Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: forced necessity or war crime? Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: causes and consequences.
IN next year humanity will mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, which showed many examples of unprecedented cruelty, when entire cities disappeared from the face of the earth within a few days or even hours and hundreds of thousands of people, including civilians, died. The most a shining example what has been said is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ethical justification of which is questioned by any sane person.
Japan during the final stages of World War II
As you know, Nazi Germany capitulated on the night of May 9, 1945. This meant the end of the war in Europe. And also the fact that the only enemy of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition remained Imperial Japan, which at that time was officially declared war by about 6 dozen countries. Already in June 1945, as a result of bloody battles, its troops were forced to leave Indonesia and Indochina. But when on July 26 the United States, together with Great Britain and China, presented an ultimatum to the Japanese command, it was rejected. At the same time, even during the time of the USSR, it took upon itself the obligation to launch a large-scale offensive against Japan in August, for which, after the end of the war, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were to be transferred to it.
Prerequisites for the use of atomic weapons
Long before the events listed above, in the fall of 1944, at a meeting of the leaders of the United States and Great Britain, the issue of the possibility of using new super-destructive bombs against Japan was considered. After which the famous Manhattan Project, launched a year earlier and aimed at creating nuclear weapons, began to function with renewed vigor, and work on the creation of its first samples was completed by the end of hostilities in Europe.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: reasons for the bombing
Thus, by the summer of 1945, the United States became the only owner of atomic weapons in the world and decided to use this advantage to put pressure on its longtime enemy and at the same time ally in the anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR.
At the same time, despite all the defeats, the morale of Japan was not broken. As evidenced by the fact that every day hundreds of military personnel imperial army became kamikazes and kaiten, directing their planes and torpedoes at ships and other military targets of the American army. This meant that when carrying out a ground operation on the territory of Japan itself, the Allied troops would expect huge losses. It is the latter reason that is most often cited today by US officials as an argument justifying the need for such a measure as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the same time, it is forgotten that, according to Churchill, three weeks before I. Stalin informed him about the Japanese attempts to establish a peaceful dialogue. It is obvious that representatives of this country were going to make similar proposals to both the Americans and the British, since the massive bombing major cities brought their military industry to the brink of collapse and made capitulation inevitable.
Selecting targets
After receiving agreement in principle to use atomic weapons against Japan, a special committee was formed. Its second meeting took place on May 10-11 and was devoted to the selection of cities that were to be bombed. The main criteria that guided the commission were:
- mandatory presence of civilian objects around a military target;
- its importance for the Japanese not only from an economic and strategic point of view, but also from a psychological one;
- a high degree of significance of the object, the destruction of which would cause resonance throughout the world;
- the target had to be undamaged by bombing for the military to appreciate the true power of the new weapon.
Which cities were considered as targets?
The “contenders” included:
- Kyoto, which is the largest industrial and cultural center and the ancient capital of Japan;
- Hiroshima as an important military port and city where army depots were concentrated;
- Yokahama, which is the center of the military industry;
- Kokura is home to the largest military arsenal.
According to the surviving memories of participants in those events, although the most convenient target was Kyoto, the United States Secretary of War G. Stimson insisted on excluding this city from the list, since he was personally familiar with its sights and was aware of their value for world culture.
Interestingly, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not initially covered. More precisely, the city of Kokura was considered as the second target. This is evidenced by the fact that before August 9, an air raid was carried out on Nagasaki, which caused concern among residents and forced the evacuation of most schoolchildren to the surrounding villages. A little later, as a result of long discussions, backup targets were selected in case of unforeseen situations. They became:
- for the first bombing, if Hiroshima fails to hit, Niigata;
- for the second (instead of Kokura) - Nagasaki.
Preparation
The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki required careful preparation. During the second half of May and June, the 509th Combined Aviation Group was redeployed to a base on Tinian Island and exceptional security measures were taken. A month later, on July 26, the atomic bomb “Baby” was delivered to the island, and on the 28th, some of the components for assembling “Fat Man” were delivered to the island. On the same day, who at that time served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed an order ordering nuclear bombing to be carried out at any time after August 3, when weather conditions were suitable.
First atomic strike on Japan
The date of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be stated unambiguously, since nuclear strikes on these cities were carried out within 3 days of each other.
The first blow was struck in Hiroshima. And this happened on June 6, 1945. The “honor” of dropping the “Baby” bomb went to the crew of a B-29 aircraft, nicknamed “Enola Gay,” commanded by Colonel Tibbetts. Moreover, before the flight, the pilots, confident that they were doing a good deed and their “feat” would be followed by a speedy end to the war, visited the church and received an ampoule of s in case they were captured.
Together with Enola Gay, three reconnaissance aircraft took off, designed to determine weather conditions, and 2 boards with photographic equipment and devices for studying the parameters of the explosion.
The bombing itself went completely without problems, since the Japanese military did not notice the objects rushing towards Hiroshima, and the weather was more than favorable. What happened next can be seen by watching the film “The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” - documentary, assembled from newsreel footage taken in the Pacific region at the end of World War II.
In particular, it shows which, according to Captain Robert Lewis, who was a member of the Enola Gay crew, was visible even after their plane flew 400 miles from the bomb drop site.
Bombing of Nagasaki
The operation to drop the “Fat Man” bomb, carried out on August 9, proceeded completely differently. In general, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the photo of which evokes associations with known descriptions The Apocalypse was prepared extremely carefully, and the only thing that could make adjustments to its implementation was the weather. This is what happened when, in the early morning of August 9, a plane under the command of Major Charles Sweeney took off from the island of Tinian with the “Fat Man” atomic bomb on board. At 8:10 a.m. the plane arrived at the place where it was supposed to meet the second, the B-29, but did not find it. After 40 minutes of waiting, the decision was made to carry out the bombing without a partner aircraft, but it turned out that there was already 70% cloud cover over the city of Kokura. Moreover, even before departure it was known about the malfunction fuel pump, and at the moment when the board was over Kokura, it became obvious that the only way to drop the “Fat Man” was to do it while flying over Nagasaki. Then the B-29 headed towards this city and made a drop, focusing on the local stadium. Thus, by chance, Kokura was saved, and the whole world learned that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had occurred. Fortunately, if such words are at all appropriate in this case, the bomb fell far from the original target, quite far from residential areas, which somewhat reduced the number of victims.
Consequences of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
According to eyewitness accounts, within a few minutes everyone who was within a radius of 800 m from the epicenters of the explosions died. Then fires started, and in Hiroshima they soon turned into a tornado due to the wind, whose speed was about 50-60 km/h.
The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki introduced humanity to the phenomenon of radiation sickness. The doctors noticed her first. They were surprised that the condition of the survivors first improved, and then they died from the disease, the symptoms of which resembled diarrhea. In the first days and months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, few could have imagined that those who survived it would suffer from various diseases throughout their lives and even give birth to unhealthy children.
Subsequent events
On August 9, immediately after the news of the bombing of Nagasaki and the declaration of war by the USSR, Emperor Hirohito advocated immediate surrender, subject to the preservation of his power in the country. And 5 days later, the Japanese media distributed his statement about the cessation of hostilities in English. Moreover, in the text, His Majesty mentioned that one of the reasons for his decision was the presence of “terrible weapons” in the enemy’s possession, the use of which could lead to the destruction of the nation.
According to a survey conducted in Japan by Populus for the international news agency and radio Sputnik as part of the Sputnik.Opinions project, the majority of Japanese respondents (61%) believe that the United States should apologize for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 74% of respondents believe that these bombings cannot be justified as a war, since many civilians died.
Only 11% believe that an apology is not necessary. Almost 30% could not answer the question; the share of doubters is especially high among young people aged 18 to 24: more than 40% of respondents of this age found it difficult to answer the question.
The survey was conducted by Populus for the news agency and radio Sputnik from July 29 to August 2, 2015, the methodology was online interviews. The sample consisted of 1004 people in Japan aged 18 to 64 years. The sample represents the population by gender, age, and geography. The confidence interval for the data for the entire country is +/- 3.1% at a confidence level of 95%.
The head of the Center for Japanese Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Valery Kistanov, commenting on the results of the survey on Sputnik radio, noted that in the United States the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still justified military necessity.
“It was a completely inhumane, barbaric act - dropping nuclear bombs on peaceful cities. And, of course, there are no justifications for this. As for the US attitude towards this historical fact: It is still, unfortunately, the prevailing opinion in the United States that these bombings were caused by military necessity. They allegedly saved tens of thousands of lives of American soldiers. Because it was planned to land the American army on Japanese territory,” Valery Kistanov said on Sputnik radio.
In his opinion, one should not expect any apologies from the US leadership.
“America is always right, they never apologize for anything, and they will not apologize for the atomic bombings. This is obvious. Despite the fact that Japanese public opinion, of course, favors that these apologies be made. All this is in spirit and mentality of the ruling American circles,” the expert believes.
At the same time, in Japan itself, according to Valery Kistanov, the fact that the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were dropped by the United States in every possible way is hushed up.
“The Japanese media, speaking about these bombings, try not to dwell on the question of who carried out them. You can look at the Japanese press, and you will see expressions such as the atomic bombing of Japan, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But without indicating who did it. It’s as if these terrible bombs came from the Moon. But this is not done by chance. Japanese propaganda deliberately hushes up who dropped the atomic bombs," the expert said.
According to him, Japan is interested in cooperation with the United States and is unlikely to make claims to Washington.
“The Japanese are trying not to irritate their main military-political ally, older brother, patron. Because America is now extremely important for Japan from the point of view of ensuring its national interests. Japan clings to the United States. And the current Prime Minister (of Japan Shinzo) Abe is heading for strengthening military cooperation with the Americans. Therefore, of course, the Japanese authorities will not push the question of who dropped these bombs and how justified it all was. And ordinary residents, of course, have a different opinion, a different feeling. But, I think there will be no changes in Japanese-American relations,” concluded Valery Kistanov.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, carried out on August 6 and 9, 1945, are the only two examples of the combat use of nuclear weapons.
The US military dropped on Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 2 atomic bombs, killing over 200,000 people.
In this article we will look at the causes and consequences of this terrible tragedy of the 20th century.
Japan at the end of World War II
In their opinion, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the only way to quickly end the military conflict.
However, this is hardly true, since shortly before the Potsdam Conference he claimed that, according to data, the Japanese want to establish a peaceful dialogue with the countries of the anti-fascist coalition.
Therefore, why attack a country that intends to negotiate?
However, apparently, the Americans really wanted to demonstrate their military potential and show the whole world the weapons of mass destruction that they have.
The symptoms of the unknown illness resembled diarrhea. The surviving people suffered from various diseases all their lives, and were also unable to reproduce full-fledged children.
Photos of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Here are some photos of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the bombing, as well as the people injured in the attack:
Cloud view atomic explosion to Nagasaki from a distance of 15 km from Koyaji-Jima, August 9, 1945. 
Akira Yamaguchi shows off his scars 
Ikimi bombing survivor Kikkawa shows off his keloid scars 
According to experts, 5 years after the tragedy, the total number of deaths from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was about 200 thousand people.
In 2013, after a revision of the data, this figure more than doubled and was already 450,000 people.
Results of the atomic attack on Japan
Immediately after the bombing of Nagasaki, japanese emperor Hirohito announced immediate surrender. In his letter, Hirohito mentioned that the enemy had “terrible weapons” that could completely destroy the Japanese people.
More than half a century has passed since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the consequences of that terrible tragedy are still felt today. The radioactive background, which people did not yet know about, claimed many lives and caused various pathologies in newborns.
The role of atomic bombings in the surrender of Japan and the ethical justification of the bombings themselves still cause heated debate among experts.
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Another US crime, or Why did Japan capitulate?
We are unlikely to be mistaken in assuming that most of us are still convinced that Japan surrendered because the Americans dropped two atomic bombs of enormous destructive power. On Hiroshima And Nagasaki. The act, in itself, is barbaric, inhumane. After all, it died purely civil population! And the accompanying nuclear attack radiation many decades later crippled and cripples newly born children.
However, military events in the Japanese-American War were no less inhumane and bloody before the dropping of atomic bombs. And, for many, such a statement will seem unexpected, those events were even more cruel! Remember the photographs you saw of the bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and try to imagine that Before this, the Americans acted even more inhumanely!
However, we will not anticipate and will cite an excerpt from a voluminous article by Ward Wilson “ The victory over Japan was not won by the bomb, but by Stalin" Presented statistics of the most brutal bombing of Japanese cities BEFORE atomic strikes simply amazing.
Scale
In historical terms, the use of the atomic bomb may seem to be the most important single event in the war. However, from the point of view of modern Japan, the atomic bombing is not as easy to distinguish from other events as it is difficult to distinguish a single drop of rain in the middle of a summer thunderstorm.
An American Marine looks through a hole in the wall at the aftermath of a bombing. Nahi, Okinawa, June 13, 1945. The city, home to 433,000 people before the invasion, was reduced to ruins. (AP Photo/U.S. Marine Corps, Corp. Arthur F. Hager Jr.)
In the summer of 1945, the US Air Force carried out one of the most intense urban destruction campaigns in world history. In Japan, 68 cities were bombed, and all of them were partially or completely destroyed. An estimated 1.7 million people were left homeless, 300,000 were killed, and 750,000 were injured. 66 air raids were carried out using conventional weapons, and two used atomic bombs.
The damage caused by non-nuclear airstrikes was colossal. All summer, Japanese cities exploded and burned from night to night. In the midst of this nightmare of destruction and death, it could hardly have come as a surprise that one or another strike didn't make much of an impression– even if it was inflicted by an amazing new weapon.
A B-29 bomber flying from the Marianas could carry a bomb load of 7 to 9 tons, depending on the target location and strike altitude. Typically a raid was carried out by 500 bombers. This means that in a typical air raid using conventional weapons, each city would receive 4-5 kilotons. (A kiloton is a thousand tons, and is the standard measure of the yield of a nuclear weapon. The yield of the Hiroshima bomb was 16.5 kilotons, and a bomb with the power of 20 kilotons.)
With conventional bombing, the destruction was uniform (and therefore more effective); and one, albeit more powerful bomb, loses a significant part of its destructive force at the epicenter of the explosion, only raising dust and creating a heap of debris. Therefore, it can be argued that some air raids using conventional bombs in their destructive power came close to two atomic bombings.
The first conventional bombing was carried out against Tokyo on the night of March 9-10, 1945. It became the most destructive bombing of the city in the history of war. Then approximately 41 square kilometers of urban area burned in Tokyo. Approximately 120,000 Japanese died. These are the largest losses from the bombing of cities.
Because of the way the story is told, we often imagine that the bombing of Hiroshima was much worse. We think that the death toll is beyond all limits. But if you make a table of the number of people killed in all 68 cities as a result of bombings in the summer of 1945, it turns out that Hiroshima in terms of the number of civilian deaths is in second place.
And if you calculate the area of destroyed urban areas, it turns out that Hiroshima fourth. If you check the percentage of destruction in cities, then Hiroshima will be in 17th place. It is quite obvious that, in terms of the scale of damage, it fits well within the parameters of air raids using non-nuclear funds.
From our point of view, Hiroshima is something that stands apart, something extraordinary. But if you put yourself in the shoes of the Japanese leaders in the period preceding the attack on Hiroshima, the picture will look completely different. If you were one of the key members of the Japanese government in late July and early August 1945, you would have felt something like this about the air raids on cities. On the morning of July 17, you would have been informed that during the night they were subjected to airstrikes four cities: Oita, Hiratsuka, Numazu and Kuwana. Oita and Hiratsuka half destroyed. In Kuwana, the destruction exceeds 75%, and Numazu suffered the most because 90% of the city burned to the ground.
Three days later you are woken up and informed that you have been attacked three more cities. Fukui is more than 80 percent destroyed. A week goes by and three more cities are bombed at night. Two days later, bombs fall in one night for another six Japanese cities, including Ichinomiya, where 75% of buildings and structures were destroyed. On August 12, you go into your office, and they report to you that you were hit four more cities.
Night Toyama, Japan, August 1, 1945, after 173 bombers dropped incendiary bombs on the city. As a result of this bombing, the city was destroyed by 95.6%. (USAF)
Among all these messages slips information that the city Toyama(in 1945 it was about the size of Chattanooga, Tennessee) destroyed by 99,5%. That is, the Americans razed to the ground almost the entire city. On August 6, only one city was attacked - Hiroshima, but according to reports received, the damage there is enormous, and a new type of bomb was used in the airstrike. How does this new air raid compare to other bombings that have lasted for weeks, destroying entire cities?
Three weeks before Hiroshima, the US Air Force carried out raids for 26 cities. Of them eight(this is almost a third) were destroyed either completely or stronger than Hiroshima(if you count what part of the cities was destroyed). The fact that 68 cities in Japan were destroyed in the summer of 1945 poses a serious obstacle to those who want to show that the bombing of Hiroshima was the cause of Japan's surrender. The question arises: if they capitulated due to the destruction of one city, then why did they not capitulate when they were destroyed 66 other cities?
If the Japanese leadership decided to surrender because of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this means that they were worried about the bombing of cities in general, and that attacks on these cities became a serious argument for them to surrender. But the situation looks completely different.
Two days after the bombing Tokyo retired foreign minister Shidehara Kijuro(Shidehara Kijuro) expressed an opinion that was openly held by many high-ranking leaders at the time. Shidehara stated, “People will gradually get used to being bombed every day. Over time, their unity and determination will only strengthen.”
In a letter to a friend, he noted that it was important for citizens to endure suffering because “even if hundreds of thousands of civilians die, are injured and starve, even if millions of homes are destroyed and burned,” diplomacy will take some time. It is appropriate to remember here that Shidehara was a moderate politician.
Apparently, at the very top of state power in the Supreme Council the sentiment was the same. The Supreme Council discussed the importance of the Soviet Union maintaining neutrality - and at the same time, its members said nothing about the consequences of the bombing. From the surviving minutes and archives it is clear that at meetings of the Supreme Council bombing of cities was mentioned only twice: once in passing in May 1945 and a second time on the evening of August 9, when an extensive discussion took place on this issue. Based on the available evidence, it is difficult to say that Japanese leaders attached any importance to air raids on cities, at least in comparison with other pressing wartime issues.
General Anami August 13 noted that atomic bombings are terrible no more than regular airstrikes, which Japan was subjected to for several months. If Hiroshima and Nagasaki were no worse than conventional bombings, and if the Japanese leadership did not consider this special significance Without considering it necessary to discuss this issue in detail, how could atomic strikes on these cities force them to capitulate?
Fires after firebombing a city Tarumiza, Kyushu, Japan. (USAF)
Strategic relevance
If the Japanese weren't worried about the bombing of cities in general and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in particular, then what were they worried about? The answer to this question is simple : Soviet Union.
The Japanese found themselves in a rather difficult strategic situation. The end of the war was approaching, and they were losing the war. The situation was bad. But the army was still strong and well supplied. It was almost under arms four million people, and 1.2 million of this number were guarding the Japanese islands.
Even the most unyielding Japanese leaders understood that it was impossible to continue the war. The question was not whether to continue it or not, but how to end it on the best terms. The Allies (the United States, Great Britain and others - remember that the Soviet Union at that time still maintained neutrality) demanded “unconditional surrender.” The Japanese leadership hoped that he would be able to somehow avoid military tribunals and preserve existing form state power and some of the territories captured by Tokyo: Korea, Vietnam, Burma, individual areas Malaysia And Indonesia, a significant part of the eastern China and numerous islands in the Pacific Ocean.
They had two plans to get optimal conditions surrender. In other words, they had two strategic options. The first option is diplomatic. In April 1941, Japan signed a neutrality pact with the Soviets, which expired in 1946. A group of mostly civilian leaders led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Togo Shigenori hoped that Stalin could be persuaded to act as a mediator between the United States and the allies on the one hand, and Japan on the other, in order to resolve the situation.
Although this plan had little chance of success, it reflected sound strategic thinking. In the end, the Soviet Union is interested in ensuring that the terms of the settlement are not very favorable for the United States - after all, increasing American influence and power in Asia would invariably mean weakening Russian authorities and influence.
The second plan was military, and most of its supporters, led by the Minister of the Army Anami Koretika, were military men. They had hopes that when American troops will begin the invasion, the ground forces of the imperial army will inflict huge losses on them. They believed that if they succeeded, they would be able to squeeze more out of the United States. favorable conditions. This strategy also had little chance of success. The United States was determined to obtain unconditional surrender from the Japanese. But since there was concern in US military circles that the casualties of an invasion would be prohibitive, there was a certain logic to the Japanese high command's strategy.
To understand what the true reason was that forced the Japanese to surrender - the bombing of Hiroshima or the declaration of war by the Soviet Union, it is necessary to compare how these two events affected the strategic situation.
After the atomic attack on Hiroshima, both options were still in force as of August 8th. Another option was to ask Stalin to act as a mediator (Takagi's diary contains an entry dated August 8 that shows that some Japanese leaders were still thinking about involving Stalin). It was still possible to try to fight one last decisive battle and inflict great damage on the enemy. The destruction of Hiroshima had no effect on the readiness of troops for stubborn defense on the shores of their native islands.
View of Tokyo's bombed-out areas, 1945. Next to the burned down and destroyed neighborhoods is a strip of surviving residential buildings. (USAF)
Yes, there was one less city behind them, but they were still ready to fight. They had enough ammunition and shells, and the combat power of the army, if it decreased, was very small. The bombing of Hiroshima did not predetermine either of Japan's two strategic options.
However, the effect of the Soviet Union's declaration of war and its invasion of Manchuria and Sakhalin Island was completely different. When the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan, Stalin could no longer act as a mediator - he was now an adversary. Therefore, the USSR, through its actions, destroyed the diplomatic option to end the war.
The impact on the military situation was no less dramatic. Most of the best Japanese troops were in the southern islands of the country. The Japanese military correctly assumed that the first target of an American invasion would be the southernmost island of Kyushu. Once powerful Kwantung Army in Manchuria was extremely weakened, since its best units were transferred to Japan to organize the defense of the islands.
When the Russians entered Manchuria, they simply crushed the once elite army, and many of their units stopped only when the fuel ran out. The Soviet 16th Army, which numbered 100,000 people, landed troops in the southern part of the island Sakhalin. She received orders to break the resistance of Japanese troops there, and then within 10-14 days to prepare for an invasion of the island Hokkaido, the northernmost of the Japanese islands. Hokkaido was defended by the Japanese 5th Territorial Army, which consisted of two divisions and two brigades. She concentrated on fortified positions in the eastern part of the island. And the Soviet offensive plan included a landing in the west of Hokkaido.
Destruction in residential areas of Tokyo caused by American bombings. The photo was taken on September 10, 1945. Only the strongest buildings survived. (AP Photo)
It doesn’t take a military genius to understand: yes, it is possible to conduct a decisive battle against one great power landing in one direction; but it is impossible to repel an attack by two great powers attacking from two different directions. The Soviet offensive invalidated the military strategy of the decisive battle, just as it had previously invalidated the diplomatic strategy. The Soviet offensive was decisive from a strategic point of view, because it deprived Japan of both options. A The bombing of Hiroshima was not decisive(because she didn’t rule out any Japanese options).
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war also changed all calculations regarding the time remaining to complete the maneuver. Japanese intelligence predicted that American troops would begin landing only in a few months. Soviet troops could actually find themselves on Japanese territory in a matter of days (within 10 days, to be more precise). The Soviet offensive threw all plans into disarray concerning the timing of the decision to end the war.
But Japanese leaders came to this conclusion several months earlier. At a meeting of the Supreme Council in June 1945, they stated that if the Soviets enter the war, "it will determine the fate of the empire" Deputy Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army Kawabe at that meeting he stated: “Maintaining peace in our relations with the Soviet Union is an indispensable condition for the continuation of the war.”
Japanese leaders stubbornly refused to show interest in the bombing that destroyed their cities. It was probably wrong when the air raids began in March 1945. But by the time the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, they were right to view the bombing of cities as an unimportant sideshow with no serious strategic consequences. When Truman uttered his famous phrase that if Japan did not capitulate, its cities would be subjected to a “destructive shower of steel,” few in the United States understood that there was almost nothing to destroy there.
Charred corpses of civilians in Tokyo, March 10, 1945 after the American bombing of the city. 300 B-29 aircraft dropped 1700 tons incendiary bombs on Japan's largest city, killing 100,000 people. This air raid was the most brutal of the entire Second World War.(Koyo Ishikawa)
By August 7, when Truman made his threat, there were only 10 cities in Japan with populations over 100,000 that had not yet been bombed. On August 9, a blow was struck Nagasaki, and there are nine such cities left. Four of them were on the northern island of Hokkaido, which was difficult to bomb because of the great distance to the island of Tinian, where American bomber aircraft were stationed.
Minister of War Henry Stimson(Henry Stimson) removed the ancient capital of Japan from the list of bombing targets because it had important religious and symbolic significance. So, despite Truman’s menacing rhetoric, after Nagasaki there remained only four large cities that could be subjected to atomic attacks.
The thoroughness and scope of the bombing of the American Air Force can be judged by the following circumstance. They bombed so many Japanese cities that they were eventually forced to target population centers of 30,000 or fewer. IN modern world It’s difficult to call such a settlement a city.
Of course, it was possible to re-strike cities that had already been firebombed. But these cities were already destroyed by an average of 50%. Additionally, the United States could drop atomic bombs on small towns. However, there remained such untouched cities (with a population of 30,000 to 100,000 people) in Japan. only six. But since 68 cities in Japan had already been seriously damaged by bombing, and the country's leadership did not attach any importance to this, it was hardly surprising that the threat of further airstrikes could not make much of an impression on them.
The only thing that retained any form on this hill after nuclear explosion, steel ruins of a Catholic cathedral, Nagasaki, Japan, 1945. (NARA)
Convenient story
Despite these three powerful objections, the traditional interpretation of events still greatly influences people's thinking, especially in the United States. There is a clear reluctance to face the facts. But this can hardly be called a surprise. We should remember how convenient the traditional explanation of the bombing of Hiroshima is in emotional plan - both for Japan and for the USA.
Ideas remain powerful because they are true; but unfortunately, they can also remain strong by meeting needs from an emotional point of view. They fill an important psychological niche. For example, the traditional interpretation of the events in Hiroshima helped Japanese leaders achieve a number of important political goals, both domestically and internationally.
Put yourself in the emperor's shoes. You have just subjected your country to a devastating war. The economy is in ruins. 80% of your cities are destroyed and burned. The army was defeated, suffering a series of defeats. The fleet suffered heavy losses and is not leaving its bases. The people begin to starve. In short, the war was a disaster, and most importantly, you lying to your people, without telling him how bad the situation really is.
The people will be shocked to learn of the surrender. So what should you do? Admit that you have failed? Make a statement that you have seriously miscalculated, made mistakes and caused enormous damage to your nation? Or explain the defeat by amazing scientific advances that no one could have predicted? If the defeat was blamed on the atomic bomb, then all mistakes and military miscalculations could be swept under the rug. The bomb is the perfect excuse for losing a war. There is no need to look for the guilty, no need to conduct investigations and trials. Japanese leaders will be able to say they did their best.
Thus, in general the atomic bomb helped remove blame from Japanese leaders.
But having explained Japanese defeat atomic bombings, it was possible to achieve three more very specific political goals. Firstly, this helped maintain the emperor's legitimacy. Since the war was lost not because of mistakes, but because of the enemy’s unexpected miracle weapon, it means that the emperor will continue to enjoy support in Japan.
Secondly, this aroused international sympathy. Japan waged the war aggressively, and showed particular cruelty to the conquered peoples. Other countries must have condemned her actions. And if turn Japan into a victim country, which was inhumanely and dishonestly bombed using a terrible and cruel instrument of war, then it will be possible to somehow atone and neutralize the most vile acts of the Japanese military. Drawing attention to the atomic bombings helped create more sympathy for Japan and dampen the desire for the harshest punishment.
And finally, claims that the Bomb secured victory in the war flattered the American victors of Japan. The American occupation of Japan officially ended only in 1952, and during this time The United States could change and remake Japanese society at its discretion. In the early days of the occupation, many Japanese leaders feared that the Americans would want to abolish the institution of the emperor.
They also had another concern. Many of Japan's top leaders knew that they could be tried for war crimes (when Japan surrendered, its Nazi leaders were already being tried in Germany). Japanese historian Asada Sadao(Asada Sadao) wrote that in many post-war interviews, "Japanese officials ... were clearly trying to please their American interviewers." If Americans want to believe that their bomb won the war, why disappoint them?
Soviet soldiers on the banks of the Songhua River in the city of Harbin. Soviet troops liberated the city from the Japanese on August 20, 1945. At the time of Japan's surrender, there were about 700,000 people in Manchuria Soviet soldiers. (Yevgeny Khaldei/waralbum.ru)
By explaining the end of the war with the use of the atomic bomb, the Japanese were largely serving their own interests. But they also served American interests. Since the bomb ensured victory in the war, the perception of America's military power is strengthened. The diplomatic influence of the United States in Asia and around the world is increasing, and American security is strengthening.
The $2 billion spent on creating the bomb was not wasted. On the other hand, if we accept that the reason for Japan's surrender was the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, then the Soviets can well claim that they did in four days what the United States could not do in four years. And then the perception of the military power and diplomatic influence of the Soviet Union will increase. And since at that time it was already in full swing cold war, recognition of the decisive contribution of the Soviets to the victory was tantamount to providing aid and support to the enemy.
Looking at the questions raised here, it is alarming to realize that the evidence from Hiroshima and Nagasaki underlies everything we think about nuclear weapons. This event is irrefutable proof of the importance of nuclear weapons. It is important for gaining a unique status, because normal rules not applicable to nuclear powers. This is an important measure of nuclear danger: Truman's threat to subject Japan to a "destructive shower of steel" was the first open atomic threat. This event is very important for creating a powerful aura around nuclear weapons, which makes them so significant in international relations.
But if the traditional history of Hiroshima is called into question, what should we make of all these conclusions? Hiroshima is the central point, the epicenter, from which all other statements, statements and claims spread. However, the story we tell ourselves is far from reality. What should we think about nuclear weapons now, if its colossal first achievement - the miraculous and sudden surrender of Japan - turned out to be a myth?
It was only thanks to our people that Japan was defeated
Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are being remembered these days, it is interesting to read the explanation
Why Truman dropped the bomb
A 1999 news study ranked the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, as one of the 100 most notable events of the 20th century. And any meaningful list of discussions that have taken place in American history would again place this event at the top of the list. But it was not always so. In 1945, the vast majority of Americans took it for granted that the United States would use the atomic bomb to end the Pacific War. Moreover, they believed that these bombs actually ended the war and saved countless lives. Now historians call this position a “traditionalist” approach, and evil tongues call it “patriotic orthodoxy.”But in the 1960s, bomb charges, once rare, began to become established. The accusers were called revisionists, but this hardly corresponded to reality. The historian who acquires significant new evidence is obliged to reconsider his assessments important events. The name critics is better suited to accusers. All critics shared three basic assumptions. The first was that Japan's position in 1945 was catastrophically hopeless. Secondly, the Japanese leaders understood this and wanted to capitulate in the summer of 1945. Third, thanks to decrypted messages from Japanese diplomats, America knew Japan was going to surrender, and knew it when it began its wanton nuclear destruction. Critics differ on what exactly prompted the decision to drop the bombs despite the impending surrender; Among the most daring arguments is Washington's desire to scare the Kremlin. The proposed interpretation replaced the traditionalist view in a significant segment of American society and even more abroad.
These views collided during the Smithsonian Institution's exhibition of the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the bombs on Hiroshima, in 1995: since then, a raft of archival discoveries and publications have expanded our understanding of the events of August 1945. New evidence requires a serious reconsideration of the terms of the dispute. Perhaps most interestingly, the new data proves that President Harry S. Truman deliberately chose not to publicly justify his decision to use the bombs.
As scholars began to study the archival records of the 1960s, some of them intuitively - and quite correctly - realized that the reasons that Truman and members of his administration had for making the fateful decision were at least partially known. And if Truman refused to make his opinion public, scholars have suggested, it was because the real reasons for this choice might cast doubt on the decision or show its illegality. To such critics - or to virtually anyone - it seemed implausible that there could be a legitimate reason why the US government would continue to withhold important evidence supporting and explaining the president's decision.
But in the early 1970s, a ton of new evidence emerged from Japan and the United States. By far the most interesting were the classified radio intercepts, which illuminated the painful dilemma facing Truman and his administration. They deliberately did not use the best arguments in explaining their actions to the public: due to strict secrecy requirements, all persons with access to the radio intercept data, including the President, were prohibited from retaining copies of documents, publicly referring to them (now or later in memoirs), and retaining any - a record of what they saw or the conclusions drawn from it. With few exceptions, these rules were followed both during and after the war.
Collectively, this missing information is known as the "Ultra Secret" of World War II (after the title of the revolutionary book by Frederick William Winterbotham, published in 1974 (The Ultra Secret, Frederick William Winterbotham - A.R.). "Ultra" is the name of what became a major and a very effective Allied radio interception organization, revealing huge amounts of information for big-time politicians. Discreet listening posts made copies of millions of encryption messages from the air; then codebreakers extracted the real text. The scale of the work was astonishing. By the summer of 1945, about a million messages per month were intercepted from the Imperial Japanese Empire alone Army, plus many thousands of messages from the Imperial Navy and Japanese diplomats.
All this effort and knowledge would have been wasted if the raw material had not been properly transcribed and analyzed and the results communicated to those who needed to know. Pearl Harbor played a role here. After this terrible surprise attack, Secretary of War Henry Stimson realized that the results of radio interception were not used in the best possible way. Alfred McCormack, a top-notch lawyer with experience in complex cases, was tasked with determining how the information received from Ultra would be distributed. McCormack's system required that all radio intercepts pass through a handful of smart people who would evaluate the information, correlate it with other sources, and then write daily reports for political leaders.
By mid-1942, McCormack's scheme had become a daily ritual that was carried out until the very end of the war - in fact, the system is still in effect today. Each day, analysts prepared three newsletters. Diplomatic couriers carrying sealed envelopes delivered one copy of each brief to a small list of high-ranking recipients in the Washington area. (They also took the previous day's reports, which were then destroyed, except for the archival copy.) Two copies of the report were sent to the White House, the president and his chief of staff. Other copies went to a very small group of officers and civilian officials in the War and Navy Departments, British Legation Headquarters and the State Department. Equally interesting is the list of persons who do not have access to these reports: the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, with the exception of those few from the War, Navy and State Departments, employees of the Bureau of Strategic Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or employees of the Manhattan Project to create nuclear bombs, starting with Major General Leslie Groves.
These three daily reports were called the "Magic" Diplomatic Brief, the "Magic" Far East Brief, and the European Brief ("magic" was a code word coined by the US Army's chief signal officer, who called his code talkers "wizards" and their results "magic." The name "Ultra" came from Britain and survives as a term mainly among historians, but in 1945 "Magic" remained the American designation for radio interception, particularly those associated with Japan). The "magic" diplomatic report included intercepted messages from foreign diplomats around the world. The "magic" Far Eastern report provided information about the military, naval and air situation in Japan. The European report corresponded in content to the Far Eastern report and should not distract us. The reports contained headlines and short articles, usually containing common quotes from intercepted messages plus comments. The latter were the most important: since none of the recipients had a back issue, it was up to the editors to explain how daily developments fit into the larger picture.
When the complete collection of the "Magic" diplomatic summary for the war years was first published in 1978, many parts were blacked out. Critics rightly wondered whether the gaps were hiding stunning discoveries. The publication of the unedited collection in 1995 revealed that the edited fragments did indeed contain sensationalism - but not at all about the use of atomic bombs. The edited fragments hid the inconvenient fact that the allied radio interception organization read the encryption of not only the main participants in the war, but also about 30 other states, including such allies as France.
Diplomatic messages included, for example, messages from neutral diplomats and attachés stationed in Japan. From the 1978 edition, critics have isolated some valuable pieces, but with full meeting 1995, it turned out that only 3 or 4 messages spoke about the possibility of a compromise peace, while at least 15 confirmed that Japan intended to fight to the end. Also prominent is a group of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who tried to negotiate peace through contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Brief correctly made clear to American leaders during the war, none of these diplomats (with the exception of one, which we will mention) however had the authority to act on behalf of the Japanese government.
The inner cabinet in Tokyo recognized initiatives only from officially sanctioned diplomats. The Japanese called this inner cabinet the Big Six because it consisted of six people: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, War Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the heads of the Imperial Army (General Yoshigiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed to attack the Soviet Union in June 1945. Not to force the USSR to surrender; rather, in order to enlist the support of the USSR as a mediator in the negotiations, so that the war ends successfully for the Big Six. In other words, peace on terms that suited the most influential militarists. Their minimum goal was not limited to just ensuring the safety of the Empire; they also insisted on maintaining the old militaristic order they ruled in Japan.
The last sentence started decisive change. As critics correctly noted, both Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Joseph Grew (formerly the American ambassador to Japan and the government's leading expert on Japan) and Secretary of War Henry Stimson advised Truman that a guarantee of the preservation of the Empire might be necessary for Japan's surrender. Moreover, critics argue that if the United States had given such a guarantee, Japan would have capitulated. But when Foreign Minister Togo informed Sato that Japan was not seeking anything like unconditional surrender, Sato immediately sent a telegram in which the editors of the Magic Diplomatic Brief reported to the American leadership that they were “in favor of unconditional surrender subject to the preservation of the reigning house.” Togo's response, quoted in the "Magic" diplomatic brief for July 22, 1945, was categorical: American leaders could read Togo's refusal of Sato's proposal without any hint that guaranteeing the safety of the reigning house would be a step in the right direction. Any reasonable person observing these developments might conclude that if the demand for unconditional surrender included a promise to preserve the reigning house, this would not ensure the surrender of Japan.
Togo's initial reports, indicating that the Emperor himself supported the attempt to secure Soviet mediation and was prepared to send his own diplomatic representative, attracted the immediate attention of the editors of the Magic Diplomatic Brief, as well as Deputy Minister of the Interior Gru. Based on his message to Truman about the importance of the Empire, critics credit him with the role of a wise advisor. As evidence from radio intercepts shows, Gru reviewed the Japanese effort and came to the same conclusion as US Army Intelligence Chief Major General Clayton Bissell: that the attempt was most likely a ruse to play on America's war-weariness . They assumed that this was an attempt by the emperor to end the war "from afar." On August 7, the day after Hiroshima, Gru drafted a memorandum with a hidden reference to radio intercepts, again confirming his views that Tokyo was still far from peace.
Since the publication of excerpts from James Forstel's diaries in 1951, the contents of many diplomatic communications have been revealed, and critics have focused on them for decades. But in the 1990s, the release of the complete (unedited) collection of the "Magic" Far Eastern Summary, supplementing the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, revealed that diplomatic messages were a trickle compared to the flow of military messages. Reports from the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy revealed that Japan's armed forces, without exception, were determined to make a final stand to the death on the homeland. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (decisive operation). It was based on the premise that American morale was weak and could be shaken by heavy casualties early in the offensive. Then American politicians will be willing to begin peace negotiations on significantly better terms than unconditional surrender. Ultra's reports were even more alarming in that they showed Japanese awareness of America's war plans. Intercepted messages showed that the Japanese warned the Americans exactly where US forces were planned to land in November 1945, in southern Kyushu (Olympic Operation). American plans for an attack on Kyushu reflected a commitment to the practical military approach that the attackers must outnumber the defenders by at least three to one to ensure success at a reasonable cost. According to American estimates, at the time of landing, only three of the six Japanese divisions should be in all of Kyushu in the southern - target - part, where nine American divisions would advance to the shore. These estimates assumed that the Japanese would have only 2,500 to 3,000 aircraft in all of Japan to counter the operation. The American air force will be four times that number.
Since mid-July, Ultra reports have shown a large build-up of military forces in Kyushu. Japanese ground forces exceeded previous estimates by four times. Instead of 3 Japanese divisions deployed in southern Kyushu, there were 10 imperial divisions there, as well as additional detachments. The Japanese air force exceeded previous estimates by two to four times. Instead of 2,500-3,000 Japanese aircraft, the number fluctuated, according to various estimates, from 6,000 to 10,000. One intelligence officer reported that Japanese defenses were "growing alarmingly so that we would have to attack at a ratio of one to one, which is not the best recipe victory."
In parallel with the publication of radio intercepts, additional documents from the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been published in the last decade. It is clear from them that there was no real agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff about an attack on Japan. The military, under the leadership of General George Marshall, believed that time was the critical factor in achieving American military goals. Therefore, Marshall and the Armed Forces supported the attack on the Home Islands, considering it the most in a fast way end the war. But the Navy presciently believed that the decisive factor in achieving American military goals was chance. The Navy was convinced that an invasion would be too costly and believed that blockade and bombing was the correct method.
The picture becomes even more complex when you consider that the Navy has decided to delay the final reveal of the plans. In April 1945, US Navy Chief Admiral Ernest King told his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he did not agree that Japan should be attacked. At this time, two months of heavy fighting off Okinawa convinced the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, that it was not worth supporting at least the capture of Kyushu. Nimitz secretly informed King of this change in his views.
This evidence sheds light on the fact that the traditionalists' central tenet is wrong - but not without a catch. It is absolutely clear that the belief that the Olympic operation seemed absolutely reliable is wrong. Truman's forced approval of the Olympic Offensive in June 1945 was based on the joint committee's unanimous recommendation for it. The curtailment of the operation was not because it was considered necessary, but because it became impossible. It is difficult to imagine that anyone who might be president at this time would not approve of the use of the atomic bomb under these conditions.
Japanese historians have revealed another key detail. After Hiroshima (August 6), the Soviet entry into the war against Japan (August 8) and Nagasaki (August 9), the Emperor intervened, moving the government forward and deciding that Japan should surrender in the early morning of August 10. The Japanese Foreign Minister sent a message to the United States on the same day stating that Japan would accept the Treaty of Potsdam "with the understanding that the above declaration does not include any demands prejudicial to the privileges of His Majesty as Sovereign Sovereign." This was not, as critics later claimed, a humiliating plea for the Emperor to be retained in a humble role as a nominal head of state. As Japanese historians would write decades later, the requirement that there would be no compromise between “His Majesty as Sovereign Ruler” as a sine qua non of surrender was a requirement that the United States would retain the Emperor's veto power over occupier reforms and that previous laws would remain in force. Fortunately, Japanese experts in the State Department immediately realized the real purpose of this demand and reported to Secretary of State James Byrnes, who insisted that the plan should not be carried out. This plan itself emphasizes that until the very end, Japan pursued dual goals: not only the preservation of the empire as a system, but also the preservation in Japan of the old order, which initiated the war that claimed the lives of 17 million.
This brings us to the other side of the story, which has belatedly entered the debate. Several American historians, led by Robert Newman, strongly insist that any estimate of the cost of the end of the Pacific Campaign must include the terrible consequences of every day of war that continued on the Asian populations captured in the Japanese conquests. Newman estimates that between 250,000 and 400,000 Asians who were completely uncommitted to the war effort died during each month of the war. Newman and others question whether an assessment of Truman's decision can emphasize only the deaths of civilians of the aggressor country, without addressing the deaths among civilians of the victim countries.
Today, many factors beyond the 1995 controversy influence our view of the issue. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central points are wrong. The Japanese did not view their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They sought not to capitulate, but to end the war on terms that would have been preserved in Japan old order, and not just the nominal head of state. Eventually, thanks to radio intercepts, American leaders realized that "until the Japanese leaders realized that conquest could not be resisted, it was extremely unlikely that they would accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This is the best concise and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic reality of the summer of 1945.
The displacement of the so-called traditionalist approach among important sections of American society took several decades. It will take about the same amount of time to displace the critical orthodoxy that developed in the 1960s and dominate the 1980s and replace it with a more multifaceted assessment of the real state of affairs in 1945. But time goes by.