Do not have any illusions - the west and east of Ukraine are different countries. Western Ukraine versus Poland: a failed attempt at Galician statehood

Yaroslav Shimov

The westernmost regions of modern Ukraine - Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia - were the easternmost provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918. For almost a century and a half (and Transcarpathia - much longer) they were under the scepter of the Habsburgs, whose internal and foreign policy in the 19th - early 20th centuries could not but influence the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism and the development of the national culture and language not only of these regions, but also, to a certain extent, of all of Ukraine. Galicia went to the Habsburgs as a result of the first (1772) and third ( 1795) sections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Austria did not participate in the second section). Bukovina was conquered by Austria from Ottoman Turkey in 1774 and annexed to Galicia; it was allocated as a separate province in the middle of the 19th century. It is characteristic that Maria Theresa, during whose reign the first partition took place, opposed the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian state and with great chagrin yielded to the pragmatic arguments of her son and co-ruler Joseph II. " Only the weakness of the Turks, the fact that we could not count on the help of England and France, the fears of a possible war with Russia and Prussia, the poverty and famine that had fallen on our lands, forced me to take that unrighteous step that tainted my reign and poisoned my days", the queen complained. However, as the long-time rival of the Habsburgs, the Prussian king Frederick II, noted with his characteristic causticity, “ she cried, but she took her due". The relative liberalism of the Habsburg regime, whose policy in the territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was noticeably softer than Russian or Prussian, may be to some extent explained precisely by the fact that “Galicia and Lodomeria” were annexed to the Danube monarchy for purely geopolitical reasons. In any case, the Habsburgs did not seek ideological justification for this step. For Prussia, participation in the partitions was a continuation of the long-standing German strategy of “pressure to the east,” and the Russian Empire claimed that it was returning the lands of Western Rus', once captured by Lithuania and Poland.

At first, due to the ethnic, cultural and linguistic affiliation of the nobility of Galicia, this province was perceived as Polish in the Habsburg Empire. As for Transcarpathia, at the beginning of the 13th century it became part of the Kingdom of Hungary, where the dominant role had long been assigned to the Hungarian culture. The East Slavic population of these lands - descendants of the inhabitants of the Galician-Volyn principality, which was part of Kievan Rus, at that time did not recognize themselves as a single ethnic group. They have formed only a local one, i.e. linguistic and religious identity associated with the place of residence (in this region, starting from the 17th century, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) religion prevailed). According to the famous Czech researcher Miroslav Groch, this situation is quite typical for Central and Eastern Europe, where a “foreign” ruling class dominated ethnic groups that occupied a compact territory but had neither their own nobility and political institutions, nor a long literary tradition.

The question of the (self)name of the East Slavic population of the provinces that were transferred to Russia and the Habsburg Empire as a result of the divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is both clear and quite confusing. We are talking about those about whom the Austrian traveler and diplomat Sigismund Herberstein wrote back in the 16th century: “ ...This people, speaking a Slavic language, professing the faith of Christ according to the Greek rite, calling themselves Russi in their native language, and in Latin called Rutheni ". But even during the time of Herberstein in various East Slavic lands the word Russi(Russian)Rusyns had different meanings, which, moreover, changed over the centuries. In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 14th–17th centuries, the ethnonym “ross” – “Rusin” – “Russian” served to designate regional and/or confessional affiliation within the framework of a broader state-political community. In the Moscow state and the one that grew out of it Russian Empire the word “Russian” began to denote, first of all, territorial and political affiliation with Russia, citizenship.

The Rus/Russians/Rusyns, who lived in different areas of the vast region they inhabited, have been subject to various ethnocultural and political influences since the time of Kievan Rus: Balto-Germanic in the northwest, West Slavic in the west and southwest, Turkic in the south, Finno-Ugric and Turkic-Mongolian in the northeast. Diversification of the ethnic community in question - in principle, not united from the very beginning, because the inhabitants of the ancient Russian state, as is known, belonged to different tribes - gradually led to the formation of three East Slavic peoples: Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. It is important to note that the process of formation of the respective nations in all three cases began relatively late and, in a certain sense, is not completed to this day. The already complicated question of the origin of Rus'-Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the ethnonyms “Rusyn”, “Russian”, “Ukrainian”, “Belarusian”, etc., is complicated by deliberate ideologization. The author of this article, speaking about the East Slavic (Orthodox and Greek Catholic) population of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, uses mainly the ethnonym “Rusyns”, since it is the most neutral from a political and ideological point of view. Moreover, this is exactly how (in German Ruthenen) called the representatives of this people in the Habsburg Empire.

Until the middle of the 19th century, the national movement of the Eastern Slavs in the Austrian Empire cannot be considered as an independent socio-political factor. We can only talk about the modest achievements of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church and the emerging Ruthenian intelligentsia in the field of public education, as well as in the development of local writing and literature. For the few (due to the low level of literacy) Rusyn readers, liturgical and other literature was published under the patronage of the Uniate Church in the so-called “Slavic Russian” language. It was an adverb that had little in common with the living speech of the Rusyns; in fact, it was a Church Slavonic language interspersed with local vocabulary, which activists of the Ukrainian national movement later called “paganism.” The first Galician publicists and educators emerged from among priests and theologians.

In 1836, Markian Shashkevich, who studied at the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv, wrote a treatise in which he argued that Rusyn texts should be written in Cyrillic, and criticized attempts to use the Latin alphabet for this purpose, guided by the rules of Polish orthography. Shashkevich together with Ivan Vagilevich and Yakov Golovatsky (the so-called “ ruska", or " Galician triytsya") published a collection " Mermaid Dnistrovaya" It included folk songs, ballads, Shashkevich's own stories and translations from Serbian and Czech. This was the first publication in a language close to the spoken Ruthenian (Western Ukrainian) dialects and using not the Church Slavonic alphabet, but the secular Cyrillic script (“citizen”). In general, the question of codifying local dialects and creating on their basis literary language figures of the national revival in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia considered it one of the most important until the end of the 19th century.

The revolution of 1848–1849 gave a strong impetus to the national movements of all peoples under Habsburg rule. In March 1848, as a result of mass protests in Vienna, the regime of Chancellor Clemens Metternich was overthrown. The unrest spread to the provinces. Galician Poles created Radu Narodov(National Council), which demanded broad autonomy from the imperial government. The hierarchs of the Greek Catholic Church and the small Ruthenian intelligentsia saw the rise of the Polish movement in Galicia as a threat to their interests. By that time, very tense relations had developed between the Polish and Rusyn populations in this province - however, the reasons for the tension were more social than national. When an uprising inspired by Polish revolutionaries from the nobility broke out in Krakow in 1846, the surrounding Galician peasants rose up against the landowners, finding themselves actually allies of the Austrian government. The Galician Massacre claimed the lives of more than two thousand Polish landowners and their families. In some districts, for example Tarnovsky, almost 90% of estates were looted and burned. The authorities punished the particularly cruel participants in this “jaquerie,” but some of its leaders received incentives and even awards.

The Habsburg government made it clear that it was ready to use the national and social contradictions in Galicia in its political interests. The governor of Galicia, Count Franz Stadion, trying to prevent Galicia from becoming a “Polish Piedmont” - a springboard from which the restoration of an independent Polish state could begin, encouraged the Ruthenian movement. As the Ukrainian-Canadian historian Orest Subtelny notes, the Stadium “ attracted and supported in every possible way... the timid Western Ukrainian elite, hoping to use it as a counterbalance to the more aggressive Poles". Not without his support, the Golovna Ruska Rada (Main Rusyn Council) was created, headed by the Greek Catholic Bishop Grigory Yakhimovich. The newspaper “Zorya Galitska” began publishing in Lviv. On May 15, 1848, she published an appeal from the Rada, which supported the constitutional reform of Emperor Ferdinand I. The appeal put forward demands for administrative autonomy and the free development of national culture and language for the Rusyns of Galicia - “ part of the great Ruthenian (Russian) people, who speak the same language and number 15 million people» .

The Manifesto of the Head Rada is considered the first official document that promotes the idea of ​​a commonality between the Ruthenian population of the Habsburg monarchy and the people of Ukraine-Little Russia, which was part of the Russian Empire. But neither in this nor in subsequent documents and publications of the Rada, which existed until 1851, will we find the names “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians”. The leaders of the Rada carefully emphasized that they represented only Rusyns, Ruthenen, a people different from the Russians ( Russen), and from the Poles, giving no reason to suspect the East Slavic population of the provinces bordering Russia of either irredentism or support for the Polish movement. Simultaneously with the Rada, the Russian Cathedral arose in Galicia, an organization that promoted the idea of ​​close Rusyn-Polish cooperation, effectively declaring the Rusyns Poles professing Catholicism of the Eastern (Greek) rite. The organ of the Council - the newspaper "Rusky Diary" - was edited by one of the members of the "Galician Trinity" Ivan Vagilevich. The cathedral, which, however, did not receive such popularity as the Rada, was supported by the Poles.

Representatives of the Golovnaya Rada, where the hierarchs of the Uniate Church predominated, also resorted to religious argumentation when defining Rusyn identity. They emphasized that, despite their common cultural roots and linguistic proximity, the Rusyns should not be identified with Russians (Great Russians) - adherents of Orthodoxy, i.e., in the eyes of Catholics and Uniates, “schismatics.” The interests of the Rusyns for the time being coincided with the interests of Vienna - perhaps that is why the Habsburg policy towards them was quite liberal. In 1847, 32 Rusyn publications were published in Galicia, in 1848 - already 156 (however, this record was not broken over the next 30 years). In addition to “Dawn of Galicia,” which was published until 1857, other Rusyn periodicals began to be published. The network of Rusyn primary schools grew rapidly, and a department of Rusyn language and literature was opened at the Faculty of Philosophy of Lviv University.

During the revolution of 1848-1849, the Ruthenian population remained loyal to the Habsburg monarchy. Pro-Russian sentiments spread among some of the Rusyns after troops sent by Nicholas I to help Franz Joseph I to suppress the Hungarian revolution arrived in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia. However, the enthusiasm with which local residents greeted the Russian army did not prevent the famous Ruthenian activist from Transcarpathia, Adolf Dobryansky, who was elected to the Hungarian parliament in 1848, from resolutely rejecting accusations of pan-Slavism. " Hungarian freedom is dearer to us than Russian autocracy, just as the mild climate of Hungary is preferable to the Siberian winter", he said. The gradually harsh policy of the Hungarian authorities aimed at assimilating ethnic minorities - both during the revolution of 1848–1849 and after the formation of the dual Austria-Hungary in 1867 - alienated some leaders of the Rusyn national movement from Budapest, making them convinced Russophiles (the same Dobryansky later emigrated to Russia). At the same time, the Magyaron direction was also growing stronger, whose supporters considered the assimilation of the Rusyns as a way to join the more developed Hungarian culture and had nothing against their people turning into “Hungarians of the Greek Catholic faith.”

So, the revolutionary upsurge of 1848–1849 contributed to the fact that the cultural and educational activities of the Rusyn intelligentsia of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia took organizational form and turned into a national-political movement. Two currents competed in it: one was loyal to the Habsburgs, the other, “Muscovophile,” was oriented toward Russia. (The Polonophilia of the activists of the “Russian Cathedral” gradually almost disappeared.) By the 70-80s, Ukrainophile views began to quickly spread among Rusyn activists, especially among young people. Representatives of this trend were called “narodovtsy”. Rejecting the possibility of a compromise with the Galician Poles, they could not accept the main ideologeme of the “Muscovophiles,” who considered the Rusyns to be part of the Russian people. The “Narodovtsy” identified the local Rusyns with the Little Russian Ukrainians, insisting that both were a single ethnic group, which differed in language and culture from the Russian. Now the formation of the Rusyn national identity depended on the success of the implementation of one or another national-political project. Each of these projects was based on a certain - Russian or Ukrainian - interpretation of the origin of the Rusyns and their ethnocultural identity.

The national policy of the Habsburg government, as well as the policy of Tsarist Russia in relation to the Ukrainian national movement that arose in Little Russia, also had a noticeable influence on the competition between the “Muscovophiles” and the “Narodovtsy”. At the beginning of his reign, Alexander II adhered to a moderately liberal course and did not seriously oppress Little Russian “Ukrainophiles.” But later, after the defeat of the January uprising of 1863–1864, which engulfed not only the Kingdom of Poland, but also part of the territory of Lithuania and Belarus, St. Petersburg switched to harsh repressive measures against activists who promoted the Ukrainian language and culture. In 1876, the “Ems Decree” was issued, prohibiting the publication of literature in the Ukrainian language on the territory of the empire. However, "p The authorities' policy on the Ukrainian issue suffered from the absence of any substantial activity of a non-repressive nature. The authorities failed to establish an effective system of primary education in Russian and effectively use other assimilation tools available to them". Since the Russification measures were not very successful, the social base of the Ukrainian movement on the territory of the empire could not be eliminated.

The repressive course of the Russian government contributed to the fact that the center of the Ukrainian national movement moved to Galicia. Over the years, such figures as Mikhail Drahomanov, Mikhail Grushevsky and Dmitry Dontsov, in particular, moved there. As Drahomanov noted in his “Letters to Naddniepryansk Ukraine”, “ Russian Ukrainians enter into closer ties with Austrian ones, appear in Bukovina and Hungarian Rus' (Transcarpathia), where no Ukrainophile had ever set foot before, Ukrainian libraries are created in Vienna, in Chernivtsi, numerous Ukrainian books are brought into Hungarian Rus', where no one has seen them before". The fairly liberal policy of the Austrian authorities does not prevent the emergence of Ukrainian educational and scientific societies (Prosvita, Taras Shevchenko Society), which are rapidly expanding the range of their activities. Cooperatives and mutual lending societies appear. Thus, by 1906, the Lviv society “Prosvita” had 39 branches in Eastern Galicia. From 1869 to 1914, it opened 1,700 reading rooms and published 82 book titles with a total circulation of 655 thousand copies.

In the last years of the 19th century, the growing Galician Ukrainophilism took on distinctly leftist, socialist tones, which added to its popularity, mainly among the intelligentsia and youth. In 1890, the Ukrainian Radical Party emerged, among the founders of which was the classic of Ukrainian literature Ivan Franko. Five years later, one of the activists of this party, Yulian Bachynsky, published his essay “Ukraine irredenta” (“Independent Ukraine”), in which for the first time the idea of ​​political independence of the Ukrainian people was openly proclaimed. Baczynski states that this idea " gains support among the Galician-Ukrainian intelligentsia and proletariat". The work of Bachynsky - by the way, who called himself a Marxist - is assessed by many today's Ukrainian historians as " one of the bricks that should form the basis of the state building of Ukraine, creatively used during the formation of a sovereign Ukrainian state in modern conditions". In 1900, a brochure by a native of Ukraine-Little Russia, Russian subject Nikolai Mikhnovsky “Independent Ukraine” was published in Lvov, which put forward a radical program for the creation of “ one, united, indivisible, free, independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus» .

The ideas of creating an independent Ukrainian state threatened the integrity of both the Romanov empire and the Habsburg monarchy, so they could not help but worry not only the Russians, but also the Austrian authorities. But still, for St. Petersburg, the spread of these ideas posed a much greater danger than for Vienna, if only because the Russian Empire contained a much larger part of the lands with a Ukrainian population than part of Austria-Hungary. Note that, unlike Russia, in the Habsburg monarchy, at least in the Austrian part of it, which included Galicia and Bukovina, there was no dominant, “titular” ethnic group; the ruling dynasty, German in language and culture, associated itself not with the Germans or any other people of the empire, but with the empire as a whole. The national policy of the Habsburg authorities (in “greater” Austria, but not in Hungary!) was not repressive, but at the same time Vienna skillfully played on the contradictions between the Polish and Ukrainian national movements.

In Russia, both in the ruling circles of the empire, and among part of the Russian public, under the last three tsars “ the opinion was widespread that the state bureaucracy (primarily in the western regions of the empire. - Ya. Sh.) called upon to constantly fulfill the mission of defender of the Russian people from the threat of denationalization and economic exploitation by the Poles, Germans and other peoples". Since Ukrainians and Belarusians, according to the official ideology, were also considered part of the Russian people, the “fight against denationalization” in Ukrainian and Belarusian lands often turned into Russification. As already mentioned, the assimilation policy of the Russian authorities was neither flexible nor consistent. Therefore, it was doomed to failure - despite the fact that the “enemy” was not so terrible: both the Ukrainian and Belarusian national movements until the beginning of the twentieth century were represented by relatively small groups of local intelligentsia and youth of various ranks. The question of awakening the national self-awareness of the peasant majority, whether a national identity would be formed on the basis of a local or regional one, still remained open.

Both Ukrainophilism and Russophilism in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia became factors in the internal politics of not only the Habsburg Empire, but also the Russian Empire. As relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary deteriorated (mainly due to the clash of their interests in the Balkans), both powers had to increasingly reckon with these trends. At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the vast majority of Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainophiles were loyal to the Austrian authorities and the imperial house. Their nearest political purpose was the provision of administrative and cultural autonomy the eastern part of Galicia, where the Rusyn population predominated, and they still considered the local Poles their main enemy. As the American historian Timothy Snyder rightly notes, “ For Ukrainian activists, Poles were models, rulers and rivals. The example is how they managed to achieve significant autonomy within Austria. Rulers - because... power was concentrated in their hands: more than 90 percent of the highest administrative posts in Galicia were in the hands of the Poles. They were rivals as Polish political forces associated with modern nationalism, such as the National Democrats, sought to spread Polish culture as a single national culture throughout Galicia» .

Ivan Franko insisted that the Poles " must once and for all abandon the idea of ​​recreating “historical” Poland on non-Polish lands and accept, as we do, the idea of ​​ethnic Poland". This was not easy to achieve, since in 1867-70 the imperial government made several important concessions to the Galician Poles, uniting the western part of Galicia (where the Polish population predominated) with the eastern part (with a predominance of Rusyns) and approved a number of measures that included the Polonization of the higher education system in the province. Since 1869, Polish has enjoyed official status in Galicia ( Landesprache). Since, until the beginning of the twentieth century, the political interests of the Galician Poles were represented by people from the ranks of the large landed aristocracy, “socially close” to the imperial court and the Austrian aristocrats, Polish political influence in Vienna was incomparably stronger than the Ruthenian.

The Ukrainian movement in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia had another notable rival: the Russophile movement in these provinces numbered thousands of activists in its ranks and had its own network of scientific and educational societies and cultural centers. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the influence of supporters of “paganism” with its Church Slavonic basis was still strong among Russophiles, but gradually most of them tended to use the Russian language, at least in written texts. The Austrian authorities treated “Muscophiles” much harsher than they treated Ukrainian activists, seeing them as agents of Russian influence. Indeed, St. Petersburg provided support to Russophile circles in Galicia - in particular, by financing the newspaper “Slovo” published in Lvov. However, we must follow the Russian historian Alexei Miller in recognizing that “ high-ranking officials... the newspaper was expected not so much to strengthen Russian influence in Galicia, but to counteract Ukrainophilia in the South-Western region... Plans for the annexation of Galicia never completely disappeared from the agenda in St. Petersburg, but it would be a mistake to believe that they were a priority and that Russia was ready to take advantage of any opportunity to implement them» .

Repressions against Russophiles, in particular the trial of several pro-Russian activists in Galicia in the early 80s, and a significant intensification of Ukrainophilia (“ people's art") led to a gradual weakening of the “Muscovophile” orientation in the Rusyn movement. Many pro-Russian Galicians emigrated to Russia, while Ukrainophiles, on the contrary, moved from Little Russia to Galicia, joining the local Ukrainian national movement. And although right up to the First World War “Muscovophilism” remained a noticeable factor in the life of the region, already from the beginning of the twentieth century, and especially after 1907, when universal suffrage was introduced in Galicia, the “Muscovophiles” in their opposition to the “Narodovtsy” were forced to seek allies. These allies sometimes turned out to be unexpected: for example, during the election campaign of 1907–1908, activists from pro-Russian circles in Galicia collaborated with Polish national democrats and the local conservative Polish administration.

It should be noted, however, that the severity of the national question in Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia was not the same. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, a harmonious balance gradually emerged in Bukovina between various ethnic communities. This provision was reinforced by the electoral reform of 1911, according to which each community was ensured proportional representation in the local legislative assembly (not counting seats "up for grabs" in free general elections). The Bukovinian electoral system was considered as a possible solution model national problems in other multi-ethnic provinces of Austria-Hungary.

In Transcarpathia, the national identity of the Rusyns was seriously threatened by the Magyarization policy pursued by the Hungarian government and supported by the Magyarons. If in 1907 there were 23 in Transcarpathia primary schools with education only in the Rusyn language, then the very next year they were all closed, only 34 bilingual (Rusyn-Hungarian) schools remained. Otherwise, the education system was completely Magyarized. Since 1898, the loyalist People's Committee of Hungarians of the Greek Catholic confession operated in Budapest. But along with the movements of Magyaron, pro-Russian and Ukrainophile orientations in Transcarpathia, there were also supporters of the independent identity of local Rusyns, which was not identical with either Great Russian, Ukrainian, or Hungarian. One of the leaders of this movement, Augustin Voloshin, complained in 1909 that “ the terrible ills of Ukrainianism and radicalism that spread in Galicia led to a schism and alienated the Ruthenian from his church, his language and even from the Ruthenian name itself» .

In Galicia, at the beginning of 1908, the results of elections to the local legislative assembly (Landtag, or Diet) were announced, bringing unexpected success to Russophile parties - despite the fact that a few months earlier, Ukrainophiles won a landslide victory in the elections to the Imperial Council (Reichsrat). Activists of the Ukrainian movement accused the authorities of falsifying the voting results. The conflict turned into a tragedy: on April 12, 1908, Ukrainian student Miroslav Sichinsky shot and killed the imperial governor in Galicia, the Polish aristocrat Andrzej Potocki. Interethnic and political tension in the region grew. This was also facilitated by the further deterioration of relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia after the Bosnian crisis of 1908–1909. The Ukrainian movement in Galicia increasingly shifted to anti-Russian and at the same time loyalist, pro-Habsburg positions. Its leaders hoped that the victory of Austria-Hungary, allied with Germany, in a possible war against Russia could lead to the formation of a Ukrainian state - or, at least, to the granting of broad national autonomy to the Ukrainians under the scepter of the Habsburgs. Therefore, the statement adopted in December 1912 following a meeting of representatives of Ukrainian political forces in Galicia directly stated: “ In the name of the future of the Ukrainian people on both sides of the border, in the event of war between Austria and Russia, the entire Ukrainian community will unanimously and decisively side with Austria against the Russian Empire as the greatest enemy of Ukraine» .

Before the war, the pro-Russian movement also intensified. In response, the Austrian-Hungarian authorities intensified their persecution. At the beginning of 1914, several Rusyn activists of the “Muscovophile” trend appeared in court in Hungary. The well-known Russian Duma politician, representative of the right, Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, acted as one of the defense witnesses at the trial. He used his trip to support Russophile sentiments in Austria-Hungary and to popularize the Russian position on the issue of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia. In an interview with one of the French newspapers, Bobrinsky stated that among the Rusyns “ no need for propaganda. They themselves know that they are Russian". Of course, this was not entirely true: a certain part of the Rusyn population really considered themselves Russians, but no less a smaller proportion identified themselves with Ukrainians; finally, there were many who had not yet decided on ethnic self-identification. Actually, one of the main problems of national self-determination of the indigenous population of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia was precisely that this process was extremely politicized and complicated by the intervention of both the Austrian and Hungarian political elites, and Russia, i.e. forces external to the region. All this ultimately led to the tragedy that took place here during the First World War.

In 1914–1916, Galicia became one of the main theaters of military operations. In August–September 1914, an attempt by the Austro-Hungarian offensive deep into Russian territory floundered, then Russian troops launched a counterattack, as a result of which they occupied most of Galicia and Bukovina. The Russian occupation administration limited teaching in the Ukrainian language, took certain measures against Ukrainian activists and against the Uniate Church, which was seen as a conductor of Austrian influence. In particular, the Greek Catholic metropolitan, outstanding church and cultural figure Andrei Sheptytsky was interned and then deported to Russia, where he remained until the spring of 1918. However, the repressive measures applied by Russia cannot be compared with the persecution to which the Austro-Hungarian authorities subjected true and imaginary “Muscophiles.” Waves of repression swept through Galicia, Bukovina and (to a lesser extent) Transcarpathia, first during the retreat of the Habsburg troops, and then after, with the support of its German ally, Austria-Hungary in 1915 ousted the Russians from most of the territory they had occupied the year before. Hundreds of death sentences were carried out by courts-martial for collaborating with Russian troops and the administration. Thousands of people, including the elderly, women and children, were deported to the concentration camps Thalerhof (in the area of ​​Graz in Austria) and Theresienstadt (now Terezin in the Czech Republic). According to various sources, from 15 to 30 thousand people were kept in Talerhof in 1914–1917, at least three thousand prisoners died. It was only in May 1917 that the new Emperor Charles I, to his credit, ordered the closure of the Thalerhof camp, which had tarnished the reputation of the Habsburg monarchy in the last years of its existence.

The events of the first two years of the First World War had a profound negative impact on Rusyn (Western Ukrainian) society. Repressions, both Austro-Hungarian and Russian, were accompanied not just by mutual attacks by Ukrainophile and Russophile activists, but by the mass surrender of national-political opponents to the military authorities of the opposing powers. In 1915, along with the retreating Russian troops, active “Muscovophiles” with their families also left Galicia and Bukovina - more than 25 thousand people in total. Austro-Hungarian repressions completed the job: the pro-Russian political movement in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia practically disappeared. Of course, the revolutionary events of 1917 and subsequent years in Russia also played a role here: the Orthodox Romanov empire ceased to exist, and with it the political and cultural center of attraction for Galician and Bukovinian Russophiles disappeared, because Bolshevik Russia evoked completely different feelings...

As for the Ukrainian movement in Galicia and Bukovina, it very actively contributed to the war efforts of the Habsburg monarchy. Already in the first days of the war in Lvov, with the permission of the Austrian authorities, a Head of Ukrainian Rada(Main Ukrainian Council). At the same time, a group of Ukrainian activists - emigrants from the Russian Empire - organized the Union of Liberation of Ukraine (SVU, Union for the Liberation of Ukraine). In May 1915, the Golovna Rada was transformed into the Zahalna Ukrainian Rada (General Ukrainian Council), which included 24 representatives of Galicia, 7 of Bukovina and 3 activists of the Ukrainian Foreign Army. The leading role in the Rada was played by members of the Austrian Parliament Kost Levitsky and Mykola Vasilko. The maximum program that guided these figures was formulated in one of the Ukrainian propaganda brochures published in Vienna in 1915: “ All Ukrainians, who are not silenced by the fist of the Russian autocracy, spoke out in favor of the creation or restoration of an independent Ukrainian state. (...) It is clear that at the moment of the collapse of Russia an independent Ukrainian state would arise. Ukraine is too large to be annexed to Austria or another state". At the call of the Rada, the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen was created, which fought as part of the 25th Corps of the Austro-Hungarian Army. About 28 thousand volunteers registered to join the “Sich”, but the Austrian command limited their number to only two and a half thousand.

Main rivals Ukrainian nationalists activists of the Polish national movement spoke. The Poles blocked the Ukrainian demand for the division of Galicia and granting its eastern part broad autonomy. The Polish elite of Galicia pinned hopes for the restoration of independent Poland on the expected victory of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Indeed, starting in 1915, when German troops occupied most of the Kingdom of Poland, which was part of the Russian Empire, the leaders of the Central Powers bloc discussed the issue of the future structure of the Polish state. It was possible that it would be ruled by a monarch from the Habsburg or Hohenzollern dynasty. The restoration of the Kingdom of Poland was officially announced by a joint Austro-German manifesto on November 5, 1916. The decision on the borders of this state and who would lead it was postponed until the post-war period. A day earlier, Franz Joseph I signed a decree granting autonomy to Galicia - without dividing it, which meant consolidating the political dominance of the Poles throughout the province.

Vienna's decision sparked violent protests from Ukrainian activists. It's already November 6th Zagalna Ukrainian Rada adopted a resolution expressing dissatisfaction with the fact that the conditions for granting autonomy were not discussed with representatives of the Ukrainian people and that the government broke promises made to a number of Galician-Ukrainian leaders that Galicia would be divided into two provinces. The Zagalna Rada proclaimed that from now on, in order to achieve its political goals, the Ukrainian movement in Austria-Hungary would rely primarily on its own forces. There were changes in the leadership of the Rada: it was headed by K. Levitsky’s rival, Evgen Petrushevich. In the last two years of the Habsburg monarchy, the Ukrainian movement gradually radicalized. This is noticeable, first of all, in the speeches of the Galician-Ukrainian deputies of the Reichsrat, reconvened by the young Emperor Charles I in the spring of 1917. However, the complete break between the Ukrainophiles and Vienna occurred only when the Habsburg monarchy actually ceased to exist.

On November 7 (20), 1917, the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) was proclaimed in Kyiv, initially as an autonomous one within Russia. On January 25, 1918, the government of the republic, the Central Rada, announced the complete independence of Ukraine. In March 1918, the Bolshevik government of Russia concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Bloc powers. Article 6 of this treaty meant recognition of the independence of the newly formed Ukrainian state, although de facto the Rada only partially controlled the territory it claimed. The position of Ukrainian activists in Austria-Hungary became somewhat ambiguous: after all, Eastern Galicia, the most important center of the Ukrainian national movement, remained part of the Habsburg monarchy, whose authorities did not consider the possibility of transferring this province to Ukraine. Many Galician figures flocked to the UPR to take part in the work of its state institutions. However, the vicissitudes of the military-political struggle led to a split in the Ukrainian movement. Thus, the “Sich Riflemen” supported the Central Rada in the fight against the pro-German regime of Hetman Skoropadsky, who came to power in the spring of 1918 (apparently, the author, firstly, confuses the Austrian “Ukrainian Sich Riflemen” and the “Kiev” “Sich Riflemen”, created under the Central Rada from Austro-Hungarian volunteer prisoners of war. Secondly, the author may be confusing the events of the “Hetman’s Coup” “in April 1918, during which the entire Ukrainian Kiev garrison was disarmed, including the “Sich”, and the “Uprising of the Directory” in the fall of the same year, supported by the “Sich Riflemen” restored by the hetman - Dmitry Adamenko). Later, during the Civil War in Ukraine, units that had experience in combat operations as part of the Austro-Hungarian army turned out to be perhaps the most combat-ready formations of the troops of the Directory - the Ukrainian government led by Simon Petliura, which waged war simultaneously with the Bolsheviks, White Guards and - until the spring 1920 - with Poland.

In the fall of 1918, when defeat in the war and internal crisis led to the uncontrollable collapse of Austria-Hungary, Ukrainian activists in Galicia were ready to take power in the province. On November 1, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUNR) was proclaimed in Lviv, which was to include not only Eastern Galicia, but also part of Bukovina and Transcarpathia. In the future, the reunification of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic with the Ukrainian People's Republic was envisaged. This caused fierce opposition from the Poles, who wanted to include all of Galicia in the new independent Poland. The Polish-Ukrainian war began, which lasted several months. It claimed the lives of a total of about 25 thousand people. As a result of the fighting of 1918-1920 and the redistribution of territories following three wars - the First World War, the Civil War and the Soviet-Polish War, Galicia and part of Bukovina became part of Poland, the other part of Bukovina went to Romania, and Transcarpathia to Czechoslovakia. In 1940, Transcarpathia was briefly annexed to Hungary, and after World War II and a new revision of borders in Central and Eastern Europe, almost all Ruthenian (Western Ukrainian) lands that were under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before 1918 became part of the Ukrainian SSR. But these events are beyond the scope of this article.

Staying under the scepter of the Habsburgs, in their multinational and multicultural empire, had a great influence on the development of the Ukrainian national movement and identity. But it would hardly be correct to consider the formation of the Ukrainian nation as a process with a predetermined result. A modern nation, according to M. Groch’s definition, is “ a large community of people, equal to each other and connected by a combination of connections that were often formed over centuries - linguistic, cultural, political, geographical, economic, etc. X" . The Ukrainian nation was not something given in advance - it is wrong to think that in order to “awaken” the corresponding identity among millions of people, only the efforts of a small group of nationally oriented activists were required. “Project Ukraine” was formed in the process of transition from a traditional agrarian society to a society modern type on a vast culturally and historically heterogeneous territory, which, moreover, from the second half of the 17th century was under the rule of several powers: the Moscow State and its successor - the Russian Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburg Empire.

It so happened that it was on the territory of the latter that in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries conditions developed that were most favorable for the development of the Ukrainian national movement. Ukrainian identity competed with alternative national-cultural and state-political projects: Little Russian regional identity within the framework of the “all-Russian” national and state identity; its mirror image - Ukrainian identity within the framework of the “all-Polish” identity; Russian identity for the Rusyns of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia and, finally, an independent Rusyn identity, different from both Polish and Russian, and from Ukrainian. That the Ukrainian version of nation-building was the most successful was the result of a combination of a number of historical factors. A special role was played by the combination of the moderate national policy of the Habsburgs in Galicia and the tough one of the Romanovs in Ukraine-Little Russia.

Participation in political life Austria-Hungary at the level of the Reichsrat, the legislative assemblies of Galicia and Bukovina, and local governments allowed representatives of the Ukrainian national movement and their electorate to gain valuable democratic experience. But we should not forget that the Austrian authorities skillfully used the principle of “divide and conquer.” The national policy of the Habsburgs, on the one hand, contributed to the growth of interethnic tensions in relations between Ukrainians and Poles, on the other hand, it did not interfere with the fierce struggle of Ukrainophiles and Russophiles in the Rusyn movement (while the authorities supported the former). During the First World War and later, simmering conflicts that arose in previous decades led to tragedies. During the Second World War, Western Ukraine became notorious not only for the genocide of Jews, which was carried out by the Nazi occupiers and their local accomplices, but also for the fierce confrontation between the partisans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Polish Home Army, during which both sides, but primarily the UPA, resorted to ethnic purges. The tragic final chord was the first post-war years, when the west of the Ukrainian SSR and the south-east of Poland turned into an arena of mass repressions and deportations organized by the new communist authorities.

The turbulent history of the region after 1918 largely contributed to the fact that the Habsburg era, with its long decades of peace, progressive economic development (although Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia were among the least developed provinces of the empire) and relative internal political stability, became in the historical memory of the inhabitants of what is now Western Ukraine a kind of “golden age”. The Habsburg heritage of Ukraine, however, does not need idealization, but a thorough and, if possible, unbiased study. Of course, it has some influence on current situation in the west of Ukraine, determining political preferences, socio-psychological stereotypes and cultural specifics of the region. Without much exaggeration, we can say that the diversity and diversity of modern Ukraine brings it closer to the long-vanished Danube monarchy. Time will tell whether today's Ukrainians will be able to preserve this diversity without sacrificing national-state unity. In any case, residents of both the west and east of Ukraine should remember the simple and wise motto inscribed on the coat of arms of Franz Joseph I - “Viribus unitis” (“United efforts”).

Notes

Although in 1809 the northwestern regions of Galicia were included in the Duchy of Warsaw created by Napoleon, and in 1815, by decision of the Congress of Vienna, into the Kingdom of Poland, which became part of the Russian Empire, the Habsburgs retained most of the territory of the province.

Quote by: Magenschab H. Josef II. Revolucionar Bozi merci. Praha, 1999. S. 104.

However, it was not exclusively Magyar in linguistic terms: until 1844 in Hungary, Latin remained the main language of legal proceedings, parliamentary debates, administrative acts, etc. The first one was written in this language treatise, dedicated to the Slavs of Transcarpathia, is a treatise by the court librarian A.F. Kollar “On the origin, history and life of the Rusyns of Hungary” (1749).

Grokh M. From national movements to a fully formed nation: the process of nation-building in Europe // Nations and Nationalism. M.: Praxis, 2002. P. 123.

Herberstein S. Notes on Muscovy. M.: Moscow State University Publishing House, 1988. P. 58.

The question of the origin of the names “Russia”, “Ukraine”, “Russians”, “Little Russians”, “Ukrainians”, etc., as well as the historical, political and ideological vicissitudes that accompanied the use of these historical and geographical concepts and ethnonyms, is discussed in detail. for example, in the monograph: Mylnikov A.S. Picture of the Slavic World: A View from Eastern Europe. Ideas about ethnic nomination and ethnicity of the 16th–18th centuries. St. Petersburg: Petersburg Oriental Studies, 2000.

For more information about the role of the Uniate Church, see, for example, in the article: Khimka I. P. Religion and nationality in Ukraine in the other half of the 18th-20th century // Ark. Scientific collection of church history. Lviv, 2004. T. 4. pp. 55–66.

See: Wandycz P. S. The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918. Seattle & London, 1996. P. 135.

Piedmont is a historical region that played a leading role in the unification of Italy.

Subtelny O. Ukraine: history. Kiev, 1993. Quoted. from: http://www.unitest.com/uahist/subtelny/s53.phtml.

Quote by: Levitsky K. History of the political thoughts of Galician Ukrainians, 1848-1914. Lviv, 1926. Part I. P. 21.

Irredentism is the desire of an ethnocultural minority to reunite with the ethnic community living on the other side of the border, which in many cases is the titular ethnic group for the neighboring side.

Magocsi P. R. A History of Ukraine. Seattle, 1998. P. 413.

Pop I. Podkarpatska Rus. Praha, 2005. S. 78.

Western outskirts of the Russian Empire / Ed. M. Dolbilov, A. Miller. M.: NLO, 2006. P. 284.

Drahomanov M. Leaves to the Nadnipryansk Ukraine. Colomia, 1894. Quote. from: www.ukrstor.com/ukrstor/dragomanov_listy4.htm.

Magocsi P. R. Op. cit. P. 442.

Ukrainian Suspil-Political Thought in the 20th Century / Ed. T. Hunchak, R. Solchanik. New York, 1983. T. I. P. 33.

Yarty A. Ukrainian national idea in the scientific-theoretical decline of Julian Bachynsky // Bulletin of Lviv University. Series: philosophy. Sciences. 2002. VIP. 4. P. 318.

Mikhnovsky M. Independent Ukraine. Lviv, 1900. Quote. from: http://www.ukrstor.com/ukrstor/mihnowskij-samostijnaukraina.html

Since 1867, the Habsburg Empire was divided into two parts, which enjoyed great independence in internal affairs: the Kingdom of Hungary (“the lands of the crown of St. Stephen”) and the “lands represented in the Imperial Council,” popularly called Cisleithania (i.e., “by this side of Leith" - a river that divided both halves of the empire on one of the sections of the border) or - conditionally - "Austria". The “lands represented in the Imperial Council” included, in addition to Austria itself, also Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, Bukovina, present-day Slovenia and some other territories. Both parts of the empire, in addition to the person of the monarch, were united by a single army and foreign policy.

Novak A. The struggle for the outskirts, the struggle for survival: the Russian Empire of the 19th century. and Poles, Poles and Empire (review of modern Polish historiography) // Western outskirts of the Russian Empire. P. 457.

Snyder T. The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. New Haven & London, 2003. P. 127.

Quote from: Rudnytsky I. L. The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule // Austrian History Yearbook. 1967. Vol. 3. Pt. 2. P. 407.

Thus, the Polish aristocrat, governor of Galicia (1888), Count K. Badeni, held the post of prime minister of the Austrian part of the dual monarchy in 1895-1897, and the son of another Galician governor, Count A. Golukhovsky, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1895-1906 Austria-Hungary.

Miller A. “The Ukrainian Question” in the policy of the authorities and Russian public opinion (second half of the 19th century). St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2000. pp. 250–251. Pop I. Op. cit. S. 98.

Magocsi P. R. Op. cit. P. 456.

Annexation by Austria-Hungary in 1908 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been ruled by the Habsburg monarchy since 1878, while nominally remaining Ottoman Empire, caused a diplomatic crisis on a European scale.

Levitsky K. History of the political thoughts of Galician Ukrainians, 1848-1914. Lviv, 1927. Part II. P. 634.

Quote from: Susta J. Svetova politika v letech 1871-1914. Praha, 1931. Sv. 6. S. 305.

For more information about Thalerhof, see, for example: War crimes of the Habsburg Monarchy 1914-1917: Galician Golgotha. Trumbull, Conn., 1964; Vavrik V. R. Terezin and Talerhof. New York, 1966; Cervinka V. Moje rakouske zalare. Praha, 1928; Kwilecki A. Lemkowie: Zagadnienie Migracji i Asymilacji. Warszawa, 1974, etc.

Levitsky subsequently described in detail the activities of Ukrainian organizations in Austria-Hungary in his multi-volume work: Levitsky K. History of free liberation of Galician Ukrainians during the hour of the World War. Lviv, 1929-1930.

Tsegelsky L. Independent Ukraine. Viden, 1915. S. 4, 9.

For more details, see: Abbott P., Pinak E. Ukrainian Armies 1914-1955. Oxford, 2004. P. 7-8.

See, for example: Zahradnicek T. Jak vyhrat cizi valku. Cesi, Polaci a Ukrajinci 1914-1918. Praha, 2000. S.61.

Hroch M. Na prahu narodni existence. Praha, 1999. S 8.

Map of the territories claimed by the Western Ukrainian People's Republic

Ternopil (de facto)

Chertkov (de facto)

Stanislav (de facto)

Ukrainian

Form of government

Republic

The president

Evgeniy Petrushevich

Historical period

World War I

- Education

– Polish-Ukrainian War

– Reunion

– Complete conquest

(abbreviated as ZUNR; to November 13, 1918 – Ukrainian State)- a short-term state created in Eastern Galicia after the First World War as a result of the collapse of Austria-Hungary. Proclaimed on October 19, 1918 in Lviv. On November 1, as a result of the First Leaves Uprising, it took control of most of the territories it claimed. On January 22, 1919, it formally united with the Ukrainian People's Republic, receiving the name Western regions of the Ukrainian People's Republic (ZO UPR), which, however, had no practical consequences.
The declaration of independence of the WUNR caused extreme discontent in Poland, which also laid claim to these lands, which resulted in the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-19, which ended in the complete defeat of the Ukrainian and the departure of the WUNR government into exile.
On the eve of the First World War, most of the Ukrainian lands - Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia - were part of Austria-Hungary. When in October 1918, in the context of the military defeat of the Austro-German bloc and the national liberation struggle of the peoples, the Austro-Hungarian Empire broke up into several independent states, and the Ukrainians began to take decisive measures to create their own state on Western Ukrainian lands.
At the end of September 1918, the Ukrainian General Military Commissariat (UGVS) was formed in Lvov, which began work on preparing an armed uprising. In October 1918, the centurion of the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, Dmitry Vitovsky, was appointed chairman of the commissariat.
October 18, 1918 in Lvov at a meeting of all Ukrainian deputies of the Austrian parliament, Ukrainian members of the Galician and Bukovinian Sejms, representatives political parties Galicia and Bukovina, the clergy and students, the Ukrainian National Council (UNRada) was formed - a political representative body of the Ukrainian people in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
On October 19, 1918, the UNRada proclaimed the Ukrainian state throughout the Ukrainian ethnic territory of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia. It was decided to develop a democratic constitution and the president of the Ukrainian National Council was elected, who became Yevgeny Petrushevich.
On October 31, 1918, in Lvov it became known that the Polish Liquidation Commission (created on October 28, 1918 in Krakow) had arrived in the city, which was to take power over Galicia from the Austrian governor - and include it in Poland. UNRada raised the question of transferring full power to it in Galicia and Bukovina to the Austrian government. However, the Austrian governor of Galicia, General K. Guyn, responded with a categorical refusal. Then, at the evening meeting of the UGVS on October 31, 1918, it was decided to take power in Lviv by armed means.
November rank

On the night of October 31 to November 1, 1918, rifle units, led by centurion Dmitry Vitovsky, occupied all the most important government institutions in the city (except for the railway station, which was one of the mistakes and the reason for the loss of Lvov).
On November 9, 1918, the UNRada formed its temporary executive body, which on November 13, 1918 was transformed into a government - the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic-ZO UPR.
On November 13, 1918, the Constitutional foundations of the newly formed state were approved - “Temporary Basic Law on State Independence of the Ukrainian lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy”, according to which it received the name “Western Ukrainian People's Republic" The law defined the territory of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, which included Ukrainian ethnic lands and covered Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia. The territory of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic was 70 thousand square meters. km, population – 6 million people. The state emblem has been approved - the Golden Lion on a blue background, and the flag is blue and yellow. National minorities on the territory of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic were guaranteed equal rights with the Ukrainian population.
Postage stamp ZUNR (May 1919) The Temporary Basic Law of the ZUNR was over time supplemented by a number of laws: on the organization of troops (November 13, 1918), temporary administration (November 15, 1918), temporary organization of judging (November 16 and November 21, 1918), official language(January 1, 1919), education (February 13, 1919), citizenship (April 8, 1919), land reform (April 14, 1919).
After the active foreign policy activities of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, the opening of embassies in Austria, Hungary and Germany and diplomatic missions in Czechoslovakia, Canada, the USA, Brazil, Italy, etc.
Ukrainian-Polish war
The Jewish and German population reacted loyally to the new Ukrainian state, and the Poles began military operations against the Ukrainian government. At the same time, Romanian troops crossed the borders of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic and, despite the resistance of the population, occupied Chernivtsi on November 11, and subsequently the entire Northern Bukovina.
In this building, where now Ternopil ZOSSH No. 4, in November-December 1918, the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (1917-1920) was located. On November 21, 1918, as a result of bloody battles, Polish troops captured Lviv (At Przemysl they were unable to destroy the bridges and Polish troops were able to arrive at the railway station in Lviv). The government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic moved to Ternopil, and from the end of December the UNRada and the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic were located in Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk).
On January 4, 1919, a new government was formed headed by S. Golubovich and the Unradi Division was created (consisted of 9 members) under the leadership of E. Petrushevich.
On December 1, 1918, the Unradi delegation and representatives of the UPR Directory signed in Fastiv a preliminary agreement on the unification of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic and finally approved supreme body State January 3, 1919
On January 22, 1919, the solemn proclamation of the Act of reunification of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia) and the Ukrainian People's Republic (Naddniepryanskaya Ukraine) into a single conciliar Ukrainian People's Republic took place in Kyiv. According to the law “On the form of power in Ukraine”, adopted by the Labor Congress of Ukraine, the WUNR received the name “Western Region of the Ukrainian People’s Republic” (ZO UPR, ZOUNR). Later after signing Warsaw Pact In 1920, the Act of Union between the UPR and Poland was denounced by the authorities of the UPR ZO.
In January-May 1919, despite the constant shortage of weapons, ammunition and ammunition, the Ukrainian Galician Army controlled the situation on the Ukrainian-Polish front and gradually ousted the Polish army from the territory of Galicia.
In mid-February 1919, the UGA began the Vovchukhiv operation. But at the end of February 1919 a successful offensive Ukrainian army was suspended at the request of the Paris Peace Conference, which sent a mission consisting of: chairman - General Berthelemy (France), members - Colonel A. Viyard (Great Britain), Professor Lord (USA) and Colonel Stabil (Italy). The mission demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and proposed a demarcation line between the two sides, on the basis of which 40% of Eastern Galicia (Lviv and the Drohobych oil basin) would go to Poland. The government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic did not accept this proposal, after which hostilities resumed.
On May 13, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente countries made a new attempt to conclude a truce between the warring parties. This time, the proposals of the inter-allied commission, headed by General L. Botha, were accepted by the Ukrainian side. However, the terms of the truce, according to which the Drohobych basin remained with the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, were rejected by the Polish government.
Under these conditions, on May 15, 1919, the 80,000-strong Polish army of General J. Haller, formed and armed in France, was sent to the Ukrainian front in Galicia and Volyn, which (in the plans of the Entente) was intended only to fight against the Bolsheviks.
At the beginning of June 1919, Polish troops captured almost all of Galicia, with the exception of the thorns between the Dniester and the lower Zbruch. In connection with the critical situation of the UPR ZO, on June 9, 1919, the government of S. Golubovich resigned, and the Vydel Unradi transferred full military and civil power to E. Petrushevich, who received the title of dictator of the UPR ZO. To carry out the functions assigned to him, E. Petrushevich created a temporary executive body - the Council of Commissioners of the Dictator and the Military Chancellery. General A. Grekova was appointed the initial leader.
On June 7-28, 1919, the UGA under the command of A. Grekov carried out the Chertkovsky offensive, as a result of which a significant part of Galicia was liberated from Polish troops. However, a shortage of weapons and ammunition forced the UGA to retreat to its old positions during June-July 1919.
July 16-18, 1919 UGA retreated across the river. Zbruch. The territory of the UPR Zone was occupied by Polish troops.
Emigration
From July to November 1919, the seat of the leadership of the UPR ZO was Kamenets-Podolsky.
At the end of November 1919, E. Petrushevich and the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic were forced to move to Vienna, where they continued active international activities to protect the state interests of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic.
The Supreme Council of the Entente on June 25, 1919 (according to other sources, June 29), fearing a Bolshevik offensive across the Zbruch River, agreed to the temporary occupation of Eastern Galicia by Polish troops, leaving legal rights over this territory to the allied states.
On November 21, 1919, under pressure from the Polish side, the “Treaty between the Allied Powers and Poland on Eastern Galicia” was concluded, according to which Galicia was part of the Polish state for 25 years, maintaining the status of territorial autonomy. After this period, the status of these lands must be determined through self-determination of the local population.
On December 8, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente, recognizing the Curzon Line as the eastern border, legally approved the Polish occupation of Ukrainian lands: Kholmshchyna, Lemkivshchyna, Podlasie and Nadsyannya.
The state-legal status of Galicia as a separate entity was recorded in the Peace Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.
During 1920-1923, the government of the WUNR and President E. Petrushevich constantly raised the issue of eliminating the Polish occupation regime on the territory of the republic and restoring the independence of the WUNR to the League of Nations, the High Rada and the Council of Ambassadors of the Entente states. However, the leaders of the Entente countries, interested in the existence of a strong Polish state as a counterweight to Soviet Russia, did not dare to make a fair decision on this problem.
In March 1921, the delegation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (K. Levitsky, E. Breiter, O. Nazaruk, L. Mishuga) expressed a strong protest against the conclusion of the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921.
1921 The Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution on the organization in 1922 of an international conference on the problem of the international legal status of Galicia.
In April-May 1922, the question of the fate of the Ukrainian lands occupied by Poland was discussed at the Genoa Conference.
On March 14, 1923, at a meeting of the Council of Ambassadors of the Entente states, the actual borders of Poland in the East were recognized with the condition of granting autonomy to Eastern Galicia. Trying to change the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky met with Poincare, but to no avail.
On March 15, 1923, the exile government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic ceased to exist.
According to the Austro-Hungarian census of 1910, about 5.4 million people lived in the territory of the proclaimed Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Among them are 3 million 291 thousand (approximately 60%) Ukrainians, 1 million 351 thousand (approximately 25%) Poles, 660 thousand (approximately 12%) Jews. The remainder were Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Gypsies, Armenians and others. Mostly Poles and Jews lived in cities and towns, while in rural areas the absolute majority were Ukrainians. This distribution of residence turned out to be problematic in the future, since the largest city and administrative center of the region, Lviv, which was founded by King Danilo, was predominantly populated at that time by Poles and was considered an important center of Polish culture. The conflict for this city was inevitable.

Despite the fact that Ukrainians formally represent an independent ethnic group, there are still certain differences between Westerners and other representatives of Independence, and often significant ones. These differences are largely due to the influence of other countries with which different regions of Ukraine neighbor.

Language is not the same everywhere

Residents of Lvov and Dnepropetrovsk can be easily distinguished by their dialect - they place different emphasis on the same words, pronouncing them with the intonation characteristic of a particular region: “lystopaAd” and “listOpad”, for a Dnepropetrovsk resident - “we have come”, and for a Lviv resident - "We are Prively." This difference is especially noticeable when using verb forms.

The southeast of Ukraine neighbors Russia, so the Russian language is more popular there. The linguistic palette of residents of the western regions of the country is influenced by the proximity to Moldova, Slovakia, Hungary, Belarus, Romania and Poland. Accordingly, the language of Westerners is replete with words borrowed from these neighbors.

Geography influences character

According to scientists, Ukrainians belong to one anthropological type, but it is divided into several subtypes. According to the Ukrainian scientist Sergei Szegeda, the majority of “average” Ukrainians have a typical appearance, and its “shades” have long been erased historically. However, the psychotypes of residents of different regions of Ukraine still differ.

Southerners are joyful and emotional

Ukrainian psychologist Sergei Steblinsky classified the residents of Square depending on the regions in which they live.

He believes that the character of Ukrainians is seriously influenced by the climate of the area and its location. So, southerners are more joyful and emotional than others. This is noticeable at least in the example of Odessa residents. Southerners living by the sea are witty and enterprising. Moldovans, Romanians and Bulgarians are considered their distant relatives.

Westerners are irreconcilable

Residents of Western Ukraine, living in mountainous areas, have a hardened, persistent character. Highlanders are characterized by intransigence and a keen sense of justice. Outwardly, they differ most from other Ukrainians - Westerners, as a rule, are very short in stature, and their eye color is darker than that of other representatives of the ethnic group. The presumptive ancestors of people from Western Ukraine are Balkan peoples.

Averages are averaged

Residents of the central part of Ukraine have everything that is statistically average, including their appearance. In this habitat, the paths of a variety of tribes crossed at one time, and among the middle peasants there are even descendants of Turkish-speaking peoples.

The population of this area is characterized by a contradictory character, which is characterized by mood swings.

Northerners are gloomy rational skeptics

The cold climate leaves its mark on the character of the inhabitants of the northern regions of Ukraine. Outwardly, they are fair-haired, of medium height, with a massive chin and furrowed eyebrows. The inhabitants of Polesie are descendants of the northern peoples who lived during the Mesolithic and Neolithic eras.

Northerners are emotional, cheerful and determined. These are people with an active lifestyle. Upper Dnieper Ukrainians are considered descendants of the Ilmen-Dnieper peoples who once inhabited the northwestern European part of modern Russia.

Have no illusions - the West and East of Ukraine are different countries

Ukraine is a country of different civilizations.

Second among the former Soviet republics after Russia in terms of population and importance is Ukraine. At various stages of its history, Ukraine was independent, but still for most of modern era she was part of a single political structure, controlled from Moscow. The decisive event occurred in 1654, when the Cossack Bogdan Khmelnitsky, the leader of the uprising against Polish oppression, agreed to swear allegiance to the Tsar in exchange for help in the fight against the Poles. From then until 1991 (apart from a short-lived independence from 1917 to 1920), what is now Ukraine was under the political control of Moscow. However, Ukraine is a divided country with two different cultures. The fault line between civilizations separating the West from Orthodoxy has been running right through its center for several centuries. At various points in the past, western Ukraine was part of Poland, Lithuania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Substantial part its population is adherents of the Uniate Church, which performs Orthodox rites, but recognizes the authority of the Pope. Historically, Western Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian and were quite nationalistic in their views. The population of Eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly Orthodox, and a significant part of it spoke Russian. In the early 1990s, Russians made up up to 22% and Russian speakers 31% of the population of Ukraine. The majority of primary and secondary school students received education in Russian. Crimea is overwhelmingly Russian and was part of the RSFSR until 1954, when Khrushchev, ostensibly in honor of Khmelnitsky's decision 300 years ago, transferred it to Ukraine. The differences between Eastern and Western Ukraine are evident in the views of their populations. For example, at the end of 1992, a third of Russians in Western Ukraine said that they had suffered due to anti-Russian protests, while in Kyiv this share was 10%. This East-West split was most evident in the July 1994 presidential elections. The incumbent president, Leonid Kravchuk, who despite close ties to Russian leaders identified himself as a “national” politician, won twelve regions of western Ukraine with a majority of up to 90%. His opponent Leonid Kuchma, who took lessons in spoken Ukrainian during the election campaign, won thirteen eastern regions with a comparable advantage. Kuchma won with 52% of the vote. It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian public confirmed the choice of Khmelnytsky in 1654 with a very small majority of votes. These elections, as one American expert noted, “reflected and even crystallized the split between the Europeanized Slavs in Eastern Ukraine and the Russian-Slavic vision of what Ukraine should become. It’s not so much ethnic polarization as it is different cultures.”

Two countries - Western and South-Eastern Ukraine. Language Differences.

For the sake of fairness, I took a closer look at the atlas of Associate Professor at the University of Krakow, Dr. W. Kubijovic, dated 1937. Here is the atlas:

The map of dialects widespread on the territory of Ukraine best characterizes the difference between the two completely in different parts- Ukraine, western and south-eastern Ukraine.

On the right, the part of Ukraine is colored red - this is the so-called southeastern dialect, also called South Russian.

As can be seen on the map from the Atlas, on the left, western part of Ukraine, other dialects (Ukrainian) are widespread. I think that smart people have long combined all these dialects into one - the Western Ukrainian dialect. Among the Western Ukrainian dialects, the map shows the Hutsul dialect, Bukovynian, Volyn, Middle Carpathian, Podolian, etc. Among these dialects, the one that is widespread in the South-East is missing. These are two completely different territories - these are different countries. In order to unite and keep these two halves together as a single whole, you need to be Stalin. Do we need it?

There is no need, of course, unless you think about the fact that the time will come when the motley public of the Western regions will stand in line in order for a NATO base or a segment of the missile defense system to be placed on their territory. They will still fight among themselves for this right.

Recent events in Ukraine have shown that there are serious differences and contradictions between the western and eastern parts of the country. We talked about what the two Ukrainian identities are and whether a split of Ukraine into East and West is possible with Alexey Miller, Doctor of Historical Sciences, leading researcher at INION RAS, visiting professor at the Central European University in Budapest.

PROFILE: From what point can we talk about dividing Ukraine into East and West? Since the collapse of Kievan Rus? From the Pereyaslavl Rada? From the section of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth?

Miller: The question is not formulated entirely precisely, because until the beginning of the 20th century there was no Ukraine as such, and, as a consequence, the question of dividing Ukraine itself did not exist. But you identified the key events correctly. The lands on which modern Ukraine is located had a very different and very confusing fate. For example, the so-called Galicia first became part of the Russian Empire during the First World War, when a short time The Russian army occupied this territory. And only later, in 1939, Galicia became part of the Ukrainian SSR. As for Volyn, which today has very similar political preferences to Galicia, it was just part of the Russian Empire and on the eve of the First World War it was a stronghold - you will be surprised! - right-wing Russian nationalism. Organizations such as the “Union of the Russian People” and other Black Hundred structures felt very at ease there. A very important border along the Dnieper arose in the 17th century after the uprising of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, when the left bank of Ukraine, together with Kiev, became part of the Muscovite kingdom, and the right bank remained under the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then, at the end of the 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was divided, as a result of which the right bank joined Russia. But there is also what was called Novorossiya, and is now called Southern Ukraine. Its agricultural development by Russia begins from the second half of the XVIII century, as Crimea came under the control of the Russian Empire. And finally, as a special region, I would highlight Donbass, including Kharkov, which was the capital of Donbass and which entered Ukraine without much desire from the local population after the October Revolution: the Bolsheviks simply believed that it was necessary to balance the “sea of ​​peasants” that spread to the west from Kharkov, by the Donetsk proletariat... So we won’t find a simple answer to your question here.

PROFILE: But when did the differences between the two Ukraines finally take shape?

Miller: The most important period in this sense is the period between the two world wars. On the eve of the First World War, most residents of the territory that we now call Ukraine considered themselves Little Russians. The general meaning of Little Russianism was that Little Russians, along with Great Russians and Belarusians, constituted a large Russian nation. But the Bolsheviks, having come to power, excluded the concept of “Little Russians” as an identification from the census. The first Soviet dictionaries defined Little Russians as “a chauvinistic Great Russian name for Ukrainians.” Starting from the 20s of the 20th century, a policy of Ukrainization was implemented, and thus the Bolsheviks greatly contributed to the formation of the eastern version of Ukrainian identity. On the other side of the border, in interwar Poland, a different Ukrainian identity was being formed - a very militant one, whose main goal was to fight the Poles. But both anti-Soviet (especially after the famine of 1932-1933) and anti-Semitic sentiments were strong in it (partly because, together with the Poles, they perceived the Soviet Union through the “Jewish commune” formula).

PROFILE: What is the difference between the two Ukrainian identities?

Miller: Soviet Ukrainian identity does not see the Russian and Russia as an enemy, but for western Russia today is an enemy, although not the only one. Western sees its main heroes in the OUN and UPA and demonstrates a similar type of political mobilization to them - with a willingness to die for an idea and kill for it. Eastern Ukrainians are accustomed to relying on the mobilization efforts of the authorities; for him, the tradition of struggle is, first of all, together with the Russians in the Great Patriotic War. For the West of Ukraine, Russian culture is foreign, but for the East it is our own. For the East, the main “other” now is the Ukrainian West, and this is perhaps the main result of the events of recent months.

PROFILE: The difference in electoral preferences between East and West is often presented as a manifestation of different political cultures - the more liberal Western and the more authoritarian Eastern. Is it so?

Miller: Indeed, there is an opinion that the main difference between Western Ukrainian identity and Eastern Ukrainian one is that the latter has no experience of democratic development, while the former had such experience both in the Habsburg Empire and then in Poland. However, the movement that Western Ukraine gave rise to before and during World War II was not at all democratic. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) is a revolutionary, nationalist, essentially pro-fascist movement; there was no smell of democracy there. It is clear that Western Ukrainians are politically better mobilized, but there is clearly no need to talk about Western Ukraine as a reservoir of liberalism. If you look at the latest elections to the Rada, the most odious representatives of the Svoboda party won them with a gigantic margin (up to 70%) in two districts in Lviv. As for the “presidential” votes of the East and West, there is no basis for such conclusions. The East voted for Yanukovych not because they loved him very much, but because the East votes against the West. The West votes similarly. So here we are not talking about liberality and authoritarianism. It’s just that Western Ukraine has a project for transforming Ukraine and establishing Western Ukrainian identity as dominant throughout the entire country, but the East does not have a similar project.

PROFILE: Is the West more passionate than the East?

Miller: Yes, we can say that Western Ukrainian identity is more energetic, consolidated, offensive, aggressive, if you like. If we look at the maps reflecting the events of recent months, this is very noticeable. For example, the seizure of administrations in Western Ukraine is carried out quickly and decisively, this happens much more difficult in the center, and nothing happens at all in the eastern and southern parts of the country. And the map that shows the places of residence of people who died during the Kyiv Maidan tells us that only a few people were from Eastern Ukraine, the rest from Western Ukraine, with the Lviv region absolutely dominating. But the East absolutely does not like the “Western project”. And it’s clear why: Western Ukrainians call Eastern Ukrainians Little Russians, trying to offend them; for them, Eastern Ukrainians are unfinished Ukrainians. And Western Ukraine would like to turn these unfinished eastern Ukrainians into correct ones. But eastern Ukrainians also look at “Westerners” as incorrect Ukrainians, as strangers, as people who take Ukrainian identity to the point of absurdity.

PROFILE: Which option is Ukraine now closer to: the victory of one identity over another, the symbiosis of two identities, or the collapse of the country?

Miller: The victory of one identity over another is possible only at the political level and for a short period of time. At the root level, this dualism cannot be eliminated. The situation of such dualism of identities makes it very difficult to implement a unified policy characteristic of a mononational state. Much depends on who is implanting what identity. For example, the first presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma were engaged in restrained, unhurried Ukrainization. Yushchenko tried to instill Western Ukrainian identity as a single all-Ukrainian one. Hence the glorification of the UPA, the proclamation of Stepan Bandera as a hero, and the Holodomor as genocide of Ukrainians. But in doing so, he prepared the reaction - the coming to power of Yanukovych, who was perceived by many as an alternative to “Westernism.” However, Yanukovych brought the situation to a boil with feckless policies and excessive greed. And now on the agenda - new choice ways. What will it be like? I think that after the recent events, there cannot be a symbiosis of two identities; there is a deep split in the country, mutual distrust and mutual fear: everyone is afraid of the victory of the other.

Miller: Just a few years ago, such a question might have been considered unacceptable. No matter what events happened in Ukraine, no one tried to split it. But over the past year, the threat of partition has increased markedly. Geopolitically and domestic policy It's a zero-sum game, where one side's gain inevitably means the other's loss. Brussels, Moscow, and Washington are to blame for this. A zero-sum game can end in different ways, but the main loser is always known in advance - this is the one who is being played for. Therefore, in this situation, Ukraine will remain a loser in any case. In principle, there is nothing terrible in the split itself, unless you are a Ukrainian nationalist for whom Ukraine is of symbolic value: in place of one state, two arise. Let us remember that at one time the Czech Republic and Slovakia parted on good terms. However, the problem is that for Ukraine there is no obvious mechanism of division, no clear boundaries between the two parts of the country, no experience of federation. Nobody knows how to divide Ukraine. And no one knows what will happen next. But one thing is clear: for Russia to act as the initiator and main driving force of such a division is extremely dangerous, because our relations with the West in this case will suffer greatly, and there will be no gain for us.

PROFILE: Barack Obama recently listed Ukraine separated by commas from Syria. How comparable are these situations?

Miller: Obama said that Putin blocked democratization in Syria and Ukraine, such words are at least incorrect. It is wrong to argue that everything that is happening in Ukraine is a struggle of the people against Yanukovych or the people against the authorities. According to recent polls, 49% of Ukrainians support Maidan and 47% do not support it. At the same time, as I said at the beginning, almost 90% of the Maidan participants are not Kiev residents, but representatives of Western Ukraine. Therefore, to say that the Ukrainian people went against Yanukovych is the same as saying that one half are the people, and the other half are renegades. It’s good if the president’s statement is just a propaganda tool, a game for the public. It is much worse if political solutions are sought based on such premises.

The character of the Polish regime was not democratic. Its main features are authoritarianism with occupational management features. Also, Polish veterans were resettled to Galicia, to whom 12% of all land was transferred over several years.

Journalism often displays nostalgia for the “civilized European world” created by the Polish authorities after the First World War and destroyed by the Soviets in 1939-1941.

It even goes so far as to assert the positive result of Polish domination in the region during 1918-1939, denying its occupational nature, saying that Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia and Western Volyn) was annexed not by Poland, but by the Council of Ambassadors of the League of Nations [ international organization, which arose after the First World War led by the victors - Britain, France, Italy and Japan - IP] in 1923, and the Poles developed cities and ensured economic and cultural development.

Such assertions are reinforced by anecdotes common in Lviv about the “first soviets” who washed their hands in toilets, and the wives of commissars in negligees went to the Opera.

However, the character of the Polish regime was not democratic. Its main features are authoritarianism with occupational management features.

Historians determine the nature of the occupation power according to the following criteria:

— establishing control over territory through military intervention;

- carrying out policies (in the spheres of political, economic, cultural life) on the occupied lands in the interests of the occupation authorities;

— suppression of national uprisings of the local population in the occupied territory by force (creation of operational special forces, use of the regular army, a network of special institutions of the penitentiary system);

— purposeful policy of national assimilation;

— restricting access of residents of the occupied territory to senior government positions;

— deportation of the local population of the occupied territories;

- attracting the local population to serve in the armed forces of the occupying state.

Difference 36th infantry regiment for participation in the “Russian” (i.e. Polish-Ukrainian) war 1918-1919 Photo: www.znak-auction.ru

So, let's consider the situation according to these points.

On November 1, 1918, on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Lviv, a Ukrainian state arose - the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, which on its birthday began a war against the Poles who wanted to take control of Galicia.

The Polish uprising in Lviv received support from the government of the newly created Second Polish Commonwealth and escalated into an interstate war.

This war lasted until the summer of 1919 and ended with the defeat of the Ukrainian Galician Army from the Haller Army [a Polish army of about 80 thousand soldiers, formed on French territory by the efforts of the Entente and the United States for the war against Bolshevik Russia - IP].

After this, the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic went abroad, the UGA retreated beyond the Zbruch to help the Active Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the war with the Bolsheviks, and Polish troops occupied Western Ukraine.

After the Soviet-Polish War in 1921, the League of Nations, following the points of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, made concessions to the Chairman of the Committee of Political Emigration Kostya Levitsky (former head of the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic) and agreed to determine the international legal status of Galicia in 1922.

The talk was about holding a referendum in the region on the issue of its status and about granting political autonomy to the region within Poland. However, in 1923, the Council of Ambassadors approved the eastern border of Poland without a referendum with a proposal to the Polish government to grant autonomy to Galicia, which the latter rejected.

Despite the fact that the status of Western Ukraine within Poland was not determined until 1923, and the region itself was under the protectorate of the League of Nations, the Polish authorities felt like masters here.

Incorporation processes expanded and were accompanied by oppression in all areas of activity.

In 1918 The political autonomy of the region was eliminated - the Galician Regional Sejm and the Regional Vydil (local budget) were abolished.

In the field of education, on August 16, 1919, a ban was introduced on Ukrainian youth who had accepted Polish citizenship but had not served military service in the Polish army from studying at Lviv universities.

In 1920 The Polish authorities conducted an illegitimate census of the population of Western Ukraine with the aim of conscripting Ukrainians in 1921 to serve in the Polish Army.

Since March 1920 The term “Małopolske Wschodne” was introduced into official records and the use of the name Western Ukraine was prohibited.

Also, instead of the ethnonym “Ukrainian”, they introduced the ancient definition from the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - “Rusyn”, “Russki” and “Rusynski”.

In local government, by complicating the election procedure, according to the law of March 23, 1933, the number of Ukrainians was limited.

A ban and restrictions were imposed on the activities of Ukrainian socio-political, cultural, educational and sports organizations and societies: "Plast" was banned in 1928 in Volyn, and in 1930 - in Galicia, the "Sich" society - in 1924, Sokol's activities were limited only to the territory of Galicia.

Numerous pogroms of Prosvita took place during the policy of pacification [literally “appeasement” - IP] of 1930, strict control over the activities was established educational society"Ridna school".

In the system of executive bodies of state power leadership positions occupied exclusively by Poles, and in the legislative bodies of the Polish government (Sejm and Senate), the participation of Ukrainians was hampered by the new Polish constitution of 1935.

Meanwhile, this happened during the conclusion political world between the Polish government and the Ukrainian National Democratic Association [- Ukrainian legal party, the only parliamentary one, its deputies represented the interests of Ukrainians in the Sejm] - the so-called. "normalization" policies.

An extensive system of state police served as a separate means of establishing the occupation regime. To its law enforcement functions, functions of political pressure were added: since 1921, the police investigated political affairs, prepared quarterly reports on the mood of the Ukrainian population, and characterized political and public organizations.

Ukrainian employees were monitored, reports contained information about specific individuals, their national and social origin, membership in political and public organizations and the “degree of danger” they pose to the Polish authorities.

For example, here is what they wrote about a Ukrainian who worked at the Lviv post office in July 1931: “Kostyshin is a Rusyn, held a position in the Ukrainian Rada in 1919 during the Ukrainian war, head of the letters department. Is in contact with Ukrainian organizations. In the pre-war period, he was known as an ardent haidamak [supporter of an independent Ukrainian state - author]. He needs to be retired."

Similar supervision was established even over members of the above-mentioned UNDO.

The position of “confidant” was introduced in the state police - a secret agent whose task was to supply the police with information about anti-state actions.

His work was limited to observing and describing Ukrainian national celebrations, in particular, the Heroes' Holidays (honoring the graves of the Sich Riflemen, accompanied by memorial services and patriotic speeches).

Confidant Skvaretsky recorded on June 11, 1923 the Ukrainian “religious manifestation campaign”, which took place on May 23, 1923.

In this protocol, in addition to a description of the action itself, its participants and a summary of their speeches, there was an assessment of the situation among the Ukrainian public: political views, methods of implementing these views, active and influential Ukrainian organizations.

The agent notes the division of the Ukrainian intelligentsia into two parts.

The first of them is “subject to peaceful coexistence with the Polish community within the Polish state,” and the second part, being much more active, acts towards “creating an independent Ukraine.” The participants in the latter group are predominantly young Ukrainian intellectuals, led by priests.

And already in the 30s, the police moved from protocols and dismissals to decisive actions to disperse peaceful demonstrations with the help of mounted municipal police.

Special departments were created in the state police (2nd and 4th departments), whose task was to suppress protests against the Polish authorities.

The second department, the so-called “two”, was a counterintelligence agent and directed his activities against the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (the “fifth column” of the USSR). Department IV of the Main Commandant's Office of the State Police (Vydział IV Głównej Komendy Policiji Państwowej) - primarily directed investigative activities against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which had the goal of creating an independent Ukrainian state.

It should be noted that in the criminal code of the then Poland there was no concept of a political crime, as it was in the Soviet one (a special part of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR is “counter-revolutionary crimes” with the notorious 54th article). However, internal police documentation used the term “anti-state.”

During arrests, the Polish police were noted for their rudeness and use of physical torture against arrested Ukrainians. In the spring of 1931, the arrested regional leader Stepan Okhrimovich was subjected to investigation and torture. As a result, S. Okhrimovich died from beatings.

Yulian Golovinsky (1894-1930) — regional commandant of the Ukrainian Military organization and commander of the “Flying Brigade” of the UVO (1924-1926), regional leader of the OUN (1930). Photo 1920s yy

But there were also unprecedented cases: in 1930, the arrested Yulian Golovinsky [pictured above], the regional leader of the OUN, was taken by police from Lvov to Bibrki and shot without trial, chained to a tree. Official version: killed while trying to escape.

To protect the Ukrainians, on March 22, 1932, Yuri Berezinsky killed in Lviv Subcommissar Emilian Chekhovsky, the head of the brigade for the fight against anti-state criminals, who was noted for his rude behavior during interrogations and did not hesitate to beat young girls who distributed OUN leaflets.

Since 1919, in Western Ukraine it was introduced state of emergency(constant readiness of the army to suppress uprisings, restrictions on movement, curfew). The security forces were especially active in 1923 - they were preparing to suppress the uprising against the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of the League of Nations.

And in September-November 1930, about 2,000 police officers and several Uhlan squadrons 6- th Corps of the Polish Army.

To conduct legal proceedings in the Polish state, several types of courts were introduced.

Since 1918, there were emergency courts-martial (sąd doraźne), in the terminology of that time they were called “brazen courts” (fast courts).

“Arrogant courts” existed until 1934. They considered cases and rendered verdicts within 12 hours, and an appeal could be filed within 24 hours (in Wielkopolska - within 48).

These courts were given the power to impose death sentences in 1920, and it was precisely this court that sentenced to death in 1932 death penalty through the hanging of Ukrainian nationalists Vasily Bilas and Dmitry Danylyshyn. The appeal was refused.

In general, the Polish justice system was actively involved in political repression in the region: “brazen courts” considered cases against political opponents of the Polish government. Another type of civil courts—district courts—heard cases of “crimes” of the following nature: duplicating and distributing illegal literature or leaflets with anti-Polish content.

To isolate and re-educate “dangerous Ukrainians” from the OUN, a concentration camp for political prisoners was created in 1934 in the town of Bereza-Kartuzka (now the town of Bereza in Belarus).

One of its first prisoners was Dmitry Gritsai, the future UPA general and chief of the UPA Main Military Staff. Among the famous prisoners of the camp were Ivan Klymiv and many others. The concentration camp was planned as temporary (for one year), but the profitability of its existence ensured the activity of the concentration camp until the end of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

To isolate dangerous people, there was a prison-monastery of the Holy Cross (Sventa Krzyz, 1884-1939). Stepan Bandera and Nikolai Lebed were sent here to life imprisonment in 1936.

It is interesting that former militants of the Polish Socialist Party, comrades of Marshal Pilsudski in the revolutionary struggle, will send a telegram to the then President of Poland Moscicki with a request to “pardon in the name of human principles three Ukrainians sentenced to death by an insolent court in Lvov and who in their convictions fought for the will of their people "

Only Zhurakovsky will be pardoned - he will be given 15 years. Bilas and Danylyshyn will be hanged on December 23, 1932, and through the efforts of OUN propagandists they will become icons for the Ukrainian youth of Galicia.

Polish politics also interfered in church affairs, especially in the Kholm region, where the Orthodox Church was widespread. Lacking protection, she became a convenient target.

By 1938, about 150 Orthodox churches were closed and church lands were confiscated. But they built Polish churches.

The intercession of the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Andrey Sheptytsky, who appealed to the Vatican with a demand to stop the Catholicization (= Polonization) of the region, did not help either. Some of the churches that came under the jurisdiction of the UGCC were saved.

Ukrainian education also suffered significant losses. At Lviv University, teaching of Ukrainian studios, which existed during Austrian rule, was abolished. The number of Ukrainian students was limited.

Since the 1930s, an attack on secondary education began - gymnasiums, where the teaching of subjects in Polish language. There was strict supervision over the activities of teachers.

The Polish government carried out active assimilation processes, starting the so-called. policy of siege. Families of Polish military personnel, mainly veterans of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-1919, were sent to Western Ukraine, where they were provided (taking away from the previous owners) land to create colonies with all the social benefits.

These policies created severe social inequality and corruption as Ukrainians in their ethnic lands were oppressed.

In 1938, 35,000 siege farms were created (all in the Ternopil region and Volyn), which owned 12% of all land.

Deportations of Ukrainians were not carried out during this period, but in the 1930s there were sentiments among Polish national democrats to implement such a plan. These intentions were reflected in the secret resolution of the Council of Ministers of March 1939 on the deportation of Ukrainians from ethnic lands in Western Poland.