug 4 advanced units of the German armies were defeated near Weissenburg by the French. division general A. Douet. Aug 6 German troops defeated the 1st Corps of Marshal M.E. McMahon at Werth and the 2nd Corps of General. S. O. Frossard at Spichern, and as a result of the battles of August 16 and 18. on the left bank of the Moselle at Vionville - Mars-la-Touré and at Saint-Privat-Gravelotte French. The troops retreated to Metz, where they were blocked by 7 corps and 3 cavalry. German divisions (160 thousand people). Aug 22 At the request of the government, the new (so-called Chalons) army of MacMahon (over 120 thousand people, 393 op., 76 mitrailleuses) set out from Reims with the goal of releasing the French. troops besieged in Metz. They spoke out against McMahon. 3rd and newly created. The Meuse army, which surrounded the French in the Sedan region. After crushing, defeat on September 2. French The Chalon army capitulated along with Napoleon III, who was with it, and surrendered. The Sedan disaster accelerated the fall of Napoleon III's empire. 4 Sep. 1870 France was declared a republic. The bourgeois government came to power. Republicans led by Gen. L. Zh. Trochu (“Production of National Defense”). Obstacles to completing the national German unifications were eliminated: in November. 1870 South German states joined the North-Germany. union. However, the ruling and militaristic circles of Prussia sought to continue the war with the goal of annexing Alsace and Lorraine and receiving predatory indemnity. For France, the war in its second stage became progressive, national liberation. The people demanded universal armament, and under their pressure “the government of the national. Defense", which sought to make a deal with the enemy in order to prevent the further development of the revolution, and had already entered into secret negotiations with Bismarck, was forced to take measures for the defense of Paris very late. German The troops advanced towards the capital of France, meeting almost no resistance, and on September 19. Paris was besieged. 23 Sep. they occupied Tul, September 27. The garrison of Strasbourg capitulated. Thanks to the patriotic thanks to the efforts of the French. people managed to create a new huge army in France (together with the National Guard, franc-tireurs, garrisons of Paris and other fortresses, it numbered approx. 1 million people). This significantly complicated the position of the Prussian command. Everything is mute. The troops were confined to the fortresses and continued the blockade of Metz and Paris. Franz. The Loire army, concentrated in Tours and Bourges, was preparing for the liberation of Paris. At this time, the commands dealt a treacherous blow to Republican France. Rhine French army Marshal A. Bazin, who entered into secret negotiations with the enemy. As a result, 27 Oct. after 72 days of blockade in Metz, the best 173 thousand capitulated without a fight. French army. “...This is a fact unheard of in the history of wars,” wrote F. Engels (Marx K., Engels F. Soch. Ed. 2nd. T. 17, p. 158). Released mute. troops (two armies) were sent against the French. armies (Loire and Northern), which in battles began to suffer defeats from German personnel; troops.

Bazin's betrayal, the reluctance of the French. government to organize defense, secret negotiations with the enemy on a truce, famine and deprivation caused October 31. in Paris, a workers' uprising was suppressed. 7 Nov The Loire army launched an offensive and on November 9. completely defeated the 2nd Bavarian Corps at Kulm and occupied Orleans, but on December 4. was knocked out of it by those who went on the offensive. troops.

In Jan. 1871 North The French army was defeated at Saint-Quentin, and the East. army at Belfort. Military France's position deteriorated sharply.

From 27 Dec. 1870 the Germans began art. shelling of Paris with 502 heavy guns. Its garrison withstood a siege for more than 4 months. Communication with the field armies was carried out through balloons (during the siege, 65 balloons with 164 people took off from Paris) and carrier pigeons.

22 Jan 1871 the population of Paris rebelled again. Having suppressed the uprising, the French. The government has completed negotiations with him. command,

26 Jan signed the agreement on the surrender of Paris, and on January 28. - truce. German Most of the forts of the Parisian fortress with artillery and ammunition were transferred to the troops.

26 Feb. A preliminary peace treaty was signed at Versailles. Before the ratification of the peace treaty, Nat. At the meeting, the Germans received the right to send their troops into Paris, which on March 3, after ratification, left Paris. On March 18, a popular uprising won in Paris and the Paris Commune of 1871 was created, which lasted until May 28. On May 10, the Frankfurt Peace of 1871 was signed between France and Germany, confirming the basic principles. terms of the Versailles preliminary treaty.

Ch. consequence of F.-p. V. was the completion of the unification of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia, the German Empire arose. Although the unification of Germany was a historically progressive event, it was achieved not in a revolutionary democratic way, but in a reactionary way, from above, with “iron and blood” (Bismarck). At the head of Herm, an empire that included within its borders in addition to him. land part of Poland and French ter., became aggressive. Prussian, Junkerism. A dangerous military has formed in the center of Europe. hearth The difficult conditions of the Frankfurt Peace gave rise to deep contradictions between France and Germany, which were one of the causes of the First World War of 1914-18.

Experience of F.-p. V. showed the enormous importance of universal conscription for the creation of a mass bourgeoisie. army, its advance and thorough preparation for war, the increased role of the general. headquarters in the preparation and conduct of combat operations. The mobilization plan and railway planning acquired exceptional importance. transportation, the use of telegraph in the military. purposes, thanks to which it The troops managed to complete mobilization and strategist, deployment earlier, and seize the strategist and initiative. There have been changes in the command and control of troops.

Moltke led the armies not with centralized orders, but with individual directives to the commanders of the armies, who acted within the framework of the received directive independently, in accordance with the situation developing in the army zone. It became possible to operate on a wider front, to maneuver to cover the flanks of the aircraft. In coordinating the efforts of a large number of troops operating on a wide front, the features of the operation began to appear more clearly. During the period of F.-p. V. This means influence on the development of the military. art was influenced by the use of the new military. technology, more advanced weapons - German. art and french Chaspo guns. The improvement of infantry combat formations continued. The rifle chain was increasingly used. The increasing role of fire gave the troops greater stability, made it difficult for the enemy to break through the defense front, and increased the importance of tact and maneuver. After F.-p. V. Many states have introduced universal conscription.

V.P. Glukhov.

Materials from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia were used.

Literature:

Marx K. Civil War in France. - Marx K., Engels F. Op. Ed. 2nd. T. 17;

Engels F. Notes on the war. - Ibid. T. 17;

Obolenskaya S.V. The Franco-Prussian War and public opinion in Germany and Russia. M., 1977;

Shneerson L.M. The Franco-Prussian War and Russia. From the history of Russian-Prussian and Russian-French. relations in 1867-1871. Minsk, 1976;

Mikhnevich N.P. The war between Germany and France 1870-71. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 1897;

Moltke G. History of the German-French War of 1870-1871. Per. with him. M., 1937.

Franco-German War 1870-1 is a military conflict between France, on the one hand, and the North German Confederation and the South German states associated with them by military treaties, on the other hand.

As you know, the war was declared by France, but it was directly planned by Prussia. France for Prussia is a hereditary enemy, led by Napoleon III, who laid claim to Hegemony in Europe after its active participation in the Crimean War.

Prussia, being one of the initiators of the unification of the German lands according to the small German plan, actually reached the finish line of unifying its lands by 1870. The war with France was supposed to be the trigger for the end of the unification process.

As for France, the reason for the war was internal turmoil within the empire of Napoleon III. France needed a small, victorious war. At the same time, the French ruling circles hoped, as a result of the war with Prussia, to prevent the unification of Germany, in which they saw a direct threat to the predominant position of France on the European continent, and also to seize the left bank of the Rhine.

The highest tension between the relations between the two states was the diplomatic crisis related to the question of a candidacy for the vacant royal throne of Spain.

The impetus for the war was dynastic disputes over the Spanish throne. In 1868, a revolution occurred in Spain, as a result of which Queen Isabella II was deprived of the throne. The people demanded a republic, and the ruling circles of Spain, meanwhile, were searching for a new monarch. In 1870, the throne was offered to a relative of the Prussian king, Prince Leopold, from the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen collateral line. Fearing being caught between two fires, France began to insist that Leopold's candidacy as a contender for the throne should not be considered.

Thus, when Leopold’s candidacy became official, the French ambassador to Prussia, Benedetti, came to Ems. In a conversation with him, the Prussian king limited himself to saying that he personally never wanted to win the Spanish throne for any of his relatives. At the end of this meeting, William I immediately tried to bring to the attention of both Leopold himself and his father, Prince Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, that it would be desirable to renounce the Spanish throne. Which was done. King Wilhelm, in a dispatch he sent on July 13 from Ems to Berlin for communication to Prussian diplomatic agents abroad and representatives of the press, agreed with the first demand, but refused to satisfy the second. Before publishing the dispatch, Bismarck deliberately changed its text in such a way that it acquired a tone and meaning offensive to the French government. He hoped that in France they would believe her at least for one day, and that this would be quite enough to get the desired result - aggression on the part of France.

The French government took this as a refusal and on July 19, 1870 declared war on Prussia. Bismarck's masterful provocation was a success. Prussia in the eyes of the public acted as a victim of aggression.

The attitude of the European powers towards the Franco-Prussian conflict remained completely neutral from the very beginning. So, without stocking up with a single ally, with an unprepared, much smaller and worse armed army, not having decent military maps of his own country, Napoleon III began this fatal war for his dynasty and for France. (250 thousand against (France) - 400 thousand soldiers (Germany))

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Franco-Prussian War

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, a war between France, on the one hand, and Prussia and other states of the North German Confederation and Southern Germany (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt) on the other.

Goals of the parties

Prussia sought to complete the unification of Germany under its hegemony, weaken France and its influence in Europe, and France, in turn, to maintain predominant influence on the European continent, seize the left bank of the Rhine, delay the unification (prevent the unification) of Germany, and prevent the strengthening of Prussia’s position , and also prevent the growing crisis of the Second Empire through a victorious war.

Bismarck, who already considered a war with France inevitable since 1866, was looking only for a favorable reason to enter into it: he wanted France, and not Prussia, to be the aggressive party that declared war. Bismarck understood that to unite Germany under Prussian leadership, an external impulse was needed that could ignite a national movement. The creation of a powerful centralized state was Bismarck's main goal.

Reason for war

The reason for the war was a diplomatic conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a relative of the Prussian King William, to the vacant royal throne in Spain. These events caused deep discontent and protest on the part of Napoleon III, since the French could not allow the same Hohenzollern dynasty to rule in both Prussia and Spain, creating a danger to the French Empire on both sides.

On July 13, 1870, Prussian Chancellor O. Bismarck, trying to provoke France into declaring war, deliberately distorted the text of the recording of the conversation between the King of Prussia (William I) and the French ambassador (Benedetti), giving the document an insulting character for France (Ems Dispatch). However, at the end of this meeting, William I immediately tried to bring to the attention of both Leopold himself and his father, Prince Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, that it would be desirable to renounce the Spanish throne. Which was done.

But the French government was eager for war and on July 15 it began conscripting reservists into the army. On July 16, mobilization began in Germany. On July 19, the government of Napoleon III officially declared war on Prussia. Bismarck's diplomacy, taking advantage of the miscalculations of French foreign policy, ensured the neutrality of the European powers - Russia, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, which was beneficial to Prussia. The war began in an unfavorable situation for France, due to diplomatic isolation and the absence of allies.

Ready for war

Entering the war, Napoleon III hoped to isolate the North German Confederation from the South German states with a rapid invasion of the French army into German territory before the completion of mobilization in Prussia, and thus ensure at least the neutrality of these states. The French government was confident that, having gained a military advantage at the very beginning of the campaign, after the first victories over Prussia it would gain allies in the form of Austria, and possibly Italy.

The Prussian command had a carefully developed campaign plan, the author of which was Field Marshal Moltke. The French army, weakened by the colonial wars and corruption reigning at all levels of the state apparatus, was not ready for war. After mobilization, the French army in the metropolis as of August 1 numbered just over 500 thousand people, including 262 thousand in the active Rhine Army (275 thousand by August 6). The German states mobilized over 1 million people, including over 690 thousand in the field troops.

The French army was inferior to the Germans. in terms of quantity and quality of artillery weapons. German steel rifled guns with a firing range of up to 3.5 km far surpassed French bronze guns in their combat qualities. In infantry armament, the advantage was on the side of the French (!). Franz. rifled needle gun system Chaspo was better than Prussian guns Draize. German ground forces states were superior to the French army in terms of organization and level of combat training of personnel. The French Navy was stronger than the Prussian Navy, but did not influence the course of the war.

Progress of military operations. First stage

From the very beginning, military operations developed extremely unsuccessfully for France. When Napoleon III, who declared himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces, arrived at the fortress of Metz (Lorraine) to cross the border the next day in accordance with the campaign plan, he found here only 100 thousand soldiers, poorly provided with equipment and provisions. And when the first serious clashes between the two warring parties took place on August 4 at Werth, Forbach, and Spichern, his army was forced to take a defensive position, which further worsened its position.

On August 14 they imposed on the units Army of the Rhine battle near the village of Borni. It did not bring victory to either side, but delayed the crossing of the French troops across the Moselle for a whole day, which had dire consequences for them - the Prussian command had the opportunity to involve the French in two new bloody battles - on August 16 at Mars-la-Tour - Resonville and August 18 at Gravlot - Saint-Privat. These battles, despite the heroism and courage shown by the French soldiers, determined the further fate of the Army of the Rhine - retreat and waiting for the moment of its complete defeat. The main culprit for this can be considered Bazina, which left the troops without the necessary leadership and reinforcements. Showing complete inactivity, he brought matters to the point that the army under his command was cut off from communications with Paris and blocked at the Metz fortress by a 150,000-strong Prussian army.

On August 23, a French army of 120 thousand men under the command of the marshal, hastily formed at Chalons, went to the aid of Bazin’s army. McMahon, without any clearly thought out strategic plan. The situation was also complicated by the fact that the advance of the French troops was extremely slow due to forced deviations from the main road in search of food.

The Prussians, advancing the bulk of their troops to the northeast at a much greater speed than MacMahon, captured the crossing of the Meuse River. On August 30, they attacked MacMahon's army near Beaumont and defeated it. The French were driven back to the surrounding area Sedana, where the emperor's headquarters was located. The 5th and 11th Prussian corps bypassed the French left flank and reached the vicinity of Sedan, closing the encirclement ring. Surrounded and disorganized, French troops concentrated in the fortress. He also took refuge there Napoleon III.

Sedan

On the morning of September 1, the Prussian army, without allowing the French to come to their senses, began the battle of Sedan (at that time it numbered 245 thousand people with 813 guns). She attacked the French division defending a village on the left bank of the Meuse. On the right bank, the Prussians managed to occupy the village of La Monselle. At 6 o'clock in the morning McMahon was wounded. The command was taken first by General Ducrot, and then by General Wimpfen. The first planned to break through the encirclement through Mezyar, and the second through Carignan. The road to Carignan was completely cut off, and it was too late to break through to Maizières, and the French army was forced to lay down its arms. By order of the emperor, a white flag was also raised on the central fortress tower of Sedan. The next day, September 2, the act of surrender of the French army was signed.

In the Battle of Sedan, French losses amounted to 3 thousand killed, 14 thousand wounded, 84 thousand prisoners (of which 63 thousand surrendered in the Sedan fortress). Another 3 thousand soldiers and officers were interned in Belgium. The Prussians and their allies lost 9 thousand people killed and wounded. More than 100 thousand captured French soldiers, officers, generals led by Napoleon III, 17 thousand killed and wounded, 3 thousand disarmed on the Belgian border, over 500 guns surrendered.

The Sedan disaster served as an impetus for the revolution on September 4, 1870. The Second Empire fell. France was proclaimed a republic. A government of bourgeois republicans and Orléanists, led by General L. J. Trochu (“government of national defense”) came to power.

Second stage of the war

Since September 1870 the nature of the war has changed. It became fair, liberating on the part of France and aggressive on the part of Germany, which sought to secede Alsace and Lorraine from France. To guide France's war efforts, the so-called government delegation to Tours (then to Bordeaux); from October 9 it was headed by L. Gambetta. Thanks to the active participation of the people in the defense of the country, the Turkish delegation managed to form 11 new corps with a total number of 220 thousand people in a short time. from reservists and mobiles (untrained army reserve).

The strategic position of France was difficult, the 3rd German. the army moved through Reims - Epernay to Paris; to the north, through Laon-Soissons, the Meuse army was advancing. On September 19, Paris was surrounded. There were about 80 thousand regular troops and about 450 thousand national guards and mobiles in the city. The defense of Paris relied on the bastions of the ramparts and 16 forts. The German command did not have sufficient forces for the assault and limited itself to a blockade.

Garrisons of many French. fortresses remaining in the German rear. troops continued to resist. South of Orleans was created Loire Army, in the Amiens area – Northern Army and in the upper Loire - Eastern Army. In the occupied territory of France, a guerrilla struggle of franc-tireurs (free riflemen) began (up to 50 thousand people). However, the operations of the newly created armies of France were carried out without sufficient preparation and were not coordinated with the actions of the Paris garrison and between themselves and did not lead to decisive results. The surrender of Marshal Bazaine, who surrendered a large army in Metz on October 27 without a fight, freed up significant enemy forces.

At the end of November, German troops pushed the Northern Army back from Amiens to Arras, and in January 1871 they defeated it at Saint-Quentin. In early November, the Loire Army carried out a successful attack on Orleans, but in early December and January 1871 it was defeated. In November, the Eastern Army launched an offensive from Besançon to the east, but in January 1871 it was defeated west of Belfort and retreated to Besançon, and then part of it retreated to Swiss territory and was interned. Attempts by the Parisian garrison to break through the blockade ring also ended in failure. In general, the “government of national defense” was unable to organize an effective rebuff to the enemy. Attempts to find support and assistance abroad were unsuccessful. Passivity and indecisive action contributed to the further defeat of France.

On January 18, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles. The Prussian king became Emperor of Germany.

End of the war. Truce and peace

The capitulation of Paris took place on January 28, 1871. The Trochu-Favre government fully accepted the difficult and humiliating demands of the winner for France: payment of 200 million francs indemnity within two weeks, surrender of most of the Parisian forts, field guns of the Parisian garrison and other means of resistance.

On February 26, a preliminary peace treaty was signed at Versailles. On March 1, German troops entered Paris and occupied part of the city. After receiving news of the ratification (March 1) of the preliminary treaty by the French National Assembly, they were withdrawn from the French capital on March 3.

The government's anti-people policy and the sharp deterioration in the situation of the working people led to a revolutionary explosion. On March 18, a popular uprising won in Paris (Paris Commune, massacres, Sacré-Coeur). In the fight against the Paris Commune, the German occupiers assisted the counter-revolutionary Versailles government (from February 1871 it was headed by A. Thiers). On May 28, the Commune fell, drowned in blood.

According to the Peace of Frankfurt 1871 (the agreement was signed on May 10), France transferred Alsace and the north-eastern part of Lorraine to Germany and pledged to pay 5 billion francs. indemnity (until March 2, 1874), until payment of which Germans were located in part of the country. occupation forces. The French government assumed all costs of maintaining the German occupation forces.

Conclusion

No one in Europe had any illusions about the durability of the peace treaty concluded in Frankfurt am Main. Germany understood that the results of the war would only lead to increased Fraco-German antagonism. France suffered not only a military defeat, but also a national insult. Revanchism was to capture the minds of many subsequent generations of the French. Having won the war, Germany achieved:
A) unification, transformation into a strong centralized state,
B) weakening France as much as possible in order to gain the strategic advantages necessary for success in the inevitable future war.

Alsace and Lorraine gave Germany more than just economic benefits. Thus, Alsace was of great defensive importance for Germany, because the offensive from France was now complicated by the chain of the Vosges Mountains. And Lorraine provided a springboard for an attack on France and access to Paris.

The Franco-Prussian War influenced not only the further development of relations between France and Germany, but also the entire course of history. Relative stability in Europe until 1871 was ensured by the fact that in the center of the European continent there was one strong state - France, which was surrounded by weak and small states acting as a “buffer”. This prevented the clash of interests of large states that did not have common borders. After the end of the war of 1871, France found itself surrounded by 2 warlike states that completed the unification (Germany and Italy).