Structure and functions of scientific theory. Law as its key element

In psychology, generally the same forms of scientific knowledge as in other sciences: concepts, judgments, conclusions, problems, hypotheses, theories. Each of them represents a relatively independent way of reflection by a subject of an object, a way of recording knowledge that has developed in the course of the development of universal human spiritual activity.

Among all forms of knowledge, the highest, most perfect and complex in the methodology of science is recognized theory. Indeed, if concepts or conclusions, problems or hypotheses are often formulated in one sentence, then an interconnected, ordered system of statements is necessary to express the theory. Entire volumes are often written to present and substantiate theories: for example, Newton substantiated the theory of universal gravitation in the voluminous work “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy” (1687), which he spent more than 20 years writing; S. Freud outlined the theory of psychoanalysis not in one, but in many works, and over the last 40 years of his life he constantly made changes and clarifications to it, trying to adapt it to changing social conditions, assimilate new facts from the field of psychotherapy, and reflect the criticism of opponents.

However, this does not mean that the theories are super complex and therefore beyond the understanding of the “man on the street.” Firstly, any theory can be presented in a concise, somewhat schematized version, removing the secondary, insignificant, and bracketing out the supporting arguments and supporting facts. Secondly, ordinary people (i.e., those who are not professional scientists) master many theories along with their implicit logic from school, and therefore in adulthood they often build their own theories based on generalization and analysis of everyday experience, different from scientific degree of complexity, lack of mathematization and formalization, insufficient validity, less systematic and logical harmony, in particular, insensitivity to contradictions. Thus, a scientific theory is a somewhat refined and complicated version of everyday theories.

Theories act as methodological units, a kind of “cells”, scientific knowledge: they present all levels of scientific knowledge along with methodological procedures for obtaining and substantiating knowledge. Scientific theory includes and combines all other forms of scientific knowledge: its main “building material” is concepts, they are connected with each other by judgments, from which inferences are made according to the rules of logic; Any theory is based on one or more hypotheses (ideas) that are the answer to a significant problem (or set of problems). If a particular science consisted of only one theory, it would nevertheless possess all the basic properties of science. For example, geometry for many centuries was identified with the theory of Euclid and was considered at the same time an “exemplary” science in the sense of accuracy and rigor. In a word, theory is science in miniature. Therefore, if we understand how the theory is structured, what functions it performs, then we will comprehend the internal structure and “working mechanisms” of scientific knowledge as a whole.

In the methodology of science, the term “theory” (from the Greek theoria - consideration, research) is understood in two main senses: broad and narrow. In a broad sense, a theory is a complex of views (ideas, concepts) aimed at interpreting a phenomenon (or a group of similar phenomena). In this sense, almost every person has his own theories, many of which relate to the field of everyday psychology. With their help, a person can organize his ideas about goodness, justice, gender relations, love, the meaning of life, posthumous existence, etc. In a narrow, special meaning, theory is understood as the highest form of organization of scientific knowledge, giving a holistic idea of ​​the patterns and essential connections of a certain area of ​​reality. For scientific theory characterized by systemic harmony, the logical dependence of some of its elements on others, the deducibility of its content according to certain logical and methodological rules from a certain set of statements and concepts that form the initial basis of the theory.

In the process of developing knowledge, the emergence of theories is preceded by the stage of accumulation, generalization and classification of experimental data. For example, before the emergence of the theory of universal gravitation, a lot of information had already been collected both in astronomy (from individual astronomical observations to Kepler’s laws, which are empirical generalizations of the observed motion of planets) and in the field of mechanics (Galileo’s experiments on study of free fall of bodies); In biology, the evolutionary theories of Lamarck and Darwin were preceded by extensive classifications of organisms. The emergence of a theory resembles an insight, during which an array of information is suddenly clearly organized in the theorist’s head thanks to a suddenly emerging heuristic idea. However, this is not entirely true: an innovative hypothesis is one thing, and its justification and development is quite another. Only after the completion of the second process can we talk about the emergence of a theory. Moreover, as the history of science shows, the development of a theory associated with its modifications, refinements, and extrapolation to new areas can last tens and even hundreds of years.

There are several positions on the question of the structure of theories. Let's highlight the most influential of them.

According to V.S. Shvyrev, scientific theory includes the following main components:

1) original empirical basis, which includes many facts recorded in this field of knowledge, achieved through experiments and requiring theoretical explanation;

2) the original theoretical basis -- a set of primary assumptions, postulates, axioms, general laws that collectively describe idealized object of theory;

3) logic of theory - a set of rules of logical inference and proof acceptable within the framework of the theory;

4) a set of statements derived in theory with their evidence, constituting the main body of theoretical knowledge .

The central role in the formation of a theory, according to Shvyrev, is played by the underlying idealized object - a theoretical model of the essential connections of reality, presented with the help of certain hypothetical assumptions and idealizations. In classical mechanics, such an object is a system of material points; in molecular kinetic theory, it is a set of chaotically colliding molecules closed in a certain volume, represented as absolutely elastic material points.

It is not difficult to demonstrate the presence of these components in developed subject-centric psychological theories of personality. In psychoanalysis, the role of the empirical basis is played by psychoanalytic facts (clinical observation data, descriptions of dreams, erroneous actions, etc.), the theoretical basis is made up of the postulates of metapsychology and clinical theory, the logic used can be characterized as “dialectical” or as the logic of “natural language”, in a “multidimensional” model of the psyche (topological, energetic, economic) acts as an idealized object. From here it is clear that psychoanalytic theory is more complex than any physical theory, since it includes more basic theoretical postulates, operates with several idealized models at once, and uses more “subtle” logical means. Coordination of these components and elimination of contradictions between them represents an important epistemological task, which is still far from being resolved.

A different approach to explicating the structure of the theory is proposed by M.S. Burgin and V.I. Kuznetsov, identifying four subsystems in it: logical-linguistic(language and logical means), model-representative(models and images describing the object), pragmatic-procedural(methods of cognition and transformation of an object) and problem-heuristic(description of the essence and ways to solve problems). The identification of these subsystems, as the authors emphasize, has certain ontological grounds. “The logical-linguistic subsystem corresponds to the existing orderliness of the real world or some part of it, the presence of certain patterns. The pragmatic-procedural subsystem expresses the dynamic nature of the real world and the presence of interaction with it by the cognizing subject. The problem-heuristic subsystem appears due to the complexity of the cognizable reality, which leads to the emergence of various contradictions, problems and the need to solve them. And, finally, the model-representative subsystem primarily reflects the unity of thinking and being in relation to the process of scientific knowledge.”

The comparison of the theory with the organism made by the above-mentioned researchers is worthy of attention. Like a living being, theories are born, develop, reach maturity, and then grow old and often die, as happened with the theories of caloric and ether in the 19th century. As in a living body, the subsystems of the theory are closely interconnected and are in coordinated interaction.

The question of the structure of scientific knowledge is addressed somewhat differently by V.S. Stepin. Based on the fact that the methodological unit of knowledge analysis should not be a theory, but a scientific discipline, he identifies three levels in the structure of the latter: empirical, theoretical and philosophical, each of which has a complex organization.

Empirical level includes, firstly, direct observations and experiments, the result of which are observational data; secondly, cognitive procedures through which the transition from observational data to empirical dependencies and facts is carried out. Observation data are recorded in observation protocols, which indicate who observed, the time of observation, and describe the devices, if they were used. If, for example, there was sociological survey, then the role of the observation protocol is a questionnaire with the answer of the respondent. For a psychologist, these are also questionnaires, drawings (for example, in projective drawing tests), tape recordings of conversations, etc. The transition from observational data to empirical dependencies (generalizations) and scientific facts presupposes the elimination from observations of the subjective aspects contained in them (related to possible errors observer, random interference distorting the behavior of the phenomena under study, instrument errors) in order to obtain reliable intersubjective knowledge about the phenomena. Such a transition involves rational processing of observation data, searching for stable invariant content in them, and comparing multiple observations with each other. For example, a historian establishing the chronology of past events always strives to identify and compare a multitude of independent historical evidence, which for him serves as observational data. Then the invariant content identified in the observations is interpreted (interpreted), using known theoretical knowledge. Thus, empirical facts, constituting the bulk of the corresponding level of scientific knowledge, constituted as a result of the interpretation of observational data in the light of a certain theory.

Theoretical level is also formed by two sublevels. The first consists of particular theoretical models and laws, which act as theories relating to a fairly limited area of ​​phenomena. The second one consists of developed scientific theories, including particular theoretical laws as consequences derived from the fundamental laws of the theory. Examples of knowledge of the first sublevel can be theoretical models and laws that characterize individual species mechanical motion: model and law of pendulum oscillation (Huygens’s laws), planetary motion around the Sun (Kepler’s laws), free fall of bodies (Galileo’s laws), etc. In Newtonian mechanics, which is a typical example of a developed theory, these particular laws, on the one hand, are generalized and, on the other hand, derived as consequences.

A unique cell for organizing theoretical knowledge at each of its sublevels is a two-layer structure consisting of theoretical model and formulated regarding it law. The model is built from abstract objects (such as a material point, a reference system, an absolutely solid surface, an elastic force, etc.), which are in strictly defined connections and relationships with each other. Laws express the relationship between these objects (for example, the law of universal gravitation expresses the relationship between the mass of bodies, understood as material points, the distance between them and the force of attraction: F = Gm1m2/ r2).

The explanation and prediction of experimental facts by theories is connected, firstly, with the derivation of consequences from them that are comparable with the results of experience, and, secondly, with the empirical interpretation of theoretical models achieved through establishing a correspondence between them and the real objects that they reflect. Thus, not only are facts interpreted in the light of theory, but also the elements of the theory (models and laws) are interpreted so as to be subject to experimental verification.

Level foundations of science is the most fundamental in the structure of scientific knowledge. However, until the mid-20th century, it did not stand out: methodologists and scientists simply did not notice it. But it is precisely this level that “acts as a system-forming block that determines the strategy of scientific research, the systematization of acquired knowledge and ensures its inclusion in the culture of the corresponding era.” According to V.S. Stepin, at least three main components of bases can be distinguished scientific activity: ideals and norms of research, the scientific picture of the world and the philosophical foundations of science.

In paragraph 2 of Chapter 1, we already looked at the first two components of this level, so we will focus on the third. According to V.S. Stepin, philosophical foundations- these are ideas and principles that justify the ontological postulates of science, as well as its ideals and norms. For example, Faraday's justification for the material status of electric and magnetic fields was carried out by reference to the metaphysical principle of the unity of matter and force. Philosophical foundations also ensure the “docking” of scientific knowledge, ideals and norms, the scientific picture of the world with the dominant worldview of a particular historical era, with the categories of its culture.

The formation of philosophical foundations is carried out by sampling and subsequent adaptation of ideas developed in philosophical analysis to the needs of a specific area of ​​scientific knowledge. In their structure, V.S. Stepin identifies two subsystems: ontological, represented by a grid of categories that serve as a matrix of understanding and cognition of the objects under study (for example, the categories “thing”, “property”, “relationship”, “process”, “state”, “causality”, “necessity”, “accident”, “ space", "time", etc.), and epistemological, expressed by categorical schemes that characterize cognitive procedures and their results (understanding of truth, method, knowledge, explanation, evidence, theory, fact).

Noting the validity and heuristic nature of the positions we have outlined on the issue of the structure of scientific theory, in particular, and scientific knowledge in general, we will try to identify them weak sides and determine your own vision of the problem. The first, naturally arising question is related to whether the empirical level of science is included in the content of the theory or not: according to Shvyrev, the empirical level is included in the theory, according to Stepin - not (but is part of the scientific discipline), Burgin and Kuznetsov implicitly include the empirical level into the pragmatic-procedural subsystem. Indeed, on the one hand, theory is very closely interconnected with facts; it is created to describe and explain them, therefore the elimination of facts from theory clearly impoverishes it. But, on the other hand, facts are able to “lead their own life”, independent of a specific theory, for example, “migrate” from one theory to another. The last circumstance, it seems to us, is more significant: the theory precisely describes and explains the facts, is imposed on them, and therefore they should be taken beyond the limits of the theory. This is also supported by the established division of levels of scientific knowledge into theoretical and empirical (fact-fixing).

Therefore, Stepin’s point of view seems to us the most justified, but adjustments must also be made to it related to the understanding of the structure and role of the philosophical foundations of science. Firstly, they cannot be considered as being on the same level with ideals and norms, with the scientific picture of the world, precisely because of their fundamental nature, primacy, as the author himself notes. Secondly, they are not reduced to ontological and epistemological, but also include value (axiological) and practical (praxeological) dimensions. In general, their structure is homologous to the structure of philosophical knowledge, which includes not only ontology and epistemology, but also ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, philosophical anthropology. Thirdly, the interpretation of the genesis of philosophical foundations as the “flow” of ideas from philosophy into science seems to us too narrow; we cannot underestimate the role of the personal life experience of a scientist, in which philosophical views, although developed to a large extent spontaneously, are most deeply rooted due to “ emotional, value-semantic charge”, direct connection with what was seen and experienced.

Thus, theory is the highest form of scientific knowledge, a systematically organized and logically connected multi-level set of abstract objects varying degrees community: philosophical ideas and principles, fundamental and particular models and laws, built from concepts, judgments and images.

Further specification of ideas about the nature of scientific theories is associated with the identification of their functions and types.

The question about the functions of theory is, in essence, a question about the purpose of theory, about its role both in science and in culture as a whole. Coming up with an exhaustive list of features is quite difficult. Firstly, in different sciences, theories do not always play the same roles: mathematical knowledge, which deals with the world of “frozen”, self-equal ideal entities, is one thing, and humanitarian knowledge, focused on understanding the constantly changing, fluid, is another thing. human existence in an equally unstable world. This substantive difference determines the insignificance (often the complete absence) of the predictive function in the theories of mathematics, and, on the contrary, its importance for the sciences that study man and society. Secondly, scientific knowledge itself is constantly changing, and along with it, ideas about the role of scientific theories are being transformed: in general, with the development of science, more and more new functions are assigned to theories. Therefore, we will note only the most important, basic functions of scientific theory.

1. Reflective. The idealized object of the theory is a kind of simplified, schematized copy of real objects, therefore the theory reflects reality, but not in its entirety, but only in the most significant moments. First of all, the theory reflects the basic properties of objects, the most important connections and relationships between objects, the patterns of their existence, functioning and development. Since an idealized object is a model of a real object, this function can also be called modeling (model-representative). In our opinion, we can talk about three types models(idealized objects): structural, reflecting the structure, composition of the object (subsystems, elements and their relationships); functional, describing its functioning over time (i.e. those single-quality processes that occur regularly); evolutionary, reconstructing the course, stages, reasons, factors, trends in the development of an object. Psychology uses many models: psyche, consciousness, personality, communication, small social group, family, creativity, memory, attention, etc.

2. Descriptive the function is derived from the reflective function, acts as its private analogue and is expressed in the theory’s fixation of the properties and qualities of objects, connections and relationships between them. Description, apparently, is the oldest, simplest function of science, therefore any theory always describes something, but not every description is scientific. The main thing in a scientific description is accuracy, rigor, and unambiguity. The most important means of description is language: both natural and scientific, the latter being created precisely to increase accuracy and rigor in recording the properties and qualities of objects. Likewise, the psychologist begins the examination of the client by searching and recording significant facts. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that, for example, Freud built a psychoanalytic theory without relying on his own and other people’s previous clinical experience, in which descriptions of case histories were abundantly presented with detailed indications of their etiology, symptoms, stages of development, and methods of treatment.

3. Explanatory also derived from the reflective function. An explanation already presupposes a search for consistent connections, clarification of the reasons for the appearance and occurrence of certain phenomena. In other words, to explain means, firstly, to bring a single phenomenon under common law(for example, a single case of a brick falling to the ground can be brought under the general law of gravitation, which will show us why the brick flew down (and not up or did not remain hanging in the air) and at exactly such a speed (or acceleration) and, secondly , find the reason that gave rise to this phenomenon (in our example, the reason that caused the fall of the brick would be the force of gravity, the gravitational field of the Earth. A psychologist, however, like any person, cannot do without searching for consistent connections, without finding out the causes of events and). taking into account the influence of various factors on what is happening to him and around him.

4. Prognostic the function stems from the explanatory one: knowing the laws of the world, we can extrapolate them to future events and, accordingly, predict their course. For example, I can reliably assume (and with one hundred percent probability!) that the brick I threw out the window will fall to the ground. The basis for such a forecast, on the one hand, is everyday experience, and on the other hand, the theory of universal gravitation. Involving the latter can make the forecast more accurate. In modern sciences dealing with complex self-organizing and “human-sized” objects, absolutely accurate forecasts are rare: and the point here is not only in the complexity of the objects under study, which have many independent parameters, but also in the very dynamics of self-organization processes, in which randomness, small force influence at bifurcation points can radically change the direction of development of the system. Also in psychology, the vast majority of forecasts are of a probabilistic-statistical nature, since, as a rule, they cannot take into account the role of numerous random factors that take place in social life.

5. Restrictive (prohibiting) function is rooted in the principle of falsifiability, according to which a theory should not be omnivorous, capable of explaining any, primarily previously unknown, phenomena from its subject area; on the contrary, a “good” theory should prohibit certain events (for example, the theory of universal gravity prohibits the upward flight of a brick thrown from a window; the theory of relativity limits the maximum speed of transmission of material interactions to the speed of light; modern genetics prohibits the inheritance of acquired traits). In psychology (especially in such sections as personality psychology, social Psychology), apparently, we should talk not so much about categorical prohibitions, but about the improbability of certain events. For example, from E. Fromm’s concept of love it follows that a person who does not love himself cannot truly love another. This is, of course, a ban, but not an absolute one. It is also very unlikely that a child who missed a sensitive period for language acquisition (for example, due to social isolation) will be able to fully master it in adulthood; in the psychology of creativity, it is recognized that there is a low probability of an opportunity for a complete amateur to do something important scientific discovery in fundamental areas of science. And it is almost impossible to imagine that a child with an objectively confirmed diagnosis of imbecility or idiocy could become an outstanding scientist.

6. Systematizing the function is determined by man’s desire to order the world, as well as by the properties of our thinking, which spontaneously strives for order. Theories act as an important means of systematization and condensation of information simply due to their inherent organization, the logical relationship (deducibility) of some elements with others. The simplest form systematization are the processes of classification. For example, in biology, classifications of plant and animal species necessarily preceded evolutionary theories: only on the basis of extensive empirical material of the former was it possible to advance the latter. In psychology, perhaps the most famous classifications relate to personality typology: Freud, Jung, Fromm, Eysenck, Leonhard and others made significant contributions to this area of ​​science. Other examples include identifying types of pathopsychological disorders, forms of love, psychological influence, varieties of intelligence, memory, attention, abilities and other mental functions.

7. Heuristic the function emphasizes the role of theory as “the most powerful means of solving fundamental problems of understanding reality.” In other words, a theory not only answers questions, but also poses new problems, opens up new areas of research, which it then tries to explore in the process of its development. Often, questions posed by one theory are solved by another. For example, Newton, having discovered the gravitational force, could not answer the question about the nature of gravity; this problem was already solved by Einstein in general theory relativity. In psychology, the most heuristic theory still remains, apparently, psychoanalysis. On this subject, Kjell and Ziegler write: “Although research concerning Freud's psychodynamic theory cannot prove his concepts beyond doubt (since the verifiability of the theory is low), he has inspired many scientists by showing them in which direction research can be carried out to improve our knowledge about behavior. Literally thousands of studies have been prompted by Freud's theoretical claims." In terms of the heuristic function, the vagueness and incompleteness of the theory are more advantages than disadvantages. This is Maslow's theory of personality, which is more a collection of delightful guesses and assumptions than a clearly defined structure. Largely because of its incompleteness, coupled with the boldness of the hypotheses put forward, it “served as a stimulus for the study of self-esteem, peak experience and self-actualization, ... influenced not only researchers in the field of personology, but also in the field of education, management and health care.”

8. Practical the function is epitomized by the famous aphorism of the 19th-century German physicist Robert Kirchhoff: “There is nothing more practical than a good theory.” Indeed, we build theories not only to satisfy curiosity, but, above all, to understand the world around us. In a clear, orderly world, we not only feel safer, but we can also function successfully in it. Thus, theories act as a means of solving personal and social problems and increase the efficiency of our activities. In the era of post-non-classics, the practical significance of scientific knowledge comes to the fore, which is not surprising, because modern humanity faces global problems, which most scientists see as possible to overcome only through the development of science. The theories of psychology today claim not only to solve the problems of individuals and small groups, but also strive to contribute to the optimization public life generally. According to Kjell and Ziegler, psychology has an important contribution to make in solving problems associated with poverty, racial and sexual discrimination, alienation, suicide, divorce, child abuse, drug and alcohol addiction, crime, etc.

Kinds theories are distinguished on the basis of their structure, determined, in turn, by the methods of constructing theoretical knowledge. There are three main, “classical” types of theories: axiomatic (deductive), inductive and hypothetico-deductive. Each of them has its own “construction base” represented by three similar methods.

Axiomatic theories, established in science since antiquity, personify the accuracy and rigor of scientific knowledge. Today they are most common in mathematics (formalized arithmetic, axiomatic set theory), formal logic (propositional logic, predicate logic) and some branches of physics (mechanics, thermodynamics, electrodynamics). Classic example Such a theory is Euclid’s geometry, which for many centuries was considered a model of scientific rigor. As part of an ordinary axiomatic theory, there are three components: axioms (postulates), theorems (derived knowledge), and rules of inference (proofs).

Axioms(from the Greek axioma “honored, accepted position”) - provisions accepted as true (as a rule, due to self-evidence) that together constitute axiomatics as the fundamental basis of a specific theory. To introduce them, pre-formulated basic concepts (definitions of terms) are used. For example, before formulating the main postulates, Euclid gives definitions of “point”, “straight line”, “plane”, etc. Following Euclid (however, the creation of the axiomatic method is attributed not to him, but to Pythagoras), many tried to build knowledge on the basis of axioms: not only mathematicians, but also philosophers (B. Spinoza), sociologists (G. Vico), biologists (J. Woodger). The view of axioms as eternal and unshakable principles of knowledge was seriously shaken with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries; in 1931, K. Gödel proved that even the simplest mathematical theories cannot be completely constructed as axiomatic formal theories (the incompleteness theorem). Today it is clear that the acceptance of axioms is determined by the specific experience of the era; with the expansion of the latter, even the most seemingly unshakable truths may turn out to be erroneous.

From the axioms, according to certain rules, the remaining provisions of the theory (theorems) are derived (deduced), the latter making up the main body of the axiomatic theory. Rules are studied by logic - the science of the forms of correct thinking. In most cases they represent the laws of classical logic: such as law of identity(“every essence coincides with itself”), law of contradiction(“no proposition can be both true and false”), law of the excluded middle(“every judgment is either true or false, there is no third choice”), law of sufficient reason(“every judgment made must be properly justified”). Often these rules are applied by scientists half-consciously, and sometimes completely unconsciously. As noted above, researchers often make logical mistakes, relying more on their own intuition than on the laws of thinking, preferring to use the “softer” logic of common sense. Since the beginning of the 20th century, non-classical logics began to develop (modal, multivalued, paraconsistent, probabilistic, etc.), moving away from classical laws, trying to grasp the dialectics of life with its fluidity, inconsistency, not subject to classical logic.

If axiomatic theories are relevant to mathematical and formal logical knowledge, then hypothetico-deductive theories specific to the natural sciences. G. Galileo is considered the creator of the hypothetico-deductive method, who also laid the foundations of experimental natural science. After Galileo, this method was used (though mostly implicitly) by many physicists, from Newton to Einstein, and therefore until recently it was considered fundamental in natural science.

The essence of the method is to put forward bold assumptions (hypotheses), the truth value of which is uncertain. Then, consequences are deductively derived from the hypotheses until we arrive at statements that can be compared with experience. If empirical testing confirms their adequacy, then the conclusion (due to their logical relationship) about the correctness of the initial hypotheses is legitimate. Thus, the hypothetico-deductive theory is a system of hypotheses of varying degrees of generality: at the very top are the most abstract hypotheses, and at the lowest level are the most concrete, but subject to direct experimental verification. It should be noted that such a system is always incomplete, and therefore can be expanded with additional hypotheses and models.

The more innovative consequences that can be verified by subsequent experience can be derived from a theory, the more authority it enjoys in science. In 1922, Russian astronomer A. Friedman derived equations from Einstein’s theory of relativity that proved its nonstationarity, and in 1929, American astronomer E. Hubble discovered a “red shift” in the spectrum of distant galaxies, confirming the correctness of both the theory of relativity and Friedman’s equations. In 1946, an American physicist of Russian origin G. Gamow, from his theory of the hot Universe, deduced the necessity of the presence in space of microwave isotropic radiation with a temperature of about 3 K, and in 1965 this radiation, called relict radiation, was discovered by astrophysicists A. Penzias and R. Wilson. It is quite natural that both the theory of relativity and the concept of a hot Universe have entered the “solid core” of the modern scientific picture of the world.

Inductive theories in their pure form in science, apparently, are absent, since they do not provide logically based, apodictic knowledge. Therefore, we should rather talk about inductive method, which is also characteristic, first of all, of natural science, since it allows us to move from experimental facts first to empirical and then theoretical generalizations. In other words, if deductive theories are built “from the top down” (from axioms and hypotheses to facts, from the abstract to the concrete), then inductive theories are built “from the bottom up” (from individual phenomena to universal conclusions).

F. Bacon is usually recognized as the founder of inductive methodology, although the definition of induction was given by Aristotle, and the Epicureans considered it the only authoritative method of proving the laws of nature. It is interesting that, perhaps under the influence of the authority of Bacon, Newton, who in fact relied mainly on the hypothetico-deductive methodology, declared himself a supporter of the inductive method. A prominent defender of the inductive methodology was our compatriot V.I. Vernadsky, who believed that it is on the basis of empirical generalizations that scientific knowledge should be built: until at least one fact is discovered that contradicts a previously obtained empirical generalization (law), the latter should be considered true.

Inductive inference usually begins with the analysis and comparison of observational or experimental data. If at the same time something common and similar is seen in them (for example, the regular repetition of a property) in the absence of exceptions (conflicting information), then the data are generalized in the form of a universal proposition (empirical law).

Distinguish complete (perfect) induction, when the generalization refers to a finitely observable area of ​​facts, and incomplete induction, when it relates to an infinitely or finitely observable area of ​​facts. For scientific knowledge, the second form of induction is most important, since it is it that gives an increase in new knowledge and allows us to move on to law-like connections. However, incomplete induction is not a logical reasoning, since no law corresponds to the transition from the particular to the general. Therefore, incomplete induction is probabilistic in nature: there is always a chance that new facts will appear that contradict those previously observed.

The “trouble” of induction is that a single disproving fact makes the empirical generalization as a whole untenable. This cannot be said about theoretically based statements, which can be considered adequate even when faced with many contradictory facts. Therefore, in order to “strengthen” the significance of inductive generalizations, scientists strive to substantiate them not only with facts, but also with logical arguments, for example, to deduce empirical laws as consequences from theoretical premises or to find the reason that determines the presence of similar characteristics in objects. However, inductive hypotheses and theories in general are of a descriptive, ascertaining nature and have less explanatory potential than deductive ones. However, in the future, inductive generalizations often receive theoretical support, and descriptive theories are transformed into explanatory ones.

The considered basic models of theories act primarily as ideal-typical constructions. In the actual scientific practice of natural science, when constructing theories, scientists, as a rule, use both inductive and hypothetico-deductive methodology simultaneously (and often intuitively): the movement from facts to theory is combined with a reverse transition from theory to verifiable consequences. More specifically, the mechanism for constructing, justifying and testing a theory can be represented by the following diagram: observational data → facts → empirical generalization → universal hypothesis → particular hypotheses → testable consequences → setting up an experiment or organizing an observation → interpretation of experimental results → conclusion about the consistency (failure) of hypotheses → putting forward new ones hypotheses The transition from one stage to another is far from trivial; it requires the use of intuition and a certain amount of ingenuity. At each stage, the scientist also reflects on the results obtained, aimed at understanding their meaning, compliance with the standards of rationality, and eliminating possible errors.

Of course, not every hypothesis verified by experience is subsequently transformed into a theory. In order to form a theory around itself, a hypothesis (or several hypotheses) must not only be adequate and new, but also have a powerful heuristic potential and relate to a wide range of phenomena.

Development psychological knowledge In general, it follows a similar scenario. Let's take, for example, the theory of personality (more precisely, the psychotherapeutic concept as one of its parts) by K.R. Rogers, recognized throughout the world, meeting to a fairly high degree the criteria of heuristics, experimental approbability, and functional significance. Before moving on to building a theory, Rogers received a psychological education and acquired rich and varied experience working with people: first helping difficult children, then teaching at universities and counseling adults, and conducting scientific research. At the same time, he studied in depth the theory of psychology, mastered methods of psychological, psychiatric and social assistance. As a result of analyzing and summarizing his experience, Rogers came to understand the futility of “intellectual approaches,” psychoanalytic and behaviorist therapy, and the realization that “change occurs through experience in relationships.” Rogers was also dissatisfied with the inconsistency of Freudian views with the “scientific, purely objective statistical approach to science.”

Rogers bases his own psychotherapeutic concept on the “basic hypothesis”: “if I can create a certain type of relationship with another person, he will discover in himself the ability to use this relationship for his development, which will cause a change and development of his personality.” Apparently, this assumption is based not only on the therapeutic and life experience of the author, but also owes its birth to philosophical ideas Rogers, intuitive conviction of its correctness. Particular consequences follow from the main hypothesis, for example, the position of three “necessary and sufficient conditions” for successful therapy: non-judgmental acceptance, congruence (sincerity), empathic understanding. The conclusion of particular hypotheses in this case cannot be considered purely logical or formal; on the contrary, it is substantive, creative in nature, and is associated, again, with the generalization and analysis of the experience of relationships with people. As for the main hypothesis, it fully complies with the above-mentioned requirements of heuristics and fundamentality, and therefore may well serve as the “ideological center” for building a developed theory. The heuristic nature of the main hypothesis was manifested, in particular, in the fact that it guided many researchers to study the quality of the relationship between the consultant and the client. Its fundamental nature is associated with the possibility of extrapolation to any (not just psychotherapeutic) relationships between people, which was done by Rogers himself.

The hypotheses put forward formed the theoretical basis of client-centered therapy, which then became the subject of objective, rigorous, measurement-based, empirical study. Rogers not only formulated a number of testable consequences due, first of all, to the operationalization of basic concepts, but also defined a program and methods for their verification. The implementation of this program has convincingly proven the effectiveness of client-centered therapy.

From Rogers' theory it follows that the success of therapy depends not so much on the knowledge, experience, and theoretical position of the consultant, but on the quality of the relationship. This assumption can also be tested if we can operationalize the concept of “relationship quality”, consisting of “sincerity”, “empathy”, “goodwill”, “love” for the client. For this purpose, one of Rogers' employees, based on scaling and ranking procedures, developed the Attitude List questionnaire for clients. For example, agreeableness was measured using sentences of different ranks: from “He likes me”, “He is interested in me” (high and medium levels of agreeableness) to “He is indifferent to me”, “He disapproves of me” (zero and negative levels, respectively). goodwill). The client rated these statements on a scale from “very true” to “not at all true.” As a result of the survey, a high positive correlation was discovered between the empathy, sincerity, and friendliness of the consultant, on the one hand, and the success of therapy, on the other. A number of other studies have shown that the success of therapy does not depend on the theoretical position of the consultant. In particular, a comparison of psychoanalytic, Adlerian and client-centered psychotherapy showed that success depends precisely on the quality of the relationship between the participants in the therapeutic process, and not on the basis of what theoretical concepts it unfolds. Thus, particular, and, consequently, Rogers’ main hypotheses received experimental confirmation.

Using the example of Rogers' concept of interhuman relations, we see that the development of the theory is cyclical, spiral-shaped: therapeutic and life experience → its generalization and analysis → putting forward universal and particular hypotheses → drawing testable consequences → testing them → clarifying hypotheses → modification based on refined knowledge of the therapeutic experience. Such a cycle can be repeated many times, with some hypotheses remaining unchanged, others being refined and modified, others being discarded, and others being generated for the first time. In such a “circulation” the theory develops, refines, enriches, assimilating new experience, putting forward counterarguments to criticism from competing concepts.

Most other psychological theories function and develop according to the same scenario, so it would be legitimate to conclude that the “average psychological theory” combines the features of both hypothetico-deductive and inductive theories. Are there “pure” inductive and hypothetico-deductive theories in psychology? In our opinion, it is more correct to talk about the gravitation of a particular concept towards the pole of induction or deduction. For example, most concepts of personality development are predominantly inductive in nature (in particular, Freud’s doctrine of psychosexual stages, E. Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development, J. Piaget’s theory of stages of intellectual development) since they, firstly, rely on a generalization of observations and experiments, - secondly, they are predominantly descriptive in nature, characterized by “poverty” and weakness of explanatory principles (for example, Piaget’s theory cannot explain, except by reference to observational data, why there should be exactly four (and not three or five) stages of intelligence formation, why only children develop faster than others, why the order of stages is this way, etc.). With regard to other theories, it is often impossible to say exactly which type they are closer to, since the development of universal hypotheses in most cases is equally based on both the experience and intuition of the researcher, as a result of which many provisions of the theories combine the qualities of empirical generalizations and universal hypotheses-guesses .

But why are there so many theories in psychology, what determines their diversity, since we live in the same world, have similar life experiences: we are born, learn language and etiquette, go to school, fall in love, get sick and suffer, hope and dream? Why do theorists interpret this experience differently, each emphasizing their own, paying attention to some aspects of it and losing sight of others, and accordingly they put forward different hypotheses and build theories that are completely different in content from each other? In our opinion, the key to answering these questions lies through the study of the philosophical foundations of psychological theories, to which we now turn.

a logically interconnected system of concepts and statements about the properties, relationships and laws of a certain set of idealized objects (point, number, material point, inertia, black body, ideal gas, actual infinity, socio-economic formation, consciousness, etc., etc.) P.). The purpose of a scientific theory is the introduction of such basic ideal objects and statements about their properties and relationships (laws, principles), in order to then purely logically (i.e. mentally) derive (construct) from them the largest possible number of consequences, which, when selecting a certain empirical interpretation would most adequately correspond to the observed data about some real area of ​​objects (natural, social, experimentally created, mental, etc.). Basic structural elements any scientific theory: 1) initial objects and concepts; 2) derived objects and concepts (the connection between the derivative and original concepts of the theory is specified by defining the former, ultimately, only through the original ones); 3) initial statements (axioms); 4) derived statements (theorems; lemmas), their connection with axioms is specified using certain rules output; 5) metatheoretical foundations (picture of the world, ideals and norms scientific research, general scientific principles, etc.). The first scientific theory in the history of knowledge was Euclidean geometry, built by ancient mathematicians for about three hundred years (VII - IV centuries BC) and culminating in a brilliant generalization in Euclid’s work “Elements”. (See theory, science, idealization).

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SCIENTIFIC THEORY

the most developed form of organization of scientific knowledge, giving a holistic idea of ​​the patterns and essential connections of the area of ​​reality being studied. Examples of T.n. are the classical mechanics of I. Newton, the corpuscular and wave theories of light, the theory of biological evolution of Charles Darwin, the electromagnetic theory of J.K. Maxwell, special theory of relativity, chromosome theory heredity, etc.

Science includes descriptions of facts and experimental data, hypotheses and laws, classification schemes, etc., but only T.N. combines all the material of science into a holistic and observable knowledge about the world. It is clear that for the construction of T.n. Certain material about the objects and phenomena under study must first be accumulated, so theories appear at a fairly mature stage of development of a scientific discipline. For thousands of years, humanity has been familiar with electrical phenomena, but the first T.N. electricity appeared only in mid. 18th century At first, as a rule, descriptive theories are created that provide only a systematic description and classification of the objects under study. For a long time, theories of biology, including Jean Baptiste Lamarck's and Darwin's theories of evolution, were descriptive: they described and classified plant and animal species and their origins; D. Mendeleev's table of chemical elements was a systematic description and classification of elements. And this is quite natural. When starting to study a certain area of ​​phenomena, scientists must first describe these phenomena, highlight their characteristics, and classify them into groups. Only after this does deeper research become possible to identify causal relationships and discover laws.

The highest form of development of science is considered to be an explanatory theory, which provides not only a description, but also an explanation of the phenomena being studied. Every scientific discipline strives to build precisely such theories. Sometimes the presence of such theories is seen as an essential sign of the maturity of science: a discipline can be considered truly scientific only when explanatory theories appear in it.

Explanatory theory has a hypothetico-deductive structure. The basis of the T.n. serves as a set of initial concepts (quantities) and fundamental principles (postulates, laws), including only initial concepts. It is this basis that fixes the angle from which reality is viewed and sets the area that the theory covers. The initial concepts and principles express the main, most fundamental connections and relationships of the area being studied, which determine all its other phenomena. Thus, the basis of classical mechanics are the concepts of a material point, force, velocity and the three laws of dynamics; Maxwell's electrodynamics is based on his equations, which connect the basic quantities of this theory with certain relationships; the special theory of relativity is based on the equations of A. Einstein, etc.

Since the time of Euclid, the deductive-axiomatic construction of knowledge has been considered exemplary. Explanatory theories follow this pattern. However, if Euclid and many scientists after him believed that the starting points of a theoretical system were self-evident truths, then modern scientists understand that such truths are not easy to find, and the postulates of their theories serve as nothing more than assumptions about the underlying causes of phenomena. The history of science has provided quite a lot of evidence of our misconceptions, therefore the fundamental principles of the explanatory theory are considered as hypotheses, the truth of which still needs to be proven. Less fundamental laws of the field under study are deductively derived from the principles of the theory. That is why the explanatory theory is called “hypothetico-deductive”.

Initial concepts and principles of the so-called. relate directly not to real things and events, but to some abstract objects, which together form an idealized object of the theory. In classical mechanics it is a system of material points; in molecular kinetic theory - a set of chaotically colliding molecules closed in a certain volume, represented in the form of absolutely elastic balls, etc. These objects do not exist by themselves in reality, they are mental, imaginary objects. However, the idealized object of the theory has a certain relationship to real things and phenomena: it reflects some abstracted or idealized properties of real things. These are an absolutely solid or absolutely black body; perfect mirror; ideal gas, etc. By replacing real things with idealized objects, scientists are distracted from secondary, insignificant properties and connections of the real world and highlight in their pure form what seems to them the most important. The idealized object of the theory is much simpler than real objects, but this is precisely what allows it to be given an accurate mathematical description. When an astronomer studies the movement of planets around the Sun, he is distracted from the fact that planets are entire worlds with a rich chemical composition, atmosphere, core, etc., and considers them as simply material points, characterized only by mass, distance from the Sun and impulse, but it is precisely thanks to this simplification that he gets the opportunity to describe their movement in strict mathematical equations.

Idealized object So-called. serves for the theoretical interpretation of its original concepts and principles. Concepts and statements T.N. have only the meaning that the idealized object gives them. This explains why they cannot be directly correlated with real things and processes.

To the original basis T.n. also include a certain logic - a set of inference rules and mathematical apparatus. Of course, in most cases, as logic T.N. The usual classical two-valued logic is used, but in some theories, for example, in quantum mechanics, sometimes three-valued or probabilistic logic is used. T.N. They also differ in the mathematical means used in them. Thus, the basis of a hypothetico-deductive theory includes a set of initial concepts and principles, an idealized object that serves for their theoretical interpretation, and a logical-mathematical apparatus. From this basis, all other statements of the T. are obtained deductively. - laws of a lesser degree of generality. It is clear that these statements also speak of an idealized object.

The question of whether the T.N. includes empirical data, results of observations and experiments, facts, still remain open. According to some researchers, facts discovered thanks to a theory and explained by it should be included in the theory. According to others, the facts and experimental data lie outside the T.N. and the connection between theory and facts is effected by special rules of empirical interpretation. With the help of such rules, the statements of the theory are translated into empirical language, which allows them to be verified using empirical research methods.

To the main functions of the T.N. include description, explanation and prediction. T.N. gives a description of a certain area of ​​phenomena, certain objects, s.-l. aspects of reality. Due to this, T.n. may turn out to be true or false, i.e. describe reality adequately or distortedly. T.N. must explain known facts, pointing out the essential connections that underlie them. Finally, T.n. predicts new, not yet known facts: phenomena, effects, properties of objects, etc. Detection of predicted T.N. facts serve as confirmation of its fruitfulness and truth. The discrepancy between theory and facts or the discovery of internal contradictions in a theory gives an impetus to change it - to clarify its idealized object, to revise, clarify, change its individual provisions, auxiliary hypotheses, etc. In some cases, these discrepancies lead scientists to abandon the theory and replace it with a new theory. About Nikiforov A.L. Philosophy of science: history and methodology. M., 1998; Stepan B.C. Theoretical knowledge. M., 2000. A.L. Nikiforov

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Any theory is a holistic, developing system of true knowledge (including elements of error), which has a complex structure and performs a number of functions. In modern scientific methodology, the following main elements of the theory structure are distinguished: 1) Initial grounds- fundamental concepts, principles, laws, equations, axioms, etc. 2) Idealized object- an abstract model of the essential properties and connections of the objects being studied (for example, “absolutely black body”, “ideal gas”, etc.). 3) Logic theory- a set of certain rules and methods of proof aimed at clarifying the structure and changing knowledge. 4) Philosophical attitudes, sociocultural and value factors. 5) Set of laws and statements, derived as consequences from the principles of this theory in accordance with specific principles.

For example, in physical theories two main parts can be distinguished: formal calculus (mathematical equations, logical symbols, rules, etc.) and meaningful interpretation (categories, laws, principles). The unity of the substantive and formal aspects of the theory is one of the sources of its improvement and development.

Methodologically important role In the formation of a theory, an idealized object (“ideal type”) plays a role, the construction of which is a necessary stage in the creation of any theory, carried out in forms specific to different fields of knowledge. This object acts not only as a mental model of a certain fragment of reality, but also contains a specific research program that is implemented in the construction of a theory.

Speaking about the goals and ways of theoretical research in general, A. Einstein noted that “theory pursues two goals: 1. To cover, as far as possible, all phenomena in their interrelation (completeness). 2. To achieve this, taking as a basis as few logically interrelated logical concepts and arbitrarily established relationships between them (basic laws and axioms). I will call this goal “logical uniqueness”.

1 Einstein A. Physics and reality. - M., 1965. P. 264.

The variety of forms of idealization and, accordingly, types of idealized objects corresponds to the variety of types (types) of theories that can be classified on different grounds (criteria). Depending on this, theories can be distinguished: descriptive, mathematical, deductive and inductive, fundamental and applied, formal and substantive, “open” and “closed”, explanatory and descriptive (phenomenological), physical, chemical, sociological, psychological, etc. d.

Modern (post-non-classical) science is characterized by the increasing mathematization of its theories (especially natural science) and the increasing level of their abstraction and complexity. This feature of modern natural science has led to the fact that work with its new theories, due to the high level of abstraction of the concepts introduced into them, has turned into a new and unique type of activity. In this regard, some scientists speak, in particular, about the threat of the transformation of theoretical physics into a mathematical theory.

In modern science, the importance of computational mathematics (which has become an independent branch of mathematics) has sharply increased, since the answer to a given problem often needs to be given in numerical form. Currently, mathematical modeling is becoming the most important tool of scientific and technological progress. Its essence is the replacement of the original object with the corresponding mathematical model and further studying it, experimenting with it on a computer and using computational algorithms.

The general structure of the theory is specifically expressed in different types(types of) theories. Thus, mathematical theories are characterized by a high degree of abstraction. They rely on set theory as their foundation. Deduction is of decisive importance in all constructions of mathematics. The dominant role in the construction of mathematical theories is played by axiomatic and hypothetico-deductive methods, as well as formalization.

Many mathematical theories arise through the combination, the synthesis, of several basic, or generative, structures. The needs of science (including mathematics itself) have recently led to the emergence of a number of new mathematical disciplines: graph theory, game theory, information theory, discrete mathematics, optimal control theory, etc. last years They are increasingly turning to the relatively recently emerged algebraic theory of categories, considering it as a new foundation for all mathematics.

The theories of experimental (empirical) sciences - physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, history - according to the depth of penetration into the essence of the phenomena being studied can be divided into two large classes: phenomenological and non-phenomenological.

Phenomenological (they are also called descriptive, empirical) describe the experimentally observed properties and quantities of objects and processes, but do not delve deeply into their internal mechanisms (for example, geometric optics, thermodynamics, many pedagogical, psychological and sociological theories, etc.). Such theories do not analyze the nature of the phenomena under study and therefore do not use any complex abstract objects, although, of course, to a certain extent they schematize and construct some idealizations of the studied area of ​​phenomena.

Phenomenological theories solve, first of all, the problem of ordering and primary generalization of the facts related to them. They are formulated in ordinary natural languages ​​using special terminology of the relevant field of knowledge and are predominantly qualitative in nature. Researchers encounter phenomenological theories, as a rule, at the first stages of the development of any science, when the accumulation, systematization and generalization of factual empirical material occurs. Such theories are a completely natural phenomenon in the process of scientific knowledge.

With the development of scientific knowledge, theories of the phenomenological type give way to non-phenomenological ones (they are also called explanatory). They not only display the connections between phenomena and their properties, but also reveal the deep internal mechanism of the phenomena and processes being studied, their necessary interrelations, essential relationships, i.e. their laws (such as, for example, physical optics and a number of other theories). Along with observable empirical facts, concepts and quantities, very complex and unobservable, including very abstract concepts, are introduced here. There is no doubt that phenomenological theories, due to their simplicity, are more easily amenable to logical analysis, formalization and mathematical processing than non-phenomenological ones. It is no coincidence that in physics such sections as classical mechanics, geometric optics and thermodynamics were among the first to be axiomatized.

One of important criteria, by which theories can be classified, is the accuracy of predictions. Based on this criterion, two large classes of theories can be distinguished. The first of these includes theories in which the prediction is reliable (for example, many theories of classical mechanics, classical physics and chemistry). In theories of the second class, prediction is probabilistic in nature, which is determined by the combined action of a large number of random factors. This kind of stochastic (from the Greek - guess) theories are found not only in modern physics but also in large quantities in biology and the social and human sciences due to the specificity and complexity of the very object of their research. The most important method for constructing and developing theories (especially non-phenomenological ones) is the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete.

Thus, a theory (regardless of its type) has the following main features:

1. Theory is not individual, reliable scientific propositions, but their totality, an integral organic developing system. The unification of knowledge into a theory is carried out primarily by the subject of research itself, by its laws.

2. Not every set of provisions about the subject being studied is a theory. To turn into a theory, knowledge must reach a certain degree of maturity in its development. Namely, when it not only describes a certain set of facts, but also explains them, i.e. when knowledge reveals the causes and patterns of phenomena.

3. For a theory, justification and proof of the provisions included in it are mandatory: if there is no justification, there is no theory.

4. Theoretical knowledge should strive to explain the widest possible range of phenomena, to continuously deepen knowledge about them.

5. The nature of the theory determines the degree of validity of its defining principle, reflecting the fundamental regularity of a given subject.

6. The structure of scientific theories is meaningfully “determined by the systemic organization of idealized (abstract) objects (theoretical constructs). Statements of theoretical language are directly formulated in relation to theoretical constructs and only indirectly, thanks to their relationship to extralinguistic reality, describe this reality.”

1 Stepin V. S. Theoretical knowledge. - M., 2000. P. 707.

7. Theory is not only ready-made, established knowledge, but also the process of obtaining it, therefore it is not a “bare result”, but must be considered together with its emergence and development.

The main functions of the theory include the following:

1. Synthetic function- combining individual reliable knowledge into a single, holistic system.

2. Explanatory function- identification of causal and other dependencies, the variety of connections of a given phenomenon, its essential characteristics, the laws of its origin and development, etc.

3. Methodological function - on the basis of theory, various methods, methods and techniques of research activity are formulated.

4. Predictive- function of foresight. Based on theoretical ideas about the “present” state of known phenomena, conclusions are drawn about the existence of previously unknown facts, objects or their properties, connections between phenomena, etc. Prediction about the future state of phenomena (as opposed to those that exist but have not yet been identified) is called scientific foresight.

5. Practical function. The ultimate purpose of any theory is to be translated into practice, to be a “guide to action” for changing reality. Therefore, it is quite fair to say that there is nothing more practical than a good theory. But how do you choose a good one from many competing theories?

Theory- an internally consistent system of knowledge about a part of reality, this is the highest form of scientific knowledge. According to K. Popper, “theories are networks designed to capture what we call “the world” in order to understand, explain and master it. We strive to make the cells of these networks ever smaller.

• Each theory includes the following components:
• original empirical basis;
• many assumptions (postulates, hypotheses);
• logic - rules of logical inference;
• theoretical statements, which are basic theoretical knowledge.

There are qualitative theories that are constructed without a mathematical apparatus (psychoanalysis of S. Freud, theory of self-actualization by A. Maslow) and formalized theories in which the main conclusions are based on mathematical analysis of data (field theory of K. Lewin, theory cognitive development of J. Piaget).
A theory is created not only to describe, but also to explain and predict reality. It is considered scientific if there is a possibility of rejecting it (recognizing it as false) in the process of empirical testing. Such verification is carried out not on the entire volume of objects under study - the general population, but on a part or subset of this population, which has all its properties. This part of the population is called a sample

• The basic rules for sampling are:
• 1) substantive criterion (criterion of operational validity), according to which the selection of subjects is determined by the subject and hypothesis of the study;
• 2) the criterion of equivalence (criterion of internal validity), according to which the subjects must be equalized according to other (as opposed to the independent variable) characteristics;
• 3) the criterion of representativeness (criterion of external validity), which determines the compliance of the subjects with that part of the population to which the results of the study will then be transferred.

The theory, according to S.L. Rubinstein, “this is a circle of phenomena that develop and function according to their internal laws. Each discipline that rises to the level of science must reveal the specific laws of determination of the phenomena being studied.” The main task of any science, including psychological science, is to reveal the basic specific patterns of the phenomena being studied.
Theoretical foundation psychological theory is the principle of determinism, i.e. the principle of causality of mental phenomena, aimed at explaining and revealing these causes. The functions of psychological theory are: 1) explanation of the occurrence of certain phenomena (for example, anxiety), or retro-narration; 2) prediction of their occurrence; 3) detection and proof of connections between several determinants and a mental phenomenon.
The features of psychological theory are: explanation of the causality of mental phenomena, justification of the variety of factors influencing a mental phenomenon, differentiation of everyday and scientific concepts.

Parameter name	Meaning
Article topic:	Scientific theory
Rubric (thematic category)	Philosophy

The basic unit of scientific knowledge is theory.

Scientific theory is a holistic, logically systematized knowledge about any specific area of ​​reality. Science includes descriptions of facts and experimental results, hypotheses and laws, classification schemes, etc., but only theory combines all the material of science into a holistic and observable knowledge about the world.

It is clear that in order to build a theory, certain material must first be accumulated about the objects and phenomena being studied; in this regard, theories appear at a fairly mature stage of development of a scientific discipline. For thousands of years, humanity has been familiar with electrical phenomena, but the first scientific theories of electricity appeared only in the middle of the 16th century. At first, as a rule, they create descriptive theories that provide only a systematic description and classification of the objects under study. For a long time, the theories of biology, for example, including the theories of evolution of Lamarck and Darwin, were descriptive in nature: they described and classified the species of plants and animals and their formation; Mendeleev's table of chemical elements was a systematic description and classification of elements; so are many theories of astronomy, sociology, linguistics and other scientific disciplines. The prevalence of descriptive theories is quite natural: when starting to study a certain area of ​​phenomena, we must first describe these phenomena, highlight their characteristics, and classify them into groups. Only after this does deeper research become possible, related to the identification of causal relationships and the discovery of laws.

The highest form of development of science is an explanatory theory, which provides not only a description, but also an explanation of the phenomena being studied, answering not only the question “how?”, but also “why?”. Every scientific discipline strives to build precisely such theories. Sometimes the presence of such theories is seen as an essential sign of the maturity of science: a certain discipline can be considered truly scientific only from the time when explanatory theories appear in it.

Explanatory theory has hypothetico-deductive structure. The basis of the theory is a set of initial concepts (quantities) and fundamental principles (postulates, laws), including only initial concepts. It is this basis that fixes the angle from which reality is viewed and sets the area that theory studies. The initial concepts and principles express the main, most fundamental connections and relationships of the area being studied, which determine all its other phenomena. Thus, the basis of classical mechanics are the concepts of a material point, force, velocity and Newton’s three laws; Maxwell's electrodynamics is based on his well-known equations, which connect the basic quantities of this theory with certain relationships; special relativity is based on Einstein's equations, etc.

Since the time of Euclid, the deductive-axiomatic construction of knowledge has been considered exemplary. Explanatory theories follow this pattern. Moreover, if Euclid and many scientists after him believed that the initial provisions of a theoretical system are self-evident truths, then modern scientists understand that such truths are difficult to achieve and the postulates of their theories are nothing more than assumptions about the underlying causes of phenomena. The history of science has provided quite a lot of evidence of our misconceptions; in this regard, the fundamental principles of explanatory theory are considered as hypotheses, the truth of which still needs to be proven. Less fundamental laws of the studied field of phenomena are deductively derived from the principles of the theory. For this reason, the explanatory theory is usually called “hypothetic-deductive”: it provides a deductive systematization of knowledge based on hypotheses.

The initial concepts and principles of the theory do not directly relate to real things and phenomena, but to some abstract objects that together form idealized object theories. In classical mechanics, such an object is a system of material points; in molecular-kinetic theory - a set of chaotically colliding molecules closed in a certain volume, represented in the form of absolutely elastic material balls; in the theory of relativity - a set of inertial systems, etc. These objects do not exist by themselves in reality, they are mental, imaginary objects. At the same time, the idealized object of the theory has a certain relationship to real things and phenomena: it reflects some properties of real things abstracted from them or idealized. For example, we know from everyday experience that if a body is pushed, it will begin to move. The less friction, the longer the distance it will travel after the push. We can imagine that there is no friction at all, and we will get an image of an object moving without friction - by inertia. In reality, such objects do not exist, because friction or resistance environment it is impossible to completely eliminate it; it is an idealized object. In the same way, objects such as an absolutely solid or absolutely black body, a perfect mirror, an ideal gas, etc. are introduced into science. By replacing real things with idealized objects, scientists are distracted from secondary, insignificant properties and connections of the real world and highlight in their pure form what seems to them the most important. The idealized object of the theory is much simpler than real objects, but it is precisely this simplicity that allows it to be given an accurate and even mathematical description. When an astronomer considers the movement of planets around the Sun, he is distracted from the fact that planets are entire worlds with a rich chemical composition, atmosphere, core, surface temperature, etc., and considers them as simple material points, characterized only by mass and distance from the Sun, but it is precisely thanks to this simplification that he is able to describe their movement in strict mathematical equations.

The idealized object of the theory serves to theoretical interpretation its original concepts and principles. The concepts and statements of the theory have only the meaning that an idealized object gives them, and they speak only about the properties of this object. It is precisely because of this that they cannot be directly correlated with real things and processes.

The initial basis of the theory also includes a certain logic– a set of inference rules and mathematical apparatus. Of course, in most cases, ordinary classical two-valued logic is used as the logic of the theory, but in some theories, for example, in quantum mechanics, sometimes three-valued or probabilistic logic is used. The theories also differ in the mathematical tools they use.

So, the basis of a hypothetico-deductive theory includes a set of initial concepts and principles; an idealized object serving for their theoretical interpretation, and a logical-mathematical apparatus. From this foundation, all other statements of the theory - laws of a lesser degree of generality - are derived deductively. It is clear that these statements also speak of an idealized object.

But how should theory be correlated with reality if all its statements speak about idealized, abstract objects? To do this, a non-set is added to the hypothetico-deductive theory reduction proposals(rules) connecting its individual concepts and statements with empirically verifiable statements. Let's say, for example, that you have made a ballistic calculation of the flight of a projectile weighing 10 kᴦ., fired from a gun whose barrel has an angle of inclination to the horizontal plane of 30 degrees. Your calculation is purely theoretical and deals with idealized objects. In order to make it a description of a real situation, you add to it a series of reduction clauses which identify your ideal projectile with a real projectile, the weight of which will never be exactly equal to 10 kᴦ.; the angle of inclination of the gun to the horizon is also accepted with a certain permissible error; the point of impact of the projectile will turn into an area with certain dimensions. After this, your payment will receive empirical interpretation and it can be correlated with real things and events. The situation is exactly the same with the theory as a whole: reduction sentences give the theory an empirical interpretation and allow it to be used for prediction, experimentation and practical activity.

Scientific theory - concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Scientific Theory" 2017, 2018.