The first Muslim battalion from the USSR in Afghanistan. Muslim Battalion Typically good training

"Muslim battalions"
Conventional name for formations (military unit,
separate battalion) for special purposes
Soviet Army (GRU) of the USSR Armed Forces, created during the preparation for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan
and staffed by officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers
Central Asian nationalities who were nominally Muslims.
The correct name is a separate special forces detachment (osSpN),
Also, in official documents there could be another name, such as a separate motorized rifle battalion (omsb),
indicating numbers (No.).

In total, two “Muslim battalions” (consolidated military unit) were created:
1) 154th separate special purpose detachment (ooSpN) in TurkVO at the base in Chirchik of the 15th separate special purpose brigade (SpN) of the GRU General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces;
2) the 177th separate special forces detachment (177 special forces) in the North Caucasian Military District (Kapchagay based on the 22 separate special forces..
The 177th separate special forces detachment was the first among special forces units in Afghanistan to receive the Battle Banner.
... In Gulbahor the question arose about awarding the unit with an order, but it turned out that we did not have the Banner of the unit.
The issue of presenting the unit's Banner came to a head. In August 1983, we were awarded the Battle Banner - we became a full-fledged combat unit... .
- “Kapchagai” battalion.

The staff of the “Muslim battalions” differed from the usual staff of special purpose battalions (bSpN), located on the territory of the Soviet Union and consisting of three reconnaissance companies and separate platoons at the battalion headquarters, by the additional presence of an engineer company, a fire support company and a motor transport company, hence and consolidated, that is, intended for individual tasks.
Initially, the 2nd “Muslim battalion” or 177 special forces in 1980 was created for possible actions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. In connection with this, 300 conscripts of Uighur nationality were selected. In fact, in the Soviet Army of the USSR Armed Forces, for the first time since the end of the Great Patriotic War, an almost (70%) national military unit was created. An accelerated Chinese language course was introduced for the officers of the detachment.
...Somewhere in September '81, they announced that we would take the autumn test to the Moscow commission, and that in addition to combat training subjects, they would also test knowledge of the Chinese language. A Chinese language instructor arrived from the district intelligence department and we quickly began to study it, that is, Chinese. The topic is the interrogation of a prisoner of war. They wrote down Chinese words in Russian letters and learned them by heart. So, learning Chinese in a month is not a myth, at least for us military men, we can. But it didn’t last long, after two weeks the language study was canceled...
- "Kara Major's Detachment." Zhantasov Amangeldy. Memoirs of an officer of the 177th Special Forces
The personnel of the 154th separate special forces detachment (osSpN) were dressed in the uniform of the Afghan army. Subsequently to the Soviet, with the insignia of the airborne troops of the Ground Forces of the USSR Armed Forces.
The detachment under the command of Major Khabib Khalbaev, an Uzbek by nationality (1st “Muslim battalion”) was transported in parts in the first ten days of December 1979, but after the decision of the CPSU Central Committee on December 13, it was completely assembled in Bagram. There, since July 1979, there was a combat guard battalion of the air base (air base) - 345 airborne division (previously 111 airborne division of the 105th airborne division). On December 14, another battalion of the 345th detachment arrived in Bagram to support the airbase. No one knew their tasks and had no plans for action. On the morning of December 20, the column of the 154th Special Forces moved to Kabul almost directly to the government residence. In total, about 540 military personnel performed. Khalbaev was ordered to cover the assault on Amin's palace and stop any armed groups attempting to attack the territory of the residence. The main tasks - capture and liquidation - were assigned to 60 military personnel of the special groups "Grom" and "Zenith".
After the capture of Amin’s palace on December 27, 1979, the detachment was returned to the USSR “due to replenishment.” In Kabul, only 459 special forces remained subordinate to the 40th Army.
At the end of October 1981, 154 ooSpN (1 omsb) was returned back, with a new composition and a new commander Igor Stoderevsky, and a “fresh” “Muslim battalion” or 177 ooSpN (2 omsb) was introduced under the command of Boris Kerimbaev, which entered in 1984 year as part of the 15th special forces unit in Jalalabad.
The 2nd “Muslim battalion” (177 ooSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev is known for its participation in the history of the Afghan war as the only intelligence formation of the GRU Special Forces that was used (5th and 6th Panjshir operation - Panjshir operations) not for its intended purpose as reconnaissance sabotage specificity, but as a mountain rifle formation to capture the high-mountain fortified areas of the dushmans. Neither before nor after the 2nd “Muslim battalion” were tasks of this nature and complexity assigned to special forces in the Afghan war.
By the time 177 special forces were introduced into Afghanistan, there was no longer a task to assemble personnel based on nationality, certainly the same as in the case of the first composition of the 1st “Muslim battalion” that stormed Amin’s palace. Therefore, the 2nd “Muslim battalion” corresponds to its name by 80%
Until 1984, they acted according to the same tactics as the dushmans - ambushes and raids. Rarely, I had to take part in combined arms operations of the 40th Army. Since the beginning of 1984, the strategy of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan has changed towards the destruction of caravans and weapons stocks of dushmans, rather than fighting individual groups. However, the activities of the GRU special intelligence in Afghanistan did not end there. They were the last to leave, covering the exit of the main troops, together with units of the Central Asian Border District of the KGB of the USSR.

Muslim battalions of the GRU of the USSR Soviet Islamic special-purpose battalions are still considered unique military formations in which Muslims from the Asian republics of the USSR heroically fought with their co-religionists. Following the example of the Iranian military, on March 18, 1979, the 1st General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, Nur Mohammad Taraki, called the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Alexei Kosygin, and asked to send soldiers, indigenous residents of the Asian republics of the USSR, to destroy the four thousand-strong detachment of Iranian military personnel dressed in civilian clothes who had penetrated into city ​​of Herat. “We want Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens to be sent to us so that they can drive tanks, since all these nationalities are in Afghanistan,” the Afghan leader convinced the Soviet prime minister. - Let them put on Afghan clothes, Afghan badges, and no one will recognize them. This is a very easy job, in our opinion. The experience of Iran and Pakistan shows that this work is easy to do. They provide a model." Despite the fact that Kosygin expressed doubts about this proposal, on April 26, 1979, the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense issued special directive No. 314/2/0061 on the formation of a special purpose detachment of the GRU, which later became known as the Muslim battalion. Soviet identity American military expert Jesy Hou (JIAYI ZHOU) dedicated a special book to the Soviet Muslim battalion, starting it with the fact that he applauded the national policy in the USSR when he studied archival materials regarding this unit. Interestingly, his research was funded by the RAND Corporation, which is considered the “thought factory” of American strategists. “The USSR has developed a unique Soviet identity that cannot be explained by traditional values ​​- national or religious,” writes Jesy Howe. According to him, 538 people under the command of Major Khabibdzhan Kholbaev were united by the idea of ​​their socialist mission in Afghanistan. This was the 154th separate special forces detachment of the GRU, consisting exclusively of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmens. In total, more than five thousand military personnel passed through the sieve of the special commission. Typically good training The training of the soldiers of Detachment 154 was quite typical for the Soviet army - typically good. In the presence of the Chief of Staff of TURKVO, Lieutenant General G.F. Krivosheev. in the summer of 1979, the “Muslims” conducted tactical exercises “to seize a separate building” and “fights in the city.” In particular, grenade launchers were required to hit targets by noise through a smoke screen. Shooting accurately on the run and mastering sambo techniques was taken for granted. Particular attention was paid to the coordination of companies and platoons through radio communications, for which senior lieutenant Yu.M. Mirsaatov was responsible. Writer Eduard Belyaev, who studied the training documents of the 154th detachment, as well as other soldiers sent to Afghanistan, writes that the stereotypes that appeared after the release of the film “9th Company” do not correspond to reality. Secret mission Despite the fact that the fighters of the “Muslim battalion” in full combat readiness regularly went to the Tuzel airfield (Tashkent) to be sent to Afghanistan, the departure was postponed every time. However, after the officers of the head of the Afghan presidential guard, Major Jandad, strangled Taraki... The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee issued a secret decree in which it was said: “... we consider it advisable to send to Afghanistan a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff, trained for these purposes, with a total number of about 500 people , in a uniform that does not reveal his affiliation with the Armed Forces of the USSR." To carry out this order, on the night of December 9-10, 1979, soldiers of the 154th separate detachment were transported to Afghanistan to Bagram airfield by AN-12, AN-22, and Il-76 aircraft. The battle with Amin's guards On December 27, 1979 at 19.00, the Muslim battalion of the USSR GRU took part in the assault on the Taj Beg Palace, where Amin is located. Jesy Howe called Operation Storm 333 fantastic, considering that 700 Soviet troops, mostly fighters from the “Muslim battalion,” defeated more than two thousand Amin’s guards, located in a building specially prepared for defense. Platoon commander Tursunkulov explained the task of detachment 154 this way: “They brought the KGB men to the entrance, ordered his own to lie down in a circle and cover the attacking soldiers with fire.” However, it soon became clear that the KGB assault groups could not break the resistance of the Afghans. Then Colonel Boyarinov called the Musbat for help. “We went ahead, destroying all living things that came our way,” recalls Shukhrat Mirzaev, a participant in the assault. - Those who resisted were killed on the spot. Those who surrendered were not touched. The first floor was cleared. We occupy the second one. Like a piston, we are squeezing Amin’s men onto the third floor and into the attic spaces. Everywhere there are many corpses of Afghan military and civilians.” Later, studying the experience of this assault, military experts noted the high quality of Soviet body armor, which did not penetrate the bullets of the German MP-5 submachine guns in service with the Afghans. Under the banner of Lenin After completing this task, the musbat became an ordinary Soviet special forces detachment, whose commander was Major Stoderevsky. The real second musbat was the 177th GRU special forces detachment under the command of Boris Tukenovich Kerimbaev. This commander became famous for being called the personal enemy of the “Lion of Panjshir” Ahmad Shah Massoud. Jesy Howe, studying the phenomenon of Muslim battalions in the USSR, noted that without the true internationalism that was in the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that such military units fought heroically under the banners of Lenin, who was incomprehensible to them.

The Soviet forces brought in to provide assistance in 1979 to “friendly” Afghanistan included one unique, well-trained special forces unit consisting exclusively of representatives of Central Asian nationalities. It was thanks to the origin of its personnel that this detachment received the name “Muslim battalion”. This battalion, unfortunately, did not last long, but managed to leave a bright mark on the history of the GRU.
Already in the spring of 1979, the leadership of our country firmly understood that the situation in Afghanistan required military intervention. Therefore, you need to be prepared for any scenario. The idea of ​​quietly and unnoticeably introducing small military units into the rebellious country immediately arose. At the end of the spring of 1979, this decision was finally made and Vasily Vasilyevich Kolesnik (Colonel of the GRU) received the order to create a special forces battalion, staffed by representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the southern republics. Carrying out the order, Kolesnik gathered soldiers from various parts of the Soviet Union. The detachment included motorized riflemen and tankers, paratroopers and border guards. They were sent to the small Uzbek district town of Chirchik. All the soldiers, warrant officers, officers and even the battalion commander himself were of Central Asian nationalities, mainly Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks, nominally Muslims. With such a composition, the detachment had no problems with language training; all Tajiks, as well as half of the Turkmens and Uzbeks, spoke fluent Farsi, which was one of the main languages ​​in Afghanistan.
The first Muslim battalion (but as history has shown, not the last), which is the 154th separate special forces detachment in the world as part of the fifteenth brigade of the Turkestan Military District, was led by Major Khabib Tadzhibaevich Khalbaev.

Initially, the unit had the following goal - to protect Nurmuhamed Taraki, the President of Afghanistan, who was trying to quickly lay the socialist foundations in his country. There were plenty of opponents to such radical changes, and therefore Taraki quite rightly feared for his life. By that time, political coups accompanied by bloodshed had become quite common in Afghanistan.
The new formation was well provided with all the necessary resources; the fighters had no restrictions or limits on funds. The detachment personnel received completely new weapons. To conduct firing training, in accordance with the Decree of the General Staff, the Turkestan Military Battalion was allocated the training grounds of two military schools: the Tashkent Combined Arms Command School and the Tank School, located in Chirchik.

Throughout July and August, the soldiers were intensively engaged in combat training. Tactical training, driving combat vehicles, and shooting were conducted daily.

The endurance of the fighters was tempered in thirty-kilometer forced marches. Thanks to extensive logistics, the personnel of the “Muslim battalion” had the opportunity to achieve a high level of training in hand-to-hand combat, shooting from all available types of weapons, as well as driving infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in extreme conditions.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, they were hastily sewing Afghan uniforms for Musbat soldiers and preparing the necessary papers. Each fighter received documents of the established type in the Afghan language. Fortunately, there was no need to come up with new names - the servicemen used their own. In Afghanistan, especially in the north of the country, many Uzbeks and Tajiks lived, and there were also Turkmens there.

Soon the battalion changed its Soviet military uniform to the uniform of the Afghan army. To make it easier to recognize each other, the squad members wrapped bandages around both hands. To make it even more realistic, the soldiers constantly trained in Afghan uniforms so that they would look worn.

When, at the end of the GRU inspection, the battalion was already preparing to be sent to Afghanistan, another coup took place in Kabul. President Taraki's closest ally, Hafizullah Amin, eliminated the previous leadership, taking over control of the country. The intensive training of the special detachment was suspended, visits from senior command personnel stopped, and life in the battalion became similar to ordinary army everyday life. But this calm did not last long; soon an order was received from Moscow to resume training. However, the purpose of learning has changed radically. Now the military personnel were no longer trained for defensive, but for assault operations against the Afghan government. This time there was no delay in sending the battalion. A list of personnel was announced, which was supposed to take off on the first flight on December 5, 1979 to prepare the camp. The rest of the battalion was to join them on 8 December.

During the flight, the servicemen of the “Muslim battalion” noticed one unusual fact: a detachment of mature military men was flying on the plane, but in soldiers’ overcoats. It was explained to the interested soldiers that a group of sappers had gone with them. Only later did it become clear that these were important bigwigs from the KGB and the GRU.

A detachment under the leadership of Uzbek Khabib Khalbaev joined the air base combat guard battalion in Bagram from the 345th separate parachute regiment, which had been stationed here since July 1979. And on December 14, another battalion of the 345th arrived.

According to the initial plan of the GRU leadership, the Muslim battalion was supposed to set out from Bagram, immediately capturing Amin’s residence, which was located in Kabul. However, at the last moment, the dictator moved to the new residence “Taj Beg”, which was a real fortress. The plans were quickly amended. The detachment was given the task of reaching Kabul on its own and appearing near the Taj Beg Palace, as if to strengthen security. On the morning of December 20, about 540 GRU special forces soldiers moved to the capital of Afghanistan.

In appearance, the detachment was very similar to an ordinary Afghan military formation, and the newly appointed President Amin was sure that the fighters had arrived to provide external security for his new residence. On the way to the palace, military personnel were stopped by patrols more than a dozen times, allowing entry only after receiving the appropriate password or permission from above. At the entrance to Kabul, the battalion was met by Afghan officers who accompanied the special detachment all the way to the presidential palace.

The first line of security for the Taj Beg was considered to be a company of personal bodyguards of Hafizullah Amin. The third was the security brigade, under the leadership of Major Jandat, Amin’s main guarantor. Our Muslim battalion was to form the second line. The palace was protected from an air strike by an anti-aircraft regiment. The total number of military personnel at the palace reached two and a half thousand people.

The GRU soldiers were placed in a separate unfinished building, located four hundred meters from the residence. The building did not even have glass on the windows; instead, the soldiers pulled blankets over them. The final stage of preparation for the operation began. Every night, our soldiers fired flares on the nearby hills, and the engines of combat vehicles were started in the pits. The commander of the Afghan guard showed dissatisfaction with such actions, but they explained to him that a planned training was underway related to the specifics of possible combat operations. Of course, everything was done in order to lull the vigilance of the guards when the detachment actually went on the assault.

Colonel Kolesnik, who drew up the operation plan, later talked about this: “I brought the plan I signed and worked out on the map to Ivanov and Magomedov (respectively, the chief adviser to the KGB of the USSR and the chief military adviser to the Ministry of Defense). They approved the plan verbally, but did not want to sign. It was clear that while we were thinking about how to complete the task set by management, these cunning people were deciding how to avoid responsibility in case of failure. Then I wrote on the plan in their presence: “The plan was approved orally. They refused to sign." I set the date and time and went to my battalion...”

Participating in the operation to storm the palace from our side were: groups “Grom” and “Zenith” (24 and 30 people, respectively, commanders Major Romanov and Major Semenov), a Muslim battalion (530 people, led by Major Khalbaev), the ninth company of the 345th regiment (87 people, commander Starley Vostrotin), anti-tank platoon (27 people under the leadership of Starley Savostyanov). The operation was led by Colonel Kolesnik, and his deputy was Major General Drozdov, head of the KGB’s illegal intelligence service.

The time of the assault was postponed, as information was received that the Afghans were beginning to guess about everything. On December 26, the soldiers were allowed to make a camp bath. Everyone was given fresh linen and new vests. Khalbaev received orders to cover the KGB special forces and suppress any groups trying to break into the territory of the residence. The main task of capturing the palace was assigned to the fighters of the Zenit and Grom groups.

At about 7 o’clock in the morning on December 27, 1979, at the prearranged signal “Storm 333,” the KGB assault brigades began to climb the mountain along the only serpentine road. At this time, Khalbaev’s people captured important positions and firing points near the palace, and removed the sentries. A separate group managed to neutralize the leadership of the infantry battalion. About twenty minutes after the start of the attack, “Grom” and “Zenith” in combat vehicles, having overcome external security posts, burst into the square in front of the palace. The doors to the troop compartments opened and the soldiers poured out. Some of them managed to break into the first floor of the Taj Beg. A fierce battle began with the personal guard of the self-proclaimed president, most of whom consisted of his relatives.

Units of the Muslim battalion, together with a company of paratroopers, formed an outer ring of defense, repelling attacks by the security brigade. Two platoons of GRU special forces captured the barracks of the tank and first infantry battalions, and tanks fell into their hands. It was then discovered that the tank guns and machine guns had no breech blocks. This was the work of our military advisers, who, under the pretext of repairs, removed the mechanisms in advance.

In the palace, the Afghans fought with the tenacity of the doomed. Hurricane fire from the windows pinned the special forces to the ground, and the attack fizzled out. This was a turning point; it was urgent to raise people and lead them forward to help those who were already fighting in the palace. Under the leadership of officers Boyarinov, Karpukhin and Kozlov, the fighters rushed into the attack. At these moments, Soviet soldiers suffered the greatest losses. In an attempt to reach the windows and doors of the palace, many soldiers were wounded. Only a small group rushed inside. There was a fierce battle going on in the building itself. The special forces acted decisively and desperately. If no one came out of the premises with their hands raised, then grenades immediately flew through the broken doors. However, there were too few Soviet soldiers to eliminate Amin. In total, about two dozen people were in the palace, and many were injured. After hesitating briefly, Colonel Boyarinov ran out of the front entrance and began calling for help from the Muslim battalion. Of course, the enemy also noticed him. A stray bullet, ricocheting off the bulletproof vest, pierced the colonel's neck. Boyarinov was fifty-seven years old. Of course, he could not participate in the assault; his official position and age allowed him to direct the battle from headquarters. However, this was a real officer of the Russian army - his subordinates were going into battle, and he had to be next to them. Coordinating the actions of groups, he also acted as a simple attack aircraft.

After the fighters of the Muslim battalion came to the aid of the KGB special forces, the fate of the palace defenders was sealed. Amin's bodyguards, about one hundred and fifty soldiers and officers of the personal guard, steadfastly resisted, not wanting to surrender. Our military personnel were saved from heavy losses by the fact that the Afghans were mainly armed with German MP-5s, which did not penetrate the body armor of Soviet soldiers.

According to the story of Amin’s captured assistant, it became clear about the last moments of the dictator’s life. In the first minutes of the battle, the “master” ordered our military advisers to be notified of the attack on the palace. He shouted: “We need Russian help!” When the adjutant rightly remarked: “That’s how the Russians shoot!”, the president lost his temper, grabbed an ashtray and threw it in the face of his subordinate, yelling: “You’re lying, this can’t be!” Then he tried to call himself. But there was no connection. In the end, Amin said dejectedly: “That’s right, I suspected it...”.

When the shooting stopped and the smoke in the palace cleared, the body of Hafizullah Amin was found near the bar counter. What actually caused his death remained unclear, either our bullet or a grenade fragment. A version was also expressed that Amin was shot by his own people. At this point the operation was officially completed.

All the wounded, including Afghans, received medical care. The civilians were taken under guard to the battalion's location, and all the killed defenders of the palace were buried in one place not far from the Taj Beck. Prisoners dug graves for them. Babrak Karmal flew in specially to identify Hafizullah Amina. Soon, Kabul radio stations broadcast a message that, by decision of the military tribunal, Hafizullah Amin was sentenced to death. Later, Babrak Karmal’s taped words to the people of Afghanistan were heard. He said that “... the system of torture of Amin and his associates - executioners, murderers and usurpers of tens of thousands of my compatriots was broken...”.

During the short but fierce battle, Afghan losses amounted to about 350 people killed. Approximately 1,700 people were captured. Our soldiers lost eleven people: five paratroopers, including Colonel Boyarinov, and six soldiers of the Muslim battalion. Colonel Kuznechenkov, a military doctor who happened to be in the palace, also died. Thirty-eight people suffered injuries of varying severity. The president's two young sons were killed in the shootout, but Amina's widow and her wounded daughter survived. At first they were kept under guard in a special room at the battalion headquarters, and then were handed over to government representatives. The fate of the remaining defenders of the president turned out to be tragic: many of them were soon shot, others died in prison. This outcome of events was apparently facilitated by the reputation of Amin, who even by Eastern standards was considered a cruel and bloody dictator. According to tradition, a stain of shame also automatically fell on his entourage.

After Amin was eliminated, a plane from Moscow immediately took off for Bagram. There, under the supervision of KGB workers, was the new head of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal. When the Tu-134 was already descending, the lights at the entire airfield suddenly went out. The plane landed only with the help of onboard headlights. The aircraft crew threw out a braking parachute, but the plane rolled almost to the edge of the runway. As it later turned out, the head of the airbase was an ardent supporter of Amin and, suspecting something was wrong when a strange plane was landing, turned off the lighting, hoping to cause a plane crash. But the high skill of the pilots made it possible to avoid tragedy.

Much later, interesting facts about the operation began to emerge. Firstly, it turned out that during the entire assault there was no communication with the command post. No one could clearly explain the reason for the absence. An attempt to immediately report on the liquidation of the president was also unsuccessful. Secondly, only a couple of years later, at a meeting of participants in those December events, it became known what the delay in reporting the death of the president could have resulted in. It turned out that the military leaders had developed a backup plan to destroy Amin and his associates. A little later than the assault brigades, the Vitebsk division, which did not know about the earlier actions of the KGB and the “Muslim battalion,” received the task of capturing the presidential palace. If the message about achieving the goal had not arrived in a timely manner, the Belarusians could have launched a new assault attempt. And then it is unknown how many participants in the first offensive would have been killed out of ignorance, in the confusion that arose. It is possible that this is exactly the outcome of events - to remove more witnesses - and was planned.

And here’s what Colonel Kolesnik said: “In the evening of the day after the assault, all the leaders of this operation were almost killed by a machine-gun fire from one Soviet soldier. Returning from a banquet organized to celebrate the successful completion of the operation, in Amin’s Mercedes we were fired upon near the General Staff building, which was guarded by paratroopers. Lieutenant Colonel Shvets was the first to notice strange flashes on the asphalt road and understood what they meant. He slipped out of the car, swearing at the sentries with choice obscenities. This worked better than the password. We called the chief of guard. The lieutenant who showed up first got hit in the ear, and only then listened to the end of the procedure for using weapons by the sentries at the posts. When we examined the car, we found several bullet holes in the hood. Any higher and neither me nor Kozlov would have been alive. At the end, General Drozdov quietly said to the lieutenant: “Son, thank you for not teaching your soldier to shoot.”

The unique Muslim unit created under the auspices of the GRU was withdrawn from Afghanistan almost immediately after the storming of the palace. All equipment was transferred to the Vitebsk division. The servicemen were left with only personal weapons and on January 2, 1980, two An-22s in full force were sent to Tashkent. For the successful conduct of the special operation, the fighters of the “Muslim battalion” were awarded orders and medals: seven people received the Order of Lenin, ten people received the Order of the Red Banner, forty-five - the Order of the Red Star, forty-six soldiers were awarded the medal "For Courage", and the rest - the medal "For military merits." Colonel Kolesnik became a Hero of the Soviet Union, and was soon awarded the rank of general.

The battalion temporarily ceased to exist, the servicemen were transferred to the reserve, and all officers were scattered to various garrisons for further service. After the reorganization, by October 1981 there was no one in it who took part in the storming of the palace.

Many events related to the coup in Afghanistan were presented by the Soviet press in a completely different light. According to the initial media version, President Amin was arrested. And only then, by a fair court, he was sentenced to death. A film about this was shot in advance and prepared for showing after the death of the dictator. The participation of Soviet special forces and the actual death of the self-proclaimed president were not mentioned anywhere.

After the assassination of Hafizullah Amin, units of the 40th Army continued to enter Afghanistan, occupying cities, villages and the main centers of the country. Industrial and administrative facilities, highways, airfields, and mountain passes were taken under control. At first, no one intended to fight, hoping only to convince others of the seriousness of their intentions. As a last resort, solve all the problems with little loss, without assuming the future scale of hostilities. The point of view of the General Staff was that only a demonstration of powerful military force, missile units, tanks, and artillery was enough. This will strike terror into the hearts of the opposition, forcing them to surrender or simply flee. In fact, the appearance of strangers in an Islamic country that has the experience of countless wars, a country where the bulk of the population knows how to handle weapons from early childhood, inflamed the already ongoing civil war, giving it the meaning of jihad.

Despite the fact that the operation to eliminate the president was carried out successfully, Western countries were quick to identify this fact as evidence of the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and called the subsequent leaders of Afghanistan (Karmal and Najibullah) puppet leaders.
On October 30, 1981, at two o’clock in the morning, the 154th separate special forces detachment, previously called the “Muslim battalion,” crossed the state border of the USSR and rushed to the place of future deployment. This is how the second arrival of “musbat” took place on Afghan soil. The new unit commander, Major Igor Stoderevsky, served with him until the very end of the war.

Information sources:
-http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/
-http://sevastopol.su/conf_view.php?id=17319
-http://afganrass.ucoz.ru/publ/musulmanskij_batalon/1-1-0-36
-http://www.desant.com.ua/spn1.html

AUTHOR OF THE STORY ABOUT THE LEGENDARY "MUSBAT"

We could have met him back in Kabul - December 28, 1979. But then this did not happen. Everyone had their own tasks. Therefore, I met Captain Rashid Abdullaev in 1985 - together we entered the first year of the Military-Political Academy named after V.I. Lenin. I even remember what date it was – September 7th. The students were taken to the training center of the Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev in Nakhabino. They told us a lot and showed us samples of weapons and equipment. And then I noticed a short captain standing not far from me on one of the platforms. On his tunic there was a sign of a graduate of the Suvorov Military School and only one order bar. But it cost ten. This was the bar of the Order of the Red Banner. Then we met and became friends. And now, years later, they found each other again. Reserve Colonel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan Rashid Igamberdievich Abdullaev is now a researcher at the Center for Military Scientific Research at the Academy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Both of his sons, Timur and Alisher, followed in their father’s footsteps. Timur is an officer in the armed forces of Uzbekistan, and Alisher graduated from the military department of the Tashkent State Technical University. True, he will be awarded the officer rank only a year later - after completing his studies at the university.

Army biographyRashid Igamberdievich began after graduating from the Kazan SVU in 1974, when he entered Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Tank and Artillery School. A year after graduation, he was scheduled to serve in Afghanistan. As part of the “musbat” - “Muslim battalion”, which later received the name of the 154th separate special forces detachment of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Lieutenant Rashid Abdullaev took part in Operation Storm-333.

Eastern wisdom says: “If you want to see a mountain, you need to move away. If you want to evaluate an event, you need time.” And now that time has come - many documents have been declassified. That’s why reserve colonel Rashid Abdullayev wrote his chronicle-documentary story “Time Has Chosen Us,” which was published in 2014 in Tashkent on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The book by Rashid Igamberdievich contains documents and memories of participants in those events - December 27, 1979. The story evoked numerous responses.

Thus, retired colonel Khabibdzhan Kholbaev, commander of the “Muslim battalion,” wrote in the preface to the story:

“Author of the book “Time Has Chosen Us” Abdullaev R.I. is a direct participant in the events covered in the book. Having gone through a difficult military path from a Suvorov student to the head of the department of spiritual, moral and military education of the Academy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Colonel R.I. Abdullaev. Even today he pays a lot of attention to issues of spiritual, moral and military-patriotic education of young people.

Inconvenient pages cannot be torn out of history. We cannot keep silent about what happened in our common history. The value of the book lies in the fact that the author does not give a political assessment of the events that took place; he talks about specific political, military and military facts that took place on the basis of his own memories, eyewitness accounts and documentary materials.

This book is another evidence of the author’s desire to leave in the memory of descendants the true picture of the events that took place at the end of the last century associated with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

The educational component of the book is precisely to show the true heroism and dedication of soldiers and officers who do not discuss, but precisely carry out the tasks assigned to them.”

And here is a review of the book by retired special services veteran Colonel Muzaffar Khudoyarov, a participant in the Afghan events:

“I am well acquainted with the now retired colonels, commander of the famous “Muslim battalion” Khabibdzhan Tadzhibaevich Kholbaev and his former subordinates – Gulomjon Yusupovich Mamatkulov and Rashid Igamberdievich Abdullaev.

My opinion is that these are people of high moral and professional principles. They are distinguished, first of all, by their decency. Their neighbors and acquaintances have no idea about their legendary past, because they have always been and remain modest and taciturn people, they never talk about their awards and titles, and do not stick out their truly heroic military past. Their feat is evidenced by military awards: Kh.T. Kholbaev was awarded the country's highest award - the Order of Lenin, R.I. Abdullaev - Order of the Red Banner, G.Yu. Mamatkulov - Order of the Red Star.

Thirty-five years after Operation Shtor-333, in this book I found in the list of special forces soldiers the names of my childhood friends: Bogodirov Abdumumin, Akbaev Turgun, Artykov Bakhtier, with whom we grew up together in the Regarsky district. All three were distinguished among their peers by their leadership qualities, took an active life position, and were diversified both physically and intellectually. They served first in the famous Vitebsk 103rd Guards Airborne Division, and then were selected to the 154th separate special forces detachment of the Main Intelligence Directorate - the “Muslim battalion”. All three took part in Operation Storm 333. Bogodirov Abdumumin died in battle the day after the capture of Amin's palace in Kabul; he was subsequently posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Artykov Bakhtier, too, unfortunately, is currently no longer alive. For the Kabul operation he was awarded the medal "For Courage". After the army, he entered the service of the internal affairs bodies and became an officer. He never gave in to difficulties and dangers. He died in the line of duty during the riots in Dushanbe. Akbaev Turgun currently works in a management position at one of the large industrial enterprises. Just like his former commanders, he does not like to advertise his military exploits, although he also has military awards, and we know that the overall success of Operation Storm-333 was ensured thanks to the impeccable actions of people like him - soldiers and officers.

At the cost of their lives, they completed the task and remained faithful to the military oath to the end, the fighters of the “Muslim battalion” Bogodirov Abdumumin Abdunabievich, Rasulmetov Kurbantai Muradovich, Madiyarov Ziyabiddin Giyasiddinovich, Shcherbekov Mirkasym Abdrashimovich, Kurbanov Khodzhanepes, Khusanov Sabirjon Kamilovich, Suleymanov Shokirzhon Sultanovich, Mamadzhanov Abdunabi Gai Janovich. These were the first victims."

I read the book carefully. And then he asked Colonel Abdullaev:

– Rashid, you’ve talked about a lot of people here, but only a few short episodes about yourself. And it’s not you who are telling the story, but your comrades in arms who are saying it.

“I can’t add anything more, sorry,” Abdullaev answered. – I was in the group of the company commander, senior lieutenant Vladimir Salimovich Sharipov, by the way, he was later awarded the Order of Lenin. Look how our guys acted. Of course, I was among them...

“You gave me a task,” I grumbled jokingly, “there are such vivid episodes, such dynamics that it would be impossible to tell briefly.” And if everything is detailed, even five articles are not enough...

“Which of us studied at the editorial department: you or me,” my friend answered me in the same tone. - So solve the problem...

- Listen, Captain Murat Khusainov also studied with us, I remember he had a wound and an Order of the Red Star - also from the Musbat...

- Yes, in 1979 he was a lieutenant - Murat Oraevich Khusainov. It seems that Murat has returned to his homeland in Turkmenistan. He was a normal guy, political officer of the 1st company of the detachment. Unfortunately, I don’t know anything about his fate now...

I again turn to the book of Colonel Rashid Abdullaev. I read the lines: “Two groups from the USSR State Security Committee took part in the storming of the palace – "Grom" and "Zenith"; The 154th separate special forces detachment of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the so-called “Muslim battalion”, with the 9th Guards Airborne Company and the Guards anti-tank ATGM “Fagot” platoon from the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Troop attached to it. airborne regiment of the Airborne Forces.

The details of the assault on the Taj Beg Palace were described mainly by members of the USSR KGB. Their information about the role and place of the special forces of the “Muslim battalion” and the paratroopers of the 345th Guards. OPDP in the operation are fragmentary and sometimes not accurate...

Over the years that have passed since then, depending on the political situation, the assessment of these events has also changed; they have become overgrown with myths and legends. In many works, the participants in the assault were portrayed as some kind of soulless robots, devoid of any human feelings and emotions. This is written by those who themselves have never come into close contact with the pain that blood and death, inevitable in war, bring!

I have made an attempt, based on the memories of eyewitnesses and documentary materials, to reconstruct the events of those days...”

Talking about Colonel Abdullaev’s book, I will give only a few fragments from the memoirs of his company commander, battalion commander and one of his fellow officers. The first to advance on seven infantry fighting vehicles was the combat group of senior lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov and the Grom group under the leadership of Major Mikhail Romanov. The backbone of the 2nd combat group was the 2nd group of the 3rd company under the command of Khamidulla Abdullaev (namesake of Rashid Abdullaev).

This is what Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov recalls:

“The infantry fighting vehicles that were ready to throw lined up in a column. The clock was counting down the last peaceful minutes. It's either hit or miss! But inside it was bad - to the point of nausea. There was still fear, there was! I sat in the driver's seat in the BMP. The engines started...

Where the Taj Beg monolith darkened on the top of the hill, the palace guards, taken by surprise, rushed about under the fiery shower of Shiloks. In the darkness of the December evening, the Afghans had not yet seen the attackers, but the annoying roar of approaching combat vehicles could already be clearly heard... We had just moved, and I lost contact with the command post. Why? I still don't know. Immediately, all five vehicles began hitting the windows with cannons and machine guns. And then... In general, when entering the area in front of the palace, the first BMP No. 035 caught the edge of the wall and stalled! They're already firing at full blast, they're hitting us point-blank from the palace parapet, but the mechanic can't get the gear out of gear! Bullets rain down on the car. I think: “The only thing missing was grenade launchers, one for each vehicle. We didn’t expect such fire.”

I immediately gave the command to dismount. The Gromovites got out. And the fire was so dense that they had to take cover behind their cars! In short, it is impossible to get into the building. On top of that, our Shilkas hit so hard that the shells fly overhead. I'll call the battalion commander on the portable radio station - no answer. Then suddenly I felt the cord from the radio station stretched, and I was completely turned around.

What kind of radio stations do we have? She herself is on the back of the signalman, and the headphones and intercom are on the commander. Sometimes a fighter will turn around awkwardly and drag all this “economy” with him. I just turned around to scold the fighter, and he was already ready, falling to the ground. And then I see an Afghan lying in the ditch next to us, hiding from the fire. For some reason it stuck in my memory: on his hand is a watch with a ruby-red dial. I gave him a turn. It seems to have hit him, but he bounces. I'm still in line - he jumps again. And these AKM bullets pierce the body and ricochet the body off the concrete. As soon as he turned in the other direction, an Afghan officer with a pistol in his hand was running past the BMP. I shot him down with a machine gun. I picked up the pistol, and for some reason I showed it to Boyarinov from Grom. And he said to me: “Well, go ahead, take it, your first battle trophy”...

When my machine-gunners saw that the KGB men were going on the attack, they immediately rushed after them! They completely forgot about their task, such was the impulse. If Amin had jumped out of the window at that moment, he would have easily left! I'm following the fighters - we have to stop them!

Near the building itself, it suddenly hit me like a brick on my left thigh. I didn’t immediately realize that I was wounded. I got to the entrance, I see: Boyarinov is lying - killed. The visor of his helmet was raised, it was clear that the bullet had hit him straight in the face. Somehow I hobbled to my BMP. I injected myself with promedol from the first aid kit. I feel like I need more. I call Sergeant Dzhumaev. He was my bodyguard instead. Come on, I say, run for the first aid kit! Just before he was sent to Afghanistan, the KGB demanded that he remain in the Union - his father had once, even before Dzhumaev’s birth, been convicted. And the sergeant got on the plane like a hare and flew with us to Bagram. Well, don't send him back! So, he ran away to get the medol and seemed to disappear - no and no. And then the “Gromovets” shouted to me: “Stop firing on the second floor! It’s impossible for anyone to go there.” Dzhumaev was gone for a long time... Then he came running with promedol. I told him: “Where have you gone?!” He says: “I reached the BMP and saw that machine gunner Khezretov was lying not far from the armor and was single-handedly holding back the Afghans, who, having come to their senses, rushed up from the guardhouse from below to the palace. A bullet crushed his lower jaw, blood was gushing, and he shot! Courageous guy! Sergeant Dzhumaev rushed into the BMP, pulled a towel out of someone’s duffel bag, somehow tied Khezret’s jaw - and only then - to me.

Here the battle began to subside. Someone from “Grom” waves at me again: “That’s it! Amin was killed! Report!” I say: “Wait, I’ll go and see myself.” We went up the stairs. We went into the room...”

Major Khabibdzhan Kholbaev, commander of the “Muslim battalion”:

“When, forty-three minutes later, Sharipov reported over the radio that the task had been completed, we headed straight to the palace in the BMP. Sharipov met us there and, as the leader of the capture group, reported on the completion of the mission. When he finished, I noticed that he was wounded in the leg. I ordered him to be put in an infantry fighting vehicle and sent to the hospital.”

Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov:

“I saw Kholbaev, took a combat stance, put my hand to the visor and began to report on the completion of the task. I thought that he would interrupt me and we would go inside the palace. And he stood at attention, also put his hand to his headdress and... and so he listened to the entire report. But standing near the building was still dangerous, they were shooting at us. The wheelman understood the situation and said: “Go into the building. It's dangerous here." They went inside, and I stayed outside. I lift up my pant leg and there is blood all over my underwear. The hole is through. Kolesnik came out and said: “Take the corpses and the wounded and get them into position.” My political officer Abdullayev Rashid was given the command to take Amin downstairs. He wrapped Amin in a curtain and, together with other fighters, carried him outside. Our losses: one killed, many wounded. And in total, three people died in my company on December 27-28: Shcherbekov, Khusanov and Kurbanov. Other units, including Grom and Zenit, also suffered losses...

However, alas, it was not without shooting at their own... In the Taj-Bek, which had already been captured by special forces and near the brigade headquarters building, the Vitebsk paratroopers, who had just entered Kabul and knew nothing about Operation Storm, entered into battle with... the Musbat. The Afghan uniform of the latter let us down..."

Senior Lieutenant Bakhodir Egamberdyev:

“On the morning of December 28, as we were leaving the brigade’s territory, we unexpectedly came under massive fire from paratroopers of the 103rd Airborne Division. Realizing that a tragic misunderstanding was occurring, the special forces did not return fire. Under the bullets, Lieutenant Rashid Abdullaev managed to crawl and run towards them and establish contact. He risked his life..."

“I knew that there was a military clash that day between your Musbat troops and our Vitebsk paratroopers,” I say to Rashid Abdullaev. – I don’t want to repeat: “In war it’s like in war,” but that’s exactly what happens...

“This just shows,” Rashid Igamberdievich answered me, “how tense the situation was that day... That pain does not subside to this day...

Concluding the story about the book by reserve colonel Rashid Abdullaev and about the legendary “musbat”, I would like to give a few more facts. In January 1980, the battalion was withdrawn to the territory of the USSR.

However, already from October 29 to October 30, 1981, the 154th detachment under the command of Major Igor Stoderevsky re-entered Afghanistan. He took part in all operations carried out by the 40th Combined Arms Army.

In accordance with the order of the USSR Minister of Defense No. 273 dated December 1, 1985, for the exemplary fulfillment of special tasks of the Soviet government, the 154th special forces unit was awarded the pennant “For courage and military valor.” The Afghan government and the PDPA Central Committee also awarded the detachment two Honorary Red Banners and the Order of the Red Banner.

By the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (on May 15, 1988), the detachment’s personnel among those awarded had:

– Knights of the Order of Lenin – 10 officers;

– Knights of the Order of the Red Banner – 53 people (31 officers, 13 sergeants and 9 soldiers);

– Knights of the Order of the Red Star – 423 people (132 officers, 32 warrant officers, 127 sergeants and 112 soldiers);

– holders of the Order “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR”, third degree – 24 people;

– awarded the medal “For Courage” - 623 people (12 officers, 15 warrant officers, 205 sergeants and 391 soldiers);

– awarded the medal “For Military Merit” – 247 people (11 officers, 24 warrant officers, 102 sergeants and 110 soldiers).

Unfortunately, 177 people were killed or died from wounds in the battles on Afghan soil, and 9 special forces soldiers went missing.

In May 1988, the detachment was withdrawn from Afghanistan and stationed near Chirchik. In 1990, a combined group of the detachment took part in activities to restore constitutional order in Tajikistan. In 1992, the detachment, together with the 15th OBRSpN, was transferred to the armed forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In 1994, the detachment was renamed the 28th separate reconnaissance battalion. In 2000, the battalion was disbanded.

Alexander Kolotilo

"A red star"

The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that large airborne formations (brigade, corps), landed behind enemy lines at a sufficiently great depth (Vyazma and Dnieper operations), could conduct active offensive and defensive operations. However, the same experience showed that the axis did not receive supplies, and interaction with front-line (strike) aviation could not be established.

As a result, due to a number of miscalculations, all major airborne operations carried out during the war did not fully achieve their goals:

Nevertheless, the actions of small reconnaissance and sabotage groups sent behind enemy lines, with proper support and preparation, brought tangible results. An example of such combat operations can be the actions of groups and detachments of a separate special-purpose motorized rifle brigade of the NKVD, the actions of front-line reconnaissance agencies, which throughout the war were thrown into the near and far rear of the enemy, and also, in part, the actions of special groups during the Far Eastern offensive operation.

Therefore, it was clear that for solving reconnaissance and sabotage tasks, it was not large military formations that were best suited, but small and mobile groups, which, in turn, required special training, different from the training of combined arms (motorized rifle, airborne) units.

In addition, almost immediately after the war, the potential enemy had targets, on the discovery and destruction of which the life or death of entire combined arms formations, large political and industrial centers depended - airfields of bombers equipped with nuclear bombs. Small sabotage groups, deployed in advance to the area where the mission was located, could theoretically destroy enemy nuclear aircraft at these airfields, or at least disrupt a mass takeoff at the right time (according to Soviet military leaders).

It was decided to form such sabotage units under the wing of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, since it was the intelligence officers who were subordinate to the sabotage formations during the war.

October 24, 1950, by directive of the USSR Minister of War In fact, special purpose companies could be called “companies of paratroopers,” but due to the special focus of their tasks, they received the name they received.

At the very beginning of the 50s, the Soviet Army suffered a large reduction.

Divisions, brigades and regiments were reduced by tens and hundreds, many corps, armies and districts were disbanded. The GRU special forces did not escape the fate of reductions either - in 1953, 35 special forces companies were disbanded. Special intelligence was saved from complete reduction by General N.V.

Ogarkov, who was able to prove to the government the need to have similar formations in the USSR Armed Forces.

A total of 11 special purpose companies were retained. There are companies left in the most important operational areas:

18th separate special purpose company of the 36th combined arms army of the Trans-Baikal Military District (in the area of ​​Borzya);

26th separate special purpose company of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Army of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (garrison in Fürstenberg);

27th separate special purpose company (district) in the Northern Group of Forces (Poland, Strzegom);

36th separate special purpose company of the 13rd combined arms army of the Carpathian Military District (Khmelnitsky);

43rd separate special purpose company of the 7th Guards Army of the Transcaucasian Military District (Lagodekhi);

61st separate special purpose company of the 5th combined arms army of the Primorsky Military District (Ussuriysk);

75th separate special forces company in the Special Mechanized Army (Hungary, Nyiregyhaza);

76th separate special purpose company of the 23rd combined arms army of the Leningrad Military District (Pskov);

77th separate special purpose company of the 8th mechanized army of the Carpathian Military District (Zhitomir);

78th separate special purpose company (district) in the Tauride Military District (Simferopol);

92nd separate special purpose company of the 25th combined arms army of the Primorsky Military District (Fighter Kuznetsov).

Among the total number of disbanded special forces companies, mention should be made of companies that, in addition to general “special forces” training, also had special conditions of service: for example, soldiers of the 99th separate special forces company (district) of the Arkhangelsk Military District in combat training were focused on performing tasks in the difficult conditions of the Arctic, intelligence officers of the 200th separate special forces company of the Siberian Military District studied “Chinese. theater of military operations, and the personnel of the 227th separate special purpose company of the 9th combined arms army of the North Caucasus Military District underwent mountain training.

In 1956, the 61st separate special purpose company of the 5th combined arms army of the Far Eastern Military District was redeployed to the Turkestan Military District in the city of Kazandzhik. Probably, the leadership of the General Staff finally decided to pay attention to the southern “Islamic” direction. The second wave of the formation of separate special-purpose companies occurred in the early 70s.

Apparently, at this time the fathers of the General Staff decided to give a “special purpose tool” not only to the fronts (districts), but also to some combined arms formations. As a result, several separate companies were formed for armies and army corps. Several companies were formed for internal military districts that previously did not have special reconnaissance units. In particular, the 791st separate special-purpose company was formed in the Siberian Military District. In the Western Group of Forces in Germany and the Far East, separate companies were formed in each army.

In 1979, the 459th separate special-purpose company was formed as part of the Turkestan Military District for the purpose of subsequent use in Afghanistan. The company will be introduced into the DRA and will show itself in the best possible way. Another wave of the formation of separate special-purpose companies occurred in the mid-80s. Then companies were formed in all armies and corps, which until that moment did not have such units. Companies were formed even in such exotic (but completely justified) directions as Sakhalin (877th separate special-purpose company of the 68th Army Corps) and Kamchatka (571st separate special-purpose company of the 25th Army Corps).

In the "democratic" . Russia after the separation of the “free”. republics and the withdrawal of troops from countries that are no longer socialist, eight military districts with the corresponding number of armies and corps remained. Some of the individual special-purpose companies took part in the first Chechen war, where they were used as military reconnaissance, as guards for columns and precious bodies of the command - in general, as always, for “special purposes”. All companies subordinate to the North Caucasus Military District, as well as two companies of the Moscow Military District, one of which, the 806th, was formed literally the day before, were deployed according to wartime standards. Chechen campaign as part of the 1st Guards Tank Army, withdrawn from Germany to Smolensk.

In addition, by the summer of 1996, as part of the 205th motorized rifle brigade, a new, 584th separate special-purpose company was formed. At the end of this war, another reduction in the Russian army, including its intelligence agencies, followed. In order to preserve large special forces formations, the GRU made acceptable sacrifices - it gave up individual special forces companies to be “eaten up.” By the end of 1998, separate special-purpose companies (with the exception of two companies located in special directions: the 75th, subordinate to the Kaliningrad defensive region and the 584th, by this time transferred to the subordination of the headquarters of the 58th combined arms army) in the structure of the Russian Armed Forces ceased to exist.

Later, already during the Second Chechen War, in the North Caucasus Military District, six unnumbered special-purpose companies had to be formed for operations on the territory of Chechnya (three companies consisting of the 131st, 136th, 205th OMSBR and three companies in reconnaissance battalions 19th, 20th and 42nd motorized rifle divisions). These companies, according to the combat training plans of special forces units, performed the required number of parachute jumps at the airfields of the district.

In 1957, the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces decided to reorganize five special forces companies into battalions. By the end of the year, the USSR Armed Forces included five special-purpose battalions and four separate special-purpose companies:

26th separate special forces battalion of the GSVG (Furstenberg);

27th Special Purpose Hotel Battalion SGV (Strzegom);

36th separate special purpose battalion of the PrikVO (Khmelnitsky);

43rd separate special purpose battalion 3akVO (Lagodekhi);

61st separate special purpose battalion of TurkVO (Kazandzhik);

18th separate special purpose company 36th unit 3aBVO (Borzya);

75th separate special purpose company of the South Georgian Army (Nyiregyhaza);

77th separate special purpose company 8th TD PrikVO (Zhitomir);

78th separate special purpose company of the OdVO (Simferopol).

At the same time, two companies were disbanded, whose personnel went to staff new battalions. For example, the 92nd separate special forces company of the 25th Army of the Far Eastern Military District was urgently loaded onto a train and sent to Poland - on the basis of this company (and the 27th company of the Northern Group of Forces) the 27th was formed in the State Guard Forces separate special forces battalion. The transfer of special forces units to a battalion structure made it possible to optimize the training process, freeing a significant part of the personnel from garrison and guard duty. Three battalions were concentrated in the western (European) direction, one was in the Caucasus and another in Central Asia.

There were three companies in the western direction, and at that time we had only one special purpose company in the eastern direction as part of the 36th Army of the Transbaikal Military District. Subsequently, after the creation of brigades, special-purpose battalions began to be called “detachments,” and organizationally they were all part of the brigades. Starting from the 60s, battalions did not exist as independent combat units, except for individual detachments of brigades, which could be separated from the formation for operations in individual operational directions, but in peacetime continued to remain in brigades.

The experience of conducting combat training and various exercises has shown the need to create formations in the GRU system that are much larger than the existing individual battalions, which could solve an expanded range of tasks.

In particular, during a threatened period, special forces units were supposed to engage not only in reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines, but also in the formation of partisan detachments in occupied territory (or in territory that could be occupied). In the future, relying on these partisan formations, the special forces had to solve their problems. It was the partisan orientation that was the priority combat mission of the created formations.

In accordance with the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of August 20, 1961 “On the training of personnel and the development of special equipment for organizing and equipping partisan detachments,” the directive of the General Staff of February 5, 1962, in order to train and accumulate personnel for the deployment of the partisan movement in wartime, the commander of military districts was it was ordered to select 1,700 reserve military personnel, bring them into a brigade and conduct thirty-day training sessions.

After training, the personnel were assigned special military specialties. They were prohibited from being reserved for the national economy and used for purposes other than their intended purpose.

By a directive of the General Staff of March 27, 1962, projects for the staffing of special forces brigades for peace and war were developed.

Since 1962, the creation of 10 squadron brigades began, the formation and arrangement of which was largely completed by the end of 1963:

2nd Specialized Brigade (military unit 64044), formed on December 1, 1962 (according to other sources, in 1964) on the basis of the collapsed 76th Specialized Forces of the Leningrad Military District and personnel of the 237th Guards Parachute Regiment, first commander - D. N. Grishakov; Leningrad Military District, Pechory, Promezhitsy;

4th ObrSpN (military unit 77034), formed in 1962 in Riga, first commander - D. S. Zhizhin; Baltic Military District, then transferred to Viljandi;

5th ObrSpN (military unit 89417), formed in 1962, first commander - I. I. Kovalevsky; Belarusian Military District, Maryina Gorka;

8th ObrSpN (military unit 65554), formed in 1962 on the basis of the 36th ObrSpN, Carpathian Military District, Izyaslav, Ukraine;

9th ObrSpN (military unit 83483), formed in 1962, first commander - L. S. Egorov; Kiev Military District, Kirovograd, Ukraine;

10th ObrSpN (military unit 65564), formed in 1962, Odessa Military District, Old Crimea, Pervomaisky;

12th ObrSpN (military unit 64406), formed in 1962 on the basis of the 43rd ObrSpN, first commander - I. I. Geleverya; 3Caucasian Military District, Lagodekhi, Georgia;

14th Regiment of Special Forces (military unit 74854), formed on January 1, 1963 on the basis of the 77th Regiment, first commander - P. N. Rymin; Far Eastern Military District, Ussuriysk;

15th ObrSpN (military unit 64411), formed on January 1, 1963 on the basis of the 61st ObrSpN, first commander - N. N. Lutsev; Turkestan Military District, Chirchik, Uzbekistan;

16th ObrSpN (military unit 54607), formed on January 1, 1963, first commander - D. V. Shipka; Moscow Military District, Chuchkovo.

The brigades were formed mainly by airborne and ground forces. For example, the officer core of the 14th Special Operations Brigade of the Far Eastern Military District, when formed, was staffed by officers of the 98th Guards Airborne Division from Belogorsk (from which 14 officers who participated in the Great Patriotic War came to the brigade), and conscript personnel were recruited from military registration and enlistment offices.

Basically, the formation of the first ten brigades ended at the beginning of 1963, but, for example, the 2nd Special Brigade, according to some sources, was finally formed only in 1964.

The organizational and staffing structure of a separate special forces brigade in 1963 was as follows:

Brigade headquarters (about 30 people);

One deployed Special Forces detachment (164 people on staff);

Special radio communications detachment with a reduced staff (about 60 people);

Three squadroned Special Forces detachments;

Two squadroned separate Special Forces detachments;

Economic support company;

In addition, the brigade included such collapsed units as:

Special mining company;

Special weapons group (ATGM, RS "Grad-P.., P3RK).

In peacetime, the number of a squadron brigade did not exceed 200-300 people; according to wartime standards, a fully deployed special forces brigade consisted of more than 2,500 people.

At the beginning of their existence, the brigades were squadroned, and, in particular, in the 9th Special Operations Brigade, stationed in Ukraine in the city of Kirovograd, there were initially six detachments, in which only the first detachment had two special forces companies, a special weapons platoon and a special radio communications platoon. The remaining five detachments had only commanders. The command, headquarters and political department of the brigade consisted of thirty people. Colonel L.S. Egorov was appointed the first commander of the 9th brigade, but soon he received a spinal injury during parachute jumps, and Colonel Arkhireev was appointed commander of the brigade.

By the end of 1963, the USSR Armed Forces included (some in the process of formation):

Twelve separate special forces companies;

Two separate special forces battalions;

Ten separate special purpose brigades (cadres).

Soon, special forces units and units were reorganized, as a result of which by the end of 1964 the following remained in the USSR Armed Forces:

Six separate special forces companies;

Two separate special forces battalions (26th and 27th) in the western direction;

Ten separate squadroned special forces brigades.

In August 1965, the Chief of the General Staff for generals and military intelligence officers and special forces units engaged in combat training of personnel in guerrilla tactics approved

"Manual on the organization and tactics of partisans".

At that time, special forces brigades were perceived by everyone as a reserve for deployment behind enemy lines in a guerrilla war. The special forces were even called that: “partisans.” The experience of creating such formations seems to have come from the preparation of the partisan special reserve in the late 20s - early 30s; as is known, all its participants were repressed in the late 30s.

A similar attitude towards trained saboteurs has been preserved in modern times: the authorities are still afraid of having qualified specialists in sabotage warfare, reasonably fearing for their own well-being. The whole country saw on television the very vague trials of Colonels P. Ya. Popovskikh and V. V. Kvachkov, the group of Captain E. Ulman. Nevertheless, the creation of “partisan” units was in full swing.

In 1966, the 165th Special Purpose Training Center was formed in the Odessa Military District to train specialists from foreign reconnaissance and sabotage units (and in fact, militants of the people's liberation movements). The center was based in the Simferopol area and existed at least until 1990.

During this time, the center trained many highly qualified terrorist fighters for a great many revolutions. Graduates of this educational unit in different parts of the globe overthrew governments, killed and kidnapped opponents of communism, caused damage to world imperialism and otherwise implemented the special knowledge acquired in Simferopol. Not all trained saboteurs were immediately sent to combat areas - some graduates were legalized in prosperous countries of Europe, America and Asia. They lived and worked for the benefit of their countries, but according to a signal known to them, these militants gathered in the right place, received weapons and carried out special tasks. In the event of the outbreak of a major war, these conspiratorial groups were supposed to become a support for the GRU special forces groups sent behind enemy lines. Apparently, this system is still relevant today.

In 1966 in Fürstenberg (Garrison Werder, Neu-Timmen) on the basis of the 5th Guards Separate Reconnaissance Motorcycle Battalion (formerly the 5th Guards Warsaw-Berlin Reconnaissance Motorcycle Regiment during the war, which was formed in 1944) By directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, on the basis of the 26th ObrSpN with the involvement of the forces of the 27th ObrSpN, 48th and 166th Orb, a new type of special forces formation was formed - the 3rd ObrSpN, which inherited the guards rank from the 5th Motorcycle Battalion . Colonel R.P. Mosolov was appointed commander of the new brigade. The brigade received the code name military unit 83149. The main difference between the new brigade and the existing ones was that the brigade, even during its formation, expanded to a full, special staff, and also that the brigade included separate units - separate special forces units.

This brigade at that time was the most fully equipped (up to 1,300 personnel) and was in constant combat readiness to carry out its intended tasks. The brigade detachments were formed according to a slightly different staff than the brigade detachments that were stationed in the USSR. These detachments had a staff of 212 people, while the “allied” brigades had detachments with a staff of only 164 people. Full name of the unit: 3rd Separate Guards Red Banner Warsaw-Berlin Order of Suvorov 3rd Class Special Purpose Brigade.

Special forces units were formed within the brigade: 501st, 503rd, 509th, 510th, 512th.

Special forces units, being staffed by physically strong and hardy soldiers and officers, were often involved in performing special tasks not only of a “sabotage” nature. So, in 1966, units of the 15th Specialized Brigade took part in the liquidation of the consequences of the earthquake in Tashkent - soldiers cleared away the rubble and pulled out survivors from the ruins. In 1970 - the elimination of the consequences of the cholera epidemic in the Astrakhan region, and in 1971 - the elimination of the consequences of the black smallpox epidemic in Aralsk - intelligence officers, together with the police, participated in the isolation of persons who had contact with the infected.

In 1972, the 16th Special Operations Brigade carried out a government task to eliminate forest fires in the Moscow, Ryazan, Vladimir and Gorky regions. For completing this task, the brigade was awarded a Certificate of Honor from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

Based on the results of combat and political training in 1967, the 14th brigade became one of the advanced formations of troops and units of the Far Eastern Military District and was included in the Book of Honor of the CDVO troops. The entire personnel of the unit was expressed gratitude by the commanders of the CDVO.

In 1968, a serviceman of the 1st battalion of the 14th Special Operations Brigade, Sergeant Vasilevsky, ran along the Ussuriysk-Vladivostok highway for the first time in the history of Primorye. 104 km were covered in 8 hours 21 minutes. Sergeant Vasilevsky dedicated his run to the 50th anniversary of the Komsomol.

The 14th Brigade took an active part in combat training. During the period from June 22 to June 27, 1970, brigade personnel took part in district reconnaissance exercises conducted by the district chief of staff. The actions of personnel during the exercises were checked by a GRU General Staff commission headed by Lieutenant General Tkachenko and Colonel Galitsin. During the exercises, personnel parachuted and landed in Primorye, the Amur Region and on Sakhalin Island and completed all tasks with a “good” rating. In the period from August 21 to 28, 1971, personnel took part in district reconnaissance exercises, during which 20 RGSpN were parachuted into Primorye. Amur region and to Sakhalin Island with the subsequent implementation of reconnaissance missions. All tasks were successfully completed.

In 1968, under the leadership of a senior officer of the GRU General Staff, Colonel Shchelokov, the 9th company of special forces cadets consisting of three platoons was created at the Lenin Komsomol RVVDKU, and in 1979 the company was deployed into a battalion of special forces (lZ-th and 14th companies) .

Also, the Kiev Combined Arms Command School, which trained officers with the specialty “referent translator,” was involved in training personnel for special forces.

In 1978 at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze created the 4th training group of special forces officers at the intelligence faculty. In 1981, the first graduation of the special forces group took place.

In 1969, on the basis of the 16th Special Operations Brigade of the Moscow Military District in the village of Chuchkovo, Ryazan Region, the GRU General Staff conducted an operational-strategic experimental exercise, the purpose of which was to work out the issues of combat use of special-purpose units. To ensure the transfer of personnel and cargo behind enemy lines, military transport aviation was involved. Take-off and landing airfield - Dyagilevo. To designate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, their security and defense, as well as to counter the landing forces, collect and store their parachutes, six personnel were involved (2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th) special purpose brigades.

In 1970, a special-purpose training company was deployed in Pechory, which was later reorganized into a training battalion, and then into the 1071st special-purpose training regiment (military unit 51064), which trained junior commanders and specialists for special-purpose units. At the 1071st UPSN there was a school for warrant officers for special forces units.

Since the mid-70s, the General Staff has found an opportunity to deploy brigades, increasing the number of personnel in them. As a result of this decision, it was possible to staff the brigade units by 60-80%. From this period, special forces brigades became combat-ready and were no longer considered only as a partisan reserve.

On June 12, 1975, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces approved the “Instructions for the combat use of formations, units and subunits (brigade, detachment, battalion) for special purposes.”

In 1972, as part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Mongolia, two brigades were formed, the numbering of which is in line with the numbers of special forces brigades, but these brigades were called “separate reconnaissance brigades.” In the US Army, in terms of the scope of tasks performed, there was an analogue to similar individual reconnaissance brigades - armored cavalry regiments. The new brigades included three separate reconnaissance battalions, armed with infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and combat support units, which was due to the nature of the terrain in the GSVM responsibility zone. However, each of these brigades had "jumping" reconnaissance and landing companies, and each brigade also had its own separate helicopter squadron. Most likely, when creating these brigades, the General Staff tried to find the optimal organization of special forces units that were to operate in mountainous desert areas.

As a result, the 20th and 25th separate reconnaissance brigades were formed. There were no such formations anywhere else in the Soviet Army. In the mid-80s, these brigades were reorganized into separate mechanized brigades and became part of the newly formed 48th Guards Army Corps, and with the collapse of the USSR, after the withdrawal of troops from Mongolia, they were disbanded.

At the end of the 1970s, the General Staff sought the opportunity to transfer special forces brigades from cadre to deployed personnel, as well as to find reserves for the formation of two more brigades. The 22nd Special Forces Brigade was formed on July 24, 1976 in the Central Asian Military District in the city of Kapchagay on the basis of one of the detachments of the 15th Brigade, a company of the special radio communications detachment of the 15th Brigade, the 525th and 808th separate special forces companies Central Asian and Volga military districts. Until 1985, the brigade was located in Kapchagai, later it changed its location several times and is currently located in the area of ​​​​the city of Aksai, Rostov region (military unit 11659).

24th Special Forces Brigade was formed in the Trans-Baikal Military District on November 1, 1977 on the basis of the 18th Special Forces and was initially stationed in the area of ​​the village. Kharabyrka village, Chita region (23rd site), then in 1987 it was transferred to the village. Kyakhta village, and in 2001 was transferred to Ulan-Ude (military unit 55433), and then to Irkutsk. When the brigade was transferred to Kyakhta, the 282nd special forces unit was transferred to the subordination of the 14th special forces brigade of the Far Eastern Military District and redeployed to the city of Khabarovsk.

Later, in 1984, in the Siberian Military District, on the basis of the 791st Special Forces Brigade, the 67th Special Forces Brigade was formed, which is stationed in the city of Berdsk, Novosibirsk Region (military unit 64655).

In 1985, during the Afghan war, in Chirchik, on the site of the 15th Brigade that had gone to Afghanistan, the 467th Special Forces Training Regiment (military unit 71201) was formed, which trained personnel for special forces operating in Afghanistan. The regiment consisted of training battalions and support units. The training regiment had great privileges in the selection of personnel. If, when selecting conscripts for this regiment, an officer encountered any difficulties at the recruiting station, the issues that arose were resolved with one phone call to the GRU.

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Reliable information about who was the first of the military leaders to introduce the code name Muslim battalion- not available.

Creation of Muslim battalions

The main reason for selecting military personnel on the basis of nationality, which was adhered to by the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, was considered to be a small external difference with the indigenous inhabitants of Afghanistan.
In total, three “Muslim battalions” (consolidated military unit) were created.

1st Muslim Battalion

During the assault, the battalion personnel lost 7 people killed and 36 wounded.
After the storming of the palace, the 177th special forces unit did not take part in further hostilities. All military equipment and military property of the battalion was transferred to the 103rd Guards Airborne Division. On January 2, 1980, the detachment's personnel were transported by plane to the territory of the USSR, after which the detachment was disbanded, conscripts were transferred to the reserve before the end of their service, and officers and warrant officers were distributed to military units.
It should be noted that the 154th separate special forces detachment was re-formed on the basis of the same 15th Regiment in the summer of 1980. On May 7, 1981, the detachment was awarded the Battle Banner. On October 30, 1981, the detachment was introduced into Afghanistan, receiving the code designation 1st separate motorized rifle battalion. When re-forming the selection of military personnel on the previous national basis, there was no and the designation “Muslim battalion” was not applied to it.

2nd Muslim Battalion

The 177th separate special forces detachment (177th special forces unit or military unit 56712) was created on the basis of General Staff Directive No. 314/2/00117 of January 8, 1980 on the basis of the 22nd separate special forces brigade of the SAVO, in the city of Kapchagay Almaty region of the Kazakh SSR.
Major Kerimbaev Boris Tukenovich, a graduate of the Tashkent General Arms School, who by that time had served in command positions in reconnaissance units of the ground forces, was appointed battalion commander.
Unlike the “1st Muslim Battalion”, the 177th Special Forces was preparing for combat operations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. In this regard, 300 conscripts of Uighur nationality and officers of Turkic peoples were recruited into the detachment. 70% of the battalion's officers were graduates of general arms schools. The total number of personnel is 498 people.
An accelerated Chinese language course was introduced for the officers of the detachment.

...Somewhere in September '81, they announced that we would take the autumn test to the Moscow commission, and that in addition to combat training subjects, they would also test knowledge of the Chinese language. A Chinese language instructor arrived from the district intelligence department and we quickly began to study it, that is, Chinese. The topic is the interrogation of a prisoner of war. They wrote down Chinese words in Russian letters and learned them by heart. So, learning Chinese in a month is not a myth, at least for us military men, we can do it. But it didn’t last long, after two weeks the language study was canceled...

The personnel of the 177th separate special forces detachment were dressed in Soviet uniforms with airborne troops insignia.
By the spring of 1981, the time had come for conscripts to be transferred to the reserve. There was a need for a new set. Mostly military personnel of Uyghur ethnicity left. With the new staffing of the 177th special forces unit, the requirements for Uyghur nationality due to the changed international situation disappeared. Priority in recruitment was made according to the nationalities of Central Asia (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz). With this choice, the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces changed the intended combat mission of the 177th special forces unit. Having completed the unit, we again began combat coordination. The 177th special forces unit was preparing to be sent to Afghanistan.
By the time the 177th special forces unit entered Afghanistan, the task of collecting personnel on a national basis, certainly the same as in the case of the first composition of the “1st Muslim battalion” that stormed Amin’s palace, was no longer standing. Therefore, the “2nd Muslim Battalion” did not fully live up to its name.
On October 29, 1981, the 177th special unit received a new symbol ( 2nd separate motorized rifle battalion or military unit 43151), was introduced into Afghanistan and redeployed to the vicinity of the city of Maymen, Faryab province.
The 177th special forces unit under the command of Major Kerimbaev is known for its participation in the history of the Afghan war as the only special-purpose formation that for a long time was used not for its intended purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage, but as a mountain rifle formation to capture and hold the high-mountain fortified areas of the dushmans. In total, the 177th Separate Division resisted the troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Panjshir Gorge for 9 months (June 11, 1982 - March 8, 1983). As a result of such a confrontation, Masud was forced to agree to a truce. Neither before nor after the “2nd Muslim Battalion” were tasks of a similar nature and duration assigned to special forces in the Afghan War.

3rd Muslim Battalion

The 173rd separate special forces detachment (173rd special forces unit or military unit 94029) was created on the basis of General Staff Directive No. 314/2/0061 of January 9, 1980 on the basis of the 12th separate special forces brigade of the ZakVO, in Lagodekhi Georgian SSR. The formation of the detachment was completed by February 29, 1980. The staff of detachment 21/19-51 was the same as that of the 177th special forces unit.
Captain Yaldash Sharipov was appointed commander of the detachment. Almost all the officers and warrant officers of the detachment were recruited from motorized rifle and tank troops, with the exception of the only officer - the deputy commander of the detachment for airborne training, a graduate of the RVVDKU.
Unlike the previous two detachments, the 173rd special forces unit was staffed primarily by military personnel from the indigenous nationalities of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, who are nominally Muslim.
Another difference between the “3rd Muslim Battalion” is that it was not introduced into Afghanistan with its original composition. The detachment's combat training lasted 4 years until February 10, 1984, when it was introduced into Afghanistan. By this time, due to the rotation of personnel, the detachment no longer corresponded to its original conventional name.

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Notes

Literature

• S.M. Bekov, Starov Yu.T., Ovcharov A.A., O.V. Krivopalov. Chapters “Storm Through Life” and “Kapchagay Battalion” // 15th Special Forces Brigade: People and Fates. - Moscow: Russian Panorama, 2009. - P. 100-109, 187-194. - 556 p. - 1800 copies. - ISBN 978-5-93165-239-9.
• Sergey Kozlov. Chapters “Second MusBat” and “Third MusBat” // 22nd Guards Separate Special Forces Brigade. - Moscow: Russian Panorama, 2011. - P. 19-24, 53-57. - 480 p. - ISBN 978-5-93165-295-5.
• Sergey Kozlov. Chapter 1.1 “Operation Storm-333” // GRU Spetsnaz. Volume 3. Afghanistan - the finest hour of special forces. 1979-1989 - Moscow: “Russian Panorama”, 2013. - P. 34-58. - 736 p. - 3000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-93165-324-2.
• Sergey Kozlov. Creation of separate brigades and educational institutions // GRU Spetsnaz. Volume 2. History of creation: from companies to brigades. 1950-1979 - Moscow: “Russian Panorama”, 2009. - P. 130-131. - 424 p. - 3000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-93165-135-4.

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An excerpt characterizing the Muslim battalions

The fifth company stood near the forest itself. A huge fire burned brightly in the middle of the snow, illuminating the tree branches weighed down with frost.
In the middle of the night, soldiers of the fifth company heard footsteps in the snow and the crunching of branches in the forest.
“Guys, it’s a witch,” said one soldier. Everyone raised their heads, listened, and out of the forest, into the bright light of the fire, two strangely dressed human figures stepped out, holding each other.
These were two Frenchmen hiding in the forest. Hoarsely saying something in a language incomprehensible to the soldiers, they approached the fire. One was taller, wearing an officer's hat, and seemed completely weakened. Approaching the fire, he wanted to sit down, but fell to the ground. The other, small, stocky soldier with a scarf tied around his cheeks, was stronger. He raised his comrade and, pointing to his mouth, said something. The soldiers surrounded the French, laid out an overcoat for the sick man, and brought porridge and vodka to both of them.
The weakened French officer was Rambal; tied with a scarf was his orderly Morel.
When Morel drank vodka and finished a pot of porridge, he suddenly became painfully cheerful and began to continuously say something to the soldiers who did not understand him. Rambal refused to eat and silently lay on his elbow by the fire, looking at the Russian soldiers with meaningless red eyes. Occasionally he would let out a long groan and then fall silent again. Morel, pointing to his shoulders, convinced the soldiers that it was an officer and that he needed to be warmed up. The Russian officer, who approached the fire, sent to ask the colonel if he would take the French officer to warm him up; and when they returned and said that the colonel had ordered an officer to be brought, Rambal was told to go. He stood up and wanted to walk, but he staggered and would have fallen if the soldier standing next to him had not supported him.
- What? You will not? – one soldier said with a mocking wink, turning to Rambal.
- Eh, fool! Why are you lying awkwardly! It’s a man, really, a man,” reproaches to the joking soldier were heard from different sides. They surrounded Rambal, lifted him into his arms, grabbed him, and carried him to the hut. Rambal hugged the necks of the soldiers and, when they carried him, spoke plaintively:
- Oh, nies braves, oh, mes bons, mes bons amis! Voila des hommes! oh, mes braves, mes bons amis! [Oh well done! O my good, good friends! Here are the people! O my good friends!] - and, like a child, he leaned his head on the shoulder of one soldier.
Meanwhile, Morel sat in the best place, surrounded by soldiers.
Morel, a small, stocky Frenchman, with bloodshot, watery eyes, tied with a woman's scarf over his cap, was dressed in a woman's fur coat. He, apparently drunk, put his arm around the soldier sitting next to him and sang a French song in a hoarse, intermittent voice. The soldiers held their sides, looking at him.
- Come on, come on, teach me how? I'll take over quickly. How?.. - said the joker songwriter, who was hugged by Morel.
Vive Henri Quatre,
Vive ce roi vaillanti –
[Long live Henry the Fourth!
Long live this brave king!
etc. (French song) ]
sang Morel, winking his eye.
Se diable a quatre…
- Vivarika! Vif seruvaru! sit-down... - the soldier repeated, waving his hand and really catching the tune.
- Look, clever! Go go go go!.. - rough, joyful laughter rose from different sides. Morel, wincing, laughed too.
- Well, go ahead, go ahead!
Qui eut le triple talent,
De boire, de batre,
Et d'etre un vert galant...
[Having triple talent,
drink, fight
and be kind...]
– But it’s also complicated. Well, well, Zaletaev!..
“Kyu...” Zaletaev said with effort. “Kyu yu yu...” he drawled, carefully protruding his lips, “letriptala, de bu de ba and detravagala,” he sang.
- Hey, it’s important! That's it, guardian! oh... go go go! - Well, do you want to eat more?
- Give him some porridge; After all, it won’t be long before he gets enough of hunger.
Again they gave him porridge; and Morel, chuckling, began to work on the third pot. Joyful smiles were on all the faces of the young soldiers looking at Morel. The old soldiers, who considered it indecent to engage in such trifles, lay on the other side of the fire, but occasionally, raising themselves on their elbows, they looked at Morel with a smile.
“People too,” said one of them, dodging into his overcoat. - And wormwood grows on its root.
- Ooh! Lord, Lord! How stellar, passion! Towards the frost... - And everything fell silent.
The stars, as if knowing that now no one would see them, played out in the black sky. Now flaring up, now extinguishing, now shuddering, they busily whispered among themselves about something joyful, but mysterious.

X
The French troops gradually melted away in a mathematically correct progression. And that crossing of the Berezina, about which so much has been written, was only one of the intermediate stages in the destruction of the French army, and not at all a decisive episode of the campaign. If so much has been and is being written about the Berezina, then on the part of the French this happened only because on the broken Berezina Bridge, the disasters that the French army had previously suffered evenly here suddenly grouped together at one moment and into one tragic spectacle that remained in everyone’s memory. On the Russian side, they talked and wrote so much about the Berezina only because, far from the theater of war, in St. Petersburg, a plan was drawn up (by Pfuel) to capture Napoleon in a strategic trap on the Berezina River. Everyone was convinced that everything would actually happen exactly as planned, and therefore insisted that it was the Berezina crossing that destroyed the French. In essence, the results of the Berezinsky crossing were much less disastrous for the French in terms of the loss of guns and prisoners than Krasnoye, as the numbers show.
The only significance of the Berezina crossing is that this crossing obviously and undoubtedly proved the falsity of all plans for cutting off and the justice of the only possible course of action demanded by both Kutuzov and all the troops (mass) - only following the enemy. The crowd of Frenchmen fled with an ever-increasing force of speed, with all their energy directed towards achieving their goal. She ran like a wounded animal, and she could not get in the way. This was proven not so much by the construction of the crossing as by the traffic on the bridges. When the bridges were broken, unarmed soldiers, Moscow residents, women and children who were in the French convoy - all, under the influence of the force of inertia, did not give up, but ran forward into the boats, into the frozen water.
This aspiration was reasonable. The situation of both those fleeing and those pursuing was equally bad. Remaining with his own, each in distress hoped for the help of a comrade, for a certain place he occupied among his own. Having given himself over to the Russians, he was in the same position of distress, but he was on a lower level in terms of satisfying the needs of life. The French did not need to have correct information that half of the prisoners, with whom they did not know what to do, despite all the Russians’ desire to save them, died from cold and hunger; they felt that it could not be otherwise. The most compassionate Russian commanders and hunters of the French, the French in Russian service could not do anything for the prisoners. The French were destroyed by the disaster in which the Russian army was located. It was impossible to take away bread and clothing from hungry, necessary soldiers in order to give it to the French who were not harmful, not hated, not guilty, but simply unnecessary. Some did; but this was only an exception.
Behind was certain death; there was hope ahead. The ships were burned; there was no other salvation but a collective flight, and all the forces of the French were directed towards this collective flight.
The further the French fled, the more pitiful their remnants were, especially after the Berezina, on which, as a result of the St. Petersburg plan, special hopes were pinned, the more the passions of the Russian commanders flared up, blaming each other and especially Kutuzov. Believing that the failure of the Berezinsky Petersburg plan would be attributed to him, dissatisfaction with him, contempt for him and ridicule of him were expressed more and more strongly. Teasing and contempt, of course, were expressed in a respectful form, in a form in which Kutuzov could not even ask what and for what he was accused. They didn't talk to him seriously; reporting to him and asking his permission, they pretended to perform a sad ritual, and behind his back they winked and tried to deceive him at every step.
All these people, precisely because they could not understand him, recognized that there was no point in talking to the old man; that he would never understand the full depth of their plans; that he would answer with his phrases (it seemed to them that these were just phrases) about the golden bridge, that you cannot come abroad with a crowd of vagabonds, etc. They had already heard all this from him. And everything he said: for example, that we had to wait for food, that people were without boots, it was all so simple, and everything they offered was so complex and clever that it was obvious to them that he was stupid and old, but they were not powerful, brilliant commanders.
Especially after the joining of the armies of the brilliant admiral and the hero of St. Petersburg, Wittgenstein, this mood and staff gossip reached its highest limits. Kutuzov saw this and, sighing, just shrugged his shoulders. Only once, after the Berezina, he became angry and wrote the following letter to Bennigsen, who reported separately to the sovereign:
“Due to your painful seizures, please, Your Excellency, upon receipt of this, go to Kaluga, where you await further orders and assignments from His Imperial Majesty.”
But after Bennigsen was sent away, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich came to the army, making the beginning of the campaign and being removed from the army by Kutuzov. Now the Grand Duke, having arrived at the army, informed Kutuzov about the displeasure of the sovereign emperor for the weak successes of our troops and for the slowness of movement. The Emperor himself intended to arrive at the army the other day.
An old man, as experienced in court affairs as in military affairs, that Kutuzov, who in August of the same year was chosen commander-in-chief against the will of the sovereign, the one who removed the heir and the Grand Duke from the army, the one who, with his power, in opposition the will of the sovereign, ordered the abandonment of Moscow, this Kutuzov now immediately realized that his time was over, that his role had been played and that he no longer had this imaginary power. And he understood this not just from court relationships. On the one hand, he saw that military affairs, the one in which he played his role, was over, and he felt that his calling had been fulfilled. On the other hand, at the same time he began to feel physical fatigue in his old body and the need for physical rest.
On November 29, Kutuzov entered Vilna - his good Vilna, as he said. Kutuzov was governor of Vilna twice during his service. In the rich, surviving Vilna, in addition to the comforts of life that he had been deprived of for so long, Kutuzov found old friends and memories. And he, suddenly turning away from all military and state concerns, plunged into a smooth, familiar life as much as he was given peace by the passions seething around him, as if everything that was happening now and was about to happen in the historical world did not concern him at all.
Chichagov, one of the most passionate cutters and overturners, Chichagov, who first wanted to make a diversion to Greece, and then to Warsaw, but did not want to go where he was ordered, Chichagov, known for his courage in speaking to the sovereign, Chichagov, who considered Kutuzov benefited himself, because when he was sent in the 11th year to conclude peace with Turkey in addition to Kutuzov, he, making sure that peace had already been concluded, admitted to the sovereign that the merit of concluding peace belonged to Kutuzov; This Chichagov was the first to meet Kutuzov in Vilna at the castle where Kutuzov was supposed to stay. Chichagov in a naval uniform, with a dirk, holding his cap under his arm, gave Kutuzov his drill report and the keys to the city. That contemptuously respectful attitude of the youth towards the old man who had lost his mind was expressed to the highest degree in the entire address of Chichagov, who already knew the charges brought against Kutuzov.
While talking with Chichagov, Kutuzov, among other things, told him that the carriages with dishes captured from him in Borisov were intact and would be returned to him.
- C"est pour me dire que je n"ai pas sur quoi manger... Je puis au contraire vous fournir de tout dans le cas meme ou vous voudriez donner des diners, [You want to tell me that I have nothing to eat. On the contrary, I can serve you all, even if you wanted to give dinners.] - Chichagov said, flushing, with every word he wanted to prove that he was right and therefore assumed that Kutuzov was preoccupied with this very thing. Kutuzov smiled his thin, penetrating smile and, shrugging his shoulders, answered: “Ce n"est que pour vous dire ce que je vous dis. [I want to say only what I say.]
In Vilna, Kutuzov, contrary to the will of the sovereign, stopped most of the troops. Kutuzov, as his close associates said, had become unusually depressed and physically weakened during his stay in Vilna. He was reluctant to deal with the affairs of the army, leaving everything to his generals and, while waiting for the sovereign, indulged in an absent-minded life.
Having left St. Petersburg with his retinue - Count Tolstoy, Prince Volkonsky, Arakcheev and others, on December 7, the sovereign arrived in Vilna on December 11 and drove straight up to the castle in a road sleigh. At the castle, despite the severe frost, stood about a hundred generals and staff officers in full dress uniform and an honor guard from the Semenovsky regiment.