Russia: return to Transcaucasia. Foreign and domestic policy of Russia in the North Caucasus
Medoev, Dmitry Nikolaevich
Academic degree:
PhD in Political Science
Place of thesis defense:
HAC specialty code:
Speciality:
Political problems of international relations and global development
Number of pages:
CHAPTER I. MAIN STAGES OF POLICY FORMATION
RUSSIA IN THE TRANSCAUCASIA.
§1. EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS.
§2. RELATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH THE TRANSCAUCASIAN COUNTRIES AT THE PRESENT STAGE.
2.1 RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN.
2.2 RUSSIA AND ARMENIA.
2.3 RUSSIA AND GEORGIA
§3. POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATIONS IN THE CAUCASUS
CHAPTER II. CASPIAN OIL AS POLITICAL
FACTOR IN REGIONAL RELATIONS.
§1. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF TRANSPORTING HYDROCARBONS OF THE CASPIAN BASIN TO THE WORLD MARKET
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION BY
TERRITORIES OF RUSSIA
1.2 THE PROBLEM OF TRANSIT THROUGH THE TERRITORY OF IRAN.
1.3 TURKEY POLITICS AND ISSUES
OIL TRANSPORTATION.
1A CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS REGION AND THEIR IMPACT ON TRANSPORTATION
CASPIAN OIL.
§2. INTERESTS OF TURKEY AND IRAN IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS.
CHAPTER III. INTERESTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND POLICIES
RUSSIA IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS. SECURITY ISSUES.
§1. US AND NATO POLICY IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS.
1.1 RELATIONS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES AND AZERBAIJAN.
1.2 RELATIONS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES AND ARMENIA
1.3 GEORGIA AND NATO.
§ 2. NORTH CAUCASUS IN THE SYSTEM
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
§3. ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS
AND THE ROLE OF RUSSIA IN THEIR SETTLEMENT.
Introduction of the dissertation (part of the abstract) On the topic "Russian Policy in the Transcaucasus: Problems and Prospects"
In the politics of the Russian Federation, the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, as a whole, occupy one of the priority places. The importance of a comprehensive study of this key region is becoming increasingly obvious, given the fact that without a deep analysis of a number of issues it is impossible to understand the ongoing processes that determine both the main trends in the development of the Caucasian countries and the character of the peoples inhabiting this vast territory.
The special conditions of the historical and political development of the Caucasus have determined the exceptional degree of ethno-national and religious diversity that characterizes the region as a whole. In this regard, the essence and main directions of development of the situation in the Caucasus, where socio-economic, national-territorial, religious, geopolitical and many other characteristic features are so strongly intertwined, are of considerable interest.
Since ancient times, the Caucasus has been the most important geostrategic region that separated Europe from Asia. At the same time, located at the junction of two continents, it simultaneously served as a connecting link between them.
The main characteristics of the Caucasus are largely determined by such parameters as geographical location, territorial, climatic and other features, which throughout the history of the region have had and continue to have a profound impact on its ethno-national composition and further development.
IN modern conditions The regional factor is becoming increasingly relevant and important, playing an increasing role in the life of various countries and peoples, as well as in international relations in general. Evidence of this is the turbulent events of the last decade. The Caucasus is once again turning into the epicenter of large-scale actions and processes of global significance. Complex knots of local, regional and global interests of the Russian Federation and the USA, Turkey and Iran, European and Asian countries are intertwined here.
From an economic point of view, Russia and the Caucasus are a long-established single economic organism. The territories and regions of Russia adjacent to the Caucasus have always functioned as important economic units of the country in close cooperation with the entire Caucasus region. And now the peoples of Russia and the Caucasus are painfully aware of the violation and severance of these economic ties. Instability in the Caucasus directly affects the lives of both Russians and the population of the Caucasian states.
Today, some states, taking advantage of the temporary weakening of Russia, are trying by all means to oust it from the Transcaucasus and establish their control over this important region, primarily over its oil wealth.
Russia defends its national interests in the Caucasus, using all available means - diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, military. Russia's political and diplomatic activity in this direction is multifaceted and is of a constant, constructive nature.
Taking into account these and other aspects this topic seems relevant and interesting for research.
This work sets a goal: to show the development of Russia’s relations with the countries of Transcaucasia in the general context of the interests of other regional countries, starting from the period when the entire Caucasus was integral part single state, and to the present, when, after the disintegration of the USSR, new independent states were formed in the region.
To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set:
1) analysis of historical literature on the formation of Russian policy in the Caucasus region;
2) determining the main priorities and goals of the Russian Federation’s policy in the Transcaucasus, based on the main documents signed after 1991;
3) study of qualitatively new trends and problems in the relations of the Russian Federation with the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and Georgia, including the role of Russia in resolving the main problems of the region, especially focusing on the resolution of conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
4) characterization and analysis of the factor of Caspian oil in interstate relations between Russia and the countries of the region, as well as their struggle for ways to transport it, highlighting the role of Turkey, Iran and other world powers in the Caucasus.
5) based on factual material, show that the countries of Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus economically constitute a single whole and that only on the basis of their close cooperation and integration can mutual prosperity and stability be achieved in the region, highlighting the importance of Russian diplomacy in the political settlement of interethnic conflicts in Transcaucasia.
6) based on the findings obtained, try to predict possible scenarios for the development of relations between the Russian Federation and the countries of the Transcaucasus for the near future, and determine ways to solve the difficult problems facing Russian politics and diplomacy at the present time.
Review of sources and literature
This work was based on the Constitution and federal laws, Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, joint documents of the CIS countries, in particular, the Almaty Declaration and Protocol to the agreement on the creation of the CIS signed on December 21, 1991; documents from various meetings within the CIS, primarily their decisions on Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the creation and functioning of peacekeeping forces in Transcaucasia.
The policy statements of the first President of the Russian Federation B.N. were also used. Yeltsin on Russia’s relations with the CIS countries; materials of the Kislovodsk meeting of the Heads of State of Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia with the participation of leaders of 12 constituent entities of the Russian Federation on June 3, 1996; materials of official visits of the current President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to Azerbaijan, Armenia, other Commonwealth countries, as well as the decisions of the latest summits of the heads of the CIS.
For a complete socio-economic and political science analysis materials were also used international organizations: UN, OSCE (reports of the Minsk Group and the Mission to Georgia), and a number of non-governmental organizations working in the region.
Along with the above program documents, the source study basis of the study was made up of Russian foreign policy documents published in the Diplomatic Bulletin of the Russian Foreign Ministry from 1992 to 2002, as well as documents and decisions of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, published in the information bulletin of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the CIS " Commonwealth" from 1992 to 2002.
When analyzing Russia's bilateral relations with the Transcaucasian states, in particular, treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation with each of these countries were widely used.
In general, all of the above documents provide a fairly complete picture of the dynamics of the development of relations between Russia and the Transcaucasian states in all main areas since the formation of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and Georgia. An analysis of these numerous documents and a comparison of their texts and wording with reality shows that the vast majority of them, unfortunately, are only partially implemented.
The study also used and took into account statements of heads of government, ministers of foreign affairs and other officials of Russia, their press conferences and briefings, as well as statements and statements of leaders and officials of the Transcaucasian states.
Numerous scientific publications and analytical articles in scientific and political journals " International life», « World economy and international relations"and others.
The work used documents from the United States and other states, statements and statements of their leaders and official representatives regarding the Caucasus, Transcaucasian states, and events in the Caucasus. The involvement of such sources and documents clearly shows the degree of US penetration into this region, their far-reaching plans, as well as the direct danger of this Western expansion for Russian interests in the Caucasus.
An important source of factual material on the issues of relations between Russia and the Transcaucasian states were newspapers, magazines and other periodicals of Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, as well as the USA, Great Britain and others Western countries, in particular the magazines "Oil and Gas", "The Economist", "Newsweek", "Time", the newspapers "The Wall Street Journal", "The Financial Times", "The Times", "The Daily Telegraph".
Interesting material was used from Iranian periodicals: “Ettelaat”, “Jomhuri-ye Eslami”, “Iran”.
Conclusion of the dissertation on the topic "Political problems of international relations and global development", Medoev, Dmitry Nikolaevich
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, we can draw the following conclusions regarding the processes of formation of relations between Russia and the Transcaucasian states after the disintegration of the USSR and make a forecast regarding some prospects for their development.
1. Over the past eight years, something has been done without which it would have been simply impossible to do business in the region. The formation of the political and legal framework for Russia’s bilateral relations with each of the Transcaucasian states began literally from scratch. More than three hundred interstate treaties and agreements on joint cooperation in various fields of activity have been signed.
The main difficulty that Russia has to face in the Transcaucasus appears to be that Russia's relations with these states, which have solid foundation three hundred years of good neighborliness between the Russian and Transcaucasian peoples, at the new stage were not supported economically due to the severance of economic ties. The economic component of Russian policy in Transcaucasia was and remains extremely weak.
2. Russia has done everything possible in Transcaucasia to promote regional stability and resolve conflict situations. The entire triad of conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) was brought out of the military stage into the political stage. Russia makes the main contribution to peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with its military contingents and financial support. All agreements on the political settlement of each of these three conflicts were reached thanks to Russian efforts.
3. The dynamics of the development of relations between Russia and the Transcaucasian states, despite all the efforts of Russian diplomacy, turned out to be far from those initial optimistic assessments of the prospects and forecasts for integration within the CIS and economic recovery, etc., which were given in the first CIS documents and somewhat later in the Kislovodsk Declaration 1996. In fact, centrifugal forces and tendencies are taking over throughout the entire CIS, including in Transcaucasia. There is a further retreat of the Transcaucasian states from Russia. The process of reorienting the policies of Azerbaijan and Georgia towards the United States and NATO is gaining momentum.
This will make it even more difficult to defend Russia’s national interests not only in the Transcaucasus, but also in the North Caucasus, where we can expect the destabilizing role of Chechnya to increase. In this regard, there is an increasing need to actively use Russia’s remaining effective levers to influence the development of the situation.
One thing is clear: without restoring the Russian economy and consistently pursuing an offensive foreign policy line, we cannot seriously talk about our ability to defend our positions in this vital region.
4. The leadership of Azerbaijan and Georgia makes statements about their intention to seek admission of their countries to NATO membership, counting on NATO intervention in the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia under the Bosnian and Kosovo scenarios.
5. The example of Georgia, which during one year, 1996, made a complete turnaround in foreign policy sympathies
Tbilisi from Moscow to Washington and has essentially become an ally of Azerbaijan in plans to transport large Caspian oil bypassing Russian territory, shows how much Russia’s position in the region has weakened, and what kind of mobilization of forces and resources and dynamism of political decisions is required to turn the situation in this region in in favor of Russia, to defend its rights and potential to exist in the 21st century as a full-fledged Caucasian power.
6. The resource potential of the Caspian Sea, according to current estimates, without fundamentally changing the world balance of oil and gas, can nevertheless turn the export capabilities of the Caspian states into comparable ones with the export capabilities of Russia.
Transcaucasia may remain a zone of increased instability for a long time if the strategic balance of forces and interests of both the peoples living in this region and Russia are not restored there.
7. A separate decision requires determining the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Until all coastal states finally resolve this issue at the negotiating table, the potential for conflicts will not only remain, but may increase, since there are no generally accepted legal grounds for the territorial division of the Caspian Sea into national sectors.
8. The fundamental problem is the issue of transporting oil and gas from the Caspian fields. A complex geopolitical structure has developed in the region. None of the Caspian states today has economic, political, or military capabilities sufficient to unilaterally resolve issues of developing deposits and transporting hydrocarbon raw materials.
A multipolar regional system has emerged, the participants of which are bound by uneasy relations of cooperation and competition. In it, in turn, the Türkiye-Azerbaijan axis continues to form.
The claims of Turkey and Iran to leadership in the Islamic world undoubtedly affect Russia's economic and political interests. It is significant that Turkey, which does not have access to the Caspian Sea, called itself a “Caspian country” at the meeting of the foreign ministers of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Turkey, held on March 1-2, 1998 in Ankara and Istanbul. At this meeting, she openly made claims to influence in Transcaucasia and Central Asia109.
9. In their expansion in the Caspian region, Western countries are seeking to expand the number of participants in solving Caspian problems and are pushing forward the ideas they themselves developed “ geopolitical pluralism"in the Eurasian space, "equality of rights for all participants in the development of the resource potential of the Caspian Sea, including non-Caspian states.
Behind these initiatives, however, lies the West’s desire to prevent Russia from using its significant potential for the development of the region’s natural resources and at the same time the desire to provide Western, primarily American oil companies, with the opportunity to take control of the oil and gas reserves available in the region.
109 P. Vlasov. Oil and the Koran. "Expert", No. 9, 1998, p. 52.
10. International relations in the region as a whole are complicated by the situations that have developed in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this regard, it seems vitally necessary to establish a strategic partnership between Russia and the countries of the region and Transcaucasia in the first place.
Without interaction with Russia, it is difficult for the Transcaucasian republics to count on maintaining real state sovereignty. Just as without Russia’s participation in peacekeeping operations, the Transcaucasian countries are unlikely to be able to independently resolve internal conflicts and restore lost stability.
List of references for dissertation research candidate of political sciences Medoev, Dmitry Nikolaevich, 2003
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V.V. Degoev
Russian policy in Transcaucasia in the first half of the 19th century: some
results
As the Transcaucasian territories were annexed or conquered in the first third of the 19th century.
Russia faced the problem of managing them. It was necessary to find such a form of imperial
presence in this region, which will, first of all, ensure social
political stability, which is necessary, among other things, to solve current and future
foreign policy tasks. The matter was complicated by a number of factors. From a language point of view,
religion, culture, internal structure, Transcaucasian state and
parastatals were heterogeneous. Inside them they often reigned
fragmentation and strife, and between them - enmity and rivalry, most often for the “local”
hegemony. Administrative and judicial uniformity, and even then conditional, existed
only within one territorial-political unit - be it a kingdom, a principality,
khanate, union of communities (etc.). However, the benefit from such uniformity, as a rule, was
little, due to the arbitrariness of rulers and feudal lords, the chaos in land relations and
taxation, civil strife and robbery.
These circumstances both created problems for Russia and helped them
allow. Local social elites and ordinary people gradually began to see the empire as
supreme power, arbitrator, supraclass and supranational instrument of organization
life according to rational rules. Almost all social strata sooner or later
come to realize the comforts of existence in a new, imperial order,
putting an end to the “war of all against all.” It is order, organization, system, how
synonyms of peace, security and prosperity are gradually becoming key for people,
vital ideas. The universal and ever-increasing need for this way of being
forced St. Petersburg to look for ways to satisfy it and suggested strategic
the direction in which Russian policy in Transcaucasia was supposed to develop.
However, this in no way detracts from the complexity and scale of the challenges facing Russia.
tasks, and in no way justifies the miscalculations she made.
It immediately became clear to the Russian authorities in Transcaucasia that the unification of this region according to
the imperial-provincial model is a risky, expensive and ineffective activity. In
In any case, such a process – historical in its content – required time.
Petersburg was in no hurry to force it, although different views were expressed on how
speed and in what forms should the involvement of Transcaucasia in the imperial
system.
2
The Russian administration in the annexed territories wore predominantly
military and emergency nature. Generals and officers had to deal with
civil affairs, reconcile socio-political elites, improve cities,
build roads, etc. Russian soldiers were used as cheap and highly qualified
work force.
The notorious principle of “divide and conquer”, which is customary, although often
groundlessly, is associated with Russian policy in Transcaucasia, has lost its rational
meaning. Previously, for example, in the 18th century, it - and even then in certain situations - was useful
Petersburg. Now that this mosaic region is under the scepter of the king, the task
was not a split, but a unification of disparate elements in the name of achieving stability and
controllability.
The problem of nonviolent integration faced Russia the more acutely, the more clearly
there was a shortage of Russian troops in Transcaucasia and a lack of management experience
newly acquired lands. It can be said that flexible and cautious approaches to this
problems arose partly spontaneously, under the influence of the realities of life that were not conducive to the method
cutting the intra-Caucasian Gordian knots. There was clear understanding on the part of Russia
the harmful consequences of the rapid breakdown of the traditional socio-economic, political
and cultural way of life. Hence the tolerance for local administrative diversity.
Imperial power was not introduced everywhere, but even where it was introduced, it often carried
nominal character, making itself felt only by those who openly demonstrated
disloyalty to her.
The motives for such a policy were based not only on objective difficulties, but also
instinctive and completely understandable reluctance of the Caucasian governors to delve deeply and
get involved in the complex intricacies of local life. Ultimately that's what
the circumstance became, oddly enough, a common source for two opposing concepts
integration strategy, which received the code names “centralism” and “regionalism”.
The “centralists” advocated the speediest imperial-administrative unification of Transcaucasia;
“regionalists” proposed to act gradually, without rushing to abolish those local
features that over time will either die out on their own or will be relatively
painlessly and organically replaced by new political forms.
These two approaches have never existed in their pure form, and therefore should not be
exaggerate the intensity of the struggle between them. What is stated as a “victory of centralism” in
the second half of the 19th century, is in fact much more ambiguous
phenomenon. The “regionalist” component, as an inevitable product of healthy opportunism,
has always been and is still present in Russian policy in the Caucasus.
3
Introduction of imperial administration into Russian possessions in Transcaucasia (where it is
took place) did not mean that Russian provinces were made from the annexed territories. Life
forced us to look for flexible approaches. For government service, civil and military,
representatives of local peoples were recruited, and not necessarily belonging to
social elite or Christian faith. The main criteria were loyalty to Russia and
professional suitability. They received the privileges of the ruling class, thanks to which
the formation of the new Transcaucasian political elite proceeded relatively smoothly. Them
this marked the beginning of the process of the emergence among the non-Russian population of the imperial
identity. This trend developed in parallel with the growth of national self-awareness,
most often getting along with him, but sometimes replacing him. In socio-psychological terms
the willingness of the local elite to identify themselves with the empire was determined by the desire
belong to the corporation of the chosen, share its spirit and values, enjoy its benefits and
symbolism. Grounds for moral doubts related to the problem of responsibility to
by its peoples, was practically absent. The fact is that for part of the new ruling class
this problem never existed. The more scrupulous could console their consciences by
that they do not betray the people's interests, but protect them.
Co-optation of Georgians and Armenians into the “colonial” management system and education in them
The imperial worldview was facilitated by religious community with the Russians. In the case of
Muslim Turks achieved the same goal religious tolerance Russians.
Moreover, in relation to Islam, the Russian government took an emphatically
protective stance, with the clear intention of attracting the Muslim clergy to
implementation of the imperial political course. Later, in light of the events of the Caucasian War, many
government officials in Russia and the Caucasus will regard this as a misguided social bet,
brought negative results.
However, the main work of the integration mechanism still took place in secular
sphere. In the first half of the 19th century. in Transcaucasia an influential layer of enlightened
"colonial" bureaucracy, represented by people who were filled with high,
a sincere sense of moral responsibility for the “civilization” task entrusted to them,
sovereign mission. Among them there were many who understood, appreciated and even admired
before the Caucasian culture, recognizing its right to original development under imperial
auspices. Far ahead of their time, they abandoned the arrogant Kulturtraeger view
on the “native” spiritual life, from the evil temptation to compare it with Russian-European
values in the context of the categories “higher-lower”, “better-worse”. They were already with everyone
course of action raised the question not of absorption, but of cultivation of the phenomenon that was
aptly named by the Canadian historian G. Rhinelander as a national-imperial culture. And in
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Ultimately, it is this and no other formula - despite the mass of objective and
subjective obstacles - will triumph in the second half of the 19th century and, even more so, in the century
twentieth.
There is both a paradox and a logic in the fact that an enlightened bureaucracy is born and begins
their active civic activities under the toughest, most imperial-minded
(in the eyes of many - the most odious) Caucasian governors - P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P.
Ermolov. Professional military men brought up in the appropriate spirit, these generals
saw their purpose primarily in establishing internal order in the region and protecting it
from external threats, which from now on becomes a security problem for Russia, that is -
priority problem of any state. Hence the widespread use of power
methods. However, they were not an end in themselves and were used only in cases where peaceful
the remedies did not work, although, of course, the question remains far from idle - to what extent this or that
the other situation was truly hopeless.
P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov realized that, in addition to the army, another one was needed
toolkit to fight against disorder. It is with this pragmatic goal that they
created a very cohesive colonial-bureaucratic corporation in Transcaucasia, guided by
the message that its effectiveness will be directly proportional to its enlightenment. Special
patronage was enjoyed by those “cadres” who, with their views and creative
potential most of all corresponded to the ideas of the governors about the essence and form of civilizational
Russian missions.
At the same time, P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov could not always completely control
the process of forming an enlightened type of bureaucracy. Often he took spontaneous
character. Thus, the “proconsul of the Caucasus”, of course, had nothing to do with the appearance in
the region under his jurisdiction of the brilliant galaxy of Decembrist figures exiled there
movements. But it cannot be denied that, largely thanks to A.P. Ermolov, the Decembrists
got the opportunity to realize their talents in a new field for them and play
a colossal role in the Russian-Transcaucasian spiritual rapprochement. Their labors laid the foundations
the basis for the great cultural synthesis that bore such brilliant fruit in the second half
XIX century and especially in the twentieth century.
Largely thanks to the high patronage of A.P. Ermolov, the
that special spiritual environment in which the formation of the brilliant Transcaucasian
intelligentsia. The governor put the system of public education in
Transcaucasia. Before Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani youths - regardless of their
social status and religion - prospects for obtaining excellent
education, not only in Tiflis (then the cultural capital of the Caucasus), but also in
5
St. Petersburg and Moscow. Along with the prestige of the imperial education system, the
demand for it. According to G. Rhinelander, by the beginning of the 1830s. Transcaucasian intelligentsia
I experienced an increased appetite for everything Russian.
The decade of M. S. Vorontsov as the Caucasian governor was famously
sense of a “golden age” for Transcaucasia. An experienced general and a talented administrator with
a rich list of achievements in the development southern Russia, he actually received complete freedom
actions in the Caucasus and was subordinate only to Nicholas I. This region acquired something similar to
status of a “state within a state”, which was recognition from St. Petersburg
the need to take into account its specifics and not force the process of its “governmentization” according to
standard imperial pattern. Few people understood this complex task and were able to
cope with it better than M. S. Vorontsov.
In social, intercorporate and interethnic conflicts that took place in
Transcaucasia, M. S. Vorontsov invariably occupied the position of an arbitrator, impartial
a conciliator, a supra-class authority. This concerned disputes between Christians and
Muslims, Georgians and Armenians, Russians and non-Russians, aristocracy and merchants,
officials and the population. The governor instilled in the warring parties and
Transcaucasian society as a whole has a broader, imperial view of things. He saw it
a way to moderate antagonisms, resolve (or prevent) a conflict situation, educate
people have a rational-egoistic understanding that benefits for the empire are benefits for
each of her subjects.
M. S. Vorontsov - thanks to his personal qualities and dedication to his work, he infected
universalist spirit of most of the Transcaucasian social elites. They are sincere and
voluntarily accepted imperial ideals and readily offered their help in the field
putting them into practice.
M. S. Vorontsov left behind a whole “colonial-bureaucratic”
class made up of representatives different nations, religions, social classes and
crops All of them were united not only by corporate solidarity, but also by the growing imperial
self-awareness with elements of sovereign patriotism, on the one hand, and “internal Russian
cosmopolitanism,” on the other.
Under M. S. Vorontsov, national-imperial culture in Transcaucasia entered the stage
heyday One of the main prerequisites for this was a personal, deeply respectful
M. S. Vorontsov’s attitude to the spiritual heritage of the Transcaucasian peoples. Entrusted to him
The region experienced trusteeship from 1845 to 1854. an entire era in which elements of the Renaissance
intertwined with completely new cultural phenomena.
6
The question of whether the famous Uvarov triad is suitable - “autocracy,
Orthodoxy, nationality" - for Transcaucasia and to what extent, was very relevant. This formula
contained the idea of a strong individual power uniting a heterogeneous society and standing
over it. It was precisely this kind of power that deeply impressed those Caucasian peoples who once
knew it, but lost it, and those who, having never had anything like it, strived for
autocracy, as a certain political ideal. (In this, by the way, one of the sources is hidden
temporary success of Shamil’s authoritarian project.)
The second component of the triad - “Orthodoxy” - had a more limited area
applications. Only the
Georgians, Armenians and part of the North Caucasian population professed Christianity.
As for “nationality,” this concept was generally inappropriate in relation to
multiethnic Caucasus.
Nevertheless, the Russian authorities - sometimes voluntarily and sometimes involuntarily - carried out a large and
unsuccessful work to adapt the “theory of official nationality” to the Caucasian
specificity, or more precisely, precisely that in this theory that could be adapted.
In relation to the Caucasus, the Uvarov triad is appropriately rethought and
adapted - was, in principle, a universal ideological means of education
imperial supra-ethnic and supra-confessional identity. Feeling of loyalty
to the Russian Tsar, combined with a sense of belonging to a “superpower”, slowly but surely
penetrated into all layers of Transcaucasian society. Imperial identity served as a common
in a sense, a protective shell for those being born (or reborn)
“national” identities, to the emergence of which socio-cultural policy
Russia was most directly involved. This policy is often not very well defined.
the correct, at least very conditional, term “Russification”. In fact
a much broader, more capacious and complex civilizational process was taking place, deserving
in our opinion, a different name. We may be talking more about an “imperial
self-identification" of an individual, class, society, formed under the influence of specific
material and spiritual incentives, a certain cultural and ideological environment and
presupposing a conscious and voluntary choice (otherwise what kind of
"self-identification"?).
The merit of M. S. Vorontsov is that he understood this himself and taught this understanding to his
subordinates, many of whom, however, were no less insightful than their boss.
The Caucasian governor, unlike some predecessors, did not believe that the local
peoples must perceive the benefits of joining the empire as self-evident. He
7
gave the opportunity to actually verify this through the active involvement of Georgians, Armenians,
Azerbaijanis into the economic, social and cultural life of Russia.
At the same time, M. S. Vorontsov was a resolute opponent of artificial planting
imperial forms, preferring to make the process of integration natural, gradual and
organic character. It got to the point that the most zealous Georgian adherents
“Russification” was begged to preserve, at least for a while, useful local laws and customs.
The governor created an atmosphere among his subordinates, which itself formed
something like “Caucasian patriotism”, which united people not by ethnic origin
or religion, but a feeling of involvement in the great work of creating something unprecedented. In
Thanks largely to M. S. Vorontsov, both Russians and Caucasians came to understand that
The Caucasus is their common concern and common destiny, that Russia is not a temporary worker and has come here forever.
Perhaps one of the most beneficial results of this “discovery” was a certain
a moral mood that inspired both Russians and non-Russians alike with a simple idea: everything that
what they do (or don’t do) in the Caucasus belongs and will belong to them and their descendants.
It was precisely this mood that forced the Transcaucasian “governors general” to create
material and spiritual environment for a prosperous life.
* * *
Being essentially a deep “tectonic” shift, the process of integration of Transcaucasia with
Russia had a complex dialectic and did not proceed without costs for both sides - inevitable and,
often tragic. For the Russian authorities to study the local situation and to adapt
Sometimes it took too much time to get to her. And before they could find
the optimal path, they managed to make serious mistakes that caused negative
social reaction. IN in a certain sense Russia's exploration of the Caucasus took place throughout
throughout the 19th century and continued into the twentieth century. Among those Russian military officers and administrators,
who on duty had to deal with this region, not everyone was given
understand it truly deeply. People who have such a gift should be sought out quickly
among those who rushed to the Caucasus at the behest of their hearts and their creative nature.
During the establishment of Russia in Transcaucasia, a certain period of difficult
mutual adaptation of different cultures. Russian generals, considering their “civilizing
missionary" as an absolute good, sometimes identified it with the absolute right to bring
to the Caucasian peoples “the light of reason and enlightenment.” They did not always have enough understanding of what
ignorance of Russian and French, inability to use a fork and knife, custom
sitting on the floor, cross-legged, and other “wildness” is not barbarism, but only evidence
belonging to another culture, in its own way no less, if not richer, than the European one.
8
The impression of “lack of culture” became more intrusive, the more clearly it was revealed
the dissimilarity of the Caucasian world from the Russian one, including due to the chaotic
the state in which local socio-political and economic life was.
Hence the desire to quickly restore order, which is presented as another
an indispensable attribute of civilization. This desire gave rise to haste and rash
actions in the field of social, educational and religious policy.
The strategy of “divide and conquer” was not always successful: in the end it
increased the disorganization of Caucasian societies, preventing their evolution into a “civilized”
direction.
Petersburg, and after it the Caucasian administrators, clearly underestimated
economic component of integration. Local “system” (“systems”) of management
was either patriarchal or feudal in nature, which in reality was almost one and the same
same. The main merit of Russia was that this “system” received protection from external
danger and internal chaos. However, so favorable conditions not on their own
gave impetus to development, they rather preserved this area social life at that
level, which was quite enough for normal existence, but too little for
emergence of economic need in Russia and for the transformation of Transcaucasia into
an organic part of the empire.
Until the end of the Caucasian War, the economic potential of the region was virtually
remained unclaimed, even to the extent that it could have been mastered by an underdeveloped,
Compared to the West, Russian industry. Transcaucasia was a “colony” that did not know
colonial exploitation, which made it a loss-making acquisition for the Russian economy.
However, the geostrategic importance of the region paid for all the costs of its maintenance, raising
in the eyes of St. Petersburg to such a value, or rather “super value” category, on
which no imperial money or imperial troops were spared. Already in the first third of the 19th century.
gradually the conditions were being prepared so that in the future - albeit not close -
the geopolitical significance of Transcaucasia was converted into a specific economic
a result that successfully patched one of the “black holes” that was draining Russian finances for
over a long period of time.
The personnel and conceptual support of Russian politics left much to be desired
in Transcaucasia. During the period from 1801 to 1830 there were nine governors there. Of these, perhaps
only two - P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov - had a clear military and political
strategy, but they did not have enough time and funds to implement their plan. Other
the governors did not have a consistent and long-term program, acting rather situationally,
as problems of greater or less complexity arise here and there. They are not
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burdened themselves with creative tasks, preferring to carefully carry out often inappropriate
or hopelessly belated instructions from St. Petersburg, where they had little knowledge of the nuances of the Transcaucasian
situation and, perhaps, were waiting for proactive proposals from the scene. Eventually -
lack of a systematic approach, against the background of which illusions, experiments, miscalculations and
disappointments.
Although in the second echelon of the army (aka civilian) leadership in Transcaucasia
there were many capable people, yet the adoption of the most important decisions did not depend on them
decisions and development of strategic ideas for the long term. Concerning
the rest of the military and official apparatus, then there were all sorts of people in it: those who
conscientiously fulfilled his duty, imbued with deep respect for the “native” world and
thirst to understand him, and those who came to Transcaucasia “to catch happiness and ranks” are careerists,
bribe-takers, daredevils and outcasts of various stripes, who despised both the region and its inhabitants, and,
sometimes, themselves. They have committed many crimes - theft, murder, violence,
betrayal, sacrilege, insult to national feelings. It would be too much
it is a beautiful delusion to believe that their deeds did not in the least tarnish the image
Russia in the consciousness of the Transcaucasian peoples.
* * *
Despite these and other gross miscalculations that always accompany the “colonial”
politics, the process of imperial integration in Transcaucasia gained strength and acquired character
fundamental and unique phenomenon. This happened largely because in Russia
the image of the empire did not symbolize the domination of one nation over others and not the typical
relations between the metropolis and its colonies. He embodied a super-ideology,
voluntary self-identification, a state of mind and soul of a person, regardless of his faith,
ethnic origin, social class, level of education and culture. And in
in this sense, there were enough people with “imperial identity” among non-Russians and non-Orthodox,
among gentlemen and common people, among bourgeois and Bolshevik politicians.
Despite all the excesses, the transformation of form and essence in Transcaucasia was carried out gradually -
even where social receptivity to the new was extremely high. National
color was not repressed or suppressed, but organically merged with imperial culture,
complementing and enriching it. Not only did the Caucasians borrow from the Russians, but also vice versa: the Russians
willingly flaunted Caucasian paraphernalia, were proud of their “Caucasianness” as some kind of special
identity. The “Russian” theme penetrated deeply into Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani
literature, and the Caucasus became an irresistible source of inspiration for Russian poets and
writers.
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Due to its syncretic nature, Russian imperial culture (in its broad
sense of the word) served in the Caucasus as a kind of relay of European ideas and
values. In this regard, Russia's policy was a type of Westernization. In the old
Caucasian house, the “window to Europe” was cut by the Russian “imperialists” and turned to
north.
By the beginning of the 60s. XIX century, despite a number of fruitful results of Russian presence
in the Caucasus, a huge front of “colonial” work still stretched before her -
political, cultural and economic, from which there was no longer any
possibilities. Having created a support area for further imperial construction in the Caucasus,
Russia could not afford to abandon to the mercy of fate a matter that required so many
efforts and sacrifices. The accumulated experience allowed us to protect ourselves from some mistakes, but did not insure against
others. Has irreversible dynamics been achieved in the Russian-Caucasian integration
process - it's hard to say. Contemporaries who answered this question negatively may
seem overly pessimistic. Those who gave an optimistic answer were probably
would have refrained from it if they had known in advance that in the future Russia would face grave consequences in the Caucasus
tests.
The Russian administration in the annexed territories wore predominantly
military and emergency nature. Generals and officers inevitably had to deal with civil affairs, reconcile socio-political elites, improve cities, build roads, etc. Russian soldiers were used as a cheap and highly qualified labor force.
On the Russian side, it was clear that they understood the disastrous consequences of the rapid breakdown of the traditional socio-economic, political and cultural structure. Hence the tolerance for local administrative diversity. Imperial power was not introduced everywhere, but even where it was introduced, it was often nominal in nature, making itself felt only by those who openly demonstrated disloyalty to it.
Two opposing concepts of integration strategy emerged, which received the conventional names “centralism” and “regionalism”.
The “centralists” advocated the speediest imperial-administrative unification of Transcaucasia; “regionalists” proposed to act gradually, without rushing to abolish local features.
In the Caucasus, Southern Kazakhstan and Crimea, Russia pursued a real colonial policy, brutally oppressing the large indigenous population, mostly Muslim or pagan.
Annexation of Georgia. The policy of tsarism in Georgia
The peculiarity of the situation in the Caucasus was that it was possible to annex Transcaucasia earlier than the mountainous North Caucasus. In 1783, Eastern Georgia (the Kartlin-Kakheti kingdom) came under Russian protection on the basis of the Treaty of Georgievsk, signed by King Heraclius II. Christian Georgia counted on Russian protection against neighboring Muslim powers: Turkey and Iran. The Treaty of Georgievsk guaranteed the inviolability and territorial integrity of the Kartlin-Kakheti kingdom.
However, in 1801, after the death of Tsar George XII, Eastern Georgia was transformed into a province of the Russian Empire.
In 1803-1804 The principalities of Western Georgia: Mingrelia and Imereti became Russian vassals. It was possible to finally annex Imereti to Russia in 1810. In 1810, Abkhazia was annexed to Russia. In 1811, the Gurian Principality submitted to Russia. Despite the attempts of the tsarist government, it was not possible to carry out widespread colonization of Georgia. Therefore, the Russian authorities sought to rely on the local nobility. The “Supreme Georgian Government” was created from Russian officials and Georgian nobles. General P.D., a native of the ancient Georgian aristocracy, became the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops and the “governor-in-chief of Georgia.” Tsitsianov. In 1827, Georgian nobles received equal rights with Russians.
At the same time, a Russification policy was carried out in Georgia. All office work and teaching were conducted in Russian. At the same time, the Georgian nobility was given access to military and civil service in the empire. This is how a layer of serving nobility was formed, closely associated with the Russian autocracy.
In the 30s XIX century Russia began to consider Transcaucasia as an important source of raw materials: cotton, mulberries, grapes, etc. Industrial development in Georgia was restrained in order to ensure supplies of raw materials and a market for Russian enterprises.
After Russian-Turkish war 1828-1829, when there was no longer any fear of Turkish influence in Transcaucasia, the Russification policy intensified. The Russian administration sought to “force the residents there to speak, think and feel in Russian.”
In 1840, a new system of governing Transcaucasia was introduced. The new provincial and district authorities practically no longer included the local nobility. Legal proceedings began to be carried out only on the basis of Russian laws, and local customary law was no longer taken into account. Contributions in kind were replaced by monetary ones, and taxation increased.
The reforms caused discontent among both the tax-paying population and the local nobility. The government commission that investigated its causes admitted that the transformations carried out did not take into account the traditional way of life of the local population.
M.S. was appointed the new governor of the Transcaucasian region. Vorontsov, who returned to the policy of relying on the local nobility. He sought to interest the Georgian nobility in rapprochement with Russia. Over 30 thousand Georgian landowners were confirmed in the ranks of princes and nobles. Vorontsov convinced Nicholas I, who was thinking of softening the dependence of the Georgian countryside on the nobles, “to leave the question of the attitude of landowners to peasants unchanged.”
Accession of Azerbaijan and Armenia
If the annexation of Christian Georgia was partly voluntary, then Muslim Azerbaijan was conquered by Russia during the wars with the Shah's Iran (Persia). Part of Azerbaijan formally went to Russia under the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813.
Already during the war with Iran, which began in 1804, Russia captured and liquidated four Azerbaijani khanates. The remaining khans retained their possessions, recognizing themselves as vassals of Russia. But in 1819-1826. Russian commander-in-chief in the Caucasus A.P. Ermolov destroyed a number of khanates, power in which passed into the hands of Russian officers and officials. Even the Russian senators who inspected the region in 1830 recognized that the administration there was a regime of military occupation. The possessions of khans hostile to Russia (3/4 of all land) were confiscated. The peasants who inhabited them had to bear duties in favor of the Russian treasury. The lands owned by the Azerbaijani beks began to be taken away in order to transfer them to Russian nobles.
Only in 1846, under Vorontsov, this course was stopped. The new governor convinced Nicholas I that it was unreasonable to turn the Azerbaijani nobility into a consistent enemy of Russia. All lands that belonged to the beks at the time of Azerbaijan’s annexation to Russia were recognized as their hereditary possessions.
In 1828, after the conclusion of the Turkmanchay Peace with Iran, Eastern Armenia went to Russia. In an effort to win over the Armenians who were under Turkish rule, the Russian government initially pursued a cautious policy in Armenia. The authorities of the “Armenian region” included representatives of the local nobility and clergy; the taxes collected from the local population were small. Behind Armenian Church her land holdings were recognized. However, already in the 30s. taxation almost doubled. In the 1840s The Armenian region was turned into a province, and general imperial laws were extended to its territory.
On the territory of Armenia, the cultivation of typical colonial crops was encouraged: cotton, tobacco, silk. The resulting raw materials were exported to Russia, and the local processing industry did not develop.
Thus, Russian policy in Transcaucasia was aimed at creating a colonial-type economy, Russification, and maintaining imperial domination over the indigenous population with partial reliance on traditional local elites.
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According to the peace treaty signed in October 1813, the entry into Russia of Dagestan, Georgia, Imereti, Guria, Mingrelia and Abkhazia, as well as Karabakh, Derbent, Kuba, Baku and a number of other khanates was finally secured. Russia has achieved the exclusive right to have a navy in the Caspian Sea. Russian merchants could now trade freely in Iran. A year earlier, Turkey, under the Bukhara Peace Treaty, recognized Russia’s right to all Caucasian lands that voluntarily became part of it.
According to the Turkmanchay Peace Treaty (February 1828), the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates of Armenia became part of Russia.
The Turkmanchay (Russia-Iran, 1828) and Adrianople (Russia-Turkey, 1829) peace treaties finally secured the annexation of Transcaucasia to Russia. Thus, in a short period of time, almost all of Transcaucasia went to the Russian Empire, with the exception of the Akhaltsykh Pashalyk and some Black Sea regions that were in the hands of Turkey, as well as the Yerevan and Nakhchevan Khanates, which still remained under Iranian rule.
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Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783 - an agreement on the patronage and supreme power of the Russian Empire with the united Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (otherwise the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, Eastern Georgia) on the transition of Georgia to the protectorate of Russia. Concluded on July 24 (August 4), 1783 in the Georgievsk fortress (North Caucasus).
At the end of 1782, the Kartli-Kakheti king Irakli II turned to the Empress of Russia Catherine II with a request to accept Georgia under the protection of Russia. In an effort to strengthen Russia's position in Transcaucasia, Catherine II granted Pavel Potemkin broad powers to conclude an agreement with Tsar Heraclius. The representatives on the Georgian side were Princes Ivane Bagration-Mukhrani and Garsevan Chavchavadze.
· According to the agreement, Tsar Irakli II recognized the patronage of Russia and partially renounced an independent foreign policy, pledging to serve the Russian Empress with his troops.
· Catherine II, for her part, acted as a guarantor of the independence and integrity of the territories of Kartli-Kakheti. Georgia was granted complete internal independence. The parties exchanged envoys.
· The agreement equalized the rights of Georgian and Russian nobles, clergy and merchants (respectively).
Especially important had 4 secret articles of the treaty. According to them, Russia pledged to defend Georgia in the event of war, and during peace negotiations to insist on the return to the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom of possessions that had long belonged to it (but seized by Turkey). Russia has pledged to maintain two infantry battalions in Georgia and to increase the number of its troops in the event of war. At the same time, Georgians were strongly recommended to maintain unity and avoid internecine strife, for which Heraclius II had to make peace with King Solomon I of Imereti.
The main political significance of the Treaty of Georgievsk was the establishment of a Russian protectorate in relation to Eastern Georgia, sharply weakening the positions of Iran and Turkey in Transcaucasia, formally destroying their claims to Eastern Georgia. In 1783, in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty of Georgievsk, the construction of the Georgian Military Road between Georgia and Russia began, along which several fortifications were built, including the Vladikavkaz fortress (1784).
On September 12, 1801, Alexander gave a manifesto on annexation in Moscow. The “imperial” policy of the Zubov brothers won, and even the manifesto itself was written in Platon Zubov’s own hand.
On April 12, 1802, the manifesto was officially read out at the Zion Cathedral in Tbilisi. The princes were sworn in, the Catholicos and all classes of the two kingdoms swore an oath of allegiance to the new order. Tuchkov writes that “This ceremony ended without the slightest confusion.” V. A. Potto describes this process differently:
“Unfortunately, Knorring was not one of those people who have the gift of arousing the trust of the people, and immediately distorted the very meaning of the voluntary annexation of Georgia, giving it the appearance of some kind of violence. Arriving in Tiflis, he gathered all the inhabitants of the city and, surrounding them with troops, ordered them to swear allegiance to the new sovereign. This crude measure and precautions, caused by nothing on the part of the people, deeply offended the Georgians, who did not want to take the oath under the threat of bayonets and went home.”
In general, the consequences of the treaty for Georgia were twofold: on the one hand, the country was spared from raids from Turkey and Iran, on the other, it lost its independence (later even ecclesiastical). The unrest in the country subsided over time, since it was mainly a protest against the methods and form of annexation, but not against annexation as such.
On this moment The North Caucasus is the most multinational territory of the Russian Federation. Because of this, religious, interethnic, and ethnic conflicts often arise in this region. It is this factor that quite strongly influences Russia’s domestic policy in the North Caucasus and is also reflected in its foreign policy.
National composition of the North Caucasus
The North Caucasus is considered the leader in the number of inhabitants among the subjects of the state. If you check the demographic data, you will notice that the region’s population is increasing every day. In 2002, about 6 million people lived in this territory. By 2010, this figure increased to 14 million.
Due to the fact that the North Caucasus includes seven different regions, the national “range” of this territory is quite diverse. Dagestan and Chechnya are considered the leaders in the number of inhabitants among the regions. The first is home to more than 3 million people, and the second - about a million. In this territory you can find 150 representatives of nations, ethnic groups, and all the rest are indigenous people. Quite often, quite serious conflicts arise between them, which lead to serious problems.
After the collapse of the USSR, hostility appeared between Muslims and Orthodox Christians. Because of this, the number of inhabitants in the Caucasus has decreased. That is why Russia’s internal policy in the North Caucasus should have been aimed at a lightning-fast solution to the situation that arose. It should be noted that such confrontation continues to this day.
Reasons for the growing confrontation in the North Caucasus
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many unresolved issues arose in the North Caucasus. Democratic processes began that affected almost the entire territory of Russia. Moreover, they caused problems and ultimately slowed down the development of the entire region. It should be said, having finished the short introduction, that Russia’s internal policy in the North Caucasus at that time was not entirely thought out, so other difficulties arose in this regard.
The authorities and the state did not trust the officials who represented the North Caucasus, therefore, even with the fact that all residents of the region had the same rights as the other population of Russia, issues of a different nature were quite difficult to resolve. At that time, the state found the only thing, in their opinion, good decision, - control of the republic from Moscow. It should be noted that such a choice also influenced the economic development of the Caucasus.
The industrial complex developed according to the residual principle. The natural resources of this territory were plundered, and the population suffered many problems, including a terrible environment. Social infrastructure has clearly suffered. Some villages and towns have neither schools nor hospitals. This was the result of a poor domestic economy. The policy of the North Caucasus was aimed at exterminating those people who were repressed during the Great Patriotic War.
Problems of the region
The policies pursued in this region have greatly affected the well-being of residents. Wages were not paid, unemployment began to flourish, problems with massive alcohol consumption appeared, the number of crimes increased, drug addiction flourished, and so on. Territorial problems have also become quite relevant. Unfortunately, many republics tried to conquer regions that they considered their own. Quite often conflicts arose between Ossetians, Gaians, and so on. At the same time, Russia’s internal policy in the North Caucasus did not solve these problems.
Due to rising unemployment, terrorism began to flourish. Moreover, it should be noted that this problem has spread not only in the North Caucasus, but throughout Russia. Groups began to emerge that influenced officials through lobbying. All this draws attention to the fact that Russia should change its domestic policy in the North Caucasus. The causes of problems do not end with this list; on the contrary, they become more and more every year.
Black page in the history of Chechnya
Before considering the internal policy of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, it is necessary to recall the events that took place in the nineties. During the genocide of the population, in particular the Jewish, Russian and Armenian, relations in the region began to deteriorate. Such a policy was not official and directly politicians was not supported. Since it was considered a gross violation international rights. It should be noted that even though politicians did not directly support the genocide, one way or another, support was not provided to the victims. A greater percentage of violence occurred in the capital - in the city of Grozny. Many families were subject to attacks and other abuses. Murders have become almost commonplace.
Russia's domestic policy in the North Caucasus was then stagnant. In this regard, an outflow of educated population began to be observed from this region, which affected the economic and cultural development subject. Ruler Dudayev can be called a black page in the history of Chechnya. Any incident reports will confirm this.
Modern Chechnya
Even though the rulers of the Russian Federation are in no hurry to completely eradicate all the danger in Chechnya, the situation in this republic has improved over time when compared with neighboring regions. The government carried out a reconstruction in 2006, during which almost all social buildings were restored in 4 years. services, roads, and infrastructure that were previously destroyed due to two collisions. In the capital of Chechnya, a mosque appeared, which became the largest in Europe; there is a complex of buildings “Grozny City”, by the way, the only ones in the entire North Caucasus. In 2012, reconstruction of streets and buildings of museums, theaters, and libraries was carried out.
It should be noted that there is also a bad side to these actions. For example, the financing of these projects was not carried out according to a completely transparent scheme. Not all workers received wages, and there were frequent allegations of fraud and corruption from local residents. This is the nature of Russia’s domestic policy in the North Caucasus.
Payments
In domestic politics in the North Caucasus there are serious problems related to property and housing. If people's houses were destroyed during the war, the residents were promised to pay about 300 thousand rubles. However, everything is not as good as it might seem at first. For example, in order to receive this payment, it was necessary to give a bribe in the amount of 50% of the full amount. If the housing was not completely destroyed, then these people had no right to claim compensation. Such payments were unofficially stopped in 2005.
Prospects
Thanks to the efforts made to create a clean management system, as well as to get rid of many serious problems, the population managed to rehabilitate the region at the international level. As a result of Russia's correct internal policy in the North Caucasus, control over public funds that are allocated in order to restore this republic allows the region to become calmer and more stable than it was before. Also, the North Caucasus is gradually beginning to interact with other parts of Russia.
Central and Northwestern Caucasus
In the northwestern and central Caucasus it is also necessary to carry out the right internal policy. These parts of the Caucasus include the Ossetian lands, as well as many others. Dwelling on them in detail, it should be noted that in the 90s, part of these lands was lost to the Ossetians. If we talk about the significance of this territory for Russia, then it should be noted that it is a connecting link between Ossetians and Russians. Additionally, it should be noted that both regions are Orthodox. Due to this, the population gets closer to each other. The policy of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus is rather against this.
Ossetian lands enter the territory of Georgia towards Armenia, so sometimes clashes can occur in Georgia, which are already considered commonplace and do not surprise anyone. Due to the fact that it is no longer relevant to sharpen attention to interethnic relations and similar conflicts, the government of the Russian Federation does not interfere in these issues. The state does not interfere in the distribution of positions based on nationality, as well as in many other problems, but this does not mean that the country is of the same opinion. The conclusion should be drawn: Russia’s internal policy in the North Caucasus is being pursued. Everything is going as usual.
Consolidation of regions
A pressing issue is the cultural development of the North Caucasus, which is very different from Russia itself. Because of this, unification of this region with the rest of the state is a little difficult. At the moment, it is almost impossible to even imagine that many peoples of this territory consider themselves to be the people of the Federation, being united with it. In short, Russia’s internal policy in the North Caucasus, in principle, completely excludes the rapprochement of the regions.
To summarize, it should be noted that due to the fact that the state is not trying to resolve the conflict at the federal level, and is not going to resolve important issues, this region still remains poor and is constantly in a state of unofficial war.
Necessary changes
In order to stabilize the situation, it is necessary to change the internal politics of the North Caucasus. It is necessary to establish strict accountability of local deputies and other authorized persons, as well as control all financial turnover in a given region, stopping the exploitation of church and national issues in their political purposes. In addition, it is necessary for the state to control all contacts of local regional heads in order to rid itself of influence from the Islamic world and Israel. For Russia’s domestic policy in the North Caucasus, first of all, the most important task should be the restoration of the region’s infrastructure and industry, thereby raising the standard of living of the population and increasing its number.
Nana Gegelashvili, Head of the Center for Regional Problems, Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, specially for Caucasus Times
PRAGUE, August 12, Caucasus Times. In the context of the deepening confrontation between Russia and the West, caused by the events in Ukraine, Russian policy in the Transcaucasus continues to remain increasingly balanced in relation to the Transcaucasian countries as they carry out diverse movements in the process of choosing foreign policy priorities.
In the Georgian direction, Moscow's policy is being pursued in line with moderate pragmatism. Moscow reacted rather neutrally to Georgia’s signing of the Association Agreement with the EU on June 27, 2014. Taking into account the “new realities in Transcaucasia,” Moscow understands that it is no longer possible to keep Georgia under its influence, and any attempts to block Georgia’s desire to integrate with the West are counterproductive. With the emergence of two de facto entities – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – they have ceased to be Moscow’s main trump cards in its game with Tbilisi, which will significantly expand Georgia’s opportunities when choosing foreign policy allies. On the one hand, today Russia cannot ignore that the integration of the two independent states– Abkhazia and South Ossetia joining the world community is a rather lengthy process and hardly justified, as well as the fact that as its sovereignty strengthens, the interests of Sukhum may not always coincide with the interests of Moscow. Today Moscow does not have a new agenda in Russian-Abkhaz relations capable of making the partnership between the two countries mutually beneficial and productive. On the other hand, Georgia also cannot fail to understand that the key to solving the problem of the country’s territorial integrity lies in the assets of Russia, its northern neighbor, which occupies a very active position in relation to post-Soviet countries. In addition, the prospects for Georgia's accession to NATO and the EU are still unclear, which largely explains Moscow's current neutral position towards Tbilisi.
In the Armenian direction of its policy in the Transcaucasus, Russia reacted rather neutrally to Armenia’s intention to initial the Association Agreement with the EU, which was to take place at the Vilnius summit, as if it could have predicted in advance Armenia’s final choice in favor of the Customs Union (EAEU). And, indeed, on October 10, 2014, at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Minsk, the Treaty on Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was signed, which entered into force on January 2, 2015. Last but not least, Moscow’s confident position in the Armenian direction is explained its awareness of the key role it plays in ensuring the security of this country, which ultimately became the main priority for Armenia when choosing its foreign policy vector. Russia is the guarantor of its integrity. Being bound by the CSTO treaty and having a military base on its territory - Gyumri, it bears specific obligations to this country. In the same context, one should not discount the leverage that Russia has on the problem of resolving the Karabakh conflict, which is fully understood not only in Baku and Yerevan, but also in the West. Moscow believes that the confrontation, which has spanned more than 20 years, can only be eliminated through political means. This gives reason to believe that forceful intervention “from the outside” is not expected, since Moscow’s main task in this matter is to maintain the precarious balance between Yerevan and Baku.
However, today Moscow also fully understands that, due to its geographical location, Armenia will always be forced to pursue a complementary policy, balancing between the interests of Moscow and the West. Yerevan's intention to continue and strengthen relations with the EU and the United States is connected, first of all, with its desire to convince Western partners of its ability to pursue a policy of complementarism. In addition, this policy of Armenia is actively supported by the large Armenian diaspora, which is concentrated mainly in the USA and France. It is she who plays a key role in the formation of an extremely positive image of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
Last but not least, Armenia’s desire for integration with the West is also due to the fact that currently the regional isolation of Armenia, in which Yerevan finds itself as a result of the closure of two land borders - with Turkey and Azerbaijan, does not allow it to become a transit state with access to Europe . However, the prospect of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, involving the opening of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, may change this situation. All this, of course, cannot be ignored by Moscow, which soberly assesses its positions in Armenia, despite the different attitudes of the Armenian political establishment towards Russian politics.
As for Russia’s policy in the Azerbaijani direction, no significant changes have been observed here either. Today, Baku, pursuing its own independent policy, which partly explains its decision to become a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, has no particular desire to join integration projects under the auspices of Moscow. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s desire for rapprochement with the EU is still determined only by the framework of energy cooperation. At the same time, it should be noted that Azerbaijan is a strategic ally of Turkey, representing the southern flank of the alliance, which allows Baku to develop and strengthen its cooperation with the alliance while maintaining its neutral status. Taking all this into account, Moscow cannot fail to understand that the priority issue for Baku is the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. That is why Russia, as a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and its participation in the peace process is supported by the United States and the EU. This is one of the mechanisms supporting Moscow’s influence in Transcaucasia. If Abkhazia and South Ossetia are recognized by Moscow as independent entities, then Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR) is not considered by it as a separate entity, which means Moscow supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
Thus, at present, Russia’s policy in the Transcaucasian countries is determined exclusively by pragmatic considerations, which is dictated not only by modern realities, but also by Moscow’s awareness of the effectiveness of its key asset - the redrawing of the territorial borders it inherited from the USSR, an invariable key attribute of national policy. It is this principle that has become a “headache” for almost all former Soviet republics that have gained independence. Inter-republic administrative boundaries overnight became interstate, which could not but lead to serious problems. Therefore, it is not possible to cut this “Gordian knot” while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Transcaucasian countries that have conflicts on their territory without the participation of Russia. This “negates” all the efforts of the United States, NATO and the EU taken together, aimed at the close integration of post-Soviet countries with problem territories into Euro-Atlantic structures. For this reason, with a certain degree of confidence, we can say: Russian policy in the Transcaucasus in the context of the Ukrainian crisis as a whole has not undergone any changes. Currently, Moscow is fully aware of the effectiveness of its powerful asset, which allows it to maintain a confident position in this region.