Space shuttle. History of the development of the Space Shuttle system

I was inspired to write this article by numerous discussions in forums and even articles in serious magazines, in which I came across the following position:

“The United States is actively developing missile defense (5th generation fighters, combat robots, etc.). Guard! They’re not fools, they know how to count money and won’t do nonsense???”

Fools are not fools, but they have always had a lot of fraud, stupidity and “drinking the dough” - you just have to take a closer look at the US megaprojects.

They are constantly trying to create a miracle weapon or such a miracle technology that will put all enemies/competitors to shame for a long time and make them tremble at the unimaginable technological power of America. They make spectacular presentations, pour out amazing data, and create a huge wave in the media.

Everything always ends in a trivial way - with a successful swindle of taxpayers represented by Congress, a huge money grab and a disastrous result.

For example, here is the history of the program Space Shuttle - one of the typical American chimera chases.

Here, at all stages, from problem statement to operation, NASA management made a series of gross mistakes/frauds, which ultimately led to the creation of a fantastically ineffective Shuttle, the early closure of the program and buried the development of the national orbital station.

How it all began:

In the late 60s, even before the moon landing, the United States decided to cut back (and then close) the Apollo program. Production capacity began to decline rapidly, and hundreds of thousands of workers and employees were subject to dismissal. The enormous costs of the Vietnam War and the space/military race with the USSR had undermined the US budget and one of the worst economic downturns in its history was looming.

NASA funding was cut more and more every year and the future of American manned space exploration was in jeopardy. There were growing voices of critics in Congress who said that NASA was senselessly wasting taxpayers' money at a time when the most important social items in the country's budget were underfunded. On the other hand, the entire free world watched with bated breath every gesture of the beacons of democracy and waited for the spectacular cosmic defeat of the totalitarian Russian barbarians

At the same time, it was clear that the USSR was not going to give up competition in space and that even a successful landing on the Moon could not be a reason to rest on its laurels.

There was an urgent need to decide what to do next. For this, under the auspices of the Presidential Administration, a special working group of scientists was created, which began developing further development plans in American space technology.

Then it was already obvious that the USSR followed the path of developing the technology of orbital stations (OS), while participation in the lunar race was actively denied by Soviet officialdom.

Thus, in 1968, Soyuz-4 and Soyuz-5 were docked in orbit and a transition through open space was made from one ship to another. During the transition, the astronauts practiced performing installation work in space, and the entire project was advertised as “the world’s first experimental orbital station.” The entire world press was filled with admiring responses. Some people rated the Soyuz docking even higher than the Apollo 8 flyby of the Moon.

Such a great response inspired the leadership of the USSR, and in 1969 a flight of three Soyuz aircraft was launched at once. Two had to dock, and the third would fly around, making a spectacular report. That is, the game was clearly intended to be played for the public. But the plan did not work out, the automation failed and it was not possible to dock. Nevertheless, valuable experience was gained in mutual maneuvering in orbit, a unique experiment on welding/brazing in a vacuum was conducted, and the interaction of ground services with ships in orbit was worked out. So the group flight was declared generally successful, and after the cosmonauts landed, at a rally, Brezhnev officially declared that “orbital stations are the main route in astronautics.”

What could America oppose? In fact, the project to create its own OS began in the United States long before these events, but it hardly moved, since all possible resources were aimed at ensuring a speedy landing on the Moon. Immediately after A11 finally visited the Moon, the question of building an OS arose at NASA in full force.

Then NASA decided to build an OS from the existing developments as quickly as possible Skylab (in duplicate), canceled two of the last lunar landings, freeing up Saturn 5 rockets to launch these stations into orbit. In what haste they built Skylab and what nonsense it turned out to be is a separate story.

At the very least, they temporarily covered the “hole” in this competition. But in any case, the Skylab program was obviously a dead end, since the launch vehicles necessary for its development were long out of production, and it was necessary to fly on the leftovers.

What did they offer?

Then the “Space Activities Planning Group” proposed in the coming years (after the Skylab flight) to create a huge orbital station, with a crew of dozens of people and a reusable space shuttle, carrying goods and people to and from the station. The main emphasis was placed on the fact that the planned shuttle would be so cheap to operate and reliable that human space flights would become almost as routine and safe as civil airliner flights.

(that’s when the Russians will put their kerosene disposable rockets to rest)

NASA's original project for building the shuttle was quite rational:

They proposed to make a space transport system, consisting of two winged fully reusable stages: “Booster” (“Accelerator”) and “Orbiter”.

It looked like this: one large “plane” carries another, smaller one on its back. Payload was limited to 11 tons (this is important!). The main purpose of the shuttle was to serve the future orbital station. It is a large OS that could create a sufficiently large cargo flow into orbit and, most importantly, from it.

The size of the Booster was supposed to be comparable to the size of a Boeing 747 (about 80 meters long), and the size of the Orbiter was like a Boeing 707 (about 40 meters). Both stages were supposed to be equipped with the best oxygen-hydrogen engines. After takeoff, the Booster, having accelerated the Orbiter, would separate halfway and return/plane itself to base.

The cost of launching such a shuttle would be about 10 million dollars (in prices of those years), subject to fairly frequent flights, 40-60 times a year. (for comparison, the cost of launching the lunar Saturn 5 was then $200 million)

Naturally, the idea of ​​​​creating such a cheap and easy-to-use orbital transport was liked by the Congress/Administration. Let the economy be at its limit, the blacks are destroying cities, but we’ll push ourselves once again, do a super thing, but then we’ll get stuck!

All this is wonderful, but to create just the super shuttle, NASA wanted a minimum of 9 billion dollars, and the government agreed to allocate only 5, and even then only on the condition active participation in financing the military. And they refused to give money at all for a large station, reasonably considering that the billions already allocated for the program of 2 Skylab stations (which had yet to fly) were quite enough at that time.

But NASA took the bait and eventually gave birth to this option:

Firstly, such a long lateral maneuver required powerful wings, which increased the weight of the shuttle. In addition, the Orbiter shuttle now lacked internal fuel tanks to carry 30 tons of cargo into orbit. We had to attach a huge external tank to it. Naturally, this tank had to be made disposable (it is very difficult to lower such a thin-walled, fragile structure from orbit intact). In addition, the problem arose of creating powerful hydrogen engines capable of lifting this entire colossus. NASA realistically assessed the possibilities in this regard and lowered the requirements for maximum thrust for the main engines, attaching two huge solid propellant boosters (SFC) on the sides to help them. It turned out that the hydrogen “Booster” completely disappeared from the configuration, degenerating into oversized door rockets from the “Katyusha”.

Thus, the Shuttle project in its modern form was finally formed. With the “help” of the military and under the guise of reducing the cost and speeding up development, the Nasovites mutilated the original project beyond recognition. However, it was successfully approved in 1972 and accepted for implementation.

Looking ahead, let's say that even on this misery they still spent far from 5 billion, as they promised. The development of the Shuttle by 1980 cost them 10 billion (in 1977 prices) or about 7 billion in 1971 prices. Note that the idea of ​​​​creating a station has been postponed for an indefinite period and therefore new tasks were invented for the new Shuttle project.

Namely, the purpose of the Shuttle was replanned along the way for the supposedly ultra-cheap launch of commercial and military satellites - everything in a row, from light to super-heavy, as well as the return of satellites from orbit.

There really was a bad problem here. At that time, they simply didn’t make enough satellites to justify the frequent launches of a huge rocket. But our brave scientists were not at a loss! They hired a private contractor, the Mathematics company, which very far-sightedly predicted simply enormous needs for launches in the near future. Hundreds! Thousands of launches! (Who would doubt that)

In principle, already at this stage, at the stage of the project approved in 1972, it was clear that the Shuttle would never become a cheap means of launching into orbit, even if everything went like clockwork. Miracles don’t happen - you can’t pull a load three times heavier into orbit, spending the same 10-15 million dollars calculated for original a much lighter and more advanced system. Not to mention that all cost calculations were given for fully reusable a device that the Shuttle could no longer achieve by definition.

And the idea itself - putting a 100-ton shuttle with people into orbit each time, only to deliver at best a dozen or two tons of payload into space - strongly smacks of absurdity.

However, surprisingly, all the numbers and promises that were the original ones for the original project were automatically declared for the castrated version!

Although the loss of almost all the advantages of relatively disposable missiles was obvious. For example, the cost of rescuing from the ocean, restoring, transporting and assembling solid fuel boosters alone turned out to be not much less than the cost of manufacturing new ones.

By the way, the Thiokol Chemical company won a competition for the development of solid fuel accelerators, underestimating the actual cost of transportation costs by three times. Next small example from tons of waste and drank from the budget that accompanied the development Space Shuttle.

The promised safety also turned out to be a complete mess: the solid fuel boosters cannot be stopped after being ignited and they cannot be shot either, while the crew is deprived of any means of escape at launch. But who cares? NASA was so keen on mastering the budget that without hesitation it announced to Congress that the TTU had achieved 100% reliability. That is, their accident can never happen in principle.

How they looked into the water...

What happened in the end

But trouble came - open the gates, everything turned out to be even more fun when it came to actual development and operation.

Let me remind you:

According to the developers' plans, the Shuttle was to become a reusable, ultra-reliable and safe transport system, with a record low cost of putting cargo and people into orbit. The frequency of flights was supposed to be increased to 50 per year.

But it was smooth on paper...

The plate below clearly shows how “successful” the Shuttle turned out to be

All prices are quoted in 1971 dollars:

Characteristic

What they wanted

What really happened

First start

Development cost

5 billion

7 billion

Load capacity

Duration of preparation for the next. launch after landing

Launch cost

$10 million

About 150 million

Max. time in orbit

Reliability of solid propellant boosters

The probability of a disaster was declared zero

Challenger explosion due to a breakthrough in the intersection gasket in the TTU.

Thus, what happened was exactly the opposite

Not reusable

Insufficiently reliable and extremely dangerous in case of an accident

With a record high cost of reaching orbit.

Not reusable - because after the Shuttle flight the external tank is lost, many critical elements of the system become unusable or require expensive restoration. Namely:

Restoring solid propellant boosters costs almost half the cost of manufacturing new ones, plus transportation, plus maintaining the infrastructure to catch them in the ocean.

After every landing major renovation marching engines pass, worse than that- their service life turned out to be so low that they had to manufacture an additional 50 propulsion engines for 5 shuttles!

The chassis is completely replaceable;

The heat-protective coating of the airframe requires a long recovery after each flight. (question - what is truly reusable in the system then? Space Shuttle ? only the shuttle body remains)

It turned out that before each launch, the “reusable” Orbiter needs a long, expensive restoration that lasts for months. Plus the launches themselves are constantly and for a long time postponed due to numerous problems. Sometimes you even have to remove components from one shuttle in order to launch another as quickly as possible. All this deprives MTKS of the ability to launch frequently (something that could somehow reduce the cost of operation).

Further, as already mentioned, during its development, NASA assured Congress that the reliability of the TTU can be conditionally considered 1. Therefore, no rescue systems were provided at the launch and they saved a lot on this. For which the Challenger crew paid.

The disaster itself occurred due to the fault of NASA management, which, on the one hand, tried to increase the frequency of launches to the maximum at any cost (in order to reduce costs and put on a good face when bad game), and on the other hand, it ignored the operational requirements for the technical specifications, which did not allow launching at sub-zero temperatures. And that ill-fated launch had already been postponed many times and further waiting disrupted the entire flight schedule. Therefore, temperature conditions they didn’t give a damn, they gave the go-ahead to start and the frozen intersection gasket in the TTU, having lost its elasticity, burned out, the torch that escaped burned through the external tank and…. Bang!

After the Challenger disaster, the structure had to be strengthened and made heavier, which is why the required carrying capacity was never achieved. As a result, the Shuttle puts into orbit a payload only slightly larger than our Proton.

In addition, this disaster, in addition to a two-year delay in flights, ultimately led to the disruption of that very long-awaited Freedom OS program, on the development of which, by the way, 10 billion dollars were ultimately spent! Due to the reduced actual carrying capacity, the Freedom developers were unable to fit the station modules into the cargo compartment.

As for the Columbia disaster, the problems with damage to the TZP at launch were known from the very beginning, but they were ignored in the same way. Although the danger was obvious! And it still persists, since this problem has not yet received a fundamental solution.

As a result, today the Shuttles have not flown even 30% of the planned flights and the program will be closed by 2010, otherwise the probability of another disaster is unacceptably high!

____________________________
Update from November 2, 2009, MiniFAK based on the discussion:
Objection:Why did the Shuttle fail? He flew for 30 years, and flew more than the Soyuz.

Answer: It definitely failed, if only because it was supposed to make about 500 flights according to plan, but will only make about 130, and then the flights are stopped due to conceptual and technical insolvency of the project.

The program is 30% completed - is this a successful program? Well, okay, it was 30% successful. Are you feeling better?

As for “flying more than the Soyuz,” it depends on how you count. Indeed, the MANLED Soyuz made only about a hundred flights. And sorry, why not count the Progress flights then? This is essentially the same Soyuz, but filled with cargo instead of people. And he made about 80 flights. Stupid Soviet engineers simply decided that there was no point in carrying cargo into orbit on a manned spacecraft, otherwise the Soyuz would have had so many flights. Shall we reproach them for this?

In general, the Soyuz launch vehicle has flown about 800 times already. And all this will continue to fly, and for Nasov’s money. A great point in the “successful” STS program.

Objection: Yes, this is a normal unit, it was just intended for something else - for orbital bombardment.

Answer: Really? This is just technical nonsense. Americans are stupid, of course, but not that much.

After all, any strategic missile is a super-duper “orbital bomber”, and an order of magnitude better than the Shuttle.

After all, it bombs targets from space (sic!) in the same way, it is thousands of times cheaper than it, it can destroy any target in 30-40 minutes from the moment the command is issued, and The Shuttle is good if it flies over the desired location only a couple of times a day (and only if you are lucky with the orbit) That is, in practice, it cannot provide any gain in flight time. After all, it cannot loiter where it needs to, like a bomber; it needs to constantly spin around the Earth, otherwise it will fall :). In addition, he can fly for at most a month or two a year. Imagine if missiles were operational only for a month out of the year, and were in maintenance the rest of the time. So in any case, from the Shuttle the carrier nuclear weapons- like a bullet made of shit.

Objection: In fact, there simply were no payloads for it; the Americans were shortchanged. Their spacecraft turned out to be much lighter and more durable than expected, so the Shuttle lost its meaning. After all, it paid off only with frequent flights, and there was simply nothing to launch so often.

Answer: Yep. They had so much “nothing” to launch that in the first years of flights, in the early 80s, there was a queue of dozens (if not hundreds) of customers waiting for the Shuttle to launch cargo. This queue was scheduled for several years in advance, but the Shuttle is banal CANNOT FLY AS FREQUENTLY AS REQUIRED. Purely technically. However, this queue eventually cleared up. After the Challenger disaster, everyone finally understood everything and transferred launches to other media. And NASA can only justify itself by spreading stupid stories about “too good satellites.”

The other day I accidentally noticed that I had already answered a question about the degree of success of the Space Shuttle program five times in the comments. Such regularity of questions requires a full-fledged article. In it I will try to answer the questions:

  • What were the goals of the Space Shuttle program?
  • What happened in the end?

The topic of reusable media is very voluminous, so in this article I specifically limit myself to only these issues.

What did you plan?

The idea of ​​reusable ships has occupied the minds of scientists and engineers in the United States since the 50s. On the one hand, it is a pity to smash discarded spent stages on the ground. On the other hand, a device that combines the properties of an airplane and a spaceship will be in line with the airplane philosophy, where reusability is natural. were born various projects: X-20 Dyna Soar, Recoverable Orbital Launch System (later Aerospaceplane). In the sixties, this rather inconspicuous activity continued in the shadow of the Gemini and Apollo programs. In 1965, two years before the Saturn V flight, a subcommittee on reusable launch vehicle technologies was created under the Aerospace Coordination Board (which included the US Air Force and NASA). The result of this work was a document published in 1966, which spoke of the need to overcome serious difficulties, but promised a bright future for work in Earth orbit. The Air Force and NASA had different vision systems and different requirements, therefore, instead of one project, ideas for ships of various layouts and degrees of reusability were presented. After 1966, NASA began to think about creating an orbital station. Such a station implied the need to deliver large quantity cargo into orbit, which, in turn, raised the question of the cost of such delivery. In December 1968, a working group was created that began to deal with the so-called. integrated launch and landing vehicle Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle (ILRV). This group's report was presented in July 1969 and stated that the ILRV should be able to:
  • Supply the orbital station
  • Launch and return satellites from orbit
  • Launch upper stages and payload into orbit
  • Launch fuel into orbit (for subsequent refueling of other devices)
  • Maintain and repair satellites in orbit
  • Conduct short manned missions
The report examined three classes of ships: a reusable ship "riding" on a disposable launch vehicle, a one-and-a-half stage ship (the "half" stage is tanks or engines that are jettisoned in flight), and a two-stage ship, both stages of which are reusable.
In parallel, in February 1969, President Nixon created a working group whose task was to determine the direction of movement in space exploration. The result of the work of this group was the recommendation to create a reusable ship that could:
  • Become a fundamental improvement to existing space technology in terms of cost and volumes launched into orbit
  • Transport people, cargo, fuel, other ships, upper stages, etc. into orbit like an airplane - regularly, cheaply, often and in large quantities.
  • Be versatile for compatibility with a wide range of civil and military payloads.
Initially, engineers were moving towards a two-stage, fully reusable system: a large winged manned ship carried a small winged manned ship, which was already in orbit:


This combination was theoretically the cheapest to operate. However, the large payload requirement made the system too large (and therefore expensive). In addition, the military wanted the possibility of a horizontal maneuver of 3000 km for landing at the launch site on the first orbit from a polar orbit, which limited engineering solutions (for example, straight wings became impossible).


Judging by the caption “high cross-range” (large horizontal maneuver), the military liked this picture

The final layout was very dependent on the following requirements:

  • Cargo compartment size and capacity
  • Amount of horizontal maneuver
  • Engines (type, thrust and other parameters)
  • Landing method (powered or gliding)
  • Materials used
As a result, the final demands were adopted at hearings in the White House and Congress:
  • Cargo compartment 4.5x18.2 m (15x60 ft)
  • 30 tons to low Earth orbit, 18 tons to polar orbit
  • Possibility of horizontal maneuver for 2000 km

Around 1970, it became clear that there was not enough money for an orbital station and a shuttle at the same time. And the station for which the shuttle was supposed to carry cargo was cancelled.
At the same time, there was unbridled optimism in the engineering community. Based on the experience of operating experimental rocket aircraft (X-15), engineers predicted a reduction in the cost of a kilogram per orbit by two orders of magnitude (a hundred times). At a symposium on the Space Shuttle program in October 1969, shuttle father George Mueller said:

“Our goal is to reduce the cost per kilogram per kilogram from $2000 for Saturn V to $40-100 per kilogram. With this we will open new era space exploration. The challenge for the coming weeks and months for this symposium, for the Air Force and NASA, is to ensure that we can do this."

B.E. Chertok in the fourth part of “Rockets and People” gives slightly different figures, but of the same order:
For various options based on the Space Shuttle, the launch cost was predicted to range from 90 to 330 dollars per kilogram. Moreover, it was assumed that the second generation Space Shuttle would reduce these figures to $33-66 per kilogram.

According to Muller's calculations, the shuttle launch will cost $1-2.5 million (compared to $185 million for the Saturn V).
There were also quite serious economic calculations, which showed that in order to even equal the cost of the Titan III launch vehicle in a direct comparison of prices without taking into account the discount, the shuttle would need to launch 28 times a year. For fiscal 1971, President Nixon allocated $125 million for the production of expendable launch vehicles, which amounted to 3.7% of NASA's budget. That is, if the shuttle had already existed in 1971, it would have saved only 3.7 percent of NASA's budget. Nuclear physicist Ralph Lapp calculated that over the period 1964-1971 the shuttle, if it had already existed, would have saved 2.9% of the budget. Naturally, such numbers could not protect the shuttle, and NASA entered the slippery slope of playing with numbers: “if an orbital station was built, and if it needed a resupply mission every two weeks, then the shuttles would save a billion dollars a year.” The idea was also promoted: “with such launch capabilities, payloads will become cheaper and there will be more of them than now, which will further increase savings.” Only the combination of the ideas “the shuttle will fly frequently and save money on each launch” and “new satellites for the shuttle will be cheaper than existing ones for disposable rockets” could make the shuttle economically viable.


Economic calculations. Note that if you remove the “new satellites” (bottom third of the table), the shuttles become economically unviable.


Economic calculations. We pay more now ( left side) and win in the future (right shaded part).

In parallel, complex political games were going on with the participation of potential manufacturing firms, the Air Force, the government and NASA. For example, NASA lost the battle for the first stage accelerators to the Office of Management and Budget of the Executive Office of the President of the United States. NASA wanted rocket engine boosters, but due to the fact that solid propellant rocket boosters were cheaper to develop, the latter were chosen. The Air Force, which had been pushing for military manned programs with the X-20 and MOL, was essentially getting military shuttle missions for free in exchange for political support from NASA. Shuttle production was deliberately spread across the country among different companies for economic and political effect.
As a result of these complex maneuvers, the contract for the development of the Space Shuttle system was signed in the summer of 1972. The history of production and operation is beyond the scope of this article.

What did you get?

Now that the program is completed, we can say with reasonable accuracy which goals were achieved and which were not.

Achieved goals:

  1. Cargo delivery various types(satellites, upper stages, ISS segments).
  2. Possibility of repairing satellites in low Earth orbit.
  3. Possibility of returning satellites to Earth.
  4. Possibility to fly up to eight people.
  5. Reusability implemented.
  6. A fundamentally new layout of the spacecraft has been implemented.
  7. Possibility of horizontal maneuver.
  8. Large cargo compartment.
  9. The cost and development time met the deadlines promised to President Nixon in 1971.

Unachieved goals and failures:

  1. High-quality facilitation of access to space. Instead of reducing the price per kilogram by two orders of magnitude, the Space Shuttle became one of the most expensive means of delivering satellites into orbit.
  2. Rapid preparation of shuttles between flights. Instead of the expected two weeks between flights, the shuttles took months to prepare for launch. Before the Challenger disaster, the record between flights was 54 days, after the Challenger - 88 days. Over all the years of operation of the shuttles, they were launched on average 4.5 times a year instead of the minimum calculated 28 times a year.
  3. Easy to maintain. The selected technical solutions were very labor-intensive to maintain. The main engines required dismantling and a lot of time for servicing. The turbopump units of the first model engines required a complete overhaul and repair after each flight. Thermal protection tiles were unique - each slot had its own tile. There are 35,000 tiles in total, and they can be lost or damaged in flight.
  4. Replacement of all disposable media. The shuttles have never launched into polar orbits, which is needed mainly for reconnaissance satellites. Preparatory work was carried out, but it was stopped after the Challenger disaster.
  5. Reliable access to space. Four orbiters meant that a shuttle disaster meant the loss of a quarter of the fleet. After the disaster, flights were stopped for years. Also, the shuttle was notorious for constantly delaying launches.
  6. The shuttles' carrying capacity turned out to be five tons lower than required by specifications (24.4 instead of 30)
  7. Greater horizontal maneuver capabilities were never used in reality due to the fact that the shuttle did not fly into polar orbits.
  8. The return of satellites from orbit ceased in 1996. Only five satellites were returned from orbit.
  9. Satellite repairs also turned out to be in little demand. A total of five satellites were repaired (though Hubble was serviced five times).
  10. The engineering decisions taken had a negative impact on the reliability of the system. During takeoff and landing there were areas with no chance of saving the crew in the event of an accident. Because of this, the Challenger was lost. The STS-9 mission almost ended in disaster due to a fire in the tail section, which broke out already on the landing strip. If this fire had happened a minute earlier, the shuttle would have fallen without a chance to save the crew.
  11. The fact that the shuttle always flew manned put people at risk unnecessarily - automation was enough for routine satellite launches.
  12. Due to the low intensity of operation, the shuttles became obsolete morally before they became physically obsolete. In 2011, the Space Shuttle was a very rare example of the operation of the 80386 processor. Disposable media could be upgraded gradually with new series.
  13. The closure of the Space Shuttle program coincided with the cancellation of the Constellation program, which led to the loss of independent access to space for many years, loss of image and the need to buy seats on spaceships of another country.
  14. New control systems and over-caliber fairings made it possible to launch large satellites on expendable rockets.
  15. The shuttle holds a sad anti-record among space systems for the number of people killed.

The Space Shuttle program gave the United States a unique opportunity to work in space, but from the point of view of the difference between “what they wanted and what they got,” we have to conclude that it did not achieve its goals.

Why did this happen?
I especially emphasize that at this point I am expressing my thoughts, perhaps some of them are incorrect.
  1. The shuttles were the result of many compromises between the interests of several large organizations. Perhaps if there had been one person or a team of like-minded people who had a clear vision of the system, it could have turned out better.
  2. The requirement to "be everything to everyone" and replace all expendable rockets increased the cost and complexity of the system. Universality when combining heterogeneous requirements leads to complexity, increased cost, unnecessary functionality and worse efficiency than specialization. Easily add an alarm to mobile phone- the speaker, clock, buttons and electronic components are already there. But a flying submarine will be more complex, more expensive and worse than specialized aircraft and submarines.
  3. The complexity and cost of a system increases exponentially with size. Perhaps a shuttle with 5-10 tons of payload (3-4 times less than what was sold) would be more successful. More of them could be built, part of the fleet could be made unmanned, and a disposable module could be made to increase the payload capacity of rare, heavier missions.
  4. "Dizziness from success." The successful implementation of three programs of successively increasing complexity could turn the heads of engineers and managers. In fact, the fact that a manned first launch without unmanned testing, and the absence of crew rescue systems in the ascent/descent areas indicate some self-confidence.
Hey, what about Buran?
Anticipating the inevitable comparisons, we will have to say a little about him. There are no operating statistics for Buran over many years. It turned out to be easier in some ways - it was covered with the rubble of the collapsed USSR, and it is impossible to say whether this program would have been successful. The first part of this program - “do it like the Americans” - was completed, but what would have happened next is unknown.
And those who want to arrange a holivar in the comments “Which is better?” Please first define what you think is “better”. Because both phrases “Buran has a larger characteristic velocity reserve (delta-V) than the Space Shuttle” and “The Shuttle does not dump expensive propulsion engines from the launch vehicle stage” are true.

List of sources (not including Wikipedia):

  1. Ray A. Williamson

The Space Transportation System, better known as the Space Shuttle, is an American reusable transport spacecraft. The shuttle is launched into space using launch vehicles, maneuvers in orbit like a spacecraft, and returns to Earth like an airplane. It was understood that the shuttles would scurry like shuttles between low-Earth orbit and the Earth, delivering payloads in both directions. During development, it was envisaged that each of the shuttles would be launched into space up to 100 times. In practice, they are used much less. By May 2010, the most flights - 38 - were made by the Discovery shuttle. A total of five shuttles were built from 1975 to 1991: Columbia (burned up on landing in 2003), Challenger (exploded on launch in 1986), Discovery, Atlantis and Endeavor. On May 14, 2010, the Space Shuttle Atlantis made its final launch from Cape Canaveral. Upon returning to Earth, it will be decommissioned.

History of application

The shuttle program has been developed by North American Rockwell on behalf of NASA since 1971.
Shuttle Columbia was the first operational reusable orbiter. It was manufactured in 1979 and transferred to NASA's Kennedy Space Center. The shuttle Columbia was named after the sailing ship on which Captain Robert Gray explored the inland waters of British Columbia (now the US states of Washington and Oregon) in May 1792. At NASA, Columbia is designated OV-102 (Orbiter Vehicle - 102). The Columbia shuttle died on February 1, 2003 (flight STS-107) while entering the Earth's atmosphere before landing. This was Columbia's 28th space voyage.
The second space shuttle, Challenger, was delivered to NASA in July 1982. It was named after a seagoing vessel that explored the ocean in the 1870s. NASA designates the Challenger as OV-099. Challenger died on its tenth launch on January 28, 1986.
The third shuttle, Discovery, was delivered to NASA in November 1982.
The shuttle Discovery was named for one of the two ships on which British captain James Cook discovered the Hawaiian Islands and explored the coasts of Alaska and northwestern Canada in the 1770s. One of the ships of Henry Hudson, who explored Hudson Bay in 1610-1611, bore the same name (“Discovery”). Two more Discoverys were built by the British Royal Geographical Society for exploration. North Pole and Antarctica in 1875 and 1901. NASA designates Discovery as OV-103.
The fourth shuttle, Atlantis, entered service in April 1985.
The fifth shuttle, Endeavor, was built to replace the lost Challenger and entered service in May 1991. The shuttle Endeavor was also named after one of James Cook's ships. This vessel was used in astronomical observations, which made it possible to accurately determine the distance from the Earth to the Sun. This ship also took part in expeditions to explore New Zealand. NASA designates Endeavor as OV-105.
Before Columbia, another shuttle was built, the Enterprise, which in the late 1970s was used only as a test vehicle to test landing methods and did not fly into space. At the very beginning, it was planned to name this orbital ship “Constitution” in honor of the bicentennial of the American Constitution. Later, based on numerous suggestions from viewers of the popular television series Star Trek, the name Enterprise was chosen. NASA designates the Enterprise as OV-101.

Shuttle Discovery takes off. STS-120 mission

General information
Country United States of America USA
Purpose Reusable transport spacecraft
Manufacturer United Space Alliance:
Thiokol/Alliant Techsystems (SRBs)
Lockheed Martin (Martin Marietta) - (ET)
Rockwell/Boeing (orbiter)
Main characteristics
Number of stages 2
Length 56.1 m
Diameter 8.69 m
Launch weight 2030 t
Payload weight
- at LEO 24,400 kg
- in Geostationary orbit 3810 kg
Launch history
Status active
Launch Sites Kennedy Space Center, Complex 39
Vandenberg AFB (planned in the 1980s)
Number of starts 128
- successful 127
- unsuccessful 1 (launch failure, Challenger)
- partially unsuccessful 1 (re-entry failure, Columbia)
First launch April 12, 1981
Last launch autumn 2010

Design

The shuttle consists of three main components: orbiter(Orbiter), which is launched into low-Earth orbit and which is, in fact, a spacecraft; large external fuel tank for main engines; and two solid rocket boosters that operate within two minutes of liftoff. After entering space, the orbiter independently returns to Earth and lands like an airplane on a runway. Solid propellant boosters are splashed down by parachute and then used again. The external fuel tank burns up in the atmosphere.


History of creation

There is a serious misconception that the Space Shuttle program was created for military purposes, as a kind of “space bomber”. This deeply incorrect “opinion” is based on the “capability” of shuttles to carry nuclear weapons (any sufficiently large passenger airliner has this capability to the same extent (for example, the first Soviet transcontinental airliner Tu-114 was created on the basis of the strategic nuclear carrier Tu-95) and on theoretical assumptions about “orbital dives”, which reusable orbital ships are supposedly capable of (and even carried out).
In fact, all references to the “bomber” mission of the shuttles are contained exclusively in Soviet sources, as an assessment of the military potential of the space shuttles. It is fair to assume that these “assessments” were used to convince senior management of the need for an “adequate response” and create their own similar system.
The history of the space shuttle project begins in 1967, when even before the first manned flight under the Apollo program (October 11, 1968 - the launch of Apollo 7), there was more than a year left, as a review of the prospects for manned astronautics after completion lunar program NASA.
On October 30, 1968, NASA's two main centers (Crewed spaceships- MSC - in Houston and the Marshall Space Center - MSFC - in Huntsville) approached American space firms with a proposal to explore the possibility of creating a reusable space system, which would reduce the costs of the space agency under the condition of intensive use.
In September 1970, the Space Task Force under the leadership of US Vice President S. Agnew, specially created to determine the next steps in space exploration, issued two detailed drafts of possible programs.
The big project included:

* space shuttles;
* orbital tugs;
* a large orbital station in Earth orbit (up to 50 crew members);
* small orbital station in orbit of the Moon;
* creation of a habitable base on the Moon;
* manned expeditions to Mars;
* landing people on the surface of Mars.
As a small project, it was proposed to create only a large orbital station in Earth orbit. But in both projects, it was determined that orbital flights: supplying the station, delivering cargo into orbit for long-distance expeditions or ship blocks for long-distance flights, changing crews and other tasks in Earth orbit should be carried out by a reusable system, which was then called the Space Shuttle.
There were also plans to create a "nuclear shuttle" - a shuttle with a nuclear propulsion system NERVA (English), which was developed and tested in the 1960s. The nuclear shuttle was supposed to fly between the Earth's orbit, the orbit of the Moon and Mars. The supply of the atomic shuttle with the working fluid for the nuclear engine was entrusted to the familiar ordinary shuttles:

Nuclear Shuttle: This reusable rocket would rely on the NERVA nuclear engine. It would operate between low earth orbit, lunar orbit, and geosynchronous orbit, with its exceptionally high performance enabling it to carry heavy payloads and to do significant amounts of work with limited stores of liquid-hydrogen propellant. In turn, the nuclear shuttle would receive this propellant from the Space Shuttle.

SP-4221 The Space Shuttle Decision

However, US President Richard Nixon rejected all options because even the cheapest one required $5 billion a year. NASA faced a difficult choice: it had to either begin a new major development or announce the termination of the manned program.
It was decided to insist on creating a shuttle, but to present it not as a transport ship for assembling and servicing the space station (keeping this, however, in reserve), but as a system capable of generating profit and recouping investments by launching satellites into orbit on a commercial basis. An economic examination confirmed: theoretically, provided there are at least 30 flights per year and a complete refusal to use disposable carriers, the space shuttle system can be profitable.
The project to create the Space Shuttle system was adopted by the US Congress.
At the same time, in connection with the abandonment of disposable launch vehicles, it was determined that the shuttles were responsible for launching into earth orbit all promising devices of the US Department of Defense, CIA and NSA.
The military presented their demands on the system:

* The space system must be capable of launching a payload of up to 30 tons into orbit, returning a payload of up to 14.5 tons to Earth, and have a cargo compartment size of at least 18 meters long and 4.5 meters in diameter. This was the size and weight of the then-designed optical reconnaissance satellite KH-II, from which the Hubble orbital telescope subsequently evolved.
* Provide lateral maneuver capability for the orbital vehicle up to 2000 kilometers for ease of landing at a limited number of military airfields.
* For launch into circumpolar orbits (with an inclination of 56-104º), the Air Force decided to build its own technical, launch and landing complexes at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

This limited the military department's requirements for the space shuttle project.
It was never planned to use shuttles as “space bombers”. In any case, there are no documents from NASA, the Pentagon, or the US Congress indicating such intentions. “Bomber” motives are not mentioned either in the memoirs or in the private correspondence of the participants in the creation of the space shuttle system.
The X-20 Dyna Soar space bomber project officially launched on October 24, 1957. However, with the development of silo-based and nuclear-powered ICBMs submarine fleet, armed with ballistic missiles, the creation of orbital bombers in the United States was considered inappropriate. After 1961, references to “bomber” missions disappeared from the X-20 Dyna Soar project, but reconnaissance and “inspection” missions remained. On February 23, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara approved the latest restructuring of the program. From that point on, Dyna-Soar was officially designated as a research program to explore and demonstrate the feasibility of a manned orbital glider maneuvering during reentry and landing on a runway at a given location on Earth with the required precision. By mid-1963, the Department of Defense had serious doubts about the need for the Dyna-Soar program. On December 10, 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled Dyna-Soar.
When making this decision, it was taken into account that spacecraft of this class cannot “hang” in orbit for a long enough time to be considered “orbital platforms”, and launching each spacecraft into orbit takes not even hours, but days and requires the use of heavy lift rockets. class, which does not allow them to be used for either a first or retaliatory nuclear strike.
Many of the technical and technological developments of the Dyna-Soar program were subsequently used to create orbital vehicles such as the Space Shuttle.
The Soviet leadership, closely monitoring the development of the space shuttle program, but assuming the worst, looked for a “hidden military threat”, which formed two main assumptions:

* It is possible to use space shuttles as carriers of nuclear weapons (this assumption is fundamentally incorrect for the above reasons).
* It is possible to use space shuttles to abduct Soviet satellites and DOS (long-term manned stations) from V. Chelomey’s Almaz OKB-52 from Earth’s orbit. For protection, Soviet DOS were supposed to be equipped even with automatic cannons designed by Nudelman - Richter (OPS was equipped with such a cannon). The assumption of “abductions” was based solely on the dimensions of the cargo compartment and the return payload, openly declared by the American shuttle developers to be close to the dimensions and weight of the Almaz. The Soviet leadership was not informed about the dimensions and weight of the HK-II reconnaissance satellite, which was being developed at the same time.
As a result, the Soviet space industry was tasked with creating a reusable space system with characteristics similar to the Space Shuttle system, but with a clearly defined military purpose, as an orbital delivery vehicle for thermonuclear weapons.


Tasks

Space Shuttle ships are used to launch cargo into orbits at an altitude of 200-500 km, carry out scientific research, maintenance of orbital spacecraft (installation and repair work).
The Space Shuttle Discovery delivered the Hubble Telescope into orbit in April 1990 (flight STS-31). The space shuttles Columbia, Discovery, Endeavor and Atlantis carried out four missions to service the Hubble telescope. The last shuttle mission to Hubble took place in May 2009. Since NASA planned to stop shuttle flights in 2010, this was the last human expedition to the telescope, since these missions cannot be carried out by any other available spacecraft.
Shuttle Endeavor with open cargo bay.

In the 1990s, the shuttles took part in the joint Russian-American Mir - Space Shuttle program. Nine dockings were made with the Mir station.
During the twenty years that the shuttles were in service, they were constantly developed and modified. More than a thousand major and minor modifications were made to the original shuttle design.
The shuttles play a very important role in the implementation of the project to create the International Space Station (ISS). For example, the ISS modules, from which it is assembled except for the Russian Zvezda module, do not have their own propulsion systems (PS), and therefore cannot independently maneuver in orbit to search for, rendezvous and dock with the station. Therefore, they cannot simply be “thrown” into orbit by ordinary Proton-type carriers. The only possibility of assembling stations from such modules is to use space shuttle type ships with their large cargo compartments or, hypothetically, to use orbital “tugs” that could find a module put into orbit by Proton, dock with it and bring it to the station for docking.
In fact, without shuttle-type spacecraft, the construction of modular orbital stations such as the ISS (from modules without remote control and navigation systems) would be impossible.
After the Columbia disaster, three shuttles remained in operation - Discovery, Atlantis and Endeavor. These remaining shuttles should ensure the completion of the ISS before 2010. NASA announced the end of shuttle service in 2010.
The space shuttle Atlantis, on its last flight into orbit (STS-132), delivered the Russian research module Rassvet to the ISS.
Technical data


Solid propellant booster


External fuel tank

The tank contains fuel and oxidizer for the three liquid-propellant SSME (or RS-24) engines in orbit and does not have its own engines.
Inside, the fuel tank is divided into two sections. The upper third of the tank is occupied by a container designed for liquid oxygen cooled to a temperature of −183 °C (−298 °F). The volume of this container is 650 thousand liters (143 thousand gallons). The bottom two-thirds of the tank is designed to hold liquid hydrogen cooled to −253 °C (−423 °F). The volume of this container is 1.752 million liters (385 thousand gallons).


Orbiter

In addition to the three main engines of the orbiter, two orbital maneuvering system (OMS) engines, each with a thrust of 27 kN, are sometimes used at launch. The OMS fuel and oxidizer are stored on the shuttle for use in orbit and for return to Earth.



Space Shuttle Dimensions

Dimensions of the Space Shuttle compared to the Soyuz
Price
In 2006, total costs amounted to $160 billion, by which time 115 launches had been carried out (see: en:Space Shuttle program#Costs). The average cost for each flight was $1.3 billion, but the bulk of the costs (design, modernization, etc.) do not depend on the number of launches.
The cost of each shuttle flight is about $60 million. To support 22 shuttle flights from mid-2005 to 2010, NASA budgeted about $1 billion 300 million in direct costs.
For this money, the shuttle orbiter can deliver 20-25 tons of cargo in one flight to the ISS, including ISS modules, plus 7-8 astronauts.
Reduced in last years almost up to cost, the price of launching a Proton-M with a launch load of 22 tons is $25 million. Any separately flying spacecraft launched into orbit by a Proton-type carrier can have this weight.
Modules attached to the ISS cannot be launched into orbit by launch vehicles, since they must be delivered to the station and docked, which requires orbital maneuvering, which the orbital station modules themselves are incapable of. Maneuvering is carried out by orbital ships (in the future - orbital tugs), and not by launch vehicles.
Progress cargo ships supplying the ISS are launched into orbit by Soyuz-type carriers and are capable of delivering no more than 1.5 tons of cargo to the station. The cost of launching one Progress cargo ship on a Soyuz carrier is estimated at approximately $70 million, and to replace one shuttle flight, at least 15 Soyuz-Progress flights will be required, which in total exceeds a billion dollars.
However, after the completion of the orbital station, in the absence of the need to deliver new modules to the ISS, using shuttles with their huge cargo compartments becomes impractical.
On its last voyage, the Atlantis shuttle delivered to the ISS, in addition to the astronauts, “only” 8 tons of cargo, including a new Russian research module, new laptop computers, food, water and other consumables.
Photo gallery

Space Shuttle on the launch pad. Cape Canaveral, Florida

Landing of the shuttle Atlantis.

A NASA crawler transporter transports the space shuttle Discovery to the launch pad.

Soviet shuttle Buran

Shuttle in flight

Shuttle Endeavor landing

Shuttle on the launch pad

Video
The final landing of the shuttle Atlantis

Night launch Discovery

Humanity has learned to build very powerful and high-speed objects that take decades to assemble in order to then reach the most distant goals. The Shuttle in orbit moves at a speed of more than 27 thousand km per hour. A number of NASA space probes, such as Helios 1, Helios 2 or Vodger 1, are powerful enough to reach the Moon in a few hours.

This article was translated from the English-language resource themysteriousworld.com and, of course, is not entirely true. Many Russian and Soviet launch vehicles and spacecraft overcame the barrier of 11,000 km/h, but in the West, apparently, they got used to not noticing this. And there is quite a bit of freely available information about our space objects; in any case, we were never able to find out about the speed of many Russian spacecraft.

Here is a list of the ten fastest objects produced by mankind:

✰ ✰ ✰
10

Rocket cart

Speed: 10,385 km/h

Rocket carts are actually used to test platforms used to accelerate experimental objects. During testing, the trolley has a record speed of 10,385 km/h. These devices use sliding pads instead of wheels to achieve such lightning-fast speeds. Rocket carts are propelled by rockets.

This external force imparts an initial acceleration to experimental objects. The trolleys also have long, more than 3 km, straight sections of track. The rocket cart tanks are filled with lubricants, such as helium gas, so that this helps the experimental object reach the required speed. These devices are commonly used to accelerate missiles, aircraft parts and aircraft recovery sections.

✰ ✰ ✰
9

NASA X-43A

Speed: 11,200 km/h

The ASA X-43 A is an unmanned supersonic aircraft that is launched from a larger aircraft. In 2005, the Guinness Book of World Records recognized NASA's X-43 A as the fastest aircraft ever made. He develops maximum speed 11,265 km/h is about 8.4 times faster than the speed of sound.

NASA X-13 A uses drop-launch technology. First this supersonic plane hits a higher altitude on a larger plane and then crashes. The required speed is achieved using a launch vehicle. On final stage, after reaching a predetermined speed, the NASA X-13 runs on its own engine.

✰ ✰ ✰
8

Shuttle Columbia

Speed: 27,350 km/h

The Columbia shuttle was the first successful reusable spacecraft in the history of space exploration. Since 1981, it has successfully completed 37 missions. The record speed of the space shuttle Columbia is 27,350 km/h. The ship exceeded its normal speed when it crashed on February 1, 2003.

The shuttle typically travels at 27,350 km/h to remain in Earth's lower orbit. At this speed, the spacecraft crew could see the sun rise and set several times in one day.

✰ ✰ ✰
7

Shuttle Discovery

Speed: 28,000 km/h

The shuttle Discovery has a record number of successful missions, more than any other spacecraft. Since 1984, Discovery has made 30 successful flights and its speed record is 28,000 km/h. This is five times faster than the speed of a bullet. Sometimes spacecraft must travel faster than their normal speed of 27,350 km/h. It all depends on the chosen orbit and altitude of the spacecraft.

✰ ✰ ✰
6

Apollo 10 lander

Speed: 39,897 km/h

The Apollo 10 launch was a rehearsal for NASA's mission before landing on the moon. During the return journey, on May 26, 1969, the Apollo 10 apparatus acquired a lightning speed of 39,897 km/h. The Guinness Book of World Records has set the Apollo 10 lander's speed record as the fastest manned vehicle speed record.

In fact, the Apollo 10 module needed such speed to reach the Earth's atmosphere from lunar orbit. Apollo 10 also completed its mission in 56 hours.

While space launches were rare, the question of the cost of launch vehicles special attention didn’t attract me. But as space exploration progressed, he began to acquire everything higher value. The cost of the launch vehicle in the total cost of launching a spacecraft varies. If the launch vehicle is serial and the spacecraft it launches is unique, the cost of the launch vehicle is about 10 percent of the total launch cost. If the spacecraft is serial and the carrier is unique - up to 40 percent or more. The high cost of space transportation is explained by the fact that the launch vehicle is used only once. Satellites and space stations operate in orbit or in interplanetary space, bringing a certain scientific or economic result, and rocket stages that have complex design and expensive equipment burn up in dense layers of the atmosphere. Naturally, the question arose about reducing the cost of space launches by re-launching launch vehicles.

There are many projects of such systems. One of them is a space plane. This is a winged machine that, like an airliner, would take off from a cosmodrome and, having delivered a payload into orbit (satellite or spacecraft), would return to Earth. But it is not yet possible to create such an aircraft, mainly due to the required ratio of payload masses to the total mass of the vehicle. Many other designs for reusable aircraft also turned out to be economically unprofitable or difficult to implement.

Nevertheless, the United States nevertheless set a course towards creating a reusable spacecraft. Many experts were against such an expensive project. But the Pentagon supported him.

The development of the Space Shuttle system began in the United States in 1972. It was based on the concept of a reusable spacecraft designed for launch into near-Earth orbits artificial satellites and other objects. The Space Shuttle consists of a manned orbital stage, two solid rocket boosters, and a large fuel tank located between the boosters.

The Shuttle launches vertically with the help of two solid rocket boosters (each 3.7 meters in diameter), as well as liquid orbital rocket engines, which are fed by fuel (liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen) from a large fuel tank. Solid propellant boosters operate only in the initial part of the trajectory. Their operating time is just over two minutes. At an altitude of 70-90 kilometers, the boosters are separated, parachuted into the water, into the ocean, and towed to the shore, so that after restoration and recharging with fuel they can be used again. When entering orbit, the fuel tank (8.5 meters in diameter and 47 meters long) is jettisoned and burns in the dense layers of the atmosphere.

The most complex element of the complex is the orbital stage. It resembles a rocket plane with a delta wing. In addition to the engines, it houses the cockpit and cargo compartment. The orbital stage deorbits like a regular spacecraft and lands without thrust, only due to the lifting force of a swept wing of low aspect ratio. The wing allows the orbital stage to perform some maneuver both in range and heading and ultimately land on a special concrete runway. The landing speed of the stage is much higher than that of any fighter. - about 350 kilometers per hour. The orbital stage body must withstand temperatures of 1600 degrees Celsius. The thermal protection coating consists of 30,922 silicate tiles glued to the fuselage and tightly fitted to each other.

The Space Shuttle is a kind of compromise both technically and economically. The maximum payload delivered by the Shuttle into orbit is from 14.5 to 29.5 tons, and its launch weight is 2000 tons, that is, the payload is only 0.8-1.5 percent of the total mass of the fueled spacecraft. At the same time, this figure for a conventional rocket with the same payload is 2-4 percent. If we take as an indicator the ratio of the payload to the weight of the structure, without taking into account fuel, then the advantage in favor of a conventional rocket will increase even more. This is the price to pay for the opportunity to at least partially reuse spacecraft structures.

One of the creators of spaceships and stations, USSR pilot-cosmonaut, professor K.P. Feoktistov assesses the economic efficiency of the Shuttles this way: “Needless to say, creating an economical transport system is not easy. Some experts are also confused by the following about the Shuttle idea. According to economic calculations, it justifies itself with approximately 40 flights per year per sample. It turns out that in a year only one “plane”, in order to justify its construction, must launch about a thousand tons of various cargo into orbit. On the other hand, there is a tendency to reduce the weight of spacecraft, increase their duration active life in orbit and, in general, to reduce the number of launched vehicles due to the solution of a set of tasks by each of them.”

From an efficiency point of view, the creation of a reusable transport ship with such a large payload capacity is premature. It is much more profitable to supply orbital stations with the help of automatic transport ships of the Progress type. Today, the cost of one kilogram of cargo launched into space by the Shuttle is $25,000, and by Proton - $5,000.

Without direct support from the Pentagon, the project would hardly have been brought to the stage of flight experiments. At the very beginning of the project, a committee on the use of the Shuttle was established at the headquarters of the US Air Force. It was decided to build a launch pad for the shuttle at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, from which military spacecraft are launched. Military customers planned to use the Shuttle to carry out a broad program of placing reconnaissance satellites in space, radar detection and targeting systems for combat missiles, for manned reconnaissance flights, creating space command posts, orbital platforms with laser weapons, for “inspection” of aliens in orbit space objects and delivering them to Earth. The Shuttle was also considered as one of the key links in the overall program for creating space laser weapons.

Thus, already on the first flight, the crew of the Columbia spacecraft carried out a military mission related to testing the reliability of an aiming device for laser weapons. A laser placed in orbit must be accurately aimed at missiles hundreds and thousands of kilometers away from it.

Since the early 1980s, the US Air Force has been preparing a series of unclassified experiments in polar orbit with the goal of developing advanced equipment for tracking objects moving in air and airless space.

The Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986 made adjustments to the further development of US space programs. Challenger went on its last flight, paralyzing the entire American space program. While the Shuttles were laid up, NASA's cooperation with the Department of Defense was in doubt. The Air Force has effectively disbanded its astronaut corps. The composition of the military-scientific mission, which received the name STS-39 and was moved to Cape Canaveral, also changed.

The dates for the next flight were repeatedly pushed back. The program was resumed only in 1990. Since then, the Shuttles have regularly flown space flights. They participated in the repair of the Hubble telescope, flights to the Mir station, and construction of the ISS.

By the time the Shuttle flights resumed in the USSR, a reusable ship was already ready, which in many ways surpassed the American one. On November 15, 1988, the new Energia launch vehicle launched the Buran reusable spacecraft into low-Earth orbit. Having made two orbits around the Earth, guided by miracle machines, it landed beautifully on the concrete landing strip of Baikonur, like an Aeroflot airliner.

Launch vehicle "Energia" basic rocket the whole system launch vehicles formed by a combination of different numbers of unified modular stages and capable of launching vehicles weighing from 10 to hundreds of tons into space! Its basis, the core, is the second stage. Its height is 60 meters, diameter is about 8 meters. It has four liquid rocket engines running on hydrogen (fuel) and oxygen (oxidizer). The thrust of each such engine at the Earth's surface is 1480 kN. Around the second stage, at its base, four blocks are docked in pairs, forming the first stage of the launch vehicle. Each block is equipped with the world's most powerful four-chamber engine RD-170 with a thrust of 7400 kN at the Earth.

The “package” of blocks of the first and second stages forms a powerful, heavy launch vehicle with a launch weight of up to 2400 tons, carrying a payload of 100 tons.

"Buran" has a great external resemblance to the American "Shuttle". The ship is built according to the design of a tailless aircraft with a delta wing of variable sweep, has aerodynamic controls that operate during landing after returning to the dense layers of the atmosphere, the rudder and elevons. It was capable of making a controlled descent in the atmosphere with a lateral maneuver of up to 2000 kilometers.

The length of the Buran is 36.4 meters, the wingspan is about 24 meters, the height of the ship on the chassis is more than 16 meters. The launch weight of the ship is more than 100 tons, of which 14 tons are fuel. A sealed all-welded cabin for the crew and most of the equipment to ensure flight as part of the rocket and space complex, autonomous flight in orbit, descent and landing is inserted into the bow compartment. The cabin volume is more than 70 cubic meters.

When returning to the dense layers of the atmosphere, the most heat-stressed areas of the ship's surface heat up to 1600 degrees, while the heat reaching directly to metal structure ship, should not exceed 150 degrees. Therefore, “Buran” was distinguished by powerful thermal protection, which ensured normal temperature conditions for the ship’s structure when passing through dense layers of the atmosphere during landing.

The thermal protective coating of more than 38 thousand tiles is made of special materials: quartz fiber, high-temperature organic fibers, partly carbon-based material. Ceramic armor has the ability to accumulate heat without transmitting it to the ship's hull. The total weight of this armor was about 9 tons.

The length of the Buran's cargo compartment is about 18 meters. Its spacious cargo compartment could accommodate a payload weighing up to 30 tons. It was possible to place large-sized spacecraft there - large satellites, blocks of orbital stations. The ship's landing weight is 82 tons.

"Buran" was equipped with all necessary systems and equipment for both automatic and manned flight. These include navigation and control equipment, radio and television systems, automatic thermal control devices, a crew life support system, and much, much more.

The main propulsion system, two groups of engines for maneuvering, are located at the end of the tail section and in the front of the hull.

"Buran" was the response of the American military space program. Therefore, after the warming of relations with the United States, the fate of the ship was predetermined.